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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a cross-national qualitative study with the purpose of obtaining 
perspectives held by people with quadriplegia and leading figures in disability 
movements in the Netherlands and Australia on the issues of euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide (EPAS). A disability voice is not prominent in public 
debate on EPAS in Australia or the Netherlands, even though people with disabilities 
are often thought to be vulnerable in relation to EPAS policies. Disability 
perspectives are potentially valuable in illuminating issues in relation to euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide, because issues of dependence, independence, and 
individual autonomy play important roles in relation to both EPAS and to living with 
disability. The study’s methodology uses a phenomenological approach and 
incorporates aspects of heuristics and grounded theory. Its conceptual framework 
incorporates MacIntyre’s (1999) theory of acknowledged dependency and 
vulnerability; Habermas’ (1989) theory of knowledge; and Festinger’s (1959) theory 
of cognitive dissonance. The main sample of twenty people with quadriplegia (the 
grassroots sample) was interviewed in the Netherlands and in Australia. 
Additionally, four leading figures (the leaders sample) in disability movements in 
each country were interviewed, a total of 28 informants. Informants were recruited 
by means of referral from organisations and snow-balling techniques. In-depth, semi-
structured interviews and an inductive data analysis, based on Colaizzi (1978), were 
used. The main finding was that grassroots informants hold views on EPAS similar 
to those of mainstream public opinion. No substantial difference was found between 
countries but there was some difference between the responses of the grassroots and 
leader samples. The grassroots informants’ views on EPAS were characterised by a 
value system that used the socially dominant value of ‘individual autonomy’. These 
views were largely not based on personal experience. Additionally, informants did 
not appear to be well-informed on issues pertinent to EPAS. The study also found 
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that the informants’ disability experience was characterised by an opposing value 
system, that of interdependence. In the interdependence framework informants 
experienced wellbeing and outgrew fundamental issues of human suffering. In the 
individual autonomy framework such issues were referred to an individual’s right to 
choose to have EPAS. Informants felt little cognitive dissonance about this apparent 
difference between their views on EPAS and their experience of suffering, even 
though suffering is common to the experience of living with quadriplegia and to 
individuals’ motivations in desiring EPAS. The significance of this low cognitive 
dissonance in relation to the informants’ views on EPAS was explained using the 
study’s conceptual framework. Various factors may play a role in preventing the 
informants from using their private interdependence values in the way they 
conceptualise their views on the public policy issue of EPAS. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
In this study I present beliefs and assumptions that Dutch and Australian 
people with quadriplegia, as well as some leaders in disability movements, hold 
about euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EPAS). This study is concerned 
with their perspectives on the phenomenon, practice and legalisation of EPAS and 
their possible impacts, including upon people who have disabilities. 
 In this chapter I present the context to this study, including philosophical, 
historical and social aspects; its purpose and significance; my beliefs; and some 
attempts at clarifying key terms. 
1.1.1 A note on disability terminology 
As preferred in the APA Publications Manual (American Psychological 
Association, 2001) I have mostly used the person-first terminology, such as people 
with disabilities to indicate people who have a disability. This terminology reflects 
that the person, the human, is the prime identifying, or defining, subject rather than 
the disability. This way of addressing persons who have disability is also Edith 
Cowan University’s preferred terminology. Sometimes I have also used disabled 
people. I have done this for two reasons. Within the international disability 
movement both terminologies are used: persons with disabilities, for the same reason 
as given above, and disabled people or persons. The second is used in recognition of 
social forces such as physical, human-made barriers, as well as public practices, 
policies and attitudes that exacerbate the disabling experiences of one’s impairment.  
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1.1.2 The Netherlands and Australia 
The Netherlands and Australia have a similar population size although with 
vastly different population densities. The Dutch population stood at almost 16 
million in 2000 with 6.4 per cent growth in the 1990’s (ESWIN, 2002) and for 
Australia at 19.7 million in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2003) with a 1.4 
per cent annual growth rate. Both countries are parliamentary democracies and are 
liberal welfare states. In the Netherlands EPAS has been discussed, tolerated and 
practised for some thirty years and has been enshrined in legislation since 2002. 
Euthanasia was briefly legal in Australia’s Northern Territory during 1996 and 
debate on EPAS has been ongoing to the present. Various Australian States have 
discussed EPAS-enabling Bills in their Parliaments. In neither country has a 
prominent disability voice has been heard about EPAS. 
1.1.3 Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
The sick … they see to with great affection, and let nothing at all pass 
concerning either physic or good diet, whereby they may be restored 
again to their health. Such as the sick of incurable diseases they 
comfort with sitting by them, with talking with them, and, to be short, 
with all manner of helps that may be. But if the disease be not only 
incurable, but also full of continual pain and anguish, then the priests 
and the magistrates exhort the man seeing he is not able to do any 
duty of life, and by overliving his own death is noisome and irksome 
to other and grievous to himself, that he will determine with himself 
no longer to cherish that pestilent and painful disease; and, seeing his 
life is to him but a torment, that will not be unwilling to die, but 
rather, take a good hope to him, and either despatch himself out of 
that painful life, as out of a prison, or a rack of torment, or else suffer 
himself willingly to be rid out of it by other. And in so doing they tell 
him that he shall do so wisely, seeing by his death he shall lose no 
commodity, but end his pain. And because in that act he shall follow 
the counsel of the priests, that is to say, of the interpreters of God’s 
will and pleasure, they shew him that he shall do like a godly and a 
virtuous man. They that thus be persuaded that finish their lives 
willingly, either with hunger, or else die in their sleep without any 
feeling of death. But they cause non be such to die against his will, 
nor they use no less diligence and attendance about him, believing this 
to be an honourable death else he that killeth himself before that the 
priests and the council have allowed the cause of his death, him as 
unworthy either to be buried or with fire to be consumed, they cast 
unburied into some stinking marsh. (More, 1516, pp. 98–99) 
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It is quite striking how Saint (Sir) Thomas More (1516/n.d.), in his satire on 
the ideal State of Utopia, anticipated many of the features of the contemporary EPAS 
debate and of its practices. He highlighted such contemporary features as 
unrelievable, unbearable individual, subjective suffering as a sufficient rationale for a 
voluntary EPAS and the courage required undergoing it. He also pointed to the 
tension between care for an ill person and burden on society, raising the possibility of 
subtle coercion. Indeed thoughts of euthanasia and its rationales are not new. What is 
new is the widespread acceptance of it as a state policy. 
This section discusses some of the historical background to the present public 
demand for EPAS. Kennedy (2002) points out that euthanasia and the law has been 
widely debated in Europe and America from the end of the 19th century. Norway, 
among others, had by then amended her Criminal Law to reduce punishment for 
doctors engageing in euthanasia, and euthanasia had been vigorously debated in 
Germany from that time. The American states of Ohio and Iowa made early attempts 
in the beginning of the 20th century to enact euthanasia legislation. England tried the 
same in the 1930’s and pro-euthanasia societies arose during that time in England 
and America. Eighty per cent of New York physicians were in favour of euthanasia 
in 1939. Much of this effort was based on the pseudo-science of eugenics, first 
formulated by Charles Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton in 1883. Eugenics became 
state ideology which saw the legal toleration of countless people with intellectual 
disability and mental illness being sterilised and support withheld from defective 
newborns in many Western countries (Kliewer & Drake, 1998; Park & Radforth, 
1998; Louter, 1997). In Australia and the Netherlands legally approved eugenic 
practices seem to have been confined to segregating and congregating people with 
disabilities (Louter, 1997; Gillgren, 1996).  
It was in September 1939 that these eugenic developments culminated in a 
secret order, signed by Adolf Hitler, against a background of the Nazi government’s 
eugenic doctrine of a superior Aryan race. This order authorised Aktion T-4, a 
program with a purpose of the killing of people with disabilities. By end 1945 
between 200,000 and 300,000 of them had been killed. The killing had been done by 
medical doctors and psychiatrists, deceptively under the cloak of the very institutions 
that were in place to the supposed benefit of people with disabilities. The 
terminology that was associated with this operation therefore used terms such as final 
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medical assistance and mercy killing (Gallagher, 1995). The grey buses that 
transported people with disabilities to their deaths carried the logo of the ‘Charitable 
Patient Transport Company’. Gallagher, himself using a wheelchair, believes that 
these German doctors acted on feelings that reside in all of us: 
Such things as the profound fear of those who may be different; the 
loathing of the vulnerability of the sick and disabled; the demented 
drive for perfect health, perfect bodies, perfect happiness. (p. xiii) 
Few parents of those who were killed actively objected to the killing of their 
children. In fact a survey in 1920 showed a majority support for mercy killing among 
them (Gallagher, 1995). Among Nazi propaganda was a film called Ich klage an (I 
accuse) where the husband of a woman with multiple sclerosis accused society of 
prolonging his wife’s suffering if euthanasia were not permissible in effecting her 
death with dignity (Gallagher, p. 61). Gallagher (2001) and others (Boyd, 1995; 
Wolfensberger, 1984, 1984a, 1987), including psychologist and WW2 concentration 
camp survivor Viktor Frankl (Hoffmann, 1995), have pointed out various parallels 
between the Nazi and Western societies and drew different conclusions about a 
possible repeat of the Nazi “euthanasia” practice in contemporary society. Gallagher 
(2001) believes that the safeguards provided by the American Constitution would 
prevent its repeat in the USA whereas Boyd, Frankl, and Wolfensberger warn against 
a possible repeat and oppose it. It is beyond this thesis to go into more detail on these 
points. 
The killing of people with disabilities was the precursor to following mass 
genocide of Jews and others. In the late 1960’s and 1970’s euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide again became acceptable issues for public debate in a number of 
Western countries. International abhorrence of the Nazi eugenic “euthanasia” of 
people with disabilities, and genocide of six million Jews and other groups of people 
(Gallagher, 1995; Wolfensberger, 1984) had not produced a taboo on its discussion 
in England and America (Kennedy, 2002). However, in Germany euthanasia 
continues to find a majority public opposition because of the enormities carried out 
under the heading of “euthanasia”. In the later debate, this history was often invoked 
to raise a slippery slope objection to euthanasia, to which others responded that 
Hitler’s euthanasia program, unlike present motivations for EPAS, had nothing to do 
with compassion or mercy (Sneiderman, Irvine & Osborne, 1995). However 
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“compassion” and “mercy” were frequently and publicly used by the Nazis to justify 
their euthanasia campaign (Gallagher, 1995).  
Contemporary moves to allow “euthanasia” occur against a background of a 
combination of a greater emphasis on individual (patient) rights, choice and self 
determination; growing secularisation, individualism and technological 
developments in medical practices, which acquired powers to extend life beyond 
points considered acceptable by patients (Callahan & Hanson, 1998; Callahan, 1994; 
Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Mann, 1998). Nowadays people have greater 
expectations of medical technology’s ability to extend life (Cassell, 1975). Medicine 
has removed many straightforward causes of death but its success has also resulted in 
most remaining causes of death becoming more drawn out, unpleasant and 
undignified dying experiences (Griffith, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Mann, 1998).  
The international pro-euthanasia movement’s profile was raised by a number 
of prominent legal cases about rights to refuse treatment, drawing the public’s 
attention to the paradox of impressive medical abilities on the one hand and the 
doubtful quality of life that could be enabled by it on the other. Two such high-
profile legal cases in the USA were that of Karen Ann Quinlan in 1976 and Nancy 
Cruzan in 1987, who were both in persistent vegetative states, kept alive by feeding 
tube and respirator. In a number of other legal actions litigants sought to establish a 
disabled individual’s right to end one’s life for reason of unbearable suffering arising 
from their disability. In 1993, Canadian Sue Rodriguez, a woman with amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), was unsuccessful in establishing a right for her to operate a 
intravenous drip in order to kill herself when she judged the time had come that her 
life was no longer worth living. Stating the familiar theme of self-determination and 
choice in the EPAS debate, she said at her petition hearing at the British Columbia 
Supreme Court: “I want to be in charge of my life and my death. I feel it’s a choice 
that I’ve made for myself, and I would like to be the one that does, you know, the 
final deed” (Sneiderman, Irvine & Osborne, 1995, p. 565). Four months after the 
judgment she killed herself, apparently with the illegal assistance of a physician.  
Countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, 
continue to witness a high public interest in euthanasia. Oregon narrowly accepted 
physician-assisted suicide in a public referendum in 1994. In the UK the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (House of Lords, 1993–1994) rejected 
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the legalisation of euthanasia. So did some landmark US Supreme Court decisions 
(Washington vs. Glucksberg; Vacco vs. Quill, 1997) and the New York State 
Taskforce on Life and the Law (New York State Task Force, 1994) and the Canadian 
Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia (Senate of Canada, 1995). Oregon, an 
American state, narrowly accepted physician-assisted suicide in a public referendum 
in 1994 and Belgium adopted euthanasia legislation in 2002. The New Zealand 
Parliament is debating euthanasia Bill in 2003. 
1.1.4 The Dutch context 
As in the international debate (Callahan & Hanson, 1998; Callahan, 1994), 
the Dutch euthanasia debate in the late 1960’s also largely came about as a result of 
techno-medical pressures within a climate of increasing patient rights and 
secularisation. The Dutch had their own version of the Cruzan and Quinlan cases 
about withdrawal of treatment in the case of Mia Versluis in 1967, who was 
unconscious, brain damaged and kept alive by a respirator. This prompted a public 
questioning of medical powers and the kind of life that should be maintained by it 
(Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998). The Dutch Penal Code of 1881 prohibited 
euthanasia as a criminal offence, and still does. But there was also a Dutch feeling 
that in a time of rapid social changes, the 1960’s and 1970’s, it was an inherently 
good thing to break through taboos, euthanasia being one of them. Together with a 
distinctive Dutch pragmatism, which is built on discussion and consensus, the Dutch 
attach value to bespreekbaarheid, that is the ability to talk about an issue openly. But 
bespreekbaarheid means more than that. It implies, by discussing it, the break-
through of a taboo, which ought to be allowed in practice (Kennedy, 2002). Ten 
Have (1998) has suggested that the Dutch talk much about EPAS, in contrast to other 
cultures, in order to overcome a cognitive dissonance. This cognitive dissonance is 
caused by a discrepancy between an ideal of overcoming suffering in the private act 
of medical killing and its practice which is less than ideal: “We try to overcome the 
gap between what we do in practice and what we say we do. … To do otherwise is to 
dissimilate” (p. 218). The Dutch discussion began in earnest in 1969 with the 
publication of an influential book by J.H. van den Berg, called “Medische macht en 
medische ethiek “(“Medical power and medical ethics”), which highlighted the 
medical powers to keep people alive beyond points that were acceptable to them 
 6
(Kennedy 2002; Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998, p. 49). Reflecting trends across the 
Western world, two strong influences in “getting euthanasia onto the [Dutch] 
agenda” (p. 49) were present. The first was a cultural change characterised by 
secularization, individualization and democratisation, and the second the medical-
technological change (Griffiths, et al., 1998). Dutch palliative doctors Zylics 
(Enklaar, 1999) and ten Have (1998) have also described such factors in debating 
EPAS. 
The first Dutch Court case about euthanasia occurred in 1973. A physician, 
doctor Postma, killed her elderly, partially deaf, wheelchair-using mother by lethal 
injection, upon her mother’s repeated requests to do so. This roused much public 
sympathy and other doctors came forward to confess similar actions. The Court 
imposed a light sentence on the physician, one week suspended imprisonment and a 
year’s probation (Thomasma et al., 1998). This set in train a series of trials, with 
courts progressively defining euthanasia and developing guidelines for its practice. 
Landmark trials over the next decades gradually widened criteria under which EPAS 
could be conducted. The 1984 matters of Schoonheim and Pols brought legal 
acceptance of the defence of the Dutch medical doctrine of force majeure or 
necessity. This means that, in the doctor’s defence of her act of medical killing, there 
had not been any other alternative open to the doctor than to kill, given the patient’s 
overwhelming need for medical attention in circumstances of unbearable suffering 
and their request to die (Griffiths). In 1985 the Admiraal1 case resulted in legal 
acceptance of a defence of careful practice, meaning the doctor’s careful weighing up 
the decision to commit EPAS in consultation with colleagues. In this matter 
Admiraal performed euthanasia on a non-terminally ill woman who was suffering 
from her multiple sclerosis: “life was nothing but torture to her, mainly because of 
her complete dependency on others” (Griffiths, p. 66). In 1994 the Chabot case 
established the legality of euthanasia in the presence of non-somatic suffering. 
Psychiatrist Chabot was convicted of the offence of assisted suicide as a second, 
independent physician had not examined the patient, even though Chabot had 
consulted other colleagues. The case involved a woman who persistently requested 
assisted death. She was not terminally ill but was suffering as a result of multiple 
                                                 
1 Pieter Admiraal, a Dutch anaesthetist, has been a leading figure in the Dutch pro-euthanasia 
movement for many years. 
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close family deaths and marital break-up and no longer wanted to live. She was 
susceptible to psychiatric treatment but consistently refused it. The Court observed 
that the physician’s defence of force-majeure, or necessity, in this matter was well 
founded but could not be proved for lack of a legally required, second consultant. It 
agreed with a lower Court’s judgement “that the wish to die of a person whose 
suffering is psychic can be based on a autonomous judgement”. The physician 
received no punishment from the Court (Griffiths, pp. 80–82; Klozko & Chabot, 
1998). More recently the Sutorius case temporarily stretched the concept of 
unbearable suffering as a legitimation for EPAS. A Dutch District Court ruled in 
2000 that the tiredness of life, which elderly senator Brongersma said had robbed 
him from enjoyment of life, was a sufficient reason for the act of physician-assisted 
suicide that killed him (Rechtspraak.nl, n.d.). The Dutch High Court rejected the 
ruling in 2002 but it remains unclear what the difference is between allowable non-
somatic suffering and the disqualified tiredness of life. In view of the findings of one 
of the major Dutch evaluation studies on EPAS (van der Maas, van Delden, & 
Pijnenborg, 1991), which was that 23 per cent of people cited tiredness of life as a 
reason to have EPAS, this judgement is not likely to be the last word on this matter. 
The Prins and Kadijk cases, both heard in 1995, established the legality of euthanasia 
for “severely defective new-born babies” without an explicit request. This was 
permissible only in the face of unbearable and hopeless suffering in absence of the 
availability of other treatment; decision-making according to careful practice 
guidelines; the doctor having acted in a medically sound manner; and there having 
been a repeated request from the babies’ parents (Griffiths, p. 83).  
These legally accepted processes and increasing public acceptance of EPAS, 
with significant involvement of the Dutch Medical Association KNMG, and Dutch 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society (NVVE), culminated in the “Wet toetsing 
levensbeeindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding” of 2001 or “Termination of life 
on request and assisted suicide (Review Procedures) Act”. The central point of law 
upon which the Dutch EPAS approach rests is that of force majeure. If a physician 
committing EPAS reports the case as EPAS and has been found to have followed the 
guidelines laid down in the Act by a government EPAS monitoring committee she 
will not be prosecuted.  
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1.1.5 EPAS in practice  
Until the advent of legalised EPAS, the Supreme Court guidelines, developed 
by the Dutch Medical Association, provided the criteria for whether an act of EPAS 
was legal. These guidelines have been adopted in the 2001 law and require the doctor 
to fulfil them so that the Penal Code is not breached. They are: 
a.) to be convinced of a voluntary and well considered request from the 
patient,  
b.) to be convinced of the presence of unbearable suffering without prospect 
of recovery,  
c.) to have informed the patient about the situation they are in and their 
medical prospects,  
d.) to have come to a joint conclusion with the patient that for this situation 
there is no reasonable alternative solution,  
e.) to have consulted at least one independent doctor who has seen the patient 
and has given his written opinion about the doctor’s adherence to the 
guidelines a.) to d.), and 
f.) to have medically carried out the ending of life or assisted suicide in a 
conscientious (medically careful) manner. 
Notably the law allows for EPAS of children between the ages of twelve and 
sixteen, with parental consent. From sixteen years of age they do not need parental 
consent. The law contains provision for an advance directive about desired end-of-
life actions in the event of future incompetence.  
In the spirit of openness and bespreekbaarheid, the Dutch government 
commissioned various reports about the practice of its EPAS policy, the Remmelink 
Reports of 1990 and 1995 with a third report underway currently. The first report of 
1990 found that 1.7 per cent (2300) of all deaths were by means of euthanasia and 
0.3 per cent (400) through physician-assisted suicide. Thirty eight per cent of all 
deaths involved a medical decision, of which about 17.9 per cent involved 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment and in another 18 per cent treatment for pain 
contributed to death. Doctors reported 18 per cent (484 cases) of the deaths estimated 
to have been caused by EPAS in 1990. In the case of 0.8 per cent (1000 cases) of all 
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deaths EPAS occurred without a request from the patient, 53 per cent of whom were 
no longer able to indicate their wishes. These were described as mostly seriously ill 
and dying people whose lives were shortened by hours to a few days. Doctors 
refused two thirds of all requests for EPAS. In 1995 the percentages had gone up to 
2.4 per cent (3200) for euthanasia and remained at 400 for physician-assisted suicide. 
Doctors now reported forty one per cent of EPAS deaths and two thirds of requests 
were still refused. Deaths by EPAS without request were now 0.7 per cent (900), and 
79 per cent of these were now said to no longer be able to indicate their wishes. 
Deaths from withdrawal or withholding of treatment had increased to 20.2 per cent. 
(van der Maas, van Delden & Pijnenborg, 1991). 
In 1998, regional committees (Toetsingscommissies) were established to 
receive all reported deaths by EPAS from the involved physicians and to check the 
rigour of adherence to the guidelines. If dissatisfied the committee can refer the case 
for legal prosecution. These committees are made up of at least a lawyer, a medical 
practitioner and an ethicist. The new EPAS law of 2001 retained these committees 
and guidelines. The coroner reports to the regional Toetsings Committees who make 
a recommendation to the College of Public Prosecutors and the regional Inspector for 
Health. Physicians who have complied with all the guidelines and who have reported 
the act of EPAS to the coroner are not punishable. Where the guidelines have been 
breached the Prosecutor will undertake further investigation and eventual 
prosecution. The Committees deliver an annual Ministerial report of their activities. 
They report on the number of cases, their nature and the committees’ judgements 
(Wet Toetsing Levensbeeindiging op Verzoek, 2001). 
Various authors have claimed that EPAS in practice is problematic. Equally 
so, others claim that these are not necessarily serious issues. It is beyond this thesis to 
debate these claims but it is relevant to understand the types of controversy that have 
accompanied EPAS and its practice. Arguments against EPAS in the Netherlands 
often involve an assertion of a slippery slope affecting the most vulnerable, the aged 
and disabled (Keown, 1995; Pollard 1994). Critics point to the fact that respectively 
only 18 per cent and 41 per cent of physicians reported their acts of EPAS in 1990 
(Van der Maas, van Delden, & Pijnenborg, 1991) and 1995 (Van der Wal & van der 
Maas, 1996); there are a reported 1000 cases of non-voluntary euthanasia; and the 
use of EPAS where palliative care could have been used, all contravening the 
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guidelines (Jochemsen & Keown, 1999; 1999a). A slippery slope has also been 
detected in the widening of the criteria that constitute suffering as sufficient to allow 
EPAS. Hendin (1997) has argued that it is impossible to devise workable guidelines 
as safeguards for EPAS because “they fail to address the inter-active nature of the 
decision-making process that is at the heart of euthanasia and its abuse” (p. 1491). 
This argument seems supported by the Australian findings of Waddell, Clarnette, 
Smith, Oldham & Kellehear (1996) who found that treatment decisions at end of life 
were more significantly determined by the doctor’s individual characteristics, their 
medical training and socio-demographic background, than by the nature of the 
medical problem. Others (DiPasquale and Gluck, 2001; Pool, 1996) reflect similar 
findings among American psychologists and psychiatrists and Dutch medical 
hospital professionals. A lack of palliative care predisposes people towards EPAS, 
Dutch physicians know little about palliative care practices (Enklaar, 1999). In the 
case of some 1000 patients whose lives are ended without their request, 21 per cent 
in 1995 and 37 per cent in 1990 were competent. In these cases consultants were who 
are legally required to give a second opinion in cases of proposed EPAS, were almost 
never involved (Hendin, 1999). Consultants have been found to be inexperienced in 
end of life issues. In 12 per cent of EPAS cases a consultant did not see the patient, 
they: “basically functioned in a pro forma way, asking questions to confirm that the 
patient wished to go forward with euthanasia”(Hendin. p. 351). This led Hendin to 
conclude that “this probably reflects the view frequently expressed to me by Dutch 
physicians that the consultations were for the purpose of meeting legal requirements 
(Hendin, 1999, p. 351). Many doctors consulted for each others, thus removing the 
independent nature of a second opinion (Onwuteaka-Philipsen, van der Wal, 
Kostense, & van der Maas, 1999). To overcome such problems the Dutch Medical 
Association (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot bevordering der 
Geneeskunde) started a program, named SCEN (Steun en Consultatie bij Euthanasie 
in Nederland) which trains doctors as independent euthanasia consultants in giving 
an assessment of a patient’s competence and nature of their suffering (“Landelijke 
dekking SCEN”, 2003). Some instances of clinical problems were found where 
intended PAS ended up as euthanasia because the patient could not complete the 
suicide for various reasons (Groenewoud, van der Heide, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 
Willems, van der Maas, & van der Wal, 2000). These are obviously stressful 
situations, not conducive to a dignified death. Forty two per cent of physicians who 
 11
had performed EPAS reported feelings of discomfort but ninety-five per cent of 
respondents said that they were willing to perform EPAS again (Haverkate, van der 
Heide, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, van der Maas, & van der Wal, 2001). Some EPAS 
occurred outside medical purview. Psychiatrist Chabot, in researching his book 
“Sterfwerk” (“Dying work”), found that non-medical volunteers from the Dutch 
national euthanasia society, the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Vrijwillige Euthanasie 
(NVVE) and another, De Einder, sometimes directly assisted with suicide (“Cognac, 
een bakje vla”, 2001). Doctors have felt the reporting procedure to be burdensome. 
Others have argued that the practice of EPAS has not led to abuse, noting 
only a slight increase in EPAS cases between the two major government evaluations 
of 1990 and 1995, most being cancer patients (van der Maas, van der Wal, 
Haverkate, de Carmen, Graaff, Kester, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, van der Heide, Bosma, 
and Willems, 1997). The Dutch have engaged in open discussion and monitoring of 
EPAS through government-sponsored reports and problems such as a low level of 
reporting EPAS will be overcome in time (Griffith, Bood & Weyers, 1998). The 
1995 study concluded that “substantial progress” had been made in the “oversight of 
physician-assisted death in the Netherlands” (p. 1706) (van der Wal, van der Maas, 
Bosma, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Willems, Haverkate & Kostense, 1996). Government-
sponsored Dutch evaluation studies, held in 1990 (Van der Wal & van der Maas, 
1996) and 1995 (Van der Maas, van Delden, & Pijnenborg, 1991) saw an increase in 
doctors’ reporting EPAS from 18 to 41 per cent. Griffith (1998a) suggests therefore 
that the Dutch may be “clambering up” a slippery slope (p. 94). More recent 
information appears to cast doubt upon this positive concept of the slippery slope. 
Since the passing of the Dutch euthanasia legislation in 2001 doctors’ reporting of 
euthanasia has dropped by 8 per cent. An anonymous survey among 355 Dutch lung 
specialists found that the reasons are that doctors do not like the official euthanasia 
procedure nor its reporting requirements which are experienced as too onerous. As a 
result “euthanasia” was more often performed by means of inducement of ‘terminal 
sedation’ and subsequent withdrawal of food and fluids (“Artsen: illegale 
euthanasie”, 2003). Further arguments for EPAS include that the procedure is 
voluntary for patients and for doctors, no-one is forced to have it or perform it and 
that the high public support of EPAS shows that the law is grounded in the moral 
norms and values in society, as it should (Griffith, Bood & Weyers; Kimsma & van 
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Leeuwen, 1998). Kimsma & van Leeuwen agree that, in 1998, several important 
matters were outstanding, deserving attention by the Dutch. These included firstly 
the relationship between terminal disease, depression and requests for EPAS because 
of emphasis on the voluntariness of EPAS; secondly not enough was known about 
the relationship between palliative care and requests for EPAS; and thirdly there was 
an absence of common procedures to implement living wills. 
1.1.6 The Australian context 
The Australian background to EPAS shares the underlying issues that drive 
the Dutch debate: “intense individualism” (Somerville, 2000, p. 121), secularisation 
and “technical determinism and bureaucratic processes which characterise modern 
medicine” (Magnusson, 2002, pp. 36–37). To these Somerville adds consumerism, 
individual and societal fears of death and a media which has contributed to the 
acceptance of euthanasia (pp. 122–128). 
Euthanasia remains illegal in Australia. But various studies have claimed 
levels of its illegal practice. Between 12.3 per cent and 28 per cent of surveyed 
samples of physicians (Kuhse & Singer; Stevens & Hassan, 1994; Baume & 
O’Malley, cited in Magnusson, 2002, pp. 39–40) were found to have illegally ended 
patients’ lives. In one study of nurses’ practices 85 per cent of them had complied 
with requests from patients to end their lives (Kuhse & Singer, cited in Magnusson, 
2002, p. 39). Paradoxically, Kuhse, Singer, Baume, Clark and Rickard (1997) 
identified a higher incidence of EPAS in Australia than is found in the Netherlands. 
They found a 1.8per cent per cent Australian level of euthanasia, which included 0.1 
per cent rate of physician-assisted suicide. In 30 per cent of all Australian deaths, 
doctors made end-of-life decisions “with the explicit intention of ending the patient's 
life, of which 4per cent were in response to a direct request from the patient”. The 
authors concluded that Australia’s rate of intentional ending of life without the 
patient's request was higher than that in the Netherlands and that the law had not 
prevented this. Possible explanations for these results included the survey 
respondents’ inaccurate knowledge of the definition of euthanasia; and a still low 
level of medical knowledge of palliative care (Ashby, 1997; Report Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, 1998). Van der Weyden (1997) gives three possible reactions to 
Singer and Kuhse’s study. Firstly, EPAS proponents will say that regulation by law 
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and guidelines is the correct response and point to the Dutch studies to say that there 
is no justified fear of a slippery slope. Secondly, opponents will be alarmed at the 
existing slippery slope and call for more palliative care responses (Ashby) while 
pointing to the crudeness of law as a tool to alleviate suffering during the complex 
process of dying. A third, neutral position, would be to point to how little is known 
about dying in Australia and call for further studies and physician training. 
Magnusson (2002) also found a presence of illegal end of life practices among 
Australian physicians, other professionals and paramedical staff. 
Parliamentary inquiries into legalisation of euthanasia have been held in most 
Australian States and Territories. These include the Australian Capital Territory, 
Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, the Northern Territory, New South Wales 
and South Australia. The issue of EPAS is currently before the South Australian 
government for the second time and a voluntary euthanasia Bill has been introduced 
in the Western Australian Parliament. Only in the Northern Territory has euthanasia 
been legislated, be it briefly, between July 1996 and March 1997. This legislation 
was the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (ROTI) of 1995. It was over-ridden by the 
Commonwealth Government’s Euthanasia Laws Act 1997. The ROTI Act allowed a 
terminally ill (in absence of medical treatment acceptable to the patient), competent 
adult to be killed by a medical practitioner after examination by at least two doctors 
(Parliament of South Australia, 1999). Under the Act’s provisions seven people died, 
all of whom had cancer and all but one of whom were terminally ill (Kissane, Street, 
Nitschke, 1998). Meanwhile, despite absence of high profile legal cases that 
propelled euthanasia and assisted suicide issues to the forefront in other countries, 
these issues do remain much in the news. A number of recent, publicised suicides 
have occurred, such as those of Mrs. Nancy Crick and others, in which Dr. Philip 
Nitschke was involved (“Nitschke’s absence deliberate”, 2002). Dr. Philip Nitschke, 
a high profile supporter of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995), facilitated the 
deaths of four patients by prescribing them lethal drugs, during the period of 
existence of the ROTI Act (Kissane, Street, Nitschke). In 1999 he was reportedly 
claiming to have helped 60 people to die (Euthanasia Clinic (News), 1999). He 
continues to be the single most visible pro-EPAS activist in Australia. He conducts 
regular workshops for those who want to explore ending their lives (Leipoldt, 2002). 
He has more recently, through his “EXIT Australia” organisation promoted suicide 
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aids such as plastic bags (“Exit bag”, 2002) and de-breathing devices (“Nitschke 
suicide device out”, 2002) as part of a civil disobedience campaign (“Nitschke: 
Right-to-die civil disobedience”, 2002) towards achieving legal EPAS. The 
popularity of the EPAS issue in Australia is perhaps reflected in Dr. Nitschke’s 
winning of 9 per cent of the vote in the 1998 Federal election, when he stood as a 
candidate, against the Minister who was responsible for successfully challenging the 
ROTI Act (“Nitschke gains 9 per cent”).  
In conclusion, the Australian EPAS debate contains three driving forces of 
liberal individualism, secularisation and the effects of an overly techno-medical 
approach to care. EPAS remains illegal in Australia even though it has been reported 
to be practiced at levels comparable to the Dutch legal practice. Continuing efforts to 
see it legalised are substantial despite controversy surrounding the Dutch record of 
legally tolerated EPAS.  
1.1.7 Public support for EPAS 
Arguments in support of legal EPAS often claim high levels of public 
support. Public support for the principle and practice of EPAS is high in the 
Netherlands, with percentages as high as 92 per cent of the Dutch public in favour 
(“Overgrote meerderheid”, 1998) having risen from 52 per cent in 1966 (Griffiths, 
Bood & Weyers, 1998). In Australia public support for legalised EPAS stood at 78 
per cent in 1995 (Morgan Gallup, 1995), whereas this was 47 per cent in 1962 
(Walsh, 1996). This matches growing support in the USA (Benson, 1999; DeCesare, 
2000), Germany (Glass, 2000), Canada (Edwards & Mazzuca, 1999) and Britain 
(O’Neill Feenan, Hughes, & McAlister, 2002).  
Many surveys have been conducted to ascertain physicians’ support for 
EPAS as well as that of nurses and allied health care workers. For example, 
Portenoy, Coyle, Kash, Brescia, Scanlon, O’Hare, Misbin, Holland, et al., (1997) 
found a variance from five per cent to 70 per cent support in various surveys among 
physicians about their support for E or PAS whereas they saw a “near-even split” in 
support of EPAS among physicians and oncology nurses in “the most credible” 
surveys (p. 278). Definitional issues, types of questions asked and closeness to the 
dying experience influence survey results and their interpretation. In addition, factors 
such as the doctors’ medical training, socio-demographics and patients’ wishes 
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affected end of life decision-making. Generally such details are not present in 
attitudinal surveys (Waddell, Clarnette, Smith, Oldham & Kellehear, 1996). 
Hassan (1996) reported on consistent medical professionals’ support for 
EPAS, in surveys conducted in Australia and overseas. As Braun and Kayashima 
(2001) also found in reviewing such surveys, the majority of them appear to reflect a 
lower level of support of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. However the 
level of their support appears generally lower than that of the general public. For 
example, in a survey of American oncologists, patients and the public, less than half 
of the oncologists were found to support euthanasia and only 23 per cent supported 
physician-assisted suicide in case of intractable pain. However two-thirds of patients 
and the public supported both (Ezekiel, Emanuel, Fairclough, Daniels, & Clarridge, 
1996). In another survey thirty-six per cent of American physicians said that they 
would prescribe medications for suicide if it were legal to do so (Meier, Emmons, 
Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison, & Cassel, 1998). In 1988, 60 per cent of surveyed 
Australian physicians believed that EPAS should be legalised (Kuhse, & Singer, 
1988). But Waddell, Clarnette, Smith, Oldham & Kellehear, (1996) reported only a 
small proportion of Australian doctors in favour, if the questions asked involved 
palliative care options. Indeed, an analysis of the determinants of willingness to 
endorse assisted suicide among 1, 137 US physicians, nurses and social workers 
found that the greater the experience with people with advanced medical illness, the 
less willingness there is to endorse assisted suicide. Doctors were less inclined to 
endorse it than social workers and those doctors who worked with terminally ill 
people were less willing to endorse PAS than doctors who were not. Professional 
burn-out and a lower knowledge of pain management was associated with a higher 
willingness to endorse PAS (Portenoy, et al., 1997). Furthermore, based on a review 
of diminished distance to death (the closer one moves to one’s end of life or the 
physician in possibly giving assistance to die, the less support for EPAS) and lack of 
knowledge of circumstances of dying have been identified as factors in decreasing 
support for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (Braun & Kayashima, 2001). 
Religious adherence is an additional factor and is associated with physicians’ 
reduced willingness to endorse EPAS (Bachman, Alcser, Doukas, Lichtenstein, 
Corning, & Brody, 1996; Portenoy, et al., 1997; van der Maas, van Delden, 
Pijnenborg, 1991; Shapiro, R.S., Derse, A.R., Gottlieb, M., Schiedermayer, D., & 
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Olson, M., 1994). If active participation in EPAS can be seen as an indicator of 
support for the practice and legalisation of it, the following figures are of interest. 
Fifty three per cent of Dutch physicians have performed EPAS (Douglas, Kerridge, 
Rainbird, McPhee, Hancock, & Spigelman, 2001). Douglas et al., also report on 
other studies in countries where EPAS is prohibited. In response to specific requests 
for EPAS doctors have performed medically assisted deaths at consistent levels of 
between 3 and 6 per cent in the US, 7 per cent in Denmark, 8 per cent in the UK and 
between 2.2 and twelve per cent in Australia.  
Polls and surveys are often quoted in support of EPAS but have been found to 
be a poor indicator of true levels of informed support (Annas, 1994; Shertz & 
Blendon, 1993). Issues such as uncertainty of definitional aspects (Aranda and 
O’Connor, 1995; Emanuel, Fairclough, Daniels, & Clarridge, 1996; Meier, Emmons, 
Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison, & Cassell, 1998) and biased phrasing of questions 
(Bachman et al., 1996; Jansz, 1996; Morgan, 1996) play a role. Additionally, an 
identified low public awareness of the nature and practice of palliative care in 
Australia (Webster & Kristjanson, 2002) and in the Netherlands (Enklaar, 1999) 
could be expected to influence survey outcomes that inquire into public support for 
EPAS. Likewise, the Dutch public is said to have a low understanding of, and to hold 
a certain indifference towards, their country’s regulatory policies and practices on 
EPAS (Kennedy, 2002, p. 10; Gomez, 1991). This literature appears to confirm the 
complexity of EPAS issues and unreliability of interpreting survey figures into 
unqualified support for EPAS. Further complications in interpreting survey data are 
represented by McNamara’s (2001) findings that people are more likely to agree with 
the principle of euthanasia than to envisage themselves asking for assistance in 
ending their own lives (p. 21). Responses may also depend upon the respondent’s 
closeness to a situation of dying. In response to the statement: “the law should allow 
doctors to comply with the wishes of a dying patient in severe distress who asks to 
have his or her life ended” regular US Harris Polls show that most adults support a 
right to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. A 61 to 34 per cent majority of 
Oregonians would support a law that covered physician-assisted suicide and 
euthanasia (Harris Poll, 2002). Such support has to be qualified by Chochinov et al’s 
(1997) finding that less than ten per cent of terminally ill patients ask for death. 
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1.1.8 Summary 
This brief survey of the history of the EPAS debate shows that much of the 
contemporary EPAS debate and practice has its origin in international debate and 
eugenic developments dating from the early nineteenth century. Modern rationales 
for EPAS occur in a secular social context and include high emphasis on individual 
rights for choice; and a highly technical medical environment, which can facilitate 
prolonged life but which may not be considered bearable. These circumstances have 
contributed to a call for a legalised death with dignity through EPAS. Internationally 
and in the Netherlands public cases involving withdrawal of life-support enlivened 
the EPAS discussion. In the nineteen sixties and seventies the Dutch climate of social 
change, involving greater individual expressiveness and tolerance, and a drive to 
publicly discuss formally taboo social issues (bespreekbaarheid), contributed to 
greater acceptance of EPAS. A Dutch governmental policy of tolerance towards the 
practice of EPAS, within an evolving framework of guidelines, and monitored with 
two evaluations, led to legalisation of the practice in 2002. Australia briefly 
experienced legal EPAS in its Northern Territory in 1995. It has seen numerous 
efforts in State and Territory legislatures to make EPAS legal. Such efforts as well as 
acts of public activism are ongoing. An Australian public debate on EPAS is 
continually stimulated by these efforts although it does not appear to be driven by the 
Dutch bespreekbaarheid. The Australian and Dutch debates share the underlying 
issues of secularisation, individual rights to choice and dual impacts of techno-
medical practice. Many authors have criticised the Dutch EPAS practice and many 
have defended it, providing an ongoing controversial environment in which practice 
and debate occur. A consistent and growing public majority support for EPAS exists 
in many countries. The support of health care workers is generally lower than the 
public’s. Responses to such surveys are dependent on a number of factors, including 
personal religious orientation, training, and the level of knowledge of the issues and 
closeness to the experience of dying. Whereas such polls are often used to defend 
EPAS a closer examination reveals that the issue is more complex than often 
portrayed. 
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1.1.9 The social position of people with disabilities and EPAS. 
It is important to know something about the social position of people with 
disabilities to understand the importance of their perspectives on EPAS. Among 
today’s people who have disabilities many are known to have a heightened 
vulnerability to abuse, neglect, isolation and discrimination and are disadvantaged, 
oppressed, stigmatised and devalued (Cocks, 1994; Cocks & Duffy, 1993; Cross & 
Zeni, 1993; Goffmann, 1963; Kliewer & Drake, 1998; Sobsey, 1994, 1994a; 
Wolfensberger, 1987, 1998). They are frequently seen and treated as devalued people 
(Wolfensberger, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1998).  
Society’s responses to vulnerable people with disabilities have varied through 
the ages. They were included in community, sometimes marginalised and sometimes 
killed. For instance, Braddock & Parish (2001) tell of evidence of some Neanderthal 
people with disabilities having been part of their society. Ancient Greek people with 
disability “were integral to the society” (Edwards, cited in Braddock and Parish, p. 
16) and were offered some public support when they could not earn a living due to 
their impairment. Hospices for blind persons existed in the fourth to sixth centuries 
AD in Turkey, Syria and France. A Belgian town in the 13th century organised the 
care of people with mental illness within their family settings. On the other hand 
ancient Greeks and Romans practised some infanticide for economic reasons. The 
Spartans killed all disabled newborns regardless of economics. During the Middle 
Ages intellectual and mental disability as well as epilepsy were seen as caused by 
demonic possession and many such people were killed as witches. The 
Enlightenment, beginning in the seventeenth century, begat the first educational and 
psychological approaches towards people with disability, based on the beliefs the 
experience and reason could be employed to improve humans and society. This 
development included the emergence of charitable hospitals and asylums, which 
began a Western history of institutionalisation of people with disabilities. Later, the 
Enlightenment’s beliefs about improvement combined with the emergence of social 
Darwinism were also expressed in the German eugenics movement as elsewhere and 
remain current (Gallagher, 1995).  
… as prevalent as ever – are the beliefs that the pursuit of “progress” 
(Gallagher’s quotation marks) can serve as justification of mass 
killings (p. xvii). 
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This eugenics movement resulted in widespread refusal by physicians to treat newly 
born infants with disabilities. They thereby facilitated their deaths and the 
sterilisation of many thousands of people with intellectual and mental disabilities. 
Such sterilisation for eugenic reasons was performed in many Western countries. 
Nazi Germany used the Californian sterilisation program as a model for its own 
eugenic sterilisation law, with eugenics culminating the Nazi German euthanasia 
program for people with disabilities (Braddock & Parish, p. 40; Gallagher).  
Abuse of people with disabilities is pervasive and persistent as Sobsey 
(1994), who leads the world’s leading international research centre on violence and 
abuse of people with disabilities, describes.  
In spite of the United Nation’s noble objectives, violence, sexual 
abuse and neglect of children and adults with disabilities continues 
throughout the world. For example, in Malaysia, adolescents with 
disability are spending their lives tied down to beds. In Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, children with mental retardation are being 
kidnapped to sell their vital organs to affluent buyers. People who 
commit offences against people with mental retardation in Germany 
and Spain are receiving reduced penalties because their victims are 
viewed as incapable of suffering…. The US and UK report cases of 
people with disabilities being denied proper legal representation and 
convicted of crimes that they did not commit. Institutional abuse and 
neglect continues to be reported from Albania, Australia, Belgium, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Greece, Jamaica and many 
others. Studies from many countries (eg, US, UK, Australia2) suggest 
that child abuse, beatings and rape are common occurrences in the 
lives of many, probably most, people with developmental disabilities. 
(Sobsey, 1994, p. 3) 
The Dutch found it necessary to introduce two Bills in their Parliament in 2001 to 
safeguard the position of citizens with disabilities. One makes it illegal to insult 
people with disabilities or incite hatred or violence for reasons of disability or 
chronic illness. The other attempts to ensure equal treatment of people with 
disabilities in terms of employment, training and sports (CG Raad, 2001). The 
Australian Disability Discrimination Act was proclaimed in 1993 in recognition of 
many disadvantages to people with disabilities, now reflected in its standards 
applying to access, education, employment, telecommunications, insurance and 
                                                 
2 Sobsey (p. 39-41) cites 27 studies, dated between 1967 and 1992. Two of these are Australian. 
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sports. The US and United Kingdom also have protective disability legislation in 
place.  
In Australia many people with disabilities are still among the poorest of 
citizens, live friendless and isolated lives within the community, are over represented 
in prison populations, and may receive inadequate support with the meeting of their 
basic needs. (Meekosha, 1999). Dutch people with disabilities still encounter 
insufficient access to education, employment, public buildings and one’s own home, 
to public transport and care. Many people with intellectual disabilities have moved 
from institutions to living independently in the community, reportedly giving them 
more choice and autonomy. But many are not included in local community as they 
lack social networks and have a low income (de Klerk, 2002). 
People with disabilities are vulnerable also as a result of developments in 
medical, genetic screening of unborn babies for defects, which is commonplace in 
the Netherlands as it is in Australia. In the Netherlands “adults with congenital 
disabilities who wish to have children, face the judgement of geneticists about what 
they think is ‘healthy’. (…). Doctors decide by refusing to co-operate doctors. In this 
way passive [eugenic] selection has become a fact in the Netherlands” (Vreeswijk, 
n.d.). The medical world’s emphasis on genetic “cure” ignores the social and cultural 
dimensions of disability. This emphasis leads towards a socially devaluing view of 
disability and devaluing practices towards persons who have disabilities (Reinders, 
1999). Newell (1999) believes that globally “there is already evidence of threats to 
the rights of people with disabilities and already stories of oppression and 
discrimination based upon genetic knowledge” (p. 35). Indeed a peak disability 
group‘s submission linked genetic screening to the Dutch Parliamentary debate about 
amendment to its abortion legislation.  
The law with regard to abortion, with reference to the late termination 
of pregnancy [in the case of unborn babies with disabilities], in 
absence of evaluative norms applicable to physicians and prenatal 
screening can have the unintentional result that eugenics in the 
Netherlands will become an implicit rule. (“Biotechnologie”, 2001)  
An Australian report on unlawful sterilization of girls with intellectual disability 
concluded that “there is good reason … to believe that girls continue to be sterilised, 
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and sterilised in numbers which far exceed those that have been lawfully authorised“ 
(Brady, Britton & Grover, 2001, p. 57).  
Besides such overt expressions of abuse, discrimination and neglect, 
Wolfensberger (1984; 1984a; 1990) has identified other practices that may lead to 
the eventual deaths of people with disability who are subject to them. He has called 
these practices deathmaking. For example, he referred to infanticide of handicapped 
new-borns in hospitals, prescribing psychotropic drugs in excess and people with 
disabilities dying as a result of neglect and abuse in human services. He estimated 
annual deaths in the US from such practices to be “hardly less than 100, 000” 
(Wolfensberger, 1990, p. 64). Abuse and death-making practices are often covert and 
cloaked in euphemisms where killing might be called a mercy-killing, merciful 
release, a blessing for the suffering (Wolfensberger, 1990, p. 69), and where 
“murder” can be called “euthanasia, neglect, assisted suicide, allowing to die” 
(Sobsey, 1994, p. xix). Nazi euphemisms which “re-define, essentially de-define, 
human life” (Sobsey, p. 2) were similar including “life without value for itself or 
society, a life whose continuation is of no interest to any reasonably thinking person, 
empty shells, and life devoid of value”. Nazi euphemisms for euthanasia included 
death with dignity and final release (Wolfensberger, 1981). EPAS of people with 
disabilities can become an extension of other deathmaking practices based on the 
widespread devaluation of people with disabilities (Wolfensberger, 1987, 1984a, 
1990). A slippery slope effect from legalised EPAS adds to further abuse of people 
with disabilities (Keown, 1995; Pollard, 1994; Wolfensberger, 1987). 
1.1.10 Disability and EPAS 
Vulnerability is part of the human condition (MacIntyre, 1999) but many 
people with disabilities experience a heightened vulnerability (Cocks & Duffy, 
1993). It has been argued that a person’s vulnerability is heightened when “the 
person has more than one characteristic which then places that person in more than 
one group”, such as being poor, having few skills, and having a disability (Cocks & 
Duffy, p. 19; Wolfensberger, 1998). But even without such multiple group 
membership the direct effects of impairment itself, due to an absence of some 
functions, can lead to a heightened level of vulnerability in itself. Much of this 
heightened vulnerability arises from the socially constructed devaluation of people 
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who have a disability (Wolfensberger, 1998) and disempowerment (Oliver, 1996), 
inherent in negative social ideologies about disability, combined with dominant 
social values of individualism, hedonism and materialism (Wolfensberger, 1990). 
People with disabilities are particularly vulnerable when social and health-related 
consequences of disability and a terminally ill state converge (Cocks & Duffy, 1993; 
Rock, 1996; Wolfensberger, 1987, 1992, 1998). Indeed people with disabilities are 
included as eligible for assisted suicide by virtue of their disability by various 
prominent euthanasia proponents (Gill, 2000). In the US, the disability group “Not 
Dead Yet” conducts a high-profile opposition to such assumptions. Yet a stance 
against EPAS by a majority of people with disabilities cannot be taken for granted. 
Though criticised as unrepresentative for its one-shot, small sample (Gill, 2000), an 
American 1994 Harris poll for instance found 66 per cent of people with disabilities 
in favour of physician-assisted suicide, compared with the general public’s response 
of 70 per cent (Batavia, 2000). Also, I am not aware of any organised disability 
opposition to EPAS in the Netherlands, Australia or in countries other than the US. 
Many people with disabilities, including those with quadriplegia, live long 
lives with conditions affecting their continence, mobility, dignity, appearance, 
independence, autonomy and so forth. Some may live with constant or regular pain 
and disability is often characterised by a higher dependence on others than most 
people experience. This can mean dependence on others for highly personal tasks, 
such as assistance with showering, toilet or dressing. Issues of pain and dignity are 
often stated as reasons for euthanasia for people who are at the end of their lives 
(Dworkin, 1995; Keown, 1995; Kuhse, 1994; Pollard, 1994). Reasons for acting on 
assisted suicide requests, as given by Dutch physicians, include pain (46 per cent of 
patients) the loss of dignity (57 per cent) and a state of dependence (33 per cent) 
(Van der Maas and Emanuel, 1998). Reasons for euthanasia are often addressed in 
terms of a declining quality of life (Kuhse, 1994; Pollard, 1994) which is often 
thought of as determined by such perceptions of pain, dependency and loss of 
dignity. Quality of life assessments are pervasive and are controversial tools to 
indicate human wellbeing, particularly for people with disability. For example, the 
World Health Organization uses the DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Year) in 
calculating the global burden due to premature death and of that caused by non-fatal 
health outcomes. The rating was developed by asking able-bodied people how they 
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value a year of life with disability, pain and immobility (Bach & Tilton, 1994). Such 
measurements of quality of life, and ranking of people by degree of disability, 
valorises the normal body (Rock, 2000) and puts people with disabilities at risk, 
including risk of their lives being seen as worse than death (Bach & Tilton, 1994). It 
is clear that quality of life assessments are highly controversial. This is because an 
individual person’s quality of life depends on their subjective attitudes, beliefs and 
values (Somerville, 2000) and assessments use another’s subjective criteria, which 
may be used to attach more worth to one life than another (Dennis, Williams, 
Giangreco, & Cloninger, 1993; Wolfensberger, 1994). Underlining these concerns, 
people with disabilities have rated the experience of their lives as far more positive 
than others, such as medical doctors, have (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999; Gill, 2000; 
Rothwell, McDowell, Wong, & Dorman, 1997).  
A medical doctor and prominent Australian EPAS campaigner, Dr. Philip 
Nitschke highlighted the relevance of concerns about using quality of life 
assessments for people with disability in terms of their eligibility for EPAS in his 
evidence to the South Australian Inquiry by the Community Development 
Committee into Voluntary Euthanasia, 1996 (Parliament of South Australia, 1999). 
He portrays the use of EPAS in a way that would legitimise the ending of life under 
conditions of a perceived low quality of life experienced by people with disabilities. 
For them the choice then seems to be between “quality of life” or life while the 
social and other causes of their supposed “abysmal” life of “chronic suffering” are 
ignored.  
The term ‘terminal illness’…is encompassed in that [definition of 
euthanasia], but a person’s definition of what I would describe as 
chronic and unremitting suffering is the definition. If a person can 
establish that – and it is not hard to establish – then certainly that 
would involve people who were, for example, not technically 
terminally-ill, such as people with problems associated with, say, 
quadriplegia, where they may have long life expectancies but, to the 
patient’s assessment the quality of their life is so abysmal that they 
wish to end it. (Nitschke, oral evidence, p 136) 
1.1.11 Summary 
The heightened vulnerability of many people with disabilities arises from 
their impairment, from social values and attitudes, and from societal (service) 
responses towards them. Their lives are vulnerable in a world that often celebrates 
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the opposite values to those represented by their embodiment of physical 
imperfection. Their lives are also more vulnerable as a result of the inadequate socio-
economic circumstances in which many people with disabilities find themselves. 
Assessment of quality of life of such disadvantaged and vulnerable people with 
disabilities therefore seems problematic in a world context of widespread abuse. Yet 
people with disabilities most often rate their own lives as good as anyone else’s. 
Quality of life is obviously measured or experienced differently by those with and 
without disability. When medical doctors assess quality of life and weigh it in their 
treatment decisions, including at end of life, the odds can then often be stacked 
against people with disabilities. Under the weight of their social position and 
negative societal assumptions about their lives people with disabilities are especially 
vulnerable to any implementation of EPAS.  
1.1.12 People with quadriplegia 
 The main sample for this study is made up of people who have quadriplegia. 
Quadriplegia in this study is limited to being caused by a traumatic event, an 
accident, which results in paralysis in body trunk and four (quad is four) limbs. This 
involves injury to the spinal cord, effecting various levels of paralysis, corresponding 
with the site of injury. The higher up on the spinal cord the more global the paralysis. 
So C3/4, for instance, is shorthand for injury to the spinal cord between the 3rd and 
4th cervical vertebrae. Some or all of continence, breathing, sexual function, 
temperature control, balance are usually impaired. People with spinal cord injury 
today can expect to survive their injury as a result of technological advances made in 
medicine after the Second World War. These advances allowed prevention of death 
from urinary tract and kidney infections and sepsis from pressure sores. These were 
major causes of death before that time (Eisenberg & Salz, 1991) often within a 
period of weeks to a few months. Rehabilitation efforts first began in 1994 in 
England (van Asbeck, 1998).  
Quadriplegia is often seen as a condition that is intolerable to live with. 
Indeed, the social consequences of quadriplegia include vulnerability to certain 
health problems, psychological and social challenges (Post, 1997). For many years 
the condition of quadriplegia has been the subject of much research in order to find a 
cure (Finkel, 1996; Read, 1996; Young, 1996). Forty four per cent of nurses in a 
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survey in the Australian Capital Territory said they would support a change in the 
law to allow voluntary active euthanasia for persons with quadriplegia (Kitchener & 
Jorm, 1999). Vignettes of people with spinal injury have been used in arguing for 
legal access to EPAS (Kuhse, 1994) or to explore arguments for and against (Parsons 
& Newell, 1996). They have been proposed as eligible for EPAS on the basis of the 
individual’s negative assessment of life with quadriplegia (Nitschke, 1996). 
People with disabilities have been the subject of legal proceedings where they 
sought access to assisted suicide, for instance Rodriguez vs. British Columbia in 
1993 and the cases of McAfee, Rivlin, Bergstedt, and Bouvia in America, all people 
with quadriplegia (Silvers, 1998a). There is a striking example of a man with 
quadriplegia in Spain who held to his wish for suicide for 29 years who finally, with 
assistance killed himself, despite reportedly living a full life amidst friends. His 
struggle has been labelled “autonomatasia”, a neologism for the right to die in a 
pursuit of one’s individual autonomy. Paradoxically he was “filled with a new sense 
of life” in the pursuit of this right (Guerra, 1999, p. 432). But the American cases of 
Bouvia, MacAfee, Rivlin and Bergstedt have revealed a society that is more ready to 
have their Courts allow them death than provide proper support to live a good life. 
People with disabilities live in a world that does not allow them equal autonomy 
(Bickenbach, J. 1998; Gill, 1992; Longmore, 1992; Silvers, 1998a). 
Despite this unequal situation there is much evidence of people with 
quadriplegia having an equal or better sense of wellbeing, sense of life-satisfaction or 
quality of life, compared to their pre-injury days and compared to the general 
population. These findings are inclusive of respirator dependent and ageing people 
with quadriplegia, some of which are longitudinal studies covering 15 to 20 years of 
measurements (Bach & Tilton, 1994; Crewe, 1996; Dijkers, 1997, 1999; Eisenberg & 
Salz, 1991; Post, 1997; Ville & Ravaud, 2001). 
1.1.13 Summary 
People with quadriplegia are often singled out as living a life of unbearable 
suffering, and viewed as eligible for EPAS for such reasons. Their life experience 
differs from such perceptions. As disability perspectives are not often heard in the 
EPAS debate, they are, along with others who have disability, especially vulnerable 
to EPAS policy and practice. 
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1.2. Definitional approaches 
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are the key term in this study and 
others, such as quadriplegia have been explained in the above Background section.  
1.2.1 Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
 This section gives a brief overview of the various positions taken towards 
defining euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and concludes by adopting one 
definition for purpose of this study. 
Euthanasia and assisted suicide and physician-assisted suicide are sometimes 
ascribed distinct meanings but are also used interchangeably (Griffiths, Bood & 
Weyers, 1998). In physician-assisted suicide medical doctors provide suffering 
patients with the means to kill themselves. Euthanasia, in its commonly used context, 
usually means an act by someone, usually a physician, to deliberately end the life of 
a person in order to avoid suffering. Euthanasia is not always defined in this same 
way and various authors identify several sub categories of euthanasia (Griffith, 1996; 
Parsons & Newell, 1996; Pollard, 1989; Zdenkowski, 1997). These include: 
• Voluntary euthanasia, where euthanasia is carried out on request of the patient. 
• Non-voluntary euthanasia, where consent to perform euthanasia can not be 
obtained as the person is non-communicative, for instance because they are in a 
coma. 
• Involuntary euthanasia, where euthanasia is performed in spite of the wishes of 
the person to the contrary. 
• Active euthanasia, where a third party administers a substance in order to end 
life. 
• Passive euthanasia, where withdrawal of treatment causes death. 
Furthermore, EPAS is usually thought of as provided by a physician but some 
illegal mercy-killing by family or other health professionals has been described also 
as euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (Magnusson, 2002). 
Thus one could have active or inactive, voluntary, involuntary or non-
voluntary euthanasia, usually, but not necessarily carried out by a physician, whether 
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one is or is not terminally ill. In practice of course there are attempts to circumscribe 
EPAS when it is made a legal or legally tolerated practice. 
 Euthanasia in the Netherlands was defined in guidelines laid down by the 
“Staats Commissie Euthanasie”, Ministries of Health, Environment and Justice 
(1985). It states: “Euthanasia is the deliberate life-terminating act by a person other 
than the person whose life is to be terminated, and which is done on the request of 
this person”. In the Netherlands euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are 
generally treated together (Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998). And in the newly 
adopted “Termination of life on request and assisted suicide (Review Procedures) 
Act” of 2001 euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have indeed been treated as 
one concept called self-killing (zelf doding). The Act, Division 1, S.1 (b.), describes 
them as follows: “Help with self-killing: the deliberate aid to another’s self-killing or 
to give him the means thereto…” (Wet levensbeeindiging, 2001). There is no 
requirement in this legislation for someone to be terminally ill in order to be eligible 
for euthanasia but there is a requirement for an explicit request from the patient, as 
discussed above. So the Dutch view of legally permitted euthanasia can be described 
as active, voluntary euthanasia and does not encompass other life ending procedures 
such as withdrawal or withholding of treatment. Nor does it include involuntary or 
non-voluntary life ending. (Jochemsen & Keown, 1999). 
In Australia the only euthanasia legislation that has ever existed was the 
short-lived Northern Territory of Australia Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 1995. It 
defined under what circumstances euthanasia could be performed as follows: 
A patient who, in the course of a terminal illness, is experiencing pain, 
suffering and/or distress to an extent unacceptable to the patient, may 
request the patient's medical practitioner to assist the patient to 
terminate the patient's life. 
However, terminal illness was defined loosely, without a timeline, and the patient’s 
degree of suffering was accepted on the subjective report of the patient.  
The intent of the doctor is held by some to be the determining factor in 
deciding whether a life-ending act is euthanasia or not (Somerville, 1993). If the 
intention is to kill the patient it is euthanasia. On this view, if the primary intention of 
medical attention is to relieve suffering but in doing so shortens life it is not 
euthanasia. This is called double effect. Beauchamp & Childress (2001, p. 129) list 
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four conditions of double effect, which must all be met for it to be justified as such. 
The act must be morally good or neutral in nature; the agent’s intention is for good 
effect on the patient; a bad effect on the patient should not be the means to a good 
effect; and the good effect must outweigh the bad effect. Others (Kuhse, 1998) do 
not see intent as relevant in making a moral distinction between letting someone die 
and taking active steps to kill out of compassion for someone’s unbearable suffering. 
The moral distinction between withdrawing or withholding treatment and EPAS thus 
vanishes.  
 One definition that covers both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and 
takes account of the issues of intent and active/inactive distinctions, is Margaret 
Somerville’s (1993, p. 4.). I adopt it as the definition of EPAS in this study. 
An intervention or non-intervention by one person, to end the life of 
another person, who is terminally ill, for the purpose of relieving 
suffering, with the intent of causing the death of the other person, 
except where the primary intent is either to provide treatment 
necessary for the relief of pain or other symptoms of serious physical 
distress, or non-provision or withdrawal of treatment is justified, in 
particular, because there is a valid refusal of treatment or the 
treatment is futile. 
1.2.2 Palliative care 
Palliative care is directly relevant to any consideration of end-of-life-options, 
such as euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide may be. The World Health 
Organisation has defined palliative care in terms of physical, social, psychological 
and spiritual dimensions involved in dying, including the needs of the dying person, 
family and community. 
Palliative care is the active, total care of patients at a time when their 
disease is no longer responsive to curative treatment and when control 
of pain, of other symptoms and of social, psychological and spiritual 
problems is paramount.  
And,  
Palliative care affirms life and regards dying as a natural process; it 
neither hastens nor postpones death. It offers a support system to help 
the patient live as actively as possible until death and help the family 
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cope during the patient's illness and in bereavement. Palliative care is 
multidisciplinary in its approach and encompasses the patient, the 
family and the community in its scope. (World Health Organisation, 
1990) 
1.3. My personal background 
The researcher’s personal background is an important factor in qualitative 
research where the researcher is the primary instrument through which the data are 
collected. The researcher’s attitudes towards a study’s informants affects every 
aspect of the study (Rew, Bechtel & Sapp, 1993) and their qualifications, experience 
and perspectives influence the study’s credibility (Patton, 1990). It is also appropriate 
to articulate one’s background in the pursuit of an ethical problem as “one’s personal 
history, one’s experience, and one’s reflection on one’s history and experience are 
critical to the way one chooses, envisions and then deals with problems” (Loewy, 
1993, p. xxii).  
I was born in the Netherlands and am the only one in my family to have 
migrated to Australia, which I did at age 23. I sustained a spinal injury the following 
year and at the commencement of this study had experienced quadriplegia for some 
23 years. I have been involved in Australia with disability issues in advocacy, 
advocacy development, government advisory bodies, guardianship and human 
service, at local, statewide and national levels. What the nature of community is and, 
later, how this relates to the issue of euthanasia have been growing interests over the 
years, which became practically explorable through the opportunity of this doctoral 
study. 
 This is a particularly sensitive research topic. It involves deeply personal and 
emotional issues such as end-of-life-decision making and accounts of vulnerability 
and dependence. Bracketing (Patton, 1990) against researcher bias is in part made 
visible here by putting up front my own beliefs and assumptions. At commencement 
of the study these were: 
1. Human beings will always be imperfect and live in an imperfect world. 
Consequently, imperfection is the norm for the world and the human condition. 
Vulnerability and disability will always be with us. 
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2. People who have disabilities are more vulnerable than others to illness, 
exploitation, poverty, abuse and neglect arising from the nature of their disability, 
their social situation and service system,  
3. People with disabilities, because of their heightened vulnerability, may 
experience an increased vulnerability to effects of euthanasia policies,  
4. The life experiences of people who have disabilities may be highly 
instructive in how questions of euthanasia, and underlying issues of reasons for 
requesting euthanasia, may be approached,  
5. Their specific perspectives are instructive as all humans face at least 
periods of heightened vulnerability and dependence in their lives and struggle 
between those issues and their needs for levels of personal autonomy and 
independence,  
6. The risk of adding to the existing vulnerability of groups such as people 
with disabilities and its possible effect on the nature of society, may be powerful 
reasons for the application of caution in considering any legalisation of euthanasia 
and for the conceptualisation of strong safeguards to protect their interests whether 
euthanasia is legalised or not. 
These have not changed. Now, at the end of this study, I sense how much the 
processes that I describe in my informants have also played a role in shaping my 
views and values. Undoubtedly they have influenced the idea, conceptualisation and 
design of this study. 
1.4. Significance of the study 
In this study a contribution arises from exploring the roles that vulnerability, 
independence, interdependence, dependence and personal autonomy play in the daily 
lives of people with disabilities. It examines how the universality of vulnerability, 
autonomy and dependency in human lives (Kittay, 1995; MacIntyre, 1999; Silvers, 
1998; Wendell, 1996) may illuminate the euthanasia debate.  
However, this study is of both specific interest to vulnerable people with 
disability and of universal significance. Four factors suggest the significance of this 
study. The first is that a disability voice on issues connected with EPAS is not much 
heard. The apparent absence of a previous study like this one adds to an impression 
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that a disability voice in this area is presently marginal. As people with disabilities 
are extra-vulnerable to decisions about their lives and deaths, it may be in their 
interests for their voice to be heard. Secondly, it appears that experience from living 
with disability may add fresh perspectives to the EPAS debate. This could be so as, 
unlike most people, many people with disabilities daily confront inevitable issues of 
dependence, vulnerability and personal autonomy, issues of the human condition and 
human nature that are central also to the EPAS debate. People with disabilities have 
obviously found their own approaches to these issues because many of them live 
long lives. In a public debate, which often appears to be stalled at polarised positions 
while majority support for EPAS continues to push for change in our laws, their 
contribution may be welcome and timely. Thirdly, reflection on any disability 
approaches to living under these circumstances in relation to attitudes, beliefs and 
practices with regard to EPAS may lead to new insights. Fourthly, such insights 
would be of disability-specific and universal interest. Disability is highly 
characterised by vulnerability, dependency and a struggle for individual autonomy. 
These are issues that touch on any human’s experience and are particularly, but not 
exclusively, felt when disabled or dying. Few of us are exempted from the first 
condition, none from the last. This fourth factor is interwoven throughout a brief 
explanation of the first three. 
1.4.1 A marginal voice 
Disability perspectives on EPAS are seldom heard publicly. The literature 
shows that some researchers, some known to have disabilities themselves, have 
investigated disability perspectives on euthanasia. But no studies were found that 
were derived wholly from interviewing people who have disabilities or disability 
movement leaders, although some works included some individual disability 
perspectives in a wider context (Kuhse, 1994; Parsons & Newell, 1996). The wider, 
public EPAS debate seldom includes disability perspectives or issues. Even more 
rarely are the voices of people with disabilities themselves heard on this issue 
(Council on Disability, 1999). There is, for instance, only one Australian disability 
advocacy group, Queensland Advocacy Inc., (out of more than 70 Commonwealth-
funded disability advocacy groups) that is conducting research and advocacy on end-
of-life matters concerning people with disability. However, I am not aware of a 
 32
public disability voice on EPAS by this group as yet. There is little evidence of a 
Dutch public disability perspective either. The peak Dutch disability group, the 
Gehandicaptenraad, supports the Dutch euthanasia law though it also says that it has 
fundamental doubts. It has pointed to a polarisation of opinion with a lack of social 
consent, insufficient enshrinement in law of a patient’s right to protection and to 
palliative care, and to a lack of sufficient legal codification of the requirements for 
careful practice (“Euthanasie, brief aan de leden”, 2001).  
It is important that public debate on euthanasia includes the possible 
consequences upon various groups and individuals of its implementation or 
otherwise (Ewin, 2002). Legalising euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide may 
have an influence upon the social relations within a society, beyond those directly 
intended, including upon how we care for people who are ill, disabled and vulnerable 
(Mann, 1998; Somerville, 1993). And there may be direct adverse impacts from 
euthanasia practice on vulnerable people with disabilities arising from their devalued 
status, social exclusion and lack of personal autonomy (Fitzgerald, 1996; 
Wolfensberger, 1987; Sobsey; 1994). But, unlike in the USA, disability perspectives 
on EPAS are seldom raised in Australian or Dutch public debates.  
1.4.2 A contribution from disability perspective 
The potential contribution to this debate from disability perspective is of 
disability-specific and wider relevance. The experiences of both those who have 
disabilities and of those who are in close contact with disability, force those people to 
confront rarely addressed assumptions about life and our place in it (Goldin & 
Scheer, 1995). And not to inquire into the lives of people with disabilities may be 
knowledge lost about our fears about “the body, our weaknesses and imperfections 
and of our inevitable deterioration and death” (Wendell, 1996, p. 110). It is a 
contribution from a rich disability context and of insights on how we may best face 
up to our universal human condition (Goldin & Scheer, 1995). For instance, people 
with disabilities and those who are involved in their lives, including those in carer 
roles, have found enduring sources of moral values in living life lived with disability 
(Reinders, 2000). In a world that appears to lack common values and a guiding story 
(Hugh Mackay, in Eckersley, 1998, p.11) such insights may be welcome. An 
acknowledged shared human condition, and how we use any resources found in our 
 33
human nature will have impacts on how we view human fragility and deal with it, 
personally and publicly, whether disabled or not.  
Specifically, the experience of people with disabilities in relation to 
dependence, vulnerability and autonomy is an obvious area to look for a contribution 
to the EPAS debate as central issues that the two have in common. Goldin & Scheer 
(1995) identified an ongoing struggle between issues of autonomy and dependency 
within individuals with disabilities. The available literature does also show differing 
approaches by people with disabilities themselves towards euthanasia. Some lean 
towards an emphasis on concepts of personal autonomy and independence in 
deciding questions of euthanasia and assisted suicide (Batavia, 1991, 1997; Hwang, 
1995; Kuhse, 1994). Others show the existence of opposing views (Gill, 2000; 
Parsons & Newell, 1996). In the USA the disability activist group Not Dead Yet (Not 
Dead Yet, 2000) opposes legalisation of euthanasia while another “Autonomy Now” 
supports it. In Canada the B.C. Coalition of People with Disabilities submitted to a 
Senate enquiry that people with disabilities must have the same rights and choices as 
anyone else in ending their lives (B.C. Coalition of People With Disabilities, 1995, 
cited in Wendell, 1996). This tension is also reflected in the wider EPAS debate. It is 
that struggle, common to both disability issues and EPAS, which this study is 
inquiring into. In this study people with acquired quadriplegia all have experience of 
life with a wholly functioning body that allows a maximum independence and 
expression of individual autonomy, as well as experience of the opposite of that 
situation. This dual experience, and an ongoing personal engagement between issues 
of dependency, vulnerability and autonomy, which are shared core issues with the 
EPAS debate, are other reasons why they may be expected to bring universally 
relevant perspectives to the EPAS debate. 
Disability experience and the experience of dying share common factors that 
affect the nature and quality of these experiences. Kastenbaum (2000), for instance, 
describes intra- and inter-personal, social and medical factors that influence the 
experience of dying. They include the quality of the dying person’s interpersonal 
relationships; the type of disease causing terminality, its medical treatment and the 
environment in which it occurs; a decline of personal control over one’s life and in 
one’s “social instrumentality”; how one is perceived and treated by others and; a 
decline in volunteer carers (pp. 111–114). Similar factors have been associated with 
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the quality of the disability experience, such the nature of one’s impairment; socio-
cultural factors, including human service responses; and dominant social values 
(Cocks, 1993; Wendell, 1997; Wolfensberger, 1998). Further, dying people may 
experience physical restrictions, a “distorted or altered body image”, 
disempowerment, restrictions in available time to get things done in a fast-paced 
world and a “transition from a world they have known” to another (Kastenbaum, pp. 
120–121). Many people with disabilities must live with these realities in their daily 
lives. Thus the lessons from their experience are likely to be a relevant contribution 
to how one may live through dying, as well as to questions of hastening death. 
1.4.3 Critical knowledge from the perspectives of devalued people  
This research is founded on the belief that the perspectives of people with 
disabilities may be able to contribute new, or thus far at least insufficiently 
considered, aspects to the euthanasia debate. Major physical, social, and 
psychological changes and challenges arise for a person who acquires a significant 
disability like quadriplegia. Many such people learn to deal with these realities 
arising from the immediate crisis and live fulfilling lives. This may constitute useful 
knowledge, which may shed new light on end-of-life issues such as EPAS, for 
reasons just discussed. However, because people with disabilities embody socially 
devalued characteristics of difference, dependence and vulnerability any such 
emancipatory knowledge is devalued too and cannot easily emerge.  
Habermas (1989) described three kinds of knowledge. The first is 
analytical/empirical knowledge. This knowledge is that of the Age of Reason, or 
Enlightenment, still dominant today. It involves empirical investigation of natural 
phenomena under controlled, objective conditions, based on reductionism, in order to 
develop a theory of causal relationships. In this study it sheds light on aspects of the 
social environment in which the informants live and on the kind of society in which 
the Enlightenment project is still dominant, and in which a demand for EPAS has 
arisen. Historical–hermeneutical knowledge is concerned with the phenomenology of 
people’s shared experiences, culture and (his)stories, in this case of people with 
disabilities. The third is emancipatory, or critical knowledge, being concerned with 
analyses of any differences between dominant ideologies and how people experience 
their lives. Any difference between knowledge from experience and of the wider 
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reality may dispel false consciousness about societal realities. Such emancipatory 
knowledge, synthesised from reflection on any differences between the first two 
kinds of knowledge might arise from this study that compares the experience of 
people with disabilities with their views on EPAS. I suggest that such new 
knowledge may be important, occurring as it does during a globally turbulent 
society, which appears to lack a common value base, or a guiding story. 
At the same time, it was always held possible that no such new disability 
perspectives would emerge from this study. After all, people with disabilities live 
within the same social value culture that we all do, and are influenced by it. Any 
unique disability perspective on EPAS could therefore not be assumed.  
1.5.0 Purpose of the study 
People who have quadriplegia are the main subject of this qualitative study. A 
small sample of leading people in the disability movements in both the Netherlands 
and Australia was also interviewed for purposes of triangulation and indicators of 
issues which might need to be followed up with the primary sample. 
The purposes of this study are: 
• to discover Dutch and Australian disability perspectives towards 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; and 
• to find how the life experiences of the informants, within a cross-national 
context, may illuminate their perspectives. 
1.5.1 Research objective 
• To find how vulnerability, autonomy, dependency, interdependence and 
independence may be experienced in the daily lives of people with quadriplegia 
in the Netherlands and Australia, and how these may relate to their views on 
euthanasia and assisted suicide in a cross-national context.  
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1.5.2 Research questions 
 
• What is the knowledge, including the beliefs and assumptions, of Dutch and 
Australian people with quadriplegia and leaders in Dutch and Australian 
disability movements, on issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide? 
• What are the life experiences and views of Dutch and Australian people with 
quadriplegia and leaders in Dutch and Australian disability movements, with 
regard to issues of vulnerability, autonomy, dependency, interdependence and 
independence?  
• What relationships may exist between the experiences of, and views on, these 
issues and the informants’ views on issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide? 
• Do cross-national disability perspectives on the above issues lead to deeper 
understanding of and insight into the issues of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide and their practical applications?  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In giving a general context, Chapter two reviews literature on disability in 
relation to EPAS involving the roles of individual autonomy, dependence, 
independence and interdependence. Parts of the Chapter’s review of literature are in 
response to themes that arose from this study. These include personal value change 
and personal wellbeing; distance to dying and death; and dominant social values as 
an influential context to issues under examination in this study.  
2.1 Disability, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
This section of the chapter reviews literature on the views of people with 
disability on EPAS and looks at literature about any vulnerability of this category of 
people to its practice. 
No research was found which specifically sought the views of people with 
disabilities on euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. In the context of an ongoing 
public debate on the vital issue of EPAS, this fact may well underscore the socially 
devalued status of disabled people.  
Nevertheless, some work that includes the views of individual people with 
disabilities and the views of researchers known to have a disability provides some 
insight.3 Most of this literature is about the views of people with disability on the 
effects of EPAS on them as a group. Some, such as Dutch columnist and author 
Spaink (2002) and Australian researcher Newell (Parsons & Newell, 1996; Newell, 
1996), mostly consider EPAS issues in general. Public debates about EPAS, 
                                                 
3 Of course it is often not known whether any particular researcher or author has a disability or not. 
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involving people with disabilities, have largely been American. Only two Australian 
studies were found that included views of some individuals with disabilities. Kuhse 
(1994), a non-disabled Australian ethicist who argues from respect for individual 
autonomy and a principle of the focal person’s best interests, edited the commentary 
of some people, including two disabled, who were represented as favourable towards 
euthanasia. Parsons & Newell (1996), the latter of whom has a disability himself, 
disagree about the merits of legalising euthanasia in Australia. The differing 
positions reached by the co-authors are reflected in the wider literature. Parsons 
(Parsons & Newell, 1996), a disability advocate, supports legal euthanasia on the 
basis of individual rights to choose one’s own assisted death. He acknowledges a 
devaluing social context for people with disabilities, including attitudes of doctors 
towards this group, but favours the legalisation of euthanasia. His support for EPAS 
is based on respect for individual autonomy and a person’s best interests where legal 
EPAS is thought safer than unregulated practice. In doing so he separates morality 
from protecting individual autonomy and dignity and public from private morality:  
 …neither autonomy nor dignity are threatened but rather, protected 
by laws that allow for active euthanasia. The moral dimensions of the 
issue are another matter. But like all issues of morality, these are the 
domain of individuals, and of ethicists, not of governments or the 
writers of law. (Parsons & Newell, 1996, p. 168)  
Newell (1996, Parsons & Newell, 1996) concludes differently. Like others (Gill, 
1992; Morris, 1991, 1992; Rock, 1996; Rock, 2000) he sees a threat to people with 
disabilities in legalising euthanasia because of the already existing devalued position 
of that group and the social valuing of the normal body. Exercising one’s autonomy 
to effect one’s euthanasia is a serious and irrevocable act. An effort to address the 
causes of the distress that leads some to request euthanasia is needed, rather than 
killing. Both co-authors, Parsons and Newell, agree that the euthanasia debate is far 
more complex than being either for or against EPAS. 
Individual autonomy plays a prominent role in the EPAS debate. The 
Australian dialogue between Parsons and Newell is mirrored in an exchange on 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS) between two American authors who have 
quadriplegia: Batavia and Gill. Batavia (2000), who headed a pro-assisted suicide 
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group called “Autonomy” (Autonomy, 2002), held a similar view to philosophers 
such as Dworkin (1993) and others (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, & 
Thomson, 1999). His view was that it is the dominant values of his society, self-
determination and individual autonomy, which are the real issues in arguing for a 
right to PAS for both terminally ill and non-terminally ill people with disabilities. He 
acknowledged the presence of empirical evidence about disabled people’s 
devaluation and vulnerability, through their generally low social position, and the 
negative attitudes of the medical profession. He does not however see that as a 
barrier to insisting on the individual right to PAS. For him that is a matter of personal 
choice and self-determination (Batavia, 1991, 1997, 2000). Gill (2000) claims that 
negative attitudes from the medical and allied professions do present a threat to 
people with disabilities in the event of PAS being legalised, within a context of the 
wider devaluation of people with disability.  
The Dutch columnist and author Karin Spaink (2001), who has multiple 
sclerosis, also supports individual autonomy as a guiding principle in ending one’s 
life. But her focus on personal autonomy leads her to reject euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide. She observes that the necessary involvement of doctors in a 
regulated process for EPAS brings with it a compromised and bureaucratised 
individual autonomy. Therefore she favours the self-administration of lethal drugs. 
She has written about how to obtain these via the internet, fraud or illegal drug 
dealers. She sees this lethal possession as an insurance against a time that the effects 
of her progressive condition are so disabling that she would soon not be able to kill 
herself and supports this strategy for those who are “finished with their lives” 
(Spaink, 2001, p. 93).4
Without suggesting that this is necessarily Spaink’s position, in the case of 
people with disabilities, the call for one’s autonomy to be respected in dying is often 
                                                 
4 The public availability of suicide pills to elderly people has been part of the Dutch debate since 1991 
when retired Vice President of the Dutch High Court Mr. Drion, publicly advocated the legal 
availability of suicide pills to the elderly. He saw this as a solution for people who “saw the moment 
arrive when [they] could no longer care for [themselves] (…) in a nursing home where [they] would 
feel dependent on others and where he would have to live his last years exclusively among elderly 
people” (Drion, cited in: Spaink, 2002, p. 93). Henceforth this proposal has been known as Drion’s 
Pill. The then Minister for Health, Mrs. Borst, remarked immediately upon passage of the Dutch 
Euthanasia Act that she was not against such a pill and since then legalisation of EPAS in the 
Netherlands has now been taken up by the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia as their next aim (Dikkers, 
2002).  
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taken at face value by those who lack an informed perspective and harbour a fear of 
disability (Gill, 1992). But this call can, rather, be one for a more general respect for 
one’s person. When American respirator-dependent quadriplegic Larry MacAfee 
obtained court permission to be killed by shutting off his respirator he was finally 
offered the independent living option that the nursing home had denied him. He 
obtained legal standing and a right to die from the courts where he could not get the 
standing to improve his living arrangements in the care system. He then no longer 
wanted to die and is now living in the community. Australian, Anne McDonald, 
herself a person with severe disabilities with personal experience of the ill effects of 
institutionalisation, agrees that the lives of many people with disabilities are awful. 
She holds that only when we improve the quality of the lives of those people will we 
be able to ascertain whether they want euthanasia because “they think life with a 
disability is worthless or because they think it is awful” (Parsons & Newell, 1996, p. 
54). The cases of quadriplegics Bouvia, Bergstedt, Rodas and Rivlin are further 
examples of (American) society’s willingness to give people with disabilities their 
autonomy to die where it was less willing to give autonomy to them in life (Gill, 
1992; Herr, Bostrom & Barton, 1992; Silvers, 1998). Most people would normally 
try to dissuade suicidal persons from their death wish. However, these people were 
encouraged by doctors, judges and family members who called their determination to 
die rational, courageous and the solution (Gill, 1992). In Australia there is no legal 
history of individual people with disability’s quests for assisted death. But it has been 
suggested that the autonomous choices that are involved in living full lives are often 
non-existent for people with disabilities (Wareing & Newell, 2002). Such restricted 
individual autonomy is reflected in the lives of such Australian institutional 
“escapees” as McDonald (Crossley & McDonald, 1984) who experienced great 
difficulties in unfolding her human potential in the restrictive institutional setting that 
she lived in. EPAS in relation to disability is clearly an issue that cannot be isolated 
from its social context. It is “interrelated with … general issues of rights, 
opportunities and status … and of the services, programs, policies and services for 
people with disabilities” (National Council on Disability, 1999).  
The literature on disability generally views people with disabilities as 
experiencing a generally devalued, segregated, stigmatised, excluded position in 
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society (Cocks & Duffy, 1993; Cross & Zeni, 1993; Goffman, 1963; Kliewer & 
Drake, 1998, Wolfensberger, 1987, 1992). They are seen as belonging to a category 
at high risk of violence and abuse (Sobsey, 1994a). Cocks (1998) points to some key 
dominant values in modernist Western societies as impacting on the situation of 
people with (intellectual) disabilities. Like Wolfensberger (1998), he identifies these 
as materialism, utilitarianism, individualism and choice, hedonism and immediacy. A 
high social value accorded to youth and physical beauty is part of this value system. 
The expression of these values in media, political processes, social policies and 
institutions is reflected in “social dislocation, dysfunctional social institutions, 
worsening social indicators and a weakening of commitments to vulnerable people” 
(p. 13). Western society devalues those who, like many people with disabilities, do 
not meet its valued human attributes of intelligence, independence and competence. 
It will withhold such goods as supportive relationships, respect and autonomy from 
them in what often is an unconscious process of social devaluation (Wolfensberger, 
1998). Braddock & Parish (2001) contend that a growing stigmatisation and 
segregation of disabled people began in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
perspectives on poverty and a “medicalised interpretation of disability in the 
following two centuries” (p. 11).  
Various conceptions of a social model of disability exist. For instance, Oliver 
(1983, 1990) and Bickenbach (in Braddock & Parish, p. 44) see handicaps as socially 
created disadvantages arising from the social response to impairments and 
disabilities. Wendell’s (1996) disability theory adds subtle social influences as 
contributing to disability, such as the fast pace of life and the disabled individual’s 
perception of life with disability. Murphy (1990), an anthropologist who examined 
his own experience of quadriplegia, holds that disability still creates fears “in the 
able-bodied … that impairment could happen to them … and … guilt that it hasn’t” 
(p. 117). Silvers (1998a) on the other hand says that portraying people with 
disabilities as weak and vulnerable is paternalistic and that they would be better 
served with a public policy that protects them from being assigned the sick role, as 
this role begs physician-assisted suicide. In saying this she may make the assumption 
that a sick role is the main, or only, issue that increases the person with disability’s 
vulnerability to misuse of assisted suicide. Others who, like Silvers, have direct 
experience of disability themselves (Coleman, 2002; Gill, 2000; Sobsey, 1994, 
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1994a; Wendell, 1996) contradict this view and want to acknowledge vulnerabilities 
experienced by people with disabilities. But Batavia and Gallagher (2002) have 
stated their outright disbelief that there is oppression and vulnerability of people with 
disabilities in contemporary US society, including vulnerability arising from 
physicians’ attitudes, even though they insisted on strong safeguards against abuse of 
any PAS legislation. The latter is a person with paraplegia who has described the 
extermination of people with disabilities in Nazi Germany (Gallagher, 1990). His 
disbelief in contemporary disabled people’s oppression and vulnerability contrasts 
remarkably with his belief expressed in that book.  
How they treated their insane, handicapped and retarded during the 
Third Reich was certainly extreme behaviour (…) but it was not 
inconsistent with patterns of social behaviour that can be traced 
throughout the history of the disabled over the centuries. The German 
physicians actually acted on the basis of feelings, which are common 
(…) to most men and women in most societies (Gallagher, 1990, p. 
239).  
Wendell (1996) appears to be in agreement with Gallagher’s observation on 
an endemic negative public attitude to disability when she says that a public notion 
that disabled lives are not worth living … 
lies at the heart of much theorising about abortion, euthanasia and 
health care reform, putting the welfare and security, and the social 
acceptance, of people with disabilities in jeopardy (p. 151). 
Wendell (1996) adds that, on the other hand, people with disabilities, with 
their extensive experiences of the limitations of medical treatment, “are unlikely to 
support an ethic of life at any cost, or a reduction of individuals’ rights to choose 
death” (p. 151). Anne McDonald, herself a person with significant disabilities and 
who escaped the life-wasting and killing effects of Australian institutionalisation 
(Crossley & McDonald, 1984), agrees that the lives of many people with disabilities 
are awful. She holds that only when we improve the quality of the lives of those 
people will we be able to ascertain whether they want euthanasia because “they think 
life with a disability is worthless or because they think it is awful” (Parsons & 
Newell, 1996, p. 54). US disability activist and researcher Paul Longmore, points to 
the need for social acceptance of disability and the risks involved to people with 
disabilities of a socially negative view of dependency. He asks whether society has 
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come to a point where people prefer death and will receive assistance to die because 
“people cannot wipe their own behinds”? (cited in Smith, 2000, p. 115). 
Clearly the available literature shows differing approaches by people with 
disabilities themselves towards euthanasia and assisted suicide. Their views vary 
between valuing the primacy of individual autonomy to seeing the social context as 
contributing to requests for EPAS and a need for society to accept disability. Not all 
people with disabilities accept their vulnerability as a given or that it might render 
them at risk if euthanasia were legalised. However these views are not based on 
studies of disabled persons’ attitudes towards EPAS. 
Literature about the actual consequences for disabled people of a legalised 
public policy that allows EPAS is of course based on the Dutch and Oregon 
experiences and more recently on the Belgium experience. One of the deaths by 
assisted suicide in Oregon in 2000 was that of a woman who had ALS (amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis). Her assessment of the depression that led to the approval of her 
assisted suicide was done without seeing a psychologist but through a written test 
that her psychologist sent her (International Task Force, 2001). One week after 
legalisation of EPAS in Belgium, the first man who received euthanasia also 
represented the first violation of this Act’s provisions. This man had multiple 
sclerosis. It happened despite a lawfully required one month cooling off period 
(“Belgian outcry”, 2002). The four patients who died under the Australian Northern 
Territory’s Rights for the Terminally Ill Act all had cancer, not a disability (Kissane, 
Street & Nitschke, 1998). However, any impacts of illegal EPAS in Australia 
(Magnusson, 2002; Kuhse, Singer, Baume, Clark & Rickard, 1997) on people with 
disabilities cannot be ignored. In relation to people who have AIDS, a disease that 
involves eventually disabling conditions, Magnusson has revealed disturbing illegal 
medical killing by doctors, nursing staff, other professionals, community workers 
and even a funeral director. Some of these deaths increased suffering and led to death 
with little or no dignity. Some killing acts were botched and extra medication, even 
smothering with a pillow was used. Obviously depressed people were medically 
killed and at very short notice by doctors and others who did not know them. 
It is noteworthy that in the Netherlands no comprehensive disability-related 
data were collected in two major government-sponsored reports on the national 
practice of EPAS (van der Maas, van Delden & Pijnenborg, 1991; van der Wal & 
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van der Maas, 1996). This absence of data could be regarded as remarkable as 
standard objections to EPAS often involve a slippery slope which affects vulnerable 
people such as the aged and people with disabilities (Keown, 1995; Pollard, 1994).  
Pijnenburg (1998), a Dutch physician, stated that the one-dimensional focus 
on autonomous choice has led to growing attention being paid to the “entitlement” of 
those who are not competent and autonomous to “receive an end to their life because 
of the presence – in the view of others – of unbearable and hopeless suffering” (p. 
246). Like Newell (Parsons & Newell, 1996), Pijnenburg sees a logical extension of 
“autonomy” to choose assisted death to other categories, such as those with 
Alzheimer’s disease or severe handicap, who might be presumed to suffer 
unbearably. They cannot choose but ought to be entitled to the same right to end their 
lives as anyone else. Indeed Gomez (1991, p. 137) felt that in the Dutch practice of 
EPAS something more than “an argument from autonomy was at work”. He felt that 
there was a sentiment that certain patients were better off dead and it was humane to 
kill them. Callahan (1993), like Newell (Parsons & Newell, 1996), argued that such 
outcomes were inevitable, arising from the combination of the two main arguments 
for EPAS, as he sees them: self-determination and compassion in the face of 
suffering. In his view it is not possible to quarantine EPAS for competent people 
from EPAS for non-competent people, or from those who insisted that they were 
suffering unbearably for a range of reasons, including losses of meaning and dignity. 
This inevitability was particularly so in the Netherlands, where his first-hand 
observations included those of doctors’ indifference to their country’s low EPAS 
reporting rates, and thus to the policy’s safeguards. Kennedy (2002) and Gomez 
(1991) have also reported on such ambivalence in the Netherlands. Prominent Dutch 
historian van der Horst (1996) has described how a physician-assisted suicide death 
in his family went unreported, apparently with everyone’s tacit agreement5. 
                                                 
5 Van der Horst described a woman of under 40 dying of lung cancer who obtained lethal pills from 
her doctor and used them. This had, and still has, a great effect on me. For everyone who was close to 
her, including myself, it was a great comfort that a humane doctor had given her the choice. We were 
grateful for this form of tolerance. The same doctor who had given her the pills certified that she had 
died a natural death, so there was no need for an autopsy. Otherwise the pathologist would almost 
certainly have established death by poisoning and the doctor would have been prosecuted. But no-one 
saw any reason to request an autopsy, including the specialists at the Roman Catholic Hospital that 
had discharged the woman a few weeks before her death in the conviction that, with radiation and 
chemotherapy, she could live another year. In her case tolerance allowed her suffering to come to an 
end” (p. 125). 
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There are perhaps some empirically supported indicators of Pijnenburg’s and 
Gomez’s assertions. People with disabilities seem over-represented in the 
Netherlands in actual acts of EPAS and in making inquiries about it. Compared to all 
reported Dutch deaths by EPAS (0.82per cent) between 1984 and 1993, higher rates 
of death by EPAS have been reported for people with AIDS (13.41 per cent), 
multiple sclerosis (5.35 per cent) and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) (4.08 per 
cent) (van der Wal & Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 1996). Ganzini & Block (2002) found 
that 20 per cent of Dutch patients with ALS requested EPAS, which they saw as 
excessively high and suggestive of inadequate palliative care. No data are available 
for people with spinal cord injury in relation to EPAS but in 1995 one fifth of 
euthanasia inquiries to the Dutch national euthanasia association, the NVVE, came 
from people with chronic illness or disability. The remainder included psychiatric 
patients (Molenwijk, 1995). One per cent of all EPAS involves people with a 
diagnosis of mental illness with an estimated two to five assisted suicides per year 
(Griffith, Bood & Weyers, 1998).  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the 1994 Chabot euthanasia case of a non-
terminally ill person, Mrs. Hilly Bosscher, who was said to experience intense and 
long-term psychic suffering set a new benchmark for suffering as a valid reason for 
EPAS. The Court decided that “that the wish to die of a person whose suffering is 
psychic can be based on a autonomous judgement” (Griffiths, pp. 80–82; Klozko & 
Chabot, 1998). This Court’s decision considered the degree of suffering rather than 
its causes (Gevers & Leegemate, 1998), which in this case involved suffering from 
terminated relationships with her sons and husband through terminal disease, suicide 
and divorce. Other EPAS cases involving psychiatric illness (van der Meer, De Veen, 
Noorthoorn & Kraan, 1999), fear of dementia at an early stage of it (“Als goede zorg 
ontbreekt”, 1999) and tiredness of life (Rechtspraak.nl, undated) have focused 
attention on a Dutch widening of the concept of unbearable suffering. Arguably, 
people with disabilities, who might request EPAS for suffering arising from effects 
of bad care, could receive it on such grounds as accepted in the Chabot case. They 
might not even have to raise their request themselves, as in 50 per cent of cases 
Dutch doctors initiated the subject of euthanasia with their patients (Hendin, 1997). 
The Dutch government’s report on the practice of EPAS during 2002 touches on the 
difficulties of determining unbearable suffering, including for those with disabilities. 
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Unbearability depends on the “patient’s perspective, his personality and values. 
Besides the experience of suffering of each patient is different. For one patient it is 
unbearable to … become completely dependent on others, for another it is the 
ongoing loss of dignity”(p. 23). Such conditions include ALS, multiple sclerosis, 
spinal cord injury and cerebral vascular accidents. “In [the latter two] it is more 
difficult to determine that suffering is unbearable. There is no doubt however that the 
suffering of such patients is without prospect of recovery [a criterion for 
implementation of EPAS]” (Regionale Toetsings Commissies Euthanasie, 2002, p. 
23). Under such vague approaches to unbearable suffering prominent Dutch 
physicians, such as EPAS pioneer Pieter Admiraal (Hendin, 1998, p. 193) and 
emeritus professor psychiatrist van Dantzig appear to confirm the reality of 
vulnerability of people with disabilities such as McDonald, MacAfee and others, who 
need good care and support but might receive permission to die upon their default. 
They think that EPAS for older dementing patients may be unavoidable, because of 
an ageing population and “steadily worsening circumstances: lack of community care 
and overfull nursing homes (…): “When nobody can care for you anymore and 
you’re no longer welcome anywhere, then some people would rather be dead” (“Als 
goede zorg ontbreekt”, 1999).  
Over a five year period, within a sample of 89 physicians, four Dutch cases of 
intentional medical life-ending of institutionalised people with intellectual disability 
were found, all of which were reported as natural deaths (Van Thiel, Huibers & de 
Haan, 1997). End-of-life decision-making for this population reflects similar types 
and percentages as for the general population (Van Thiel, van Delden, de Haan & 
Huibers, 2001). There is a lack of openness among the medical profession with 
regard to end-of-life decision-making about people with intellectual disability (Van 
Thiel, et al.). This appears reflected in a zero per cent reporting of EPAS in this 
population, compared with 18 per cent in 1990 (van der Maas, van Delden & 
Pijnenborg, 1991) and 41 per cent in 1995 (van der Wal & van der Maas, 1996) for 
the general Dutch population. The Dutch peak parent group for people with 
intellectual disability, the “Federatie van Ouder Verenigingen” objects to EPAS of 
people with intellectual disability in a context of generally negative views from 
doctors of the quality of life of such people (van der Wijngaard & Quast, 1997). A 
changing notion of personhood from “intrinsic dignity of the individual entity to a set 
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of social characteristics that qualify one as a member of society”, brought about by 
the EPAS debate (Ten Have (1998, p. 209), together with an increased and misplaced 
emphasis on individual autonomy (Pijnenburg, 1998), may put people with cognitive 
impairments at risk. 
2.1.1 Summary 
The preceding literature shows differing approaches towards EPAS by people 
with direct experience of disability. However there is no literature of any 
examination of the attitudes that people with disabilities have towards this topic. 
Individual autonomy and the degree to which people with disabilities are able to 
exercise it play an important role in the EPAS debate. I am unaware of any relevant 
statistical information on the incidence of EPAS concerning people with disabilities. 
The best available evidence indicates however that the legal Dutch practice of EPAS 
appears to pose risks to people who have disabilities and there are some tenuous 
indicators from the Oregon and Belgium practice that may confirm such risk. The 
condition of disability may be seen as unbearable suffering. Some people, especially 
those who are incompetent, may receive EPAS under a misplaced proxy’application 
of autonomy under circumstances of perceived unbearable suffering. In the 
Netherlands there appear to be some indicators of an increasing acceptance of wider 
criteria of suffering that may entitle one to EPAS. Social pressures arising from 
rising numbers of those who need care may see them receive EPAS instead. Such 
developments may also increase the vulnerability of people with physical disabilities 
who are seen to need a high level of care but who do not receive it. The illegal EPAS 
practice in Australia, mainly concerning people with AIDS, suggests that keeping 
EPAS illegal also poses problems. 
2.2 Autonomy 
In this section I pay closer attention to literature that refers to individual 
autonomy as it relates to people with disability and how autonomy relates to issues of 
EPAS more generally.  
The same struggle between respect for one’s individual autonomy and one’s 
inevitable times of dependency and vulnerability as experienced by people with 
disabilities is present in the general EPAS debate. Many people seek respect for their 
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individual autonomy to choose their time of death in the face of their fears of an 
unworthy, undignified death, dependency on others and of being in pain (van der 
Maas, van Delden & Pijnenborg, 1991). A report about the first three years of 
operation of the Oregon Act found that burden on family, friends and care givers; 
losing autonomy; decreasing ability to participate in activities that make life 
enjoyable; and losing control of bodily functions, all rated much higher as 
motivations for PAS than inadequate pain control (“Oregon’s Death With Dignity 
Act”, 2000). 
The word autonomy is derived from the Greek auto, or self, and nomos, 
meaning governance, law or rule. Issues and meanings of self-determination, 
authority, control, independence, rational choice, individual choice, liberty rights, 
privacy, freedom of will and self-governance have all been connected with the 
modern understanding of the term autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; 
Dworkin, Frey & Bok, 1998; Ells, 2001; Fitzgerald, 1996). Autonomy as a theory 
has various constructions. Beauchamp & Childress (2001, p. 59) analyse autonomous 
action as that of “normal choosers who act intentionally, with understanding and 
without controlling influences that determine their action” (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2001, pp. 58–59). They hold that almost all theories of autonomy agree that two 
conditions are essential. These are liberty, or independence from controlling 
influences, and agency, a capacity for intentional action. Modern conceptions of 
autonomy owe a lot to the work of philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill. Kant holds that each person has unconditional worth by virtue of having the 
capacity to decide one’s moral destiny. This makes them independent moral agents 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Kant is the architect of the concept of the 
autonomous agent who makes moral choices based on reason. Good reasons are 
those that do not contain internal inconsistencies. And good choices are those that are 
universalisable (Kerner, 1990). Kant (cited in Callahan, 1993, p.112) also said that 
the use of free will to destroy one’s own life is internally inconsistent. John Stuart 
Mill was particularly concerned with the individuality of moral agents’ actions in 
advancing their preferences, as long as they do not harm others (Beauchamp & 
Childress). Others have criticised the individualistic view of the independent normal 
chooser as not accounting for the relational context in which we all find ourselves 
and is at odds with the disability experience (Ells, 2001; Donchin, 2000; Fitzgerald, 
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1996; Wendell, 1999). It also increases the vulnerability of those who do not meet 
the standards for rational normal choosers, as Reinders (2000) argues: 
… the prevalent idea [is] … that creating meaning is an individual 
activity has serious implications for human beings to whom the notion 
of agency does not apply. Where there is no agent there must be a 
deficit in meaning. Where there is a deficit of meaning it is difficult 
not to perceive human existence as the cause of grave suffering. If it is 
merely a cause of great suffering, the question of why these people are 
kept alive becomes hard to avoid indeed. Not only is it hard to avoid, 
it also appears to have a definite answer. (Reinders, p. 205) 
Arising from a situation of high dependency on segregative and restrictive 
service models, people with disabilities first called for rights to autonomy and self-
determination in the 1960’s. This culminated in the emergence of the influential 
“Independent Living Movement” in the USA in the 1970’s, and which has spread 
worldwide. Self-determination, self-image and public education, advocacy and 
service to all, were formulated as the core principles of this movement (Braddock & 
Parish, 2001). Despite what its name suggests, this disability movement recognised 
the social factors in contributing to disablement, besides a focus on individual 
independence. It sought greater independence for disabled individuals within the 
social context. This is different from the pursuit of the greatest possible physical 
independence from others. People with disabilities’ struggle for autonomy is most 
often manifest in their struggle for independence (Ells, 2001). This is a struggle 
between the dependence arising from impairments and social and cultural factors 
(Wendell, 1996) and individual autonomy expressed in grappling with barriers to 
such goods as work, housing, education, transport, and the physical environment. 
Grappling with these inevitably involves connection with others, not separateness 
from them (Ells, 2001). But the dominant “paradigm of humanity” that has been 
constructed around an identity of the healthy, able-bodied, “ideally shaped” person, 
over-emphasises respect for individual autonomy. This idea of autonomy, as used in 
the bio-ethical debate, is about the concept of the individual in isolation, rather than 
in community (Fitzgerald, 1999). Indeed Martin, Emanuel & Singer (2000) view 
individual autonomy as the socially dominant principle applied in health-care, rather 
than as one in balance with other principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence and 
justice as advanced by Beauchamp & Childress (2001). Pellegrino (1993) criticises 
Beauchamp and Childress’ principles, which include autonomy, as being too 
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abstract, rationalistic and too removed from the context in which moral choices are 
made. They ignore the person’s character, life story, cultural background and gender.  
In arguments in favour of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EPAS) 
individual autonomy, self-determination, control over the circumstances and timing 
of one’s death in order to find relief from suffering are dominant ideas (Bickenbach, 
1998; Donchin, 2000; Dworkin, 1993; Dworkin, Frey & Bok, 1998; Dworkin, Nagel, 
Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, & Thomson, 1999; Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Mann, 
1998; Kuhse, 1994; Somerville, 2000). In the debate about physician-assisted 
suicide, this concept of individual autonomy was advocated by six prominent 
philosophers (Dworkin, et al., 1999) in their Amici Curae Brief to the US Supreme 
Court in defence of the right of terminally ill patients who experienced unbearable 
suffering. These patients, they said, have a right to demonstrate that their “decision to 
die is indeed informed, stable, and fully free”. It was based on a right of liberty to 
make one’s own decisions "involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" 
(Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 1992, cited in Dworkin et al., 
1999). Speaking of euthanasia, Ronald Dworkin (1993) supports the individual 
freedom to choose one’s death, in accordance with the way we have lived our lives, 
that is in possession of the important human characteristics of self-determination and 
individual autonomy. He claims that as people fear the impacts of pain, excessive 
medical treatment and dependence on others, when dying, euthanasia can accord 
dignity to death. But as Battin (1998) has pointed out, his analysis focuses on the 
person’s agency at the end of life, and the agency of others is only taken into account 
in so far as it may impinge on the dying person’s agency. For most people the reality 
is one of a more complicated interpersonal life. 
Just as individual autonomy is often present more in name than in actuality in 
the disability experience (Donchin, 2000; Ells, 2001; Fitzgerald, 1996; Gill, 2000; 
Pijnenburg, 1998; Sobsey, 1994; Wendell, 1999), there are indications of a similar 
situation with regard to the practice of EPAS and other end-of-life decision making 
in general. Physicians and other professionals have been found to make end-of-life 
decisions that were significantly determined by the doctor’s individual characteristics 
such as their medical training and socio-demographic background (Braun & 
Kayashima, 2001; DiPasquale and Gluck, 2001; Waddell, Clarnette, Smith, Oldham 
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& Kellehear, 1996). Pool (1996), an anthropologist who conducted a study in a 
Dutch hospital found that whether or not an act of EPAS was performed depended on 
individual doctors’ ability to communicate and willingness to perform it as well as 
difficulties in interpreting patients’ wishes. Some patients appeared to receive EPAS 
without a clear request and others not despite their request. In the US, physicians, 
while valuing patient autonomy, were found to place end-of-life decisions in a wider 
context and did not always accept that decisions ought to be made from this 
principle. Physicians who would not comply with patients requests still cited patient 
autonomy as the most important principle that they used in their decision making 
(Fried, Stein, O’Sullivan, Brock & Novack, 1993). Blaas (1998) found that Dutch 
physicians did often not honour advance directions about euthanasia once individuals 
became incompetent. Bach (1992) also found that the attitudes that patients have 
towards their disability and their treatment options was less influenced by them 
making informed rational decisions than by the attitudes of their doctors. 
2.2.1 Public and private morality  
Besides saying that individual autonomy is inevitably relational in nature but 
is often used as non-relational and that its dominant use as non-relational adds to the 
vulnerability of people with disabilities as it appears to do for those who are the 
subject of end-of-life decisions, there is another dimension of autonomy relevant to 
EPAS. That is the role of individual autonomy with regard to public and private 
morality. Individual autonomy in EPAS involves two interpretations. The first is the 
idea that autonomy is a matter of individual rights about whether one lives or dies. 
The second involves the individual’s capacity to make reasonable choices. Rights are 
derived from social agreements. Thus the limits of a right to autonomy are socially 
decided (Ewin, 2002). But according to Reinders (2000), our liberal, pluralistic 
society is unable to engage values that go further than the level of rights to individual 
choice and self-determination.  
This idea of neutrality of government with regard to private morals and the 
values that they are based on is called by Griffith, Bood & Weyers (1998) the 
principle of tolerance. The neutrality that guides governmental positions they term 
neutrality of justification (p. 187). A public morality that operates at that level 
accords people individual rights to choice and self-determination by which they then 
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make their own moral decisions. Public morality in liberal society does not concern 
itself with the morality of individual choices as long as their consequences remain in 
that person’s private sphere. Public morality then can only operate at a consensus 
level of, what Reinders (2000) calls narrow morality, leaving the remainder to 
private choices. And public policy is limited in what it can resolve about EPAS 
controversies because the public/private liberal paradigm cannot accommodate 
moral values that appear to restrict private individual freedom (Clor, 1996; Griffith, 
Bood & Weyers, 1998, p.185). For example, some people with disabilities 
themselves use this public/private dichotomy as a way to justifying a right to EPAS:  
You do not need to be pro-abortion to support the rights of a woman 
to determine what happens to her own body. Nor do you need to be in 
favour of suicide to support physician-assisted suicide. You simply 
must recognise that these are personal issues. (Kohout, cited in 
Corbett, 1999) 
According to Griffiths, Bood & Weyers (1998), a public/private separation principle, 
as recognised in legal philosophy, has two basic views. The liberal view is one of 
state power being restricted in principle, with a presumption of individual liberty that 
is reflected in any state regulations. Any restriction of individual freedom must be 
justified by considerations of greater weight, where those who argue for the 
restriction carry the burden of proof. The conservative view, by contrast, holds that 
there are only practical reasons for limited state power where communitarian and 
individual concerns of moral goods are held as important. 
While taking different positions as to the role of individual autonomy in 
ethical decision-making, Griffith, Bood & Weyers (1998) and Reinders (2000) both 
conclude that a sensitive ethical question, such as EPAS represents, cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved by public policy. In the view of the first, there is a problem 
because of the compromises that need to be made, such as “restrictions on individual 
freedom [to exercise one’s autonomy to choose EPAS] which do not correspond with 
that [liberal] paradigm” (p. 185). In the view of the second, the problem is that the 
question can only be approached at a superficial level because of the compromise 
level at which debate in a pluralistic, liberal society stalls, requiring a cultural 
change, rather than a political solution (MacIntyre, 1999; Reinders, 2000). Reinders 
argues that the presumed divide between the first view (or procedural morality) and 
the second (or content-full morality) collapses. This is because the justification of 
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morality in the private/public paradigm cannot succeed without reference to the 
morals and values that individuals bring with them. The public and private spheres 
are intimately connected. His strategy is then to use the values found in care for, and 
living with, people with intellectual disability to point out that our society’s “moral 
fabric is much richer than liberal morality allows us to acknowledge” (p. 33). Ells 
(2001) concurs but includes disability, from the experience of the person who has the 
disability, in re-conceptualising individual autonomy.  
In relation to attitudes towards EPAS there appears to be empirical evidence 
of the private/public divide, as Reinders (2000) described it, where individuals draw 
on different moral levels in each sphere. Some studies have shown a discrepancy 
between people’s approval for a public policy and what they do themselves. For 
example, positive private attitudes are often expressed about advance directives 
about medical treatment but few people complete them (Emanuel, Barry, Stoeckle, 
Ettelson & Emanuel, 1991; Kastenbaum, 2001). Chochinov et al., (1995) drew on a 
number of surveys of physicians’ attitudes towards EPAS (Fried, Stein, O’Sullivan, 
Brock & Novack, 1993; Kuhse & Singer, 1988; Kinsella & Verhoeff, 1993) to show 
that 35–60 per cent of doctors thought these practices should be legalised but only 
28–40 per cent said that, if legal, they would be willing to practice them. Similarly, 
60 per cent of doctors supported the legalisation of assisted suicide in Oregon but 
only 46 per cent were willing to prescribe the lethal drugs to effect it (Lee, Nelson, 
Tilden, Ganzini, Schmidt & Tolle, 1996). It has been suggested that a decrease in 
support for PAS among Oregon oncologists, between 1994 and 1998, was related to 
their increased training in and knowledge of palliative care. Portenoy, et al. (1997), 
in surveying doctors, nurses and social workers, confirmed this suggestion. One-and-
a-half per cent of these oncologists had performed EPAS where they were able to 
provide all necessary care. However 6.2 per cent had performed EPAS where 
“administrative, fiscal and structural barriers allowed them to provide their dying 
patient with only some of the care they needed…” (p. 530) (Ezekiel, et al., 2000).6 
Another study showed that of 988 terminally ill patients, 60 per cent supported a 
hypothetical EPAS situation. Only 10.6 per cent would consider it seriously for 
                                                 
6 In 1998, from the time of enactment of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act in 1994, Ezekiel, et al 
found that support for physician-assisted suicide among Oregon oncologists, declined by half and for 
euthanasia by two-thirds. Besides issues of training and knowledge of palliative care, spirituality also 
seemed to play some role.  
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themselves (Emanuel, Fairclough & Emanuel, 2000). The latter could perhaps also 
be explained as a distantiation between their own immediate, and future, 
circumstances. This seemed to be so in the case of people in the earlier stages of 
terminal illness of whom about one third would consider EPAS (Chochinov et al, 
1995). As Chochinov et al. (1995) have pointed out, only 8.5 per cent of patients 
receiving palliative care for terminal cancer reported a strong desire for death 
(Chochinov et al., 1995); 3.6 per cent of dying people had discussed with family a 
wish to have euthanasia (Seale & Addington-Hall, 1994); and 9.9 per cent of Dutch 
patients who are nearing death from non-acute causes requested euthanasia (Olde 
Scheper & Duursma, 1994). Only 39.9 per cent of American terminally ill elderly 
patients with psychiatric and medical conditions preferred PAS, compared to 59.3 
per cent of their relatives supporting their PAS. In cases of chronic illness patient 
support for PAS was respectively18.2 per cent compared to 25.3 per cent of support 
by their relatives and in cases of mental incompetence patient and relatives’ support 
compared as 13.5 to 15.4 per cent (Koenig, Wildman-Hanlon, & Schmader, 1996). In 
other words, these studies show that the closer one’s experience with dying, the less 
support for EPAS there is. Public support for EPAS stands at 92 per cent in the 
Netherlands (Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998) and at 78 per cent in Australia 
(Morgan Gallup, 1995). These large differences between public support for EPAS 
and private support by people who are terminally ill, or are otherwise closely 
involved in others’ dying, may be connected to Reinders’ public/private divide and 
may include an element of personal distantiation. A mechanism of distantiation may 
be the application of different values to each scenario, influenced by levels of 
personal knowledge of dying and palliative care. As phronesis (MacIntyre, 1999), or 
first-hand practical knowledge, develops, private values may change. 
2.2.2 Summary  
Regard for individual autonomy is a dominant argument in the general EPAS 
debate as it is in the EPAS debate with regard to disability. Scholars hold differing 
views. It is often used as a non-relational, free-standing principle but is inevitably 
bound up in inter-relational dynamics and is not free from controlling influences. 
These dynamics involve patients and medical and other professionals as decision-
makers where the potential implementers of EPAS have the greater power. Just as in 
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the disability experience, patient autonomy may at times not be honoured and may be 
misplaced in justifying end-of-life decisions in general. Non-relational individual 
autonomy may be an insufficient principle to resolve end-of-life issues, which 
require additional, relational values in resolving underlying questions involving 
adequate care and support. The dominance of the non-relational autonomy paradigm 
involves a public/private divide as a means to address end-of-life issues by individual 
choice.  
2.3 Interdependence  
This section briefly discusses MacIntyre’s theory of interdependence, in 
relation to some of the disability literature on the subject. This theory is also 
described in Chapter Three, this study’s conceptual framework. It then goes on to 
review literature that seems related to MacIntyre’s concepts of flourishing and 
phronesis. These involve literature on wellbeing within the experiences of disability 
and personal value change and touch also on similar studies in relation to ageing and 
dying in suggesting a universal application of MacIntyre’s views. Themes involving 
wellbeing, value change and personal growth are manifest in this study’s findings. 
MacIntyre argues that human dependency and vulnerability are insufficiently 
acknowledged in Western society. However, he explains that dependency on others, 
along with vulnerability, is a key human experience. Dependency and vulnerability 
are experienced by all of us at various times over the course of our lives: when new-
born, a child, when ill, disabled or frail-aged. Not acknowledging these important 
aspects of our human nature leaves an unbalanced and incomplete account of 
ourselves and of our human nature. In turn this non-acknowledgement leaves us 
insufficiently open to using our emotional intelligence, that is, our ability to use both 
our emotional and rational capacities in conducting our lives. According to 
MacIntyre, for human beings to flourish a balance between the virtues of rational 
independence and acknowledged dependence and vulnerability is necessary. 
Flourishing involves entering into the full experience of engagement with the 
unacknowledged aspects of the human condition as well as concepts of ourselves as 
independent. It is within this engagement with “life as a whole” (p. 113), necessarily 
involving unconditional relationships with others, that private, relational values are 
expressed in the development of virtues such as kindness, generosity, patience and 
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persistence. A human being’s life flourishes “as a whole”, when an individual learns 
through “experience about the places both of independence and of dependence on 
others in the different stages of a flourishing life” (p. 113). The learning of a practical 
reasoner is that of “find[ing] one’s place within a network of givers and receivers in 
which the achievement of one’s individual good is understood to be inseparable from 
the achievement of the common good” (p. 113). Having thus acknowledged one’s 
vulnerability and dependence, and consequently having entered into an ongoing 
process of development of such virtues, or the practical knowledge called phronesis, 
in relationship with others, one may become a practical independent reasoner and 
experience human flourishing. Flourishing thus constitutes an ongoing 
developmental process involving both the individual and community.  
Others have also described human dependency and vulnerability as 
unacknowledged in Western society but as inevitable parts of the human experience. 
These realities are felt most keenly when our survival, or wellbeing, such as under 
conditions of disability or illness, are threatened (Ells, 2001; Held, 1990; Loewy, 
1993; Kittay, 1995; Reinders, 2000; Tronto, cited in Wendell; Wendell, 1996; 
Sontag, 1978).  
… no culture that endures beyond one generation can secure itself 
against the claims of human dependency. While we are all dependent 
on some form of care or support, at least minimally, and although 
dependencies vary in degree, those that involve the survival or 
thriving of a person cut most deeply through the fiction of a social 
order presumably constituted by independent equal persons. (Kittay, 
1995, p. 8) 
The dependency of disability, needing others for very basic personal tasks, in a 
society which values individual independence, is often seen as humiliating (Wendell, 
1996). Even within the disability movement there is a shame about the need for 
others, something rather kept in the realm of privacy. Therefore the disability 
movement tends to spend a lot more energy on issues like accessible transport than 
on ensuring basic care is available (Wade, cited in Wendell, p. 147). An example of 
the difficulty of acknowledging dependency appears reflected in medical staff’s more 
negative perception of suffering and levels of depression that spinal cord injury 
patients experience than the latter did themselves (Cushman & Dijkers, 1990; 
Patterson, Miller-Perrin, McCormick & Hudson, 1993). Also, some people would 
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rather be dead than dependent on others in their hour of need and in pain (van der 
Maas, van Delden & Pijnenborg, 1991; Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, 2000). 
Often we will not notice our bodies until something goes wrong with them 
and then have to adapt our lives to a different reality where the limited body becomes 
part of our identity (Leder and Zola, cited in Ells, 2001, p. 560). The literature 
contains many examples of an apparently good personal accommodation of the 
realities of increased dependence and vulnerability under conditions of acquired 
chronic disability, of old age and when dying. Parts of this literature indicate the 
presence of aspects of MacIntyre’s flourishing when it shows personal wellbeing and 
value changes towards greater emphasis on social aspects of life and a sense of 
personal growth. Relational factors are very important to the wellbeing in these 
categories of people and involve intra-personal attitudes and changes towards one’s 
changed circumstances and towards others. 
Gill (2000) has pointed to the many studies showing high levels of wellbeing 
under conditions of severe disability, as an important part of her argument against 
PAS. Despite the presence of heightened dependency and vulnerability for many 
disabled people, most studies indicate that they rate their own lives as good or better 
than those of others (Crewe, 1996; Eisenberg & Salz, 1991; Stensman, 1985). In a 
sample of 1668 people with quadriplegia 74 per cent rated their lives from fairly 
good to very good and 26 per cent from fairly bad to very bad (Ville, Ravaud & 
Tetrafigap Group, 2001). Under conditions of ageing with quadriplegia, combining 
two concepts that are usually assumed to imply negative wellbeing, people felt 
“pretty good”. They were “happy with their lives and … glad to be alive”. This was 
so despite many “potential problems and health complications” (Gerhart, Charlifue, 
Menter, Weitzenkamp & Whiteneck, 1997). Dijkers (1999), Woodrich & Patterson 
(1983) also found no impact of ageing upon quality of life or levels of wellbeing 
among people with spinal cord injury, nor was level of injury related to acceptance of 
disability. This was also true in comparing those whose onset of spinal cord injury 
arose between the ages of 1–25 and 16–39, showing age and level of injury do not 
predict long-term psychological adjustment (Kennedy, Gorsuch & Marsh, 1995). 
Ventilator-assisted people with quadriplegia rated their lives as better than those 
without ventilation and the majority of both groups of people with quadriplegia, 
ventilated and non-ventilated, reported positive life satisfaction and wellbeing (Bach 
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& Tilton, 1994). Brooks, Tonack, King, Simson, Gould & Goldstein (2002), in a 
qualitative study, confirmed the perception of high quality of life among 26 
respirator-dependent people who did have conditions other than quadriplegia. Such 
findings are contrary to public beliefs about the experience of disability (Patterson, 
Miller-Perron, McCormick & Hudson, 1993). Medical staff interprets the 
experiences of spinal cord injured more negatively than how the latter experience life 
themselves. Hospital staff, for instance, have been found to overestimate the 
suffering and levels of depression that spinal cord injury patients experience 
(Cushman & Dijkers, 1990; Patterson, Miller-Perrin, McCormick, & Hudson, 1993). 
Some studies suggest that there is no significant difference between the 
quality of life of non-disabled and that of disabled people (Cameron, Titus, Kostin, & 
Kostin, 1973; Eisenberg & Salz, 1991; Fine & Asch, 1988; Stensman, 1985; Titley, 
1996;Wacker, Harper, Powell & Healey, 1983; Weinberg, 1984; Yerxa & Baum 
1968). Some people with disabilities may view their lives as better post injury than 
before it (Ray & West, 1984; Weinberg, 1984). Somewhat lower rating of the quality 
of their lives by people with disabilities compared to non-disabled control groups has 
also been shown (Decker & Schultz, 1985; Fuhrer, Rintala, Hart, Clearman & 
Young, 1992). Where studies show lower ratings of life satisfaction, these are due to 
negative correlation of quality of life to social dimensions (Gill, 2000). These include 
inadequate social support or control over life choices (Fuhrer et al., 1992; Viemero & 
Krause, 1998) rather than physical factors, such as severity of impairment (Decker & 
Schultz, 1985) or items related to independent functioning (Ville, Ravaud & 
Tetrafigap Group, 2001). As discussed by Ville et al., and Gill (2000), a number of 
studies have nevertheless shown that life satisfaction is not influenced by either 
severity of impairment or level of independence (Craig et al., 1994; Cushman & 
Hassett, 1992; Dijkers, 1997; Dunnum, 1990; Fuhrer, et al., 1992; Viemero & 
Krause, 1992). Instead life satisfaction is often related to social factors. Loss of 
autonomy was found to affect wellbeing to the degree it limited social activity, 
relational or occupational (Ville, et al., 2001), suggesting the primacy of importance 
of social relationships over other benefits derived from occupational activity. Social 
support was found to be important in adjustment to disability (Brooks, et al., 2002; 
McColl & Skinner, 1995). Support from family and friends ranked higher in 
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importance in adjusting to disability than disability conditions, psycho-social or 
demographic factors (Li & Moore, 1998). 
Life satisfaction, quality of life and wellbeing rises with the richness, 
frequency and quality of social contacts, confiding relationships and social 
interaction (Bach & Tilton, 1994; Coyle, Shank, Kinney & Hutchins, 1993; Schultz 
& Decker, 1985; Crisp, 1992; Clayton & Chubon, 1994). Physical survival of people 
with quadriplegia has been linked to better personal adjustment and being socially 
and vocationally active (Crewe, 1996; Krause, 1991; Krause & Crewe, 1987). 
Bracken & Shepard (1980) found that the kind of person one was before spinal 
injury, and the influence of significant others, play a significant role in coping with 
injury. They discussed studies showing that those with a more stable personality and 
high ego strength with an ability to delay gratification, cope better with disability 
than those who were ambitious and showed intense personal effort. 
There is evidence that people who are faced with disability adjust to the new 
situation by changing their values and worldview (Bach & McDaniel, 1993; Keaney 
& Glueckauf, 1993). This is true for people with spinal cord injury (Crewe, 1996) 
and has been found in people with many types of disabilities, whether congenital or 
traumatic in origin (Keaney & Glueckauf). These studies do not directly refer to 
acknowledgement of the respondents increased dependency and vulnerability but 
appear to suggest an acceptance of that reality attended by value changes that would 
assist flourishing. Wright (cited in Crewe, 1996) suggests that the key to good 
psychological adjustment to onset of disability is a personal change in values. Four 
areas of values change have been identified (Keaney & Glueckauf). Enlargement of 
the scope of values occurs when the disabled person recognises other values as 
important compared to those lost. This process is initiated by a number of factors, 
including the need to attend to manage daily life and relief from grief over losses. 
The enlargement is said to occur when the person perceives meaning in “[traumatic] 
events [that have happened to them], abilities and goals” (Keaney & Glueckauf, p. 
200). A seemingly closely related second avenue of values change opens when one’s 
scope of values broadens, away from the socially admired values of physical 
perfection, beauty and ability towards others such as friendship, intelligence, work 
and creativity. This change is a compensation for the loss of one’s own physique. 
Stensman (1985), for instance, showed people with mobility impairments redirect 
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their valuation of walking and getting dressed independently towards 
communicating, relating socially and thinking. The third area of values change 
occurs when the person sees their disability as but one of their characteristics, rather 
than as a condition that defines them. Watson, Cunningham-Burley, Watson & 
Milburn (1996) found that people with physical disabilities adopted criteria for 
judging health different from the dominant view. Their adopted criteria were 
independent of physical appearance or level of functioning. The fourth area of values 
change occurs when self worth is judged not by comparison with the social standard 
but as an expression of one’s intrinsic worth. A sense of personal growth may arise 
as the person becomes aware of their changed values (Crewe, 1996). In looking at 
gains and losses of 50 people with quadriplegia over a 20-year time span, Crewe 
found that the most frequently reported gains were in the areas of personal growth, 
reflecting changes in values, priorities and self-understanding. Deeper relationships 
were also often mentioned as perceived gains from the disability experience.  
These phenomena of wellbeing, value change and personal growth are not 
restricted to the disability experience. They have been studied also in ageing people 
and in those who are dying. The world’s longest study of ageing, the Harvard Study 
of Adult Development, followed 824 people in three cohorts. Key findings on 
wellbeing included: the relationships with good people in overcoming negative 
events is a significant factor: that the capacities for gratitude, forgiveness and loving 
people facilitate healing relationships; that objective physical good health is less 
important than subjective good health, showing that is there is a difference between 
being ill and suffering from it. Further, graceful ageing involved being caring 
towards others, having trust and hope in life, “sensible autonomy”, initiative, a sense 
of humour and capacity to accept “indignities of old age, [being] graceful about 
dependency issues, [taking] care of self, and when ill [being] a patient a doctor 
would want to care for” (Vaillant, 2002, p. 346). Dignity was found in an integrity 
that was an acceptance of the “next best to what you want” (Vaillant, p. 159). 
Vaillant concludes that wisdom is that which one needs to know to live life well and 
its acquisition depends on “the toleration of ambiguity and paradox” (p. 256). It is 
about engageing with one’s emotions, rather than ignoring them and involves the 
integrated use of cognitive and emotional intelligence (pp. 252–256).  
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Like in the disability and aged experiences, a wellbeing in dying is also 
associated with social support and intra-personal dimensions. Although the phrase 
dying with dignity is often heard in the EPAS debate, including from my informants, 
its meaning is seldom clarified. This is despite data, such in the Netherlands, which 
showed loss of dignity and associated issues to be highly relevant to the EPAS 
debate. In the Netherlands loss of dignity (57 per cent), dying in an ‘unworthy way 
(46 per cent), dependency on others (33 per cent), being tired of life (23 per cent) and 
physical pain and suffering (46 per cent) were reported as reasons underlying 
requests for EPAS (van der Maas, et al., 1991). Kass & Land (1996) hold that “death 
with dignity is solely dependent on social support” (p. 17). Chochinov, Hack, 
McClement, Kristjanson & Harlos (2002) clarified the meaning of loss of dignity in 
terminally ill people, capturing many of the issues that are also involved in 
wellbeing. They found three categories: firstly, illness-related concerns, including 
symptom management and preservation of independence; secondly, a dignity-
conserving repertoire, involving the way one looks at one’s own situation and 
personal actions that bolster one’s dignity; and thirdly, a social dignity inventory, 
referring to “social concerns or relationship dynamics that enhance or detract from a 
patient’s sense of dignity” (p. 439). Chochinov et al.(2002) have proposed this as a 
new model for palliative care where the dignity of the dying person stands central. In 
this model the dignity conserving repertoire appears to incorporate the phenomenon 
of personal value change and growth, affecting the way one views one’s own 
situation and acts accordingly. The first and third categories appear to fit with the 
positive roles of good social support and care, and social relations in wellbeing, also 
found to be so for dying people by many others (Chochinov, et al., 1995; Lavery, 
Boyle, Dickens, Maclean, & Singer, 2001; Muskin, 1998; Breitbart, Rosenfeld, & 
Passik, 1996). 
Akin to MacIntyre’s flourishing, wellbeing in dying has also been observed 
as part of a developmental process which, akin to phronesis offers opportunities for 
personal growth towards “feelings of mastery, expansion, a sense of wellbeing ..” 
(Byock, 1997, pp. 33–34) Imara (1993), Byock, (1994, 1996) and Thomas (2001) 
have also described dying as a developmental process containing opportunities for 
fulfilment and wellbeing.  
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2.3.1 Suffering and transformation 
Interdependence and its manifestation under severe threats to human 
wellbeing or survival can be understood as responses to suffering found within the 
resources of human nature. It appears to be a successful approach because it 
acknowledges that a “whole of life” experience must involve engagement with all 
aspects of the human condition. This has a dual, inter-related outcome of flourishing, 
or wellbeing, as individuals within community and of overcoming suffering by 
accepting the full reality of the human condition. This second aspect of flourishing is 
the outgrowing of suffering by seeing it in a different light. 
Suffering, including much physical pain, has been said to be always “socially 
informed” (Csordas, cited in Paterson & Hughes, 1999). Viktor Frankl described 
suffering as a loss of purpose and meaning rather than as the extreme deprivation of 
the German concentration camp that he endured (Frankl, 1985). According to Frankl  
and Achterhuis (1995), meaning seems to arise when life is not perfectly controlled. 
Because of findings of personal interpretations of pain in such dimensions as 
malfunction, as spiritual and self-growth, coping and control, abuse and power, pain 
is necessarily “permeated” with meaning (Paterson & Hughes, p. 602). Suffering is 
essentially caused by events that threaten one’s physical and psychological integrity, 
or intactness, as a person (Cassell, 1991). Because of the intra-personal and social 
nature of suffering it can be overcome by using these as resources to transform its 
experience, as MacIntyre’s interdependence framework does. Wendell (1996), who 
says that she is speaking from personal experience, speaks of transcendence of pain 
through acceptance: 
… we must also talk about how to live with the suffering body, with 
that which cannot be noticed without pain, and that which cannot be 
celebrated without ambivalence. We may find then that there is a 
place in our discussion of the body for some concept of transcendence 
(p. 179). 
The relevance of suffering to the disability experience and dying and end-of-life 
decision making such as EPAS, is apparent when considering its universal causes, 
arising from external circumstances, intra-personal dynamics and social relations as 
reflected in Wendell’s (1996) social theory of disability and in Cocks & Duffy’s 
(1993) concept of vulnerability. 
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Just as the enlargement of the scope of values held by people with 
quadriplegia allowed them to overcome suffering from their disability (Keaney & 
Glueckauf, 1993), Cassell (1991) sees patients as enlarging themselves as they grew 
in their suffering. They transcended their suffering by re-arranging their beliefs in 
new ways, leading to a self-perception as another “intactness” in a new dimension” 
(p. 44). Carl Jung (Wilhelm, 1962) believed that life’s most important and greatest 
problems are in essence insoluble and that they can only be outgrown. Outgrowing 
suffering in this sense means that the actual observable condition causing the 
suffering, like dependency, might not change but by perceiving it differently it may 
no longer be experienced as suffering. Jung held that these problems are unsolvable 
because such problems contain the polarities, like dependence and independence, 
inherent in any self-regulating system, or in MacIntyre’s life as a whole. When one 
part of such a system is denied, not acknowledged, or is attempted to be controlled, 
the system may become dys-functional. Meaning, a cause of suffering, may then 
disappear. 
Reinders (2000) contends that there often is a conscious personal choice 
involved in accepting life as a whole. He uses the example of the personal growth, or 
“transformation experience” (pp. 175–187) of parents involved in the daily care and 
support of their children who had intellectual disability. Reinders points to a paradox 
of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perception of one’s life. On the one hand these parents 
find their caring role enriching and rewarding in the sense of a ‘fulfilment’ that can 
only come in the pursuit of demanding, difficult tasks. On the other, they might think 
to themselves that they might choose a life without this task, if they had a choice – 
Reinders calls this the objective ‘view from the outside’. These subjective and 
objective views within the one person produce a tension because it is difficult to 
integrate the objective view into the subjective view grounded in one’s own 
experience. It is difficult to hold both views at the same time without the detached 
objective view undermining the commitment, which enables the care in one’s lived, 
subjective experience to occur. From the objective view their life may seem of a 
negative quality as a result of “the hardships we endure, the emotions we invest, the 
passions that absorb us into making an effort – all of which make our commitments 
seem important to us appear as simply a waste of energy” (p. 181). Thus the 
objective view may lead to alienation. The objective and subjective views are parts in 
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each of us and both have their value. But parents, in a study by Scorgie (in Reinders, 
pp. 184–185), transcended this inner conflict by making a choice of embracement, or 
acceptance, of their lives. They made a commitment of continual care for their 
children with intellectual disability. This required a personal change where they 
became more compassionate, confident and enjoyed an increased sense of humour. 
They had adopted a different perspective of what was important in life, using the 
values found in their private experience of care, accepted the disability, reframed 
their beliefs and attitudes and learned to live with uncertainty. Reinders supports the 
possibility that people have a choice about whether to transcend events. It is not that 
what we think, feel and perceive that determines what we experience but how we 
experience it. Therefore a sense of coherence between “how we experience what 
happens in our own lives … and our view of the world at large” is important (p. 187). 
2.3.2 Summary 
The preceding review of literature on interdependence, wellbeing, suffering 
and personal growth suggests dependence and vulnerability are largely not 
acknowledged within the Western culture, despite its inevitable presence in each 
person’s life. MacIntyre’s interdependence framework is of universal relevance for 
this reason. When threats to personal wellbeing or survival occur, these underlying 
parts of the human condition are more prominently felt. A conscious choice can be 
made to acknowledge and accept dependency and vulnerability by anyone at any 
time but becomes more pressing at such a time of threat. The literature shows that 
many people with disability appear to adopt at least parts of the interdependence 
framework and experience wellbeing. The wider relevance of this phenomenon is 
strengthened by similar evidence in relation to aged people and in dying. Human 
flourishing is made up of individual and social wellbeing and of an outgrowing of 
suffering by changing one’s values and perception of reality. Such personal growth 
occurs in the ongoing process of engaging with the full paradox of life’s dependence 
and independence. As the literature shows, the interdependence paradigm appears to 
offer practical approaches to suffering and routes towards individual and social 
wellbeing. MacIntyre’s framework has many parts in common with other scholar’s 
views on its cultural and practical dimensions and value and appears confirmed in 
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some empirical evidence. Interdependence appears as a plausible representation of 
human nature. 
2.4 Distance from death and dying 
Most of the grassroots informants in my study had little direct experience of 
the dying of others. They also appeared to be unclear about the nature and practice of 
possible options at the end of life, such as EPAS or palliative care. They professed a 
low personal fear of death or dying but thought that such fear was publicly pervasive. 
There is a vast literature on death and dying. The main purpose of this part of the 
literature review is to get some insight into whether my informants’ experience and 
knowledge is isolated or is a more widespread phenomenon. Some detail on 
availability of palliative care in Australia and the Netherlands is included. The nature 
and practice of EPAS is of course discussed more extensively elsewhere in this 
study. 
A distance from the experience of dying and death seems to be a modern 
phenomenon.  
As with every other looming terror and looming temptation, we seek 
ways to deny the power of death and the icy hold with which it grips 
human thought. Its constant closeness has always inspired traditional 
methods by which we consciously and unconsciously disguise its 
reality …. In recent generations, we have added something new. We 
have created the method of modern dying. Modern dying takes place 
in the modern hospital, where it can be hidden, cleansed from its 
organic blight, and finally, packaged for modern burial. We can now 
deny the power not only of death but of nature itself. We hide our 
faces from its face… . (Nuland, 1995, xv) 
Indeed by 1987, in Wales and England, less than 32 per cent of people died at home 
(Seale & Cartwright, 1994, as cited in MacNamara, 2001, p. 73). For America in 
1988 this was about 20 per cent (Quint Benoliel & Degner, 1995, as cited in 
McNamara, 2001, p. 73) and for Western Australia in 1995, 22 per cent (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 1997, as cited in MacNamara, 2001, p. 73). Most deaths 
occurred in hospital with the remainder in institutions, hospices and deaths 
elsewhere. Dying has become greatly medicalised and is shaped by the medical 
profession’s mission for curing disease, set within a highly technological 
environment (Callahan & Hanson, 1998; Callahan, 1993; Cassell, 1991; Griffiths, et 
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al., 1998; MacNamara, 2001). This is not surprising in an age where “many have 
come to look upon the termination of human life as a mechanical failure”, where the 
expression pulling the plug is a phrase that is revealing of this view (Kastenbaum, 
2001, pp. 46–47). Fears of a techno-medical approach to dying, which would keep 
people alive beyond thresholds of futility of treatment and institutionalisation, and 
involving a loss of personal control, are important factors in the desire for hastened 
death (Achterhuis, 1995; Griffith, Bood, & Weyers, 1998; Kellehear, 2001; Mitchell, 
Kerridge & Lovat, 1996, p. 262).  
Fear, and consequently, denial of death in Western societies is pervasive 
according to Aries, 1974, 1981; Becker, 1973; Borysenko, 1994; and Gorer, 1955. 
But unrelated to any belief in their immortality or extinction, many people say that 
they are not afraid of death but are afraid of dying (Loewy & Loewy, 2000). 
Kellehear (2001) suggests that the Australian culture, like the North American and 
British cultures, does acknowledge grief and death but not dying, which leads to an 
“absence of ideas” about end-of-life scenarios.  
It is as if Australian culture … readily acknowledge[s] death and 
grief, but not the process of dying. (…) Is it any wonder that when 
Australians now face the prospect of dying they are empty of ideas 
about what is to be done? (p. 508).  
Fears of death may not be the same as fears of dying. Kastenbaum (1992, p. 
149) refers to literature reviews and cites studies (Kastenbaum & Costa, 1977; 
Lester, 1967; Schell & Zinger, 1984) which show that death is not feared much at all. 
However, in Becker’s (1973) analysis the fear of death is ever present as a drive to 
any organism’s self-preservation. But this fear must be repressed if people are to 
function. This requires a constant psychological effort that drives the way we live. 
Many of us attempt hero projects requiring the pursuit of control over life’s 
processes and which last beyond our selves as a way to meaning and immortality. If 
successful these projects give us self-esteem.  
A low knowledge of end-of-life options has been identified in some studies. 
Silveira, DiPiero, Gerrity & Feudtner (2000) for instance did find a low level of 
public knowledge about refusing or withdrawing treatment, euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide and Kennedy (2002) observed a low level of knowledge about EPAS 
among the Dutch. And palliative care, as another option at the end of life, is not well 
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understood by the Australian public (Webster & Kristjanson, 2002). In a survey by 
the Palliative Care Council of South Australia (1998, cited in Webster and 
Kristjanson, p. 15) half the respondents were not able to describe palliative care. 
Another survey by Palliative Care Australia (1999, cited in Webster & Kristjanson, 
p. 15) showed that three in four people did not “understand the meaning of palliative 
care”. Nor is it well understood by the Dutch public (Enklaar, 1999). Furthermore, 
diminished distance to death, lack of knowledge of circumstances of dying, and 
provision of palliative care have been identified as factors in decreasing support for 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (Braun & Kayashima, 2001; Enklaar, 1999; 
Ganzini, Nelson, Schmidt, Kraemer, Delorit & Lee, 2000; Portenoy, et al., 1997; 
Waddell, Clarnette, Smith, Oldham & Kellehear, 1996). Ganzini, et al., for example, 
found that 46 per cent of Oregonian patients who requested assisted suicide changed 
their minds when offered palliative care. 
Palliative care in the Netherlands has a low public profile. There is evidence 
of a low awareness of and practice of palliative care in the Netherlands (Zylics, 
1998) with only 70 specialist palliative care beds for the whole of the Netherlands in 
1998 and little palliative care training for doctors. Dutch palliative care has been 
described as being in its infancy with palliative care institutions only being 
developed since the early ninety nineties. The Netherlands had six in-patient 
hospices and 29 palliative care units by 1999 (Janssens, ten Have & Zylics (1999). 
Nevertheless, Fraencke & Willems (2000) reported the presence of a “broad 
spectrum” of palliative care options and some improvements in its availability (p. 
21). By contrast, Australian palliative care possesses (Palliative Care Australia, 
2002) some 1159 beds and 28, 441 patients receiving assistance through hundreds of 
dedicated palliative care services.7  
                                                 
7 In absence of national aggregate data, I compiled these figures from the national Directory of 
palliative care services of Palliative Care Australia. They are not necessarily reflective of the full 
scope of Australian palliative care services as many services did not list their beds or numbers of 
patients. However, as a comparison between the Dutch and Australian situations it is perhaps a useful 
indicator of a significant difference in level of services. 
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2.5 Dominant social values 
The purpose of this section is to give some context to those findings in my 
study where informants believed that they live in socially declining times while 
showing some optimism about improving circumstances for people with disabilities. 
It is not within the province of this thesis to present extensive literature on the subject 
of social decline and dominant values. However, the presented literature gives a 
context to my informants’ beliefs of social turbulence and decline, including a 
dominant Western culture of individualism and losses of community and public trust. 
This dominant value system is the setting within which attitudes towards EPAS and 
its policy and practice find their expression. In presenting this context I use 
individualism as characterised by a culturally dominant over-emphasis on the 
interests of individual persons with a lesser importance placed on communal 
interests. Individualism has of course both positive aspects, such as an individual’s 
responsibility for self-governance, and negative aspects such as an egotistical self-
interest.  
Kastenbaum (2001, p. 80) asserts a historically “strong connection between 
ways of life and ways of death in every epoch”. The contemporary Western values of 
individualism and individual autonomy, together with attendant developments of 
growing secularism, and emphasis on technological approaches in medical practice, 
have shaped social attitudes towards death and dying (Callahan & Hanson, 1998; 
Callahan, 1994;Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Mann, 1998; McNamara, 2001; 
Dworkin, 1995; Dworkin, et al., 1996). The widespread support for legal euthanasia, 
or the “requested death movement” (McInerney, as cited in McNamara, 2001, p. 4) is 
a contemporary attitude that is strongly linked to individualist values through its 
respect for a right to individual, rational choice. Likewise, negative attitudes towards 
disability were and are also embedded in the dominant values of the time (Cocks, 
1998; Wolfensberger, 1998). Contemporary dominant social values of 
“individualism and choice, materialism, utilitarianism, youth and physical beauty, 
hedonism and immediacy” (Cocks, 1998, p. 12) have been identified as driving 
social policies and practices. They pose threats to the lives and wellbeing of people 
who have disabilities, as these values are reflected in “social dislocation, 
dysfunctional social institutions, worsening social indicators and weakening of 
commitments to vulnerable people” (p. 13). Indeed Cocks and Duffy (1993) have 
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pointed to the presence of these dominant values as in part constituting the need for 
the strong presence of disability advocacy responses.  
Much of modern thought and values are linked to the emergence of the 18th 
century Enlightenment. Rationality and respect for individual persons in a pursuit of 
human emancipation were its hallmarks (Harvey, cited in Haralambos, van Krieken, 
Smith & Holborn, 1996). 
The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by 
many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of 
human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. The scientific 
domination of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want and the 
arbitration of natural calamity. The development of rational forms of 
social organisation and rational modes of thought promised liberation 
from the irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, release from the 
arbitrary use of power as well as from the dark side of our own human 
natures (p. 721). 
Such ideas are still part of the Western worldview. However, there are those who 
perceive a 20th century post-modernity where modern beliefs that arose from the 
Enlightenment are no longer necessarily accepted. These include a belief in “the 
inevitability of progress, the power of science to solve all problems, the perfectibility 
of humanity or the possibility of running societies in a rational way” (p. 721). In the 
post-modern era there is a greater pluralism of beliefs and a greater scepticism about 
the future (Haralambos, et al., 1996). According to Dutch historian van der Horst 
(2000, pp. 549–560), modernistic progress in the Netherlands appears to have made 
way for a post-modernist search for meaning in “the most individual expression of 
[one’s] most individual emotion”.  
Hugh Mackay (1993) has identified our time as “The age of anxiety” where 
stress and insecurity is keenly felt (p. 7.), not only for Australians but for the entire 
Western world. There are many commentators who complement this picture. 
Goleman (1996), Saul (1993) and Taylor (1992) for example have also identified a 
general, overly rational–individualistic emphasis within Western societies. And 
according to Clor (1996, p. 134), personal autonomy, “a condition of personal 
independence, freedom of choice, or self-determination” (p. 134), is in our 
contemporary society much celebrated and glorified. Autonomy involves the 
individual’s rational agency in order to make her choices. Dominant Western values 
and Western ways of life are undergoing a very high rate of social change, or 
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turbulence, and appear to be at a crisis point (Capra, 1982, 1996; Cocks, 1994). 
According to Capra (1996), this is a crisis of perception where there is a need to 
recognise the interrelatedness of major social and environmental problems and a 
failure to perceive the further damage caused by our solutions to those problems 
within that worldview. Popenoe (1994) perceives a “declining sense of civic 
obligation and rising social disorder” (p. 7.). Goleman (1996) agrees that we live in a 
time where “the fabric of society seems to unravel at ever greater speed when 
selfishness, violence and a meanness of spirit seem to be rotting the goodness of our 
communal lives” (p. xii).  
For social historian Jacques Barzun (2000) contemporary times in Western 
civilisation are those of decadence and are demotic, a chaotic democracy. It is a 
world characterised by individualism in a context where one feels hemmed in by 
both too many rules and too many people: “… the individual came in conflict with 
his alter ego—his equal in rights—throughout the day” (p. 775). This is of course a 
metaphor for the tension between individual autonomy and community. Ours is also 
an age of technocratic managerialism where democracy is more of a façade then 
reality, being influenced by money, lobbyists and propaganda of every kind. Our 
dependence on the products of technology has made us more insecure through fears 
of destruction through nuclear weapons and through a “psychic disarray” arising 
from manipulation of genes, including cloning. The demotic society places a high 
emphasis on the physical through sports and image rather than the substance of the 
person and through its sexualisation of human life. The overriding taste of the 
“demotic individual” is for the “unconditioned life”, a utopian life where one “acts as 
if nothing stood in the way of every wish” (Barzun, pp. 780–781).  
Dutch historian van der Horst (2000) states that the Dutch are now trying to 
meet their individual, material desires in a context of a wholesale loss of meaning 
and idealism at the turn of this century. 
… the sort of idealism and meaning for which the Dutch were 
searching [was] an idealism which was the most individual expression 
of their most individual emotion. They were desperately looking for a 
mission. But they could not find it (pp. 549–550). 
Increased material welfare has been associated with a growing 
individualisation in the Netherlands, described as a growing decrease in individual 
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dependence and increase in choices in life. A result has been that citizens have less 
acceptance of limitations in health-care and are more used to making demands of 
services in general such as who delivers a service and its time, place and content 
(VWS, 2001, p. 13). Charles Taylor (1992) observes that a societal over-emphasis on 
the individual has seen a decline in a sense of personal inter relatedness and 
connectedness and a decline in the practice of moral virtues and has eroded a 
perception of meaning in life. Society has found its highest good in pursuit of 
material, economic ends. A dominant technological worldview has resulted in 
creating significant problems for humanity. There are indicators to support these 
beliefs. The many social problems that have arisen from the dominant Western value 
framework include rising rates of suicide, depression, substance abuse, stress, 
anxiety, violence and crime (Goleman, 1994; Norton, 1994; Popenoe, 1994; 
Seligman, cited in Myers, 1992, p. 145). Presently unipolar major depression is a 
globally widespread clinical condition, projected to become the leading cause of 
disease burden by 2020 (World Health Organization, 2003). Seligman (cited in 
Myers, 1992, p. 145) believes that depression is a “contemporary plague” caused by 
epidemic hopelessness, which in turn is caused by individualism that prides itself in 
personal independence. In the Netherlands, Breedveld and van den Broek (2002) 
underline this situation by reporting a growing incidence of mental illness and 
anxiety among the Dutch within a demanding and hurried society where myriad 
choices in many areas are experienced as stressful obligations.  
Surveys have reported a public perception of social decline. People believe in 
the Western central tenet of progress but many of them do not believe life is getting 
better or believe it is getting worse. Eckersley (1998) reported that Australians, as in 
surveys in other Western countries, showed a satisfaction with their personal life. 
However, an Australian survey published in 1997 (CSIRO, 1997, cited in Eckerley, 
p. 7) showed that 52 per cent of people believed that life was getting worse in their 
country “taking into account social, economic and environmental conditions and 
trends” (p. 7). Only 13 per cent thought that it was getting better and 33 per cent 
thought it was static. Another study (Commission for the Future, 1988, cited in 
Eckersley, p. 7) found that most Australians thought of life as having become worse 
in the last 20 years with more believing that this situation would worsen by the turn 
of the 21th century than those who were optimistic.  
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The widespread perception that things are getting worse at the social 
or national level is significant, regardless of whether it is ‘factually’ or 
‘objectively’ true. The resulting erosion of faith in our society and its 
future influences the way we see our roles and responsibilities, and 
our relationship to social institutions, especially government. It denies 
us a social ideal to believe in – something to convince us to 
subordinate our own individual interests to a higher social goal – and 
a wider framework of meaning (Eckersley, p. 9). 
Eckersley believes that such data show such discontent to be based at deep 
levels, that is, of those values that underlie notions of material growth and progress 
as the road to better life. Whereas “a sense of meaning and purpose is the single 
attitude most strongly associated with life satisfaction (Headey & Wearing, cited in 
Eckersley, p. 9), the “personal, social and spiritual relationships that give our lives a 
moral texture and a sense of meaning – of self-worth, belonging, identity, purpose 
and hope” tend to be overlooked in the current dominant social value context. This 
discontent about life which appears to not be getting any better is demonstrated in 
national “Genuine Progress Indicators”, which show that despite an ever-rising 
measure of economic progress (Gross Domestic Product) in Western countries, social 
wellbeing has actually not improved much with it (Eckersley, 1999; Hamilton & 
Sadler, 1997; Yencken & Porter, 2001). Currently commonly used indicators of 
wellbeing such as GDP are inadequate and lack acknowledgement of “the social 
relationships that link us” (Cox, 1998, p. 158). Indeed a growing gap has been 
identified in the Netherlands between “dispersed, well-willing and active citizens” 
and the political sphere’s attempt at judging what are important societal values (SCP, 
1999, p. 2). Cox believes that the development of indicators of social, unlike 
economic causes of wellbeing have been ignored because they are seen as being 
within the purview of the private sector of daily life. Public policy mainly restricts 
itself to interventions in exchanges of goods and services. Cox believes that the 
public/private interest dichotomy is artificial and counter-productive as each sphere 
inevitably permeates the other. 
The dominant individualist paradigm is associated also with a decline in 
public trust in our institutions, between community members and in our collective 
endeavours (Cox, 1998; Eckersley, 1998; Goleman, 1996; Misztal, 1996; O’Neill, 
2002; Popenoe, 1994). Misztal suggests that replacing lost sources of public goods 
such as trust: tradition, community and the church with no more than a “vague and 
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murky concept of …civil society” only returns us to the inevitable paradox between 
“individualism“ and “collective solidarity”, between “autonomy and community”, 
within liberal society (pp. 6–7). However, a Dutch trend apparently contradictory to 
my Dutch informants’ perceptions has also been reported. Measured between 1972 
and 1998, trust in one’s fellow citizen rose from 38 per cent to 55 per cent in the 
Netherlands and participation in voluntary organisations, a public trust indicator was 
comparatively higher for Europe than America (SCP, 1999). On the other hand 
Australian public trust in some professions declined “dramatically” between 1976 
and 1997 from an average of 31 to 17 per cent, except for physicians, teachers and 
dentists (Eckersley, 1998, p. 9).  
Among a number of possible explanations of the difference between 
perceptions of personal and general conditions, the “most important” appears to be 
“the nature of personal happiness and life satisfaction” and its “relative independence 
to external circumstances and changes in these” (Headey & Wearing, 1992; Myers & 
Diener, 1996; Hamer, 1996, all cited in Eckersley, 1998). Perhaps this explanation 
could mean that there is a reservoir of private social values, which are different from 
those that are associated with negative social indicators and public anxiety about 
them. Some studies show recent shifts in behaviour, which may support such a 
notion. Hamilton & Mail (2003) found an Australian trend where 23 per cent of 
adults between ages 30 to 59 have downshifted over the last ten years. Downshifting 
means a change involving “pursuing a more balanced and fulfilled life”, which may 
be “motivated by a desire to live a less materialistic and more sustainable life”. More 
time spent with family is their most important reason, with a healthier lifestyle, more 
personal fulfilment, and a more balanced lifestyle also important. Their changed 
lifestyle may involve voluntarily reducing their income by leaving a career, 
consuming less and make changes to simplify their lives. 
They may make the change following a sudden event such as a severe 
illness, the death of someone close or a marriage breakdown. More 
often the decision follows a longer process of questioning. (Hamilton 
& Mail, p. 8.) 
Ray and Anderson (2000) conducted a 12-year survey, focus group and interview-
based study among US citizens, finding a personal shift in values which they say is 
adopted by about 50 million Americans from all walks of life. These cultural 
 74
creatives reject materialism, and are more interested than others in (re-) building 
community and environment, and have a greater belief in voluntary simplicity, in 
helping others, and in relationships. In other words they are less materialistic and 
less interested in the individual’s good than the common good.  
In summary, contemporary Western society places a high value on individual 
interests. A high valuation of rational–technological pursuits and a notion of largely 
material progress accompanies this emphasis. Indicators of decline in wellbeing 
show a dissonance with indicators of material progress. Citizens show dissatisfaction 
with their public world but not their private world, which could be explained by a 
relative independence of external factors in private wellbeing. There are some reports 
of value changes in large sections of the Australian and American population with 
one associating such personal changes with significant challenges in the lives of 
these people. Perhaps the currently repressed private sector of relationships 
represents a wellspring of values that may offer a counterbalance to anomalies of an 
overly individualistic Western value system. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter I will describe the conceptual framework that supports the 
structure of this study.  
3.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework is designed as a theoretical framework to aid 
exploration of the problem that is under investigation in this study. This problem 
involves inquiring into the knowledge of a socially devalued group about their 
experiences and views on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. 
The conceptual framework of this qualitative study consists of four levels. 
Firstly, the study’s theoretical approach is that of a phenomenological perspective. 
Some aspects of grounded theory and heuristics perspectives are associated with this 
approach. Secondly I have applied MacIntyre’s (1999) concept of interdependence to 
the design of the study and to interpretation of my findings. In MacIntyre’s concept 
dependence and vulnerability and independence are important parts of the human 
condition. MacIntyre shows how a tension between vulnerability and dependence on 
the one hand and independence on the other can be bridged by acknowledgement of 
the necessary parts that vulnerability and dependence play in achieving states of 
independence. The process of such acknowledgement can lead to human flourishing. 
Thirdly, I have used Habermas’ (1989) theory of critical knowledge to highlight the 
significance of this study and to interpret my findings. It has been apparent from 
inception of this study that using MacIntyre’s concept would involve comparison and 
juxta positioning of Habermas’ empirical analytical knowledge and hermeneutic 
knowledge. According to Habermas, such synthesis may result in the development of 
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emancipatory knowledge, which may recognise and dispel false consciousness. 
Fourth, I have used Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory to try and explain 
findings which suggested that the informants had not developed such critical 
knowledge from their applications of two apparently different value systems, one 
residing in their private lives, the other in the public sphere. 
 3.2. An integrated phenomenological/ heuristics/ grounded theory perspective 
This study’s main approach is a phenomenological perspective. It has also 
associated aspects of heuristic and grounded theory perspectives. Baum (1995) 
believes that research in public health issues, and EPAS constitutes such an issue, is 
most effective when it is “eclectic” in its methodology. This is because such issues 
result from “complex social, economic, political, biological, …and environmental 
causes” (p. 459). According to Marshall and Rossman (1995), building flexibility 
into the research design is crucial. The researcher does this, firstly, by demonstrating 
how the methodology used fits logically and appropriately with the research 
question. Secondly this is done with a research plan that reserves the right to adapt 
the plan during the research process (p. 39). Denzin and Lincoln (2000) agree that 
the qualitative researcher is a bricoleur, a Jack of all trades, or a quilt maker. The 
bricolage of a “pieced-together set of interpretations that are fitted to the specifics of 
a complex situation” is a construction that “changes and takes new forms as different 
tools, methods, and techniques of representation and interpretation are added to the 
puzzle” (p. 4). Lincoln and Guba (2000) argue that at a philosophical level 
commensurability between positivist and post-positivist paradigms is not possible but 
“within [a positivist or post-positivist] paradigm, mixed methodologies (strategies) 
may make perfectly good sense” (p. 169). Flick (in Denzin and Lincoln, p. 5) holds 
that qualitative research is essentially multi-methodological in nature, as one of its 
approaches to triangulation. Patton (1990) agrees that it is possible to combine some 
theoretical perspectives. What is required is the researcher’s clarity about the 
orientation he uses and about “the implications of that perspective on study focus, 
data collection, fieldwork, and analysis” (p. 87). The integrated theoretical 
framework that is used in this study is eclectic in its design, a bricolage, combining 
elements of a phenomenological perspective with heuristic and grounded theory 
perspectives. 
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3.3 A phenomenological perspective 
Phenomenology’s disciplinary roots lie in philosophy. It focuses on how 
people integrate their descriptions of experience and their interpretations in order to 
“make sense of the world” and “in so doing develop a worldview” (Patton, 1990, p. 
69). It assumes that there are mutually understood core meanings in shared 
experiences. In practice this means that shared themes are looked for in the data and 
individual voices are not heard (Patton). Consequently, the semi-structured 
interviews, used in this study, probed for the essential experiences and views of 
participants and the data analysis sought the themes arising from the data. A 
phenomenological approach is one where the essence of the informants’ experiences 
of a certain phenomenon is sought (Colaizzi, 1978; Crotty, 1996; Field & Morse, 
1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1985). A phenomenological approach is one without the 
experiencers’ underlying theories of their causal explanations and is as free as 
possible from preconceptions or assumptions (Spielberg, 1975). On the part of the 
researcher personal assumptions and beliefs need to become explicit and set aside as 
much as possible until such time as all the data are in (Patton). A phenomenological 
perspective is distinct from a phenomenological approach. It has two possible 
meanings, which may be used together or separately. Firstly, it can refer to people’s 
experiences and their interpretation of them (Patton). The second meaning is one 
where there is a ”methodological mandate” (p. 70) for the researcher to experience 
for him- or herself the phenomenon under investigation (Patton).  
A phenomenological perspective was chosen. The study inquired into the 
essence of informants’ experiences and I was explicit about my own values and 
background in the design of this study (but not to my informants), aspects reflective 
of a phenomenological approach. However I did not use the open-ended interview 
methodology that would normally be used in such a study. Nor did I refrain from 
developing a conceptual framework for this study. My framework inevitably 
involved preconceptions and assumptions in doing so. My study involved referring 
to people’s experiences and views and their interpretations of them as in a 
phenomenological perspective study. My prior personal insights and understanding 
about disability within its socio-cultural context, and within its (inter-) personal 
context of dependency and vulnerability, influenced me to frame the research 
questions as I have. I found those insights reflected in the literature. In particular, I 
 78
found MacIntyre’s (1999) idea of discussion of acknowledged dependency and 
vulnerability as important parts of human nature, reflected in some of my own 
experiences with disability. 
3.4 The heuristics aspect 
Heuristics is a form of phenomenological inquiry where the insights and 
intense experiences of the researcher and her co-researchers of a shared 
phenomenon, are examined. It is concerned with meanings, essence, quality and 
experience rather than measurements, appearance, quantity or behaviour. Whereas 
phenomenology encourages the researcher’s detachment in analysing experiences, 
heuristics emphasises connectedness and relationships between researcher and the 
phenomenon under investigation. Unlike phenomenology it brings out individual 
voices (Patton, 1990). 
This study’s topic, which involves the close examination of the universally 
confronting human issues of dying, death and disability, has unavoidably invoked my 
personal feelings and beliefs. This is true the more so because of my shared 
experience of the specific disability of quadriplegia with my informants. Inevitably a 
relationship between a researcher and informants who share a prominently present 
disability of the same diagnostic label will be a different kind of relationship to one 
where disability is not shared. I have also commenced the study with a conceptual 
framework, which arose from my personal disability experience of some 25 years. 
Part of this was gained through contacts with other people who have disabilities and 
those associated with them. Indeed, “reflexivity” of the qualitative researcher’s 
historical, geographical and personal “situatedness” and investments in the research 
has been recognised as an “emerging innovation” in the developing field of 
qualitative research (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1027). By acknowledging the 
heuristic aspect to this phenomenological study I try to show some such reflexivity. 
3.5 The grounded theory aspect 
Grounded theory consists of “systematic inductive guidelines for collecting 
and analysing data to build middle-range theoretical frameworks that explain the 
collected data (Charmaz, 2000). There is a continual analysis of the incoming data 
throughout the research process. These analyses then serve to “inform and refine” 
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developing theory (p. 509). In other words, this approach allows the researcher to 
develop one’s theoretical framework as throughout a flexible research process. 
Charmaz points to early conceptions of grounded theory as positivist, operating on 
assumptions of an objective external reality, an unbiased researcher, and verification. 
But she believes grounded theory “need not be rigid or prescriptive; [focussing] on 
meaning furthers, rather than limits interpretive understanding” (p. 510); and 
grounded theory can be employed without positivist assumptions. Grounded theory 
can be “used with sensitising concepts from other perspectives”. Applicability and 
usefulness, she says, “are part of the criteria for evaluating grounded theory 
analyses” (p. 513). 
Having commenced with a conceptual framework, I needed flexibility to 
incorporate any new insights as the findings and their analysis progressed. 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory was added to the framework, in order 
to explain better the emerging, apparently paradoxical, data. I have borrowed this 
flexibility from the grounded theory approach. I have not used some of grounded 
theory’s methodological tools to analyse incoming data but my methodology did 
involve an ongoing data analysis in keeping with a grounded theory approach.  
3.6 Summary 
The conceptual framework of this qualitative study combines elements of 
phenomenology, heuristics and grounded theory. The phenomenological perspective 
is the dominant one in this study, reflected in the study’s search for shared themes of 
the informants’ essential experience and views. The study aimed for a certain 
detachment by the researcher, effected through the phenomenological technique of 
epoche. The phenomenological perspective is reflected in the inquiry into the 
essential experiences and views of the informants and in the data analysis, seeking 
the themes arising from the data. The heuristics perspective is reflected in the 
research questions and my sharing, with my informants, of the intense phenomenon 
of living with quadriplegia. The grounded theory perspective is reflected in a 
conceptual framework, which remained open to change.  
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3.7 MacIntyre’s interdependence 
MacIntyre (1999) argues that, despite the prominence given in most 
philosophical writings to the role of personal autonomy, for human beings to flourish 
a balance between the virtues of rational independence and acknowledged 
dependence and vulnerability is necessary. It is commonly unacknowledged that we 
are all are vulnerable, disabled and dependent at some times in our lives, whether in 
childhood, in old age, infirmity or permanent disability. Not acknowledging these 
aspects of human nature also means that we are not fully open to our emotional 
intelligence. A balance, which I have termed interdependence, can be achieved by 
conceptualising independent reasoning as having been developed from experiences 
of dependency and which continues to be reliant on others’ contributions to our 
thinking within unconditional relationships with them. Persons who have 
acknowledged the human condition as one involving dependence and vulnerability 
may become independent practical reasoners and experience a human flourishing. 
Independent practical reasoning, and the human flourishing based on it, involves the 
development and expression of virtues, such as kindness, courage and persistence 
and candidness. With such virtues, including self-knowledge, and attendant social 
skills one would be able to imagine a range of possible and realistic futures for 
oneself, that is futures that include realities of vulnerability and dependence. 
Independent practical reasoners can then make judgements based on knowledge of 
“both the particularities of those parts of the social and natural parts of the world 
which impinge upon them and of those generalisations which will enable them to 
judge the probability of different outcomes of this or that kind of action in this or that 
kind of situation” (p. 94). In other words his concept is in essence one of an ongoing 
process of human development through application of the practical knowledge of 
interdependence, or phronesis. He believes that only in the relational context of 
community, where giving and receiving in social relationships is seen as 
unconditional, can this balance between rational independence and acknowledged 
dependence be achieved. In such a community both the individual good and the 
common good are advanced. MacIntyre argues that disability, characterised by 
highly present dependence on others and a personal vulnerability, and its support in 
such a community, is of universal interest:  
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Our interest in how the needs of the disabled are adequately voiced 
and met, is not a special interest, the interest of one particular group 
rather than of others, but rather the interest of the whole political 
society, an interest that is integral to their conception of their common 
good. (p. 130) 
This theory directly relates to this study’s purpose and those research questions, 
which inquire into themes of personal autonomy, vulnerability, independence and 
dependence. MacIntyre’s (1999) theory appears to reach deeply into both the 
disability experience and our responses to it. It involves an exploration of the human 
condition that underlies our responses to disability and to other situations of high 
dependency and vulnerability. It also illuminates the presence of innate resources 
that enable us to resolve difficult tensions in the human condition. MacIntyre’s 
theory, together with other literature, provides a starting point to discuss and explain 
the roles of interdependence and vulnerability in the lives of the informants. 
3.8 Habermas’ critical knowledge theory 
Habermas (1989) described three kinds of knowledge. Firstly, 
analytical/empirical knowledge is that derived from positivist science, the still 
dominant contemporary knowledge base. It involves empirical investigation of 
natural phenomena under controlled, objective conditions, based on reductionist 
assumptions, in order to develop a theory of causal relationships. Its modus operandi 
is that of technical control. Positivist science and its descriptive language make it 
“obligatory [to filter] out the merely emotive from cognitive contents” (p. 303). Its 
knowledge is considered value-free or ethically neutral and is committed to a  
theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic 
association with the natural interests of life and their irritating 
influence, [with] the cosmological intention of describing the universe 
theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is. (p. 303) 
Analytical–empirical knowledge thus separates (objective) knowledge from human 
interests, or in MacIntyre’s terms, from conceptions of the human good. The 
meaning of such knowledge is its predictive technical employability, “established 
only by the rules according to which we apply theories to reality” (p. 308). But, so 
Habermas argues, this objective descriptiveness is an illusion, as the empirical 
sciences inevitably all have their origin in the life world of human action. Thus 
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knowledge and human interests are interlocked, but that connection is denied in this 
kind of knowledge. In this study analytical–empirical knowledge sheds light on 
aspects of the social (values8) environment in which the informants live and on the 
kind of society in which the Enlightenment project is still dominant, and in which a 
demand for EPAS has arisen.  
The second kind of knowledge Habermas describes is historical–
hermeneutical knowledge. It is concerned with the phenomenology of people’s 
shared experiences, culture and (his)stories, in this case of people with disabilities. It 
is concerned with the understanding of meaning and its “interpretations make 
possible the orientation of action within common traditions” because one way in 
which “the human species secures its existence” … is by “reconsolidating the 
consciousness of the individual in relation to the norms of the group” (p. 313). 
Historical–hermeneutical knowledge acknowledges that its knowledge is always 
mediated through the “interpreter’s pre-understanding” (p. 309).  
Habermas identifies phenomenology as the philosophy that is associated with 
this knowledge. But he also points out that when it asserts that it can separate the 
generation of subjective data from preconceived ideas about human interests it 
employs the very positivist, objectivist philosophy that it criticises. It “displaces our 
connection with tradition into the arbitrary” (Habermas, 1989, p. 316). Thus 
Habermas’ theory is directly relevant to the choice of a phenomenological 
perspective associated with heuristics.  
 The third kind of knowledge is emancipatory, or critical knowledge, being 
concerned with analyses of any differences between dominant ideologies and how 
people experience their lives. It is arrived at by reflection on (analytical–empirical) 
knowledge and (historical–hermeneutical) human interests. Perceiving the difference 
between knowledge from experience and knowledge of the wider reality may dispel 
false consciousness about societal realities. Habermas notes that false consciousness 
has a practical function. It cushions the unease associated with those risks that 
science cannot solve and which “appear once the connection of knowledge and 
                                                 
 
8 Even though positivist science may consider itself value-free, it is apparent, including in the findings 
of this study that it is not. It is inevitably associated with values derived from its detached objectivism 
and material reductionism that lead to theory of causal relationships. Causal relationships are 
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human interest has been comprehended on the level of self-reflection” (p. 315). 
Emancipatory knowledge is expressed in daily practice (“of work, language and 
power”, p. 313), it aids “mankind’s evolution towards autonomy and responsibility”, 
it … “[unites] knowledge and interest ... and it “reconstructs what has been 
suppressed”(p. 315). Emancipatory knowledge is a logical concept to take into 
account in this study, as MacIntyre’s discussion of interdependence involves the 
suppressed knowledge of human vulnerability and dependency in tension with 
human independence, thus involving concepts of individual autonomy. 
This study incorporates the experience and knowledge of people with 
disabilities (historical–hermeneutical knowledge) and the social setting, their society, 
in which their views on EPAS arise. Much of their society, Habermas asserts, reflects 
the dominant analytical–empirical knowledge paradigm. Emancipatory knowledge, 
synthesised from reflection on any differences between the first two kinds of 
knowledge, might arise from this study which compares the experience of people 
with disabilities with their views on EPAS.  
3.9 Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory 
 Upon analysis, the data showed an apparent inconsistency between the 
informants’ views on similar issues of suffering in their daily lives and suffering 
underlying requests for EPAS. This could be interpreted as a possible indication of 
the presence of the false consciousness that Habermas (1989) argues is dispelled by 
emancipatory knowledge. However these two views, grounded in two distinct kinds 
of knowledge, as Habermas suggests, had apparently not produced emancipatory 
knowledge in the informants. Indeed Nagel (in Reinders, 2000, pp. 179–180) 
suggested that people find it difficult to simultaneously hold an objective and a 
subjective view of themselves. This is because of the unsettling feeling of seeing 
one’s life in the objective view as detached and with different meaning than that of 
the direct experience of living it. Festinger’s approach offers an explanatory tool for 
dealing with this inconsistency. The usefulness of this framework could not have 
been foreseen in the original design of this research, only when the data came in. 
Festinger (1957) holds an inconsistency within a belief system or between belief and 
                                                                                                                                          
conditional as relationships are within an individualistic paradigm of respect for individual choice. 
Positivism therefore appears closely related to the values of modernism. 
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experience creates an internal psychological discomfort. This will motivate the 
person to want to reduce this discomfort, or dissonance, in order to arrive at a state of 
consistency and consonance. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to 
reduce it, the person will actively try to avoid situations and information that may 
increase the dissonance. Festinger’s theory includes personal and cultural factors 
which may cause a reduction in the internal dissonance that people feel. Personal 
dissonance reducers include changing the view that causes one’s dissonance; adding 
more cognitions of the type that support the view that would reduce the dissonance; 
or decreasing the importance of the elements in the views that cause the dissonance. 
Dissonance reduction by social support, meaning a reassuring support of one’s belief 
by others, can easily occur. Cultural dissonance reducers may change one’s private 
view or behaviour in the face of overt dominant beliefs of others. Such a cultural 
dissonance reducer could be exposure to information, for instance from the media 
that can be used to reduce dissonance. Another influence towards reduction of 
dissonance is when many people all carry the same dissonance.  
Cognitive dissonance theory may thus help articulate how certain cognitive 
elements may be involved in development or suppression of emancipatory 
knowledge in this study. 
3.10 Summary 
The phenomenological perspective used in this study is in acknowledgement of the 
nature of this study’s problem, which requires hearing the voices of individual people 
who have direct experience of disability. It includes aspects of heuristics to reflect 
the inevitable connection between the informants’ experiences and mine, particularly 
because we share a type of disability. It also is associated with an aspect of grounded 
theory in order to reflect the flexibility that was apparently needed in this study’s 
conceptual framework, once data were received and analysis commenced. 
MacIntyre’s (1999) interdependence concept informed much of the design, research 
questions and analysis of this study. His theory illuminates the human condition and 
responses to it that may not only resolve difficult issues, but may also lead to human 
flourishing. Habermas’ (1989) three kinds of knowledge are relevant to MacIntyre’s 
interdependence framework in that the latter’s theory and this study involve 
analytical–empirical and historical–hermeneutical knowledge and their synthesis into 
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emancipatory knowledge finds a parallel in MacIntyre’s phronesis. Festinger’s 
theory of cognitive dissonance is used to try and locate and explain the cognitive 
elements that may be involved in development or suppression of the informants’ 
emancipatory knowledge. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I will describe the methodology that I have used in this study 
and its relevance to its conceptual framework. I also discuss the study’s ethical 
considerations and its limits. 
4.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was: 
1.) to discover Dutch and Australian disability perspectives towards 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; and 
2.) to find how the life experiences of the informants, within a cross-national 
context, may illuminate their perspectives. 
4.2 A qualitative methodology 
The meaning of the word qualitative suggests that qualitative methods are 
indicated where “qualities of entities, … processes and meanings … are not 
experimentally examined or measured …, in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or 
frequency” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8).Unlike quantitative methods, qualitative 
research can produce rich, detailed data about a population (Patton, 1990, p. 14). 
There appears to be only one qualitative study that has sought disability views on 
EPAS directly from people with disabilities. It did so however within a wider sample 
of non-disabled people (Parsons & Newell, 1996) and did not further specify its 
methodological paradigm.  
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This study’s topic, which involves the close examination of the universally 
confronting human issues of dying, death and disability, has unavoidably involved 
my personal feelings and beliefs. This is particularly so because of my shared 
experience of the specific disability of quadriplegia with my informants. Indeed 
“reflexivity” of the qualitative researcher’s historical, geographical and personal 
“situatedness” and investments in the research has been recognised as an “emerging 
innovation” in the developing field of qualitative research (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, 
p. 1027). While I have throughout the study sought to minimise bias from my 
personal views such as is required in a phenomenological study by the technique of 
bracketing, or epoche9(Patton, 1990) I have also commenced the study with a 
conceptual framework that arose from my personal disability experience of some 25 
years. Part of this framework was also gained through contacts with other people 
who have disabilities. My own prior personal insights and understanding about 
dependency and vulnerability and about disability, arising in significant part from a 
socio-cultural context, influenced me to frame the research questions as I have.  
4.3 Cross-national research and methodology 
This study uses data from two countries: the Netherlands and Australia. The 
rationale for choosing these two included: 
• the countries’ different histories in respect of EPAS, where one allows 
and the other prohibits it;  
• my cultural connection to both countries which offered an opportunity for 
further informing the study;  
• both countries being comparable in their Western liberal welfare state 
credentials, and;  
• samples in two countries provided a means of triangulating the data. 
                                                 
9 The nature of a phenomenological study is about accepting the experiences of the participants 
as valid in themselves. The treatment of this topic subject will inevitably invoke personal feelings 
and beliefs of the researcher. Epoche (Patton, 1990) will be used to minimise the resulting 
potential for bias. These are phenomenological techniques of making any of the researcher’s 
beliefs and assumptions explicit. Epoche is an ongoing process within the researcher where the 
aim is to maintain a fresh and open viewpoint without prejudging or ascribing meaning too 
soon. Personal assumptions and beliefs need to become explicit and set aside as much as 
possible until such time as all the data are in (Patton, 1990). 
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Use of a phenomenological perspective, as in this study, is compatible with 
cross-national research. Qualitative methods used in cross-national research include 
life history and reminiscence, biographical-interpretive, ethnographic methods and 
discourse analysis where biographical-interpretive methods are seen as rooted in 
phenomenology (Chamberlayne & King, 1996).  
As discussed, methodologically this study differs from a purely 
phenomenological inquiry in that it does not employ open-ended interviews, it uses 
aspects of a heuristic perspective and grounded theory methodology and there is a 
preliminary literature review in which to ground the research. Furthermore, the data 
is discussed in the light of cross-national contexts and of juxtapositions based on 
some broader national cultural backgrounds and trends, thus not solely relying on the 
experiences of individuals as data. Having said that, the samples’ primary data are 
the main source of inquiry and there is no attempt at an exhaustive socio-cultural 
comparison between the two countries, which is beyond the scope and resources of 
this study.  
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been used in cross-national 
research (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996). Qualitative approaches have been used for 
instance with frail elderly people in Britain and Germany in the form of “model case 
studies” (Schunk, 1996, p. 97) and young carers in Britain, France, Sweden and 
Germany, using semi-structured interview schedules (Becker, 1995). No cross-
national studies with a disability focus and/or end-of-life questions were found in the 
literature.  
Cross-national research may aim to gain a greater depth of awareness and 
understanding of phenomena in different countries or to seek explanations of 
similarities and dissimilarities and to generalise from these. It may place individual 
stories and lives in a context of broader social limitations and options (Chamberlaine 
& King, 1996). Sharpening of analysis of the issue being researched may occur as 
new perspectives may emerge and the data collected in another country can 
illuminate the results in one’s own country, putting them in an unexpected light 
(Hantrais & Mangen, 1996).  
 It is not necessary for a cross-national study to be fully comparative. Data 
may simply be placed in juxtaposition whereas in other cross-national studies each 
country’s wider social context is compared in order to explain data. Exploration of 
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this context through secondary resources depends on close contact with key 
informers who are native to the countries under investigation (Hantrais & Mangen, 
1996). In this study the cross-national approach is intended to give some suggestions 
about the respective countries’ dominant values and let the almost uniform cross-
national results speak for themselves. 
Language skills are important and one must guard against loss of culturally 
loaded meaning in translation of data (Ungerson, 1990, cited in Hantrais and Becker, 
1996). My dual cultural/linguistic background assisted in minimising this potential 
problem. However I do not assume that my absence from the Netherlands for 24 
years has not had any effect on data gathering or their interpretation. On the whole I 
judge such risks to have been minimal in this study. My fluency in the Dutch 
language has been largely maintained over that time and I have also maintained an 
interest in Dutch socio-political affairs. 
4.4 Relevance of methodology to conceptual framework. 
It is important that the problem under investigation is epistemologically 
linked with the chosen methodology (Brown, 1999). The conceptual framework’s 
relevance to methodology is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1., where it 
shows the connections between the study’s purpose, sample, methodology and 
conceptual framework. Phenomenology in this diagram refers to the study’s 
phenomenological perspective. The theory derived from a phenomenological 
perspective with heuristic and grounded theory aspects, from MacIntyre (1999), 
Habermas (1989), and Festinger (1957), has been described in Chapter Three. The 
diagram can show only an approximation as to how these aspects predominantly 
interrelate in this study because they together form a dynamic whole, which is 
intimately inter-connected at different levels, and at different stages of the research.  
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Phenomenological perspective,  
Heuristic aspects,  
Grounded theory aspect,  
Cross-national study. 
 
 
 
The Problem: 
People with disabilities’ perspectives on EPAS are not  
heard in the public debate 
while the debate is potentially impactful on this group 
and disability experience may contribute to the debate. 
 
Researcher 
 
The sample: 
People with quadriplegia and some disability leaders 
in Australia and the Netherlands 
 
 
How:    Inquiring about:   Theory 
 
Semi-structured  1.Their views and knowledge  Phenomenology  
interviews      on EPAS       MacIntyre  
           Habermas 
 
          
Semi-structured  2.Their views and knowledge   Phenomenology  
Interviews     about vulnerability, dependence   MacIntyre  
        independence, autonomy    Habermas 
 
 
Analysis   3.How daily experiences and    Festinger, Habermas  
of 1. and 2.       knowledge on EPAS   MacIntyre,  
        may relate      Phenomenology 
 
 
Cross-national  4. Possible illumination   Habermas, Festinger  
Comparison      of findings   
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1. A diagram showing the relationship of theory to method, in relation to the 
problem, the sample and the questions under investigation. 
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4.5 Method of investigation 
 
4.5.1 Sample 
 The sample was made up of a main grassroots sample consisting of 20 
people with quadriplegia through spinal cord injury and a minor leadership sample 
made up of 8 individuals who occupy leadership positions in the disability 
movements in Australia and the Netherlands. The leadership sample was interviewed 
for purpose of any suggestions of a wider context to the grassroots responses and for 
triangulation purposes. 
4.5.2 Grassroots sample 
The grassroots sample consisted of people with quadriplegia through spinal 
cord injury, which had been established for at least five years. This time limit was 
imposed to reduce any negative effects of recent trauma on reliability of data. 
Adjustment to spinal cord injury can be a lengthy process of several years (Patterson, 
Miller-Perrin, McCormick, & Hudson, 1993). Five years has been identified as a 
period for most people with spinal cord injury to come to terms with the disability to 
the extent that depression and suicide are not contemplated for most people with 
spinal injury (Parsons & Newell, 1996). 
The onset of their quadriplegia typically happened at a relatively youthful 
age. For most of the Dutch and Australian samples the acquisition of quadriplegia 
came in their early twenties with only a few exceptions. Of the Dutch sample, four 
had had their disability less than ten years, with the others ranging between 12 and 
29 years. There were no Australians who had had quadriplegia for less than ten years 
with many who had quadriplegia in excess of 15 years up to more than 30 years. The 
average age at interview was 36 for the Dutch and 47 for the Australians. This made 
the Australian sample as a whole somewhat more experienced in quadriplegia in 
years and older than the Dutch sample. 
Grassroots informants came from a variety of social strata. Four of the Dutch 
and five of the Australian informants were unemployed. One was studying for a 
tertiary degree. Of those who were employed their work included conducting their 
own home-based consultancies, disability support work, low and middle 
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management, and teaching. Four Dutch informants and two of the Australians had 
had a tertiary education. Most informants in both countries had been raised with a 
Christian religion but were not practising it themselves. Three in the entire sample 
said they were practising their religion. 
A criterion for sample selection was that those in the grassroots sample had a 
traumatic spinal injury. All interviewed informants had spinal cord injuries through 
accidents, including traffic, diving and sporting accidents. Thus quadriplegia caused 
by gradual diseases was avoided, as this may involve different variables, such as 
mental or cognitive effects of a disease, which may make it more difficult to draw 
reliable conclusions from the data. One potential informant was excluded upon 
learning of the non-traumatic origin of his quadriplegia. 
No lower level of injury than at cervical spinal level was admitted into the 
sample. The rationale for this was that issues of dependency and vulnerability might 
be experienced differently by people who were restricted by paralysis of four limbs 
than for those with a lesser degree of paralysis, such as paraplegia. The higher the 
spinal-cervical damage to the spinal cord, the greater the part of the body is affected 
by paralysis. This study included two people with a high C3/4 level, with the rest 
more or less evenly spread between the various lower levels. One informant had 
amputations in addition to his quadriplegia.  
The Australian grassroots sample was mostly obtained in Perth, Western 
Australia, with one informant in the Eastern States. The Dutch sample was 
geographically spread all over the country. In some sense my samples were 
convenience samples, as I reside in Perth. Given my budgetary and physical mobility 
restrictions these were necessary constraints on the geographic catchment areas.  
The size of this sample was arrived at through my determination that, at some 
point, no new themes were emerging from interviews. This is termed the point of 
saturation (Patton, 1990). From that point on I interviewed no other potential 
informants.  
4.5.3 Leaders sample 
Four individuals were interviewed in each country who were identified as 
having leading roles in what is often called the disability movement. This is the 
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leadership sample. The sample’s size is small and it is difficult to say whether it  
reached saturation point. The informants in this sample did not need to fit into the 
specific disability categories chosen for the grassroots sample. However six leaders 
had a mobility-impairment and used wheelchairs. One had quadriplegia and two also 
experienced chronic illness. Two interviewees, one in each country, did not have 
disabilities themselves but had for considerable time worked in advocacy and in 
other organisations that represented the interests of people with disabilities. 
To create this sample, key individuals, known to me in Australia and the 
Netherlands were asked to participate and nominate others in a snowball sampling 
approach. For the Dutch sample this process was commenced well before my arrival 
in the Netherlands. 
I have a long-term involvement in the Australian disability area, at local, 
State and national levels. Although I made contact with various people in the Dutch 
disability area during the development of this study’s research proposal, my 
knowledge of the Dutch disability leadership was more limited than in the Australian 
context. I drew on my knowledge in selecting the initial referring leaders. In order to 
be able to make any decisions on who could be an informant in this sample I 
attempted to find and choose two individuals, considered to be leaders in the 
respective countries’ disability movements, who were asked to refer potential leader-
informants to me. In the Netherlands I only received such suggestions from one 
leader. Despite my earlier decision not to use referring leaders in the sample, I did 
decide to include that person in my list of to-be-interviewed leaders because of her 
apparently outstanding credentials. My limited knowledge of the Dutch leadership 
and time-constraints were other reasons to make this decision. Referring leaders were 
provided with a clarifying letter (Appendix C). Leader-informants were selected by 
referral from other leaders based on a known profile and track record of leadership, 
including occupying positions of moral and/or political power and demonstrated 
longer-term interest in disability issues. Following receipt of their suggested names, I 
chose the most commonly occurring ones. Except in one Australian case, I did not 
have any prior knowledge of their stance on EPAS.  
 Leaders were found at local and national levels and the geographic sampling 
area was a national sampling in both countries. Australian leaders resided in three 
different states and Dutch leaders also resided in various part of their country. 
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A certain overlap between the two samples occurred in that two leaders had 
spinal cord injury, one being quadriplegia. In any case it was difficult for all 
interviewed leaders with disability to separate their private world of living with their 
disability from the public one of wider issues. Frequently the two perspectives came 
up. I have taken this as valid and have simply used any of the leader themes to 
confirm or contrast them with the grassroots data.  
 
4.6 Data collection 
 
4.6.1 Interviews 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face wherever 
possible. Almost all interviews took place at the informants’ place of residence; one 
was conducted at an informant’s workplace. All but one of the interviews were 
conducted without the presence of any third parties. In one case, the mother of an 
informant stayed in the back of the living room during the interview; I did not detect 
any inhibition by the informant in giving his responses but this possibility remains. 
Interviews took from one hour to two and a half hours with an average of one and a 
half hours. Field notes were made not in the presence of the informants but as soon 
as possible after the interviews. A mixture of face-to-face, phone and e-mail 
interviews were used. In the grassroots sample most first interviews were conducted 
face-to-face. One grassroots informant was interviewed via e-mail and telephone, 
and three by telephone alone. All follow-up Dutch interviews were done by e-mail 
whereas most Australian second interviews occurred by telephone with some 
interviewed again face-to-face. A letter of consent for both country’s samples was 
provided prior to interview (Appendices A, A(NL) and C was signed by all 
informants. 
An interview guide (Appendix E) served to seek the informants’ opinions and 
experiences on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and on their life 
experiences as people with disabilities. Using the interview guide the informants 
were prompted for their perspectives on their experiences in their own words where I 
engaged in active listening to understand and capture those meanings in the 
informant’s own words. Interviews were commenced with some general questions, 
inviting the informant to describe how they acquired their disability. Probing was 
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used to clarify any statements made by the informant or to encourage them to explore 
a particular theme further. Sometimes this consisted of merely a short summary of 
what I thought had just been said; other times more specific probing was used.  
 
4.6.2 Procedure 
A combination of recruitment techniques was used. Recruitment via major 
rehabilitation centres and via a Dutch spinal cord self-help group, was combined with 
snowball sampling. Contact was made with the heads of major rehabilitation centres 
in both countries. They were asked to send copies of my recruitment letter to some 
thirty potential informants who met certain criteria. These included a minimum time 
of five years post original trauma, no diagnosis or feelings of depression and no 
lower spinal injury than cervical level. Snowball sampling occurred after the first 
informants were interviewed. These individuals were asked to provide names of 
potential participants with the desired characteristics. When the same names were 
being mentioned repeatedly by these key individuals these took on special 
importance (Patton, 1990) but this occurred only to a limited extent. While in the 
Netherlands I had to spend some time to recruit more potential informants. My active 
time in the Netherlands in order to interview people was ten weeks. To overcome the 
limited time available, I had commenced this process well before arrival.  
For the grassroots sample the research method was tested by conducting three 
pilot interviews. Some pilot interviews were done with two Australians and one 
Dutch informant, the latter by email. One of these Australian pilot interviews was 
unusable due to a malfunctioning tape-recorder. This informant did not wish to be 
interviewed again. The other two interviews were incorporated into the sample and 
follow-up interviews were done with them. Two changes were made following the 
pilot interviews. The early methodology used a Q-sort approach where informants 
selected significant statements, printed on cards, and ranked them in importance. 
This methodology was found unsuitable as it was physically too difficult to use 
owing to the impairments that informants had. This methodology also did not lend 
itself easily to email or telephone interviews. This was an obvious problem that my 
own experience with quadriplegia should have alerted me to. This may have been a 
demonstration of how one can sometimes be bedazzled by the technology of a 
methodology and lose sight of practicality and the human interests of the informants! 
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Some small addition was made to the interview schedule to include probing on 
informants’ experiences with dying people. 
I did not conduct any pilot interviews with leader-informants. In order to 
minimise researcher bias, given my knowledge of individuals in the Australian 
disability movement, the first key individuals whom I approached for names of 
leaders were excluded from taking part in the study. These individuals were asked to 
contact the individuals they suggested, asked whether they would be willing to be 
contacted by me, and informed me of the responses they received. I informed the 
referring individual at that point that I would then decide whom I would contact. The 
referring individuals did not know whether I eventually used any of their suggested 
informants. However they were also asked to keep the referred names confidential. 
For reasons of transparency and clarity these key people were provided with a letter 
setting out the nature, purpose and ethical considerations of the proposed research. 
This study does not report on individual responses but on shared themes. 
Even so, in recognition of a small disability field where leaders may be identifiable 
because of anything reported in the final dissertation, identifying details of such 
individuals were changed where needed in some quotes. Leaders were asked that 
where concerned about their possible identification to indicate this to me. Following 
acceptance by prospective informants I then further discussed the study with them 
and organised interviews. 
Emergent patterns were looked for during the data gathering as well as for 
any presence of negative cases. The study did identify some negative cases, who 
stood in contradiction to the dominant themes. Informants were asked for their 
feedback on my descriptions of their essential experiences. 
 4.7 Data analysis 
A qualitative analysis of the transcriptions was carried out after the manner 
described by Colaizzi (1978), with some modification from open-ended to semi-
structured questioning. This method involved interviewing the selected informants 
where the following steps were taken: 
1.) Review of the literature. 
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2.) Doing semi-structured interviews, collecting participants’ descriptions of 
their experiences as people with disability and their views on euthanasia 
and assisted suicide. 
3.) Keeping and reviewing field notes of my experiences, insights and 
decisions in order to provide a contextual richness of the analysis. 
4.) Listening to the tape recordings and reading transcripts of recorded 
interviews several times to absorb them. Recording of my reflections and 
emerging code clusters. 
5.) Significant statements and terms were then identified and categorised. 
6.) These were then clustered into themes with constant referral to the 
transcripts to verify the themes. 
7.) Results from the data analysis were used to write exhaustive descriptions 
of the experiences and views of the informants. 
8.) With these descriptions I then returned to the informants to verify the 
descriptions of their essential experiences and their views. This was done 
to clarify the identified themes. Any subsequent data was added to the 
body of findings.  
9.) A research colleague from my university who had extensive, professional 
and teaching knowledge of qualitative research methodology, reviewed 
and commented on a random sample of interview transcripts and their 
emerging themes. 
10.) After data analysis further material was added to the literature review, in 
particular on issues of wellbeing in the face of threats to one’s wellbeing, 
value change, suffering and growth, and human nature. 
 4.8 Reliability and validity 
Validity is a question of the degree of authenticity, that is the trustworthiness 
of the findings so that the researcher may act on their implications (Lincoln & Guba, 
2000), or it is “the degree to which researchers measure what they claim to measure” 
(Brown, 1999, p. 159). Reliability is about the consistency of measurement. In other 
words, would another researcher measuring the same things obtain the same results? 
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Reliability therefore depends on triangulation in order for potential researcher bias to 
be minimised. Denzin (1978) identifies the use of different sets of data, different 
types of analyses, different theoretical perspectives and different researchers to study 
one phenomenon. Following Denzin this study used the data collected from 
grassroots and leaders samples in two countries. The combined use of the 
phenomenological perspective and cross-national juxtaposed data involved different 
types of analyses. Further, the study uses three different theories in its conceptual 
framework, namely MacIntyre’s (1999), Habermas’ (1989) and Festinger’s (1957) 
theories, one a psychological theory and two philosophical frames of reference. 
Reliability of research rests on the research design and the rigour with which the 
research is done. To maximise reliability a sample of the interview transcripts and 
emerging themes were reviewed by an experienced researcher; informants gave their 
feedback on my descriptions of their essential experiences; and emerging themes 
were compared with the literature. 
4.8.1 Reliability, validity and bias 
As discussed, it is important in a study with a phenomenological perspective 
to minimise the researcher’s bias. This was attempted by setting out my personal 
beliefs and assumptions on the issue of EPAS in the Research Proposal. However I 
did not inform my informants of these but asked them whether they had noticed an 
expression of my own views during our interviews. I consciously tried not to show 
my own beliefs in interacting with the informants, apparently with some success. 
One informant thought I supported EPAS, others did not detect my views, as some 
asked for them. I explained to them that I could not do so until completion of the 
research. I offered an electronic copy of the completed thesis to all informants.  
4.8.2 Reliability, validity and heightened vulnerability of the informants 
Demi & Warren (1995) warn that, because of informants’ vulnerability, there 
may be an adverse effect on the validity of research. This is due to the informants’ 
perceived power imbalances and cultural differences, and may therefore mean that 
their responses might not always be entirely truthful. Even though I shared with the 
informants the status of their disability, power imbalances of some sort no doubt 
existed in this study. These are embodied in any researcher-informant relationship as 
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one elicits information from another. This is particularly so in an area of inquiry 
where many participants may have been subjects of many medical and social 
research studies in the past. Barnes (1996) cites Hunt (1992), Oliver (1990, 1992), 
Morris (1992), Abberley (1992) and Rioux and Bach (1994) as “disabled people” 
who have argued that there is a history of disability research as a tool of oppression 
and therefore may suffer from research subject fatigue. Barnes therefore finds a 
wariness of researchers by potential research informants as understandable. A 
potential validity problem of this kind was probably minimised by several factors: 
1.) I have an obvious, significant level of disability, which probably led to 
some mutual identification of a common condition and experiences with 
the informants which may lead to increased trust. One informant said that 
he would not have thought about participating had I not had quadriplegia 
myself. Frequently informants said that they appreciated the effort 
involved in undertaking my study with my kind of disability and expressed 
that their participation was partly to assist. I felt that many informants did 
talk about daily, private, aspects of their life with disability without 
reserve, as well as about sensitive matters related to EPAS. Such thoughts 
may not have been disclosed to non-disabled researchers.  
2.) In the case of leaders with other disabilities the common experience was 
obviously broader but was experienced as close enough to have played a 
positive role. One Dutch leader who did not have a disability gave, as 
reason for his participation, that a first-hand disability view is different 
from anybody else’s and my serious inquiry therefore deserved a serious 
response from him. 
3.) I was born in the Netherlands, am aware of the culture and speak, read and 
write Dutch. Whereas this is not a disability issue, the obviously shared 
language and culture did, I feel, help to overcome a certain wariness of 
“foreigners” visiting to criticise the Dutch on their EPAS policy (Griffith, 
Bood & Weyers, 1998; Kennedy, 2002, p. 23). 
4.) I have tried to be mindful of any ethical aspects to this study. Informants 
were made aware of any potential ethical issues in relation to their 
participation before interviewing. 
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4.8.3 Reliability, validity and fairness 
Lincoln and Guba (2000) discuss validity as authenticity which incorporates 
the criterion of fairness. Fairness is related to the presence of “all stakeholder views, 
perspectives, claims, concerns and voices should be apparent in the [research] text” 
(p. 180). They hold omission of any informant voices to be a form of bias. This 
research text sought to incorporate any such voices. It is noteworthy in this context 
that the gender representation in the sample reflects the gender ratio among people 
with spinal cord injury in general and that both genders therefore appear fairly 
represented. 
4.8.4 Reliability, validity and interviews through telephone and e-mail 
It is possible that the quality of data obtained over the telephone is less rich 
than that obtained through face-to-face interviews as some people may not want to 
answer sensitive questions over the phone. Some research done in the UK has found 
this not to be a problem in obtaining such information (Sykes & Collins, 1988; 
McQueen, 1989). In my telephone interviews, particularly if a first interview had 
been conducted face-to-face, and a subsequent interview was by telephone, I felt 
little loss of richness. In the first interviews by telephone I did feel some loss in one 
of these. In some circumstances lack of body language and lack of the person’s 
observable context probably did affect the richness of the data. Telephone interviews 
were only conducted when face-to-face options were not possible or too difficult. It 
was a trade-off that was unavoidable and its incidence was minimised. 
 E-mail data can suffer from loss of spontaneity. Its use is limited by limited 
distribution of the technology, due to cost, causing sample bias in terms of gender, 
income, age and race. On the other hand, distance is overcome easily and a transcript 
is readily available (Selwyn and Robson, 1997). Markham (1998) noted the greater 
length of time that electronic interviewing takes, and reported on a reduced richness 
of data but also observed greater researcher opportunity to ask detailed follow-up 
questions or do probes.  
Bearing in mind the limitations of these media as well as the geographic 
constraints on this study, telephone and e-mail use also was limited as much as 
possible. In the only first pilot interview with a Dutch informant a loss of flexibility 
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is acknowledged. This loss of spontaneity was in part due to the informant’s 
disability, which saw him able to only type slowly, with a mouth stick. This was to 
some extent overcome with the informants’ second interview by telephone. Ideally 
this should have been a face-to-face interview but my transport difficulties to the 
southernmost area in the Netherlands, where he lived, precluded this. E-mail did 
allow follow-up interviews with most Dutch informants after my return to Australia, 
as all but one Dutch grassroots informant used email. In the case of this one 
exception there was an exchange by ordinary mail. 
Overall I believe that the use of such technologies has been positive as it 
allowed informants’ full participation under conditions of geographical remoteness 
from the researcher. The benefits have, I believe, outweighed any disadvantages. 
4.8.5 Reliability, validity and cross-national research 
If, as discussed, all precautions are taken to minimise any adverse effects on 
its reliability, cross-national research is likely to strengthen the validity of the 
research through triangulation of research methods and through comparison or juxta-
posing of two samples in different locations. Three non-tape recorded general 
orientation interviews were conducted in the Netherlands. One was with a 
philosopher with interests in the intellectual disability area and its socio-cultural 
value dimensions; another was with a palliative care pioneer; the third was with a 
head of a major rehabilitation centre for people with spinal cord injury; and a fourth 
(by telephone) with the secretary of a Dutch organisation, which promotes assisted 
suicide. In Australia an orientation interview was conducted with a palliative care 
expert and head of a rehabilitation hospital with expertise in spinal cord injury. 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
My university, Edith Cowan University, reviewed the study’s ethical 
provisions and approved them. I adhered to these provisions. Research did not 
commence until its approval was given. In addition, although not required, but in 
order to be sensitive to any ethical issues that might have been pertinent to the Dutch 
content, Prof. Evert van Leeuwen and Dr. Arko Oderwald, of the Vrije Universiteit, 
Faculty of Medicine, Division of Metamedica, Section Philosophy and Medical 
Ethics in Amsterdam, also reviewed the study’s research proposal for any specific 
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ethical aspects that they might detect to be in need of attention. They did not indicate 
any need to make changes to the study’s ethical provisions. 
Given the sensitivity of the research topic of EPAS, it was necessary to have 
in place qualified counsellors, should any informant become emotionally affected by 
the research topic. As already reported, people with a recent or current diagnosis of 
depression or who had feelings of depression were not admitted as informants but the 
possibility of emotional distress for others who did take part was nevertheless not 
excluded. In the Netherlands a national telephone-counselling agency agreed to take 
any calls from any Dutch informant. In Australia counsellors with a major 
rehabilitation hospital in Perth and with a national organisation that advances the 
interests of people with quadriplegia, in Sydney, were engaged. I do not know 
whether any informant undertook any counselling with these sources. 
Participation in this research was by informed consent only. All informants 
signed a letter of consent, which was verbally explained with opportunity to ask 
questions about it prior to the first interview. All participants were made aware that 
they could withdraw at any time. The one informant who was unresponsive to my 
requests to reply to the account of his first interview was again reminded of this but 
did not take up this option. I had sole access to stored data and ensured the security 
of tapes and transcripts by keeping them in a locked filing cabinet.  
Confidentiality of data seen by transcribers, during data analysis, was 
safeguarded with signed confidentiality assurances from these persons. A research 
colleague in my university reviewed a random sample of themes arising from 
transcripts and assured her confidentiality. In order to protect the confidentiality of 
the data a code number was assigned to each participant, thus maximising 
anonymity. Tapes will be destroyed immediately upon completion of the study and 
transcripts will be kept for a period of five years in a locked filing cabinet in keeping 
with NHMRC requirements. They will subsequently be destroyed. No data deemed 
harmful to any participants will be published.  
 4.10 Limitations 
This is a qualitative study involving a total of 28 informants in a subject area 
where no previous, similar research has been undertaken. Qualitative research is 
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valid despite using relatively small numbers of informants. Its richness and rigour in 
the methodology it uses are key contributors to its validity. Nevertheless caution 
should be applied in assuming the study’s generalisability. This study appears to be 
unique in illuminating EPAS issues in the way that it does. It is important to 
recognise that this study and its conclusions presently stands alone and cannot be 
contrasted with any from comparable studies. In the interest of greater validity 
follow-up studies of this kind ought to be conducted to confirm or challenge this 
study’s conclusions. 
The main sample consists of people with quadriplegia. Although the literature 
suggests not, it may nevertheless be that different results would be obtained with 
other diagnostic disability categories of physical disability. Although, again, the 
literature suggests not, it may be that different results would be obtained with a non-
disabled sample of people who faced a severe threat to their being. 
Whereas the greater part of this study used face-to-face interviews, some loss 
of richness may have occurred through the use of telephone and e-mail, limited as the 
use of these was. 
One Dutch grassroots informant died from his long-standing health problems 
soon after the first interview. Therefore, with regard to his interview there was no 
possibility to verify the interview’s data and of course a follow-up interview could 
not be conducted. Another did not respond to my requests for his comment on the 
written summary of the first interview. His reason for his non-response was that he 
had not yet had the time to respond to it and would, but he never did. He had been 
made aware on several occasions that he could withdraw from the study at any time 
but he did not do so. After analysing all the data I decided to use these incomplete 
interviews as their themes were common to those found for the entire sample. 
The cross-national nature of the study posed limitations of time and financial 
cost. Only a limited time could be afforded in the Netherlands for these reasons. An 
added dimension were my disability-related costs, including need for a personal 
assistant in travel and during the stay in the Netherlands. A private driver with car 
was engaged to visit the Dutch informants as use of public transport would have been 
too cumbersome and time-consuming. My disability made it too time-consuming to 
transcribe the interviews from their tapes myself. Dutch and Australian transcribers 
were paid to do this. My university made some extra funds available. Non-solicited 
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gifts were received from a home-nursing agency and some friends in Queensland, 
active in disability advocacy, after these parties heard about my research. I perceived 
no conflict of interest in accepting these gifts as none came subject to conditions. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the study’s findings based on interviews with 28 
informants. The interview data from the grassroots sample of 20 informants, that is 
informants with quadriplegia, are treated as the primary data. The data from the 
leader sample, totalling eight informants is mainly used to illuminate the data from 
the main sample. Such illumination could arise from confirming or not confirming 
grassroots themes or by raising additional issues. Where they were present and 
pertinent, leader themes are presented immediately below the relevant grassroots 
theme. Leader responses did not greatly differ in substance from grassroots responses 
although in several themes they show more nuance and are more moderate. Where I 
found important differences in responses between national samples I have indicated 
these. On the whole the national samples did show a great similarity with few 
differences. 
The chapter is written in two parts, each reflective of data relevant to the first 
two research questions. Five major themes and their sub-themes are presented in the 
first half of this chapter, which addresses the first research question. Three major 
themes and their sub-themes are presented in the second half, which addresses the 
second research question. The last two research questions are answered from an 
analysis of the data in response to the first two questions and will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Each theme will commence with a brief overview before setting out 
specific examples. 
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There is a small number of informants within the grassroots sample who 
spoke of their life as unenjoyable and unfulfilling for reason of their disability. For 
them this was sufficient reason to claim that they would want EPAS for themselves. 
This small group included one Dutch and two Australian informants. Their 
contributions often contrasted with that of the majority of the sample and are 
presented throughout this chapter. 
Table 1. Themes, sub-themes and sub-subthemes___________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
Themes Sub-themes  Sub-subthemes_________________ 
A. Conceptualising Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
 A.a Advance directives 
B. The primacy of rules as safeguards 
 B.a Legality as safeguard 
 B.b Doctors and professionals as safeguard 
 B.c Others as safeguard 
B.d Open  discussion, or bespreekbaarheid as safeguard 
B.e Safeguard breaches and caution 
C. Death and dying as distant experience 
 C.a Private and public fear of death 
 C.b No personal death wish 
 C.c Dutch courage 
 C.d Impacts on others 
 C.e A low awareness of palliative care 
D. Suffering and EPAS 
 D.a Unbearable suffering 
 D.b Subjective experience of suffering 
 D.c Whose suffering? 
 D.d Physical and mental suffering 
 D.e Terminal illness and loss of meaning 
 D.f Medical treatment, care, relations and dignity 
E. Rights, choice and compassion 
 E.a Impacts on others 
                          (Table continues) 
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Table 1. (continued)__________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
Themes Sub-themes  Sub-subthemes_________________ 
E.b Involvement of doctors in EPAS 
 E.c Non-autonomy: complexity and confusion 
F. Vulnerability: physical, psychological and social factors – threats to   
wellbeing 
 F.a Vulnerability and physical health 
 F.b Vulnerability arising from treatment and care 
 F.c Public attitudes 
 F.d Buraucracy 
 F.e Vulnerability within a context of social decline 
    F.e.i   Decline in trust 
    F.e.ii  Increasing self-centredness 
    F.e.iii Decline and technology 
    F.e.iv Worsening negative trends 
 F.e.v   Improving conditions for people with 
disabilities 
    F.e.vi  Tolerance and use of EPAS 
  F.e.vii  Declining social trends in relation to 
EPAS 
    F.e.viii The disability movement and EPAS 
    F.d Felt vulnerability 
G. A good, difficult life: responses to threats to wellbeing 
 G.a Choosing to embrace the disability experience 
 G.b Shifting criteria of acceptance 
 G.c Intra-personal approaches to public attitudes 
 G.d Losing friends and forming new relationships 
 G.e Enrichment of relationships 
 G.d Conscious relationship building 
 G.e Sense of meaning 
 G.f Loss of dignity and regaining it 
 G.g Loss of independence, gaining a sense of interdependence 
____________________________________________________________ 
        (Table continues) 
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Table 1. (continued)__________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
Themes Sub-themes  Sub-subthemes_________________ 
H. Value change and personal growth 
 H.a Being more social 
 H.b Living in the moment: letting go of control 
 H.c Greater assertiveness 
 H.d Value change and perception of wellbeing 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Research question 1: What are the beliefs and assumptions and what is the 
knowledge of people with quadriplegia and leaders in Dutch and Australian 
disability movements on issues of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide?  
5.2 Conceptualising euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
This section describes the nature and degree of knowledge and the beliefs that 
informants had of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EPAS) and the closely 
associated issue of advance directives or living wills. Conceptual understanding of 
EPAS was often incomplete and the informants’ descriptions of it were mostly not 
based on first-hand experience. Informants in both countries, but mostly the Dutch, 
raised advance directives as being an integral part of EPAS and its procedure. Only 
one informant possessed an advance directive. 
Throughout these themes, where euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is 
used as a collective term for both life-ending procedures, I have abbreviated it as 
EPAS. Physician-assisted suicide is at times abbreviated as PAS. 
An overview of this theme is that informants used broad descriptions of 
euthanasia and PAS. They confused the two terms and used them interchangeably or 
associated them with suicide. Withdrawal and withholding of treatment was seen as 
the same as euthanasia and PAS because the outcome, death, is the same. Informants 
appeared to often jump to expressing their views on euthanasia and PAS before 
answering a question on what they thought the terms meant. There appeared to be a 
widespread assumption that everyone knew what euthanasia meant. Informants from 
the leaders’ sample reflected these grassroots views. 
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In both countries most informants were unclear when describing euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or, in Dutch: “hulp bij zelfdoding”. It is not a 
topic that many participants had considered deeply: ”I hadn’t given a great deal of 
thought to the topic until you mentioned you were coming over”. Most appeared not 
well-informed. Dutch informants were more likely than the Australians to say that 
they do not know much about EPAS – because they were not interested in the topic.  
You hear things on TV but it does not really interest you. You don’t 
remember. (…) It doesn’t happen that often, does it? It is not [like] 
every day three people receiving euthanasia. I cannot believe that. In 
the Netherlands perhaps 100 per year? 
The terms euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were often used broadly 
and interchangeably. Informants often did not draw a distinction between the two 
terms “because the end product is the same” or otherwise explained the terms in 
unorthodox ways. Informants spoke of euthanasia as a cover-all term for various life-
ending scenarios, mostly, but not necessarily, with the involvement of a doctor. 
Withdrawal or withholding of treatment, or increasing pain-relieving medication, 
was often seen as no different from euthanasia.  
I remember seeing a TV program once, I can’t remember what it was 
and they said something about that and they said they just upped the 
morphine or something and if you upped the morphine it makes them 
die. So to me whether the person is there an hour before they 
presumably die but they give them morphine, it’s still the same as 
euthanasia. 
To me, in some ways, pulling the plug is very similar. I mean, OK, … 
you might be brain dead but you are still stopping your heart from 
beating by pulling that plug out. 
I don’t know. I thought they were the same. I mean euthanasia I guess 
can be performed by anyone. That’s possibly the only difference that I 
can think of off-hand. The fact that euthanasia can be carried out by 
anyone, whereas doctor-assisted suicide can obviously only be carried 
out by a doctor. 
A few informants only, on the other hand, did make a point of emphasising 
that there is a distinction between EPAS and withholding or withdrawing treatment.  
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I don’t see it as euthanasia. If actually they are withholding a drug, … 
an artificial means to keep someone alive, then that really is the 
opposite to euthanasia… because one is allowing an natural process to 
take place and euthanasia, as I think of it …, is that euthanasia is 
providing someone with a black box that will inject a lethal substance 
into their vein… 
When Australians claimed to know that EPAS did go on despite its illegality 
in their country, they often included withdrawal of treatment, which is legal medical 
practice. 
Well, of course, it happens all the time. I mean doctors are doing it all 
the time. I mean, my wife’s ex partner, I mean they did it fairly much 
with him, when they said – because he was on a ventilator at that time 
– they switched the ventilator off him. 
In defining euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide some informants 
associated suicide with medical life-ending procedures.  
Euthanasia is technically someone helping you to die. I think it’s (for) 
someone who has lost the ability to commit suicide. 
Euthanasia or self-killing I literally see as help with self-killing.  
Some Dutch informants distinguished passive and active terms. Most saw 
both as euthanasia. 
… I have always understood that there were only two kinds of 
euthanasia. They call it passive and active forms of euthanasia. And 
passive is, say that you stop a treatment, or stop giving food or fluids. 
And that a person then dies. While active, then you give something 
that causes someone to die…. Help in suicide by a doctor then you 
could perhaps think of something like asking your doctor: which pills 
are best for me to take so that I die? … That you ask a doctor to guide 
you and that you are more actively involved in the process. 
(Leaders)  
Australian leaders reflected the grassroots’ broad interpretation in defining 
euthanasia and PAS.  
Euthanasia … is that people, either the individual or the individual 
person and/or their immediate associates have or want an option at 
times to be able to take their life or end their life prematurely by some 
form of intervention whether it be drug induced or whether it be 
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withdrawal of medication or withdrawal of some forms of support that 
would be maintaining them or keeping them alive. To end their life, or 
patient directed, or individual assisted suicide enables someone [via] a 
mechanical device or some sort of method to actually facilitate that 
process to happen. 
Dutch leaders were more specific but included advance directives in their 
definitions.10 They were more able to distinguish between euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide although some could not. 
In physician-assisted suicide the doctor is providing you with a 
substance. And you act and kill yourself. With euthanasia the doctor 
does it. 
Some Dutch leaders distinguished between euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide in the sense that in the first a doctor was there to “travel the last bit together” 
and in PAS “you act yourself and that can be very lonely”. Some included 
withholding and withdrawing treatment in their definitions, some did not. 
 
5.2.1 Advance directives 
In overview, the theme of advance directives shows the centrality of relations 
with others in whether or how one’s future wishes about interventions at the end of 
one’s life is honoured. The Dutch informants raised advance directives in the course 
of describing what euthanasia and PAS means to them. However, few have made 
advance directives to cover end-of-life scenarios for themselves. Reasons for not 
doing so included an awareness of a possibility that life might still be worthwhile at 
any point and a mistrust of doctors’ use of the advance directives. The nature of the 
advance directives made out by the one informant turned out to cover withholding or 
withdrawing treatment, not euthanasia. Coercion of people who have signed an 
advance directive to have euthanasia but are hesitant when the time comes appeared 
as an issue in one case.  
Dutch informants raised advance directives as part of their description of 
euthanasia and PAS but Australians did not.  
                                                 
10 In the Netherlands advance directives have been used for some time to direct under what 
circumstances one would want euthanasia. Their legality is enshrined in the Dutch euthanasia law of 
2002. 
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I think that is how I see euthanasia or zelf-doding11 as having a grip on 
things when you have reached your limit, that you then want to make 
use of it … a kind of decision-making authority that you can use very 
consciously.  
However, almost all Dutch informants said that they had not made advance 
directives. Reasons for not doing so partly revolved around relationship issues, 
unpredictability of future ill-health scenarios and not knowing what thresholds one 
might be able to cross in the future, not trusting doctors to act on advance directives 
or the uncertainties about who would be carrying out the directives. 
No, … because I love life … I would in very many situations, of 
which maybe you now imagine that you wouldn't want to carry on, … 
at that moment you might choose to carry on after all. 
Some people have arranged that with their doctor and then the doctor 
changes his mind. … Better if he said ‘no’ straight away. 
An informant further added to the uncertainties about making decisions in 
advance about conditions that one knows little about, suggesting that others may act 
from a different perception of what is life worth living than the focal person feels it: 
[Before her accident] I saw someone in a wheelchair from time to 
time. Well, no, I would not accept that then [as something she would 
ever want to live with]. And people around you [me] say that now too 
of course: well, I don’t know how I would handle that. No, you don’t 
know. You absolutely don’t know. So I don’t know either how I 
would deal with it if I had cancer tomorrow. I have no idea. 
 
For the one Dutch informant who did make advance directives, and who had 
multiple health complications, it emerged that the directives were related to refusal 
and withholding of treatment, not euthanasia or PAS. It involved refusing antibiotics, 
and refusing hospital treatment or referral to a nursing home in favour of going home 
to die. The only Australian who was in the process of drawing up a ‘living will’ 
stipulated withholding of treatment should any serious “long-term illness or cancer” 
afflict her. And another Australian who talked about advance directives echoed some 
                                                 
11 self-deathing or self-killing, an otherwise untranslatable Dutch term in favour of suicide. The word 
self-deathing has replaced the commonly used zelfmoord or self-murde, for suicide. 
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of the Dutch concerns about them noted the importance of knowing who would carry 
out the directives. 
I’ve always seen doctors as key people in the community because 
that’s the way we were brought up. (…) But if you had someone who 
was a real prick and didn’t want to listen to your wishes, you’d be in 
bloody trouble and if you couldn’t change that doctor to another one, 
like if you were in an institution, like if you were intellectually 
disabled and you just didn’t have the communication skills, you didn’t 
know the system, that would be quite bloody confronting. 
 
A Dutch informant related a story in which he was directly involved, which 
appears to confirm some of the informants concerns about who is involved in end-of-
life decision-making. Coercion and a breech of one of the Dutch EPAS criteria – the 
presence of a durable request – appeared to play a role. The story is about the 
informant’s relative, who “was also a supporter of euthanasia”. They often talked 
about it. Now that the relative had cancer we said:  
gee, it is time you obtain the documents [advance directive format for 
euthanasia], because you are already going down hill. So, in the 
evening we talked with him. Filled in all the papers [advance 
directives]. … In spite of that he had not mailed them. Everything 
went so fast.  
The relative did then receive euthanasia in hospital when he went to see a 
doctor for a check-up:  
Then they kept him in hospital straight away. But he had a good 
doctor straight away. (…). The lungs began to seize up. So they 
helped him. But imagine that the doctor had said: No, I won’t do it. 
[As] he had not completed those forms. (…) Then he would have 
hung. (…) Because if you get a religious one [doctor], you can wait a 
long time. (…). … he was sure about it but always procrastinating. 
Oh, that will come tomorrow. It will not come around that quickly. 
But it came quicker than he thought. 
(Leaders) 
Only Dutch leaders mentioned advance directives as part of an EPAS 
definition that for them also involved withdrawal of treatment.  
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Euthanasia is an advance directive that you make … where you put 
down, if such and such happens to me then I don’t want to go on. You 
may cease treatment. 
They also expressed ambivalence about advance directives. One who had a 
“euthanasia declaration” said that she had now come to think about it differently and 
wondered whether she “can do this to other people”, who would have to assist in 
killing her. Another says that end of life decisions are made in a context where 
others, including family also have an input and are thus not always honoured. A third 
had not signed a euthanasia declaration for reason of having experienced a near-
euthanasia with a family member as a disturbing process. 
I felt: can you really do this. We did respect that choice but the idea of 
it. She was just at home and everyone would come to say goodbye. 
And then an injection … and with the thought of that I got 
nightmares. And when she died naturally and perhaps then also 
because she knew that the euthanasia [act] was close – that she did 
find peace, that she no longer has to have that pain. I am confused 
about that myself. I have not signed a euthanasia declaration for 
instance because I really don’t know. 
5.3 The primacy of rules as safeguards 
Primacy of rules as safeguards covers the informants’ faith in the desirability 
and efficacy of law and rules as the primary safeguards to rely on against abuse of 
EPAS. Informants mostly supported the practice of EPAS if legalised as a safeguard. 
This belief stood, in the face of their awareness that not all abuse could be stopped 
and safeguards ultimately depend on the people involved in the EPAS process. Dutch 
participants hardly mentioned any discomfort with any perceived efficacy of their 
country’s rules when they related any breaches of them from their experience, such 
as doctors not reporting EPAS. They also did not know much about the nature of the 
rules in place in the Netherlands. The medical profession was seen as playing an 
important role in the carrying out of the rules.  
5.3.1 Legality as safeguard 
Informants mostly supported EPAS if safeguarded from abuse. 
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I think it should be legal. Yes. I think a person should have that right 
to say yes but it would have to be screened. 
Society must remove euthanasia as an unlawful act. 
It is good that the opportunity is there. I am not negative about it. I am 
indeed a positive supporter. 
One informant only, an Australian opposed the practice of EPAS outright. 
Well, I don’t agree with giving people something, with or without 
disability, the right for euthanasia. That’s the right that I don’t believe 
should be given because it would be too hard to police and it will end 
up being abused. 
Reasons for making EPAS legal revolved around illegal practice of EPAS, an 
associated need to protect doctors and so that not just anybody can have EPAS for 
any reason. All Australian informants assumed that EPAS was being practised in 
Australia despite its illegality. Two Australian quotes first, then two Dutch quotes.  
It’s no use sticking our heads in … the bucket (sic) saying it doesn’t 
exist, because it definitely does. Doctors are, as I said, doing it all the 
time.  
Q: Do you have ideas about legalising or not legalising? A: You are 
better off doing that because otherwise you keep having disputes. 
[Rather] then every doctor who does it is a murderer. Because you do 
kill someone. 
… I think they would still have to screen. I mean they cannot go and 
say to people: do you want to die? (…) The person would go to the 
committee or whoever … and just say, you know, I would like the 
opportunity to die with dignity. What do I have to do? 
The law has to take voluntary euthanasia out of the criminal sphere, 
after very thorough discussion with doctors, family and others, and 
should not have repercussions for people that assist with it. 
Overall Dutch and Australian informants had faith in the efficacy of legal 
rules as safeguards but there was some understanding that avoiding all instances of 
abuse of EPAS was not possible but that having legal rules offered good protection.  
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Yes it should be legal. There is no doubt about that.. if euthanasia was 
legalised I am sure they would still make it so difficult for, like a 
family member to say, oh yes, this person wants to have euthanasia. 
I’m sure there would be such involvement and checking and 
interrogation that people would not be easily bumped off. There are so 
many ways in which it can be written up legally. 
To really have one hundred per cent secure rules that prevent abuse is 
not possible. People who have wrong interests and want to do wrong 
will probably always find a way to abuse something – [you can] make 
it difficult by having simple law that cannot be used for different 
interpretations. But for the normal and official world where people are 
humane towards one another, and have solidarity with the weaker 
ones, a law like that and rules should prevent abuse. 
A more uncommon view was that the best possible application of EPAS 
ultimately depended on people's relations with each other: 
 In the final analysis your family has to make a definite decision. Well 
just let them decide then. Hopefully they know what you would or 
would not have wanted. 
Most Australian informants correctly indicated that euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide were not legal in their country, though some did not know. A 
dominant theme across both countries’ samples was that euthanasia should be 
legalised, but must be safeguarded from abuse. There was a strong theme of reliance 
on, and faith in, having “strict” and “secure” rules and guidelines in place to protect 
people from abuse of EPAS. This was the primary safeguard against abuse of EPAS 
that informants offered.  
Q: Do you think that if it was legal that we can make it so that it’s safe 
and it can’t be abused? A: Of course we can, anything can. 
Even I suppose if euthanasia was legalised I am sure … the 
government would make it so difficult for say a family member to 
say: oh yes this person wants to have euthanasia. I am sure there 
would be such involvement and checking and interrogation that 
people would not, as we’re being told now, people would not be 
easily bumped off because they’ve got a fortune in the bank that the 
rest of the family wants or because they’re a nuisance and 
encroaching on the lives of the people that are caring for them. … 
[T]here are so many ways that it can be written up legally to keep the 
legal eagle people happy. 
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 [N]o-one should be afraid of having things done that they do not 
want. This should be safeguarded in law. 
There have to be good rules, about who can do it, how they do it. To 
really make it safe for someone … there have to be good agreements. 
It seems that the Dutch trust the rules that are in place despite not knowing 
much about them. 
And the rules are well kept? Yes, from what I hear and see in the 
Netherlands. By chance I just read an article about it in the newspaper 
the day before yesterday …about euthanasia. 
Most Dutch knew that EPAS is allowed in the Netherlands, if certain 
guidelines are followed, and is otherwise an offence. But most were unsure about 
how this is organised or knew the precise content of the guidelines.  
I don’t know how euthanasia is organised. I just know there are four 
conditions and that it is still an offence.  
There is a duty to report I think, for the doctors. But for the rest I 
know little about it. You hear things on TV, but because it does not 
really interest you, you don’t remember. It is not legal I think, and that 
duty to report. Those are the only things that I know about it. 
At best, some Dutch informants could refer to some incomplete knowledge of 
the existence of guidelines that doctors have to follow.  
I don’t know the rules very well. It’s something like this: if someone 
is in a terminal phase and after repeated requests to his doctor, the 
doctor asks another doctor. I don’t know how or when. This will be 
reported to the Attorney-general who checks the procedure. I don’t 
think there’s anything yet for non-terminal people. 
I think that in the Netherlands, only with severe suffering, and there 
are some terms for that, by which the doctors are formally allowed or 
not allowed. But it is allowed as far as I know. They have to report it. 
But I think that in those cases where you have to actively administer 
something, that that is still an offence in the Netherlands.  
The one Dutch informant who cited the most guidelines, though not correctly, 
had consulted a doctor associated with the Dutch euthanasia society [Nederlandse 
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Vereniging Voor Euthanasie], who had informed him of the guidelines. This was to 
pre-arrange his euthanasia at a time when he had enough of living with quadriplegia.  
Unbearable suffering, and I think quadriplegia is that; consent of 
family, and they do not agree; not being clinically depressed and I had 
that assessed and I am not. There is another one that I cannot 
remember. 
Two of the three informants who would rather be dead than live with 
disability expressed that they saw no need for complex guidelines, while all other 
participants preferred strict guidelines. They required little more than just “a couple 
of checks” and acceptance that some people would rather be dead.  
I think that it is very much a personal matter. I mean, whether you 
have a physical disability or a mental one. Or that you say: I have not 
succeeded in life and I cannot make anything of it and I don’t see a 
point. Then I think people should be able to make such choices. I 
don’t think we should be attached to too many rules. Because they do 
it anyway. If they want it, they’ll do it. 
That’s the whole point, euthanasia should be about the person, it 
shouldn’t be whatever…. Now what I care about and what the person 
next door is to do is irrelevant. It’s what I want to do with my life – it 
should boil down to the individual. (…). Q: Do you think it would be 
a safe thing to do? A: Well I think so. As long as there’s a couple of 
checks – like I say as long as it’s not down to one person. (…). [E]ven 
if you’re perfectly healthy. If you decide to make that decision why 
shouldn’t you be allowed to go down to the doctor … and if they’re 
perfectly coherent and understand what’s going on but they’re just not 
particularly happy with life and don’t really see the sense in going on, 
why should they have to. I don’t understand that. 
5.3.2 Doctors and professionals as safeguards 
An important safeguard, seen as part of EPAS rules, was an assessment by 
doctors or other “professionals”, as implementors of the strict rules, of the person 
requesting EPAS with regard to their competency to make such decisions.  
You’d have to be of sound mind to be allowed to have euthanasia. … 
a process that you have to go through where there are professional 
people involved. (…) if there is rigid and strict guidelines to follow I 
think it would be safe and I don’t think people would be able to fall 
through the cracks…. 
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The doctor knows when the time has come, that it can really be done 
and is possible. I think so. 
I think there has [sic] to be safeguards. That’s probably why the 
medical profession has to be involved. I think here in Australia they 
involve psychiatrists and people like that. They could view the 
person’s mental state and make sure they’re not being impulsive. 
People have to be very carefully checked psychologically. There has 
to be a deep reason for it I think. You cannot just say: I don’t like my 
life, everything is bad, my wife is gone, I lost my job.  
Doctors were seen as needed in an EPAS individual assessment process but 
there was also some caution about their roles. Several informants suggested that the 
doctor who engaged in euthanasia should be trained in assessment and 
communication or be a euthanasia specialist. 
So, therefore I would say, any doctor, because he is a doctor, doesn’t 
mean he’s qualified to decide whether that’s something that’s an 
option for that person. 
I certainly think that the people, the doctors especially, need to be 
well trained as far as how to deal with people and how to deal with the 
sensitive issue of it, how to put enough of the criteria together to 
decide whether that person qualifies or not. Certainly a minimum of 
two. 
5.3.3 Others as safeguards 
Both Dutch and Australians often referred to the need to involve family and 
the need to take time in an assessment of the capacity of someone who requests 
EPAS as well as assessment of the motivations of the request.  
I think that a psychological assessment is good, a medical 
examination and in the end the person’s own choice. And also family 
members ask: how is the person, … and why is he in this state. A bit 
of investigation is necessary I think. 
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5.3.4 Open discussion or bespreekbaarheid as safeguard 
Dutch informants in particular regularly mentioned that open discussion and 
level-headedness (being nuchter), together with strict rules, about EPAS is a good 
thing in the Netherlands and this was implied to be an added safeguard to its practice. 
I am a supporter of talking about it openly but keep to strict rules. I 
think so because those strict rules must be there otherwise it gets out 
of hand. 
It should not be so that if I think one day: gee, I don’t feel good guys, 
I should end it all today. Of course it has to be very well considered. 
And discussed with a lot of people. That you know for sure what 
people want. 
For one Dutch informant this discussion could normalise EPAS and lead to a 
situation where EPAS could become more easily available. 
I can imagine that euthanasia will be more easily available. Because 
there has been a lot of discussion about it and situations develop 
where it will become more normal, or easier. In the Netherlands there 
is of course a lot of discussion about it. 
5.3.5 Safeguard breaches and caution 
Some Dutch examples of informant’s knowledge about possible cases of 
EPAS involving people with disabilities were given, where doctors did not seem to 
have reported these. Such informants did not draw any conclusions from these 
instances in terms of their support for EPAS or of the efficacy of safeguards. 
But I have experienced from close by, a woman who lived where I 
did. Also a high level quadriplegia, and who really has not been able 
to deal with it from the beginning. She had studied psychology. She 
gave a very big party. And after that she went on holidays with some 
girl friends, and suddenly she was dead. That was very strange. Well, 
she has had help with that for sure. Well, then think, that is really 
fantastic that that has been possible. If she [had] wanted that for 20 
years. And from the start she had not wanted to live with quadriplegia. 
Well, then it is good, isn’t it, that there are girlfriends who want to do 
this? … Liver failure was [put] on the doctor’s death certificate. 
Another Dutch informant, who had herself been suicidal during rehabilitation, 
related a story of an apparent act of euthanasia on a woman who was still going 
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through her rehabilitation in the first year of her injury. She was upset about this and 
thought it problematic: 
And one time she went home in the evening, all packed up. So, I said: 
hey, how nice, are you going home, all cosy and blah, blah, blah. I 
never noticed anything. And then it appeared that the general 
practitioner [huisarts] …, and she received an injection. The next day 
we heard that she was dead. Yes, then you do project it on yourself. A 
similar situation to mine. I was quite upset. Also that she did not have 
the courage anymore to go on. She was still in rehabilitation. I found 
that very problematic. 
It was not clear whether the rehabilitation hospital staff had been aware of the 
intended euthanasia before the event. However both these informants did affirm the 
importance of strict safeguards as minimising abuse of it. Despite such knowledge of 
apparent breaches of these safeguards informants thought that the option for 
euthanasia should be available. 
The option should be there. I’ve always felt that because … I have 
spinal cord injury. I’m not sick and I’m not at this stage ready to stop 
what I’m doing in my world. But even before the accident, it’s just an 
option that should be allowed to be there. Particularly when it’s a 
person that can make an informed choice. 
At most there was some Dutch caution towards the use of rules, held only by 
a few. Australians all relied on law and rules as the main safeguards. There was only 
one articulate Dutch voice of doubt about safeguards in the Netherlands. The efficacy 
of safeguards depends on the intentions of the rule makers. This man, who 
“hesitate[d] to reject euthanasia in all cases”, expressed a declining faith in his 
country’s rules as he knew of a low reporting rate by doctors of instances of EPAS, 
as legally required. But he still had some faith in the intentions of the regulators 
themselves: “I have faith in the intentions of most policy makers but some rules do 
not appear to be functioning so that my trust has diminished”.  
Two Australians only were doubtful about the efficacy of guidelines. They 
thought that EPAS would be too difficult to “police” and “will end up being abused”. 
It’s really a thing that they should put up really tough guidelines for. 
(…) again, it’s difficult as well. I mean anything can be abused a la 
our tax system. There’s clear guidelines out for that. I think, yes it 
can, it can be possibly abused and that’s why it’s very difficult to 
make up my mind about the whole issue. 
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 (Leaders) 
Most Australian leaders confirmed the grassroots theme that it is difficult to 
safeguard EPAS from all abuse. These leaders believed legalising it would make it 
unsafe for vulnerable people with disabilities. An Australian leader with disability 
who has had life-threatening health conditions himself said: 
I’ve got support for the concept of euthanasia. I mean I would like to 
be able to say that if I’m in this type of situation I would like to be 
able to have assistance to commit suicide if my quality of life was 
ratshit. However I don’t see how you could give an adequate 
definition at all that could be followed that would protect everybody 
else. 
 By contrast, another also saw potential abuse of rules with regard to people 
with disability but believed safeguards could be developed to protect them: 
[L]et’s not stop everybody from using a euthanasia Bill because 
someone may misuse it. Let’s make sure that the safeguards are strong 
enough to withstand that. 
Some Dutch leaders acknowledged that not all abuse can be prevented, 
because of the social context in which it occurs. 
Of course it will always remain a process between people. And 
whatever wonderful legislation you make people often do not keep to 
it. 
Of course you have strange things happening anywhere in the world. 
(…) and you cannot do anything against that. Everywhere you have 
mad people walking around. So these two things are totally 
independent of each other. And I think that euthanasia practice is 
reasonably careful. 
However, all Dutch leaders expressed faith in their country’s rules. They 
approved of the Dutch system of monitoring committees and the (then) pending law 
to allow EPAS. They believed that EPAS is done in accordance with “very strict 
guidelines” and that “great care” is taken by doctors. 
Because a number of matters are now settled in law and you can test 
them. That means everyone will have to remain alert. 
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[Safeguards include:] That there are all sorts of bureaucracy around it 
[EPAS], before one decides yes or no, [in] ending life and who does 
it. That there will be an assessing committee that supports the doctor 
and says it is accountable and I say it is accountable and I think it’s all 
fine. It has to be done carefully. (…) And I know that that happens 
with great care. 
One leader stated that she thought that the euthanasia debate in the 
Netherlands is more about the technical issues than the substantial ones, which she 
sees as existential questions. 
When we talk about euthanasia here it is always about protocol. 
Euthanasia guidelines and what we think is better or worse about that. 
Or the regional committees … of a lawyer and an ethicist and a doctor 
who have to judge the doctor [who has reported euthanasia]. For me 
they are political topics. But not the existential subjects that it turns 
around. 
Reflecting grassroots informants’ apparent contradictions, one leader said 
that: “within Dutch society I am in no aspect of it afraid of euthanasia practice”. But 
he also related how after his mother’s death the doctor gave a death certificate stating 
that she died of natural causes while this leader suggested that her life was ended by 
a doctor in an act of EPAS. This seemed to have come about as a result of an 
agreement between the doctor and the family.  
My own mother formally has in her death certificate [death] by 
natural causes, but it was not. We had a good agreement. Everyone 
happy. I say it a little hard and unfriendly but there it was prevented 
what happened with my grandmother [dementia]. And that is good but 
the problem is you can argue about the question of incompetence [to 
make one’s own decision] but in principle it means that with 
incompetence options of euthanasia and [help with] suicide are not 
present. 
It seems that this example confirms the grassroots’ theme of wanting strict 
guidelines but not when they stand in the way of anyone’s choice. 
5.4 Death and dying as a distant experience 
An over view of the theme of “Death and dying as a distant experience” is 
that most informants had a limited experience of death and dying in their immediate 
environment. Death is for most at a distance and meaningless. Leaders had more 
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first-hand experience. There was no expressed personal fear of death while dying 
was hoped for as short. There was some reference to a fear of death in others. Some 
meaning could sometimes be derived from others’ deaths experienced in one’s own 
life. Most informants had no wish to have EPAS for themselves. 
Most informants had parents, other family, friends and acquaintances who 
had died but had had little involvement with the dying person at the time and had not 
been present at their dying. 
No, I haven’t had any major experiences. No, I haven’t seen anybody 
[die]. Well, the closest I’ve seen is a chap with emphysema but again, 
I didn’t live with him.  
I was around when my grandfather died but not so consciously. I 
deliberately took less notice because you don’t want to see someone 
go backwards like that. Just keep the picture of the person you know 
and not the picture of someone at the end. 
Death was seen as relatively meaningless and as the end to life. 
Not living any more, just gone. Nothing. Death is nothing. 
There is always the question in the background whether there is 
anything after life, whether there is some higher power. Well, I am not 
convinced of that. 
5.4.1 Private and public fear of death 
Informants expressed that they had no personal fear of death but they thought 
that most people did have such fears. Dying was something that informants hoped 
was short. It was not something informants had clear ideas about.  
[You] go to sleep and you don’t wake up so therefore you just don’t 
know anything about it. People are shit scared of death, most of them. 
I don’t think I am but then again I haven’t got to that point yet. But 
death is unknown because people don’t know what happens after that 
but death is like a – to be honest for a lot of people it’s an easy option, 
an easy way out. Living can be harder for people than dying. 
Yes, in any case I don’t want a long dying process. Two, three or four 
weeks in bed and waiting for what’s coming. 
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A few who had engaged in some spiritual practice and were most doubtful 
about EPAS made an association between a societal sense of meaninglessness and a 
public fear of death. 
[H]umans are not on earth for nothing, a coincidence, or a collection 
of genes and molecules. Look, there walks a person and he walks 
here, he originates because his parents have slept with each other, and 
he happens to die. That would make my life terribly meaningless. You 
live then, but for what? And I get the impression when I look around 
me, and especially when I read the newspaper, that the realisation that 
life was given and that it is not up to me to end it [is getting less]. 
Because that comes from a realisation that I have, that life is a gift. 
That is connected. And when I look at society I think that realisation 
is getting less. Death is sometimes drowned out. Then you get 
billboards like: ‘Is there coffee after death?’ And then I think, why do 
you yell so much at death? Are you perhaps scared of it? Would that 
be it? Do you want to make life normal in this way? 
A lot of people believe that you’ve got one life, you live it the best 
you can, you make as much money and have as much fun and then 
‘beep’, you die. Now I think society reflects that that is the majority 
attitude. 
Most informants did not say why they were not fearful of death but two did. 
One of the few informants who had experienced frequent patient deaths close up in a 
hospital said that his disability has removed his fear of death. And another had been 
“acclimatised” to his own future death by seeing other family members die.  
It was a big ward. There were twelve people in that ward, a lot of 
older people. But they had a kind of trolley to collect dead bodies 
with. And that went like: jolly, jolly, jolly [sound of the castor 
wheels]. (…). You heard it quite often. Then it was collecting another 
one. … the funny thing is because you experienced it so often, that 
people are dying, and I also had experience with walking people who 
died. In the first instance there’s a kind of a fear of death, but that fear 
has been overcome. 
I know that it’s inevitable that I’ve got to die sooner or later, 
hopefully not too soon. But, yeah, I don’t really find it confronting. I 
don’t really find that an issue. … Seeing aunties die and uncles die 
and Mum pass away and Dad go, I suppose we’re all getting trained 
up as we get older. 
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The same informant, who had the above experience of frequent death in 
hospital and was strongly in favour of EPAS, described the peace people experience 
close to a natural death as opposed to the fear he thinks most people have for it. 
I think, very many people fear death. Because the strange thing is, I 
have experienced it with a few people, then they took the decision [to 
let go], then they are no longer afraid. They can do it laughing. Very 
strange. They get a peaceful feeling [in the last few hours], have you 
ever experienced that? (…) They laugh, enjoy it. You can say 
goodbye, thanks for the good friendship, thanks for what we meant to 
each other. I think it is wonderful. 
Deaths of those who are close can also influence one’s view of life. An 
informant whose father had died was prompted by this to live more for the moment:  
Yes, I am totally a supporter of ‘carpe diem’ [seize the day]. You 
think that that tomorrow [death] will never come but at a certain 
moment it is there of course. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders, at a personal level, described a somewhat greater degree of direct 
experience with death than the grassroots sample. Particularly some of those who 
have disabilities themselves, had been with many family members and friends when 
they died, including in a nursing home: “I have had a lot to do with death because I 
lived in an institution where they fell in droves”.  
Some have derived meaning in their own lives from the deaths of others that they 
were close to. 
I am not a supporter of dying. [But] it taught me this. I keep on where 
the others stopped. And that I took over from them. Because every 
now and then there were very special people there, people of whom I 
thought they could have gone far, if their bodies had kept up.  
Her grandmother’s undignified dying in a nursing home prompted a non-
disabled leader, to look after her mother at home when she died. She concluded that 
this period with her mother “ended up being one of the best times both of us had ever 
had and neither of us had expected that”. 
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5.4.2 No personal death wish  
Some informants have had suicidal thoughts themselves but these were 
temporary and were overcome. They were glad not to have acted on them at the time 
while they were well aware that their disability was no barrier to committing suicide. 
Informants knew of suicide of other people with disabilities. Some Dutch informants 
saw this as a brave act whereas some others saw it as a selfish act. Dutch leaders 
suggested the existence of their society’s view of deliberate life-ending as 
courageous. Australians did not ascribe such moral values to suicide. Suicide was 
seen as having a negative emotional impact on others and this provided a reason for 
preferring EPAS over suicide as it is seen as less emotionally burdensome on others. 
Most did not see EPAS as applicable to themselves and certainly not for reason of 
their disability. 
Some informants had thought about their life with a disability when in 
hospital and rehabilitation, post-accident, or at later times, as to whether they would 
like to continue. They were, in the main, now glad that they never acted on their 
feelings then as they now enjoyed the life they had. An informant who had a bad 
time in the acute stage and another who has some bad days speak next. 
I probably would not have accepted it (euthanasia) but it certainly was 
touch and go…. There is a period of anger and anguish and a real 
down feeling and God this is the worst thing that’s ever happened to 
me and maybe death would be better. … Then I look at my life now 
and I think wow, what a path that I’ve come and it’s just so different. 
Life’s just so wonderful now and there’s no … knowing I was the 
same person back then. 
Have you ever thought about that yourself [suicide]? Finishing myself 
off, no. [I] have thought when there are some physical problems, and 
you clash a bit more in everyday life than normal, than differently: 
when I go to sleep – I don’t necessarily have to wake up. These 
thoughts never last long. 
Where most did not, a few did consider euthanasia or suicide at those times. 
One informant tried to stop eating or drinking but the hospital said that they would 
feed him by tube if he did. Another discharged herself from the rehabilitation 
hospital to kill herself at home. A friend caught on to what she intended and stayed 
with her until she was no longer suicidal.  
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There was a realisation that one could commit suicide if one really wanted. 
Examples were given of the possibility to cease eating or of others who had drowned 
themselves by driving their wheelchairs into the water.  
But I think that if a person really wants to these days, they can do it at 
the drop of a hat anyhow. 
One guy, it was rather bizarre, he was in an electric wheelchair and he 
just got his taxi driver to drop him off at the wharf and he just rode off 
the end of the wharf, straight into the drink. 
Most informants, in both countries, were in favour of allowing euthanasia or 
PAS for persons who wanted this, but not necessarily for themselves, and not for 
reason of having quadriplegia. For themselves some held the door open in case of a 
future situation that might require EPAS but most tied this to extreme circumstances 
only. 
I would not easily agree to euthanasia for myself. Then it would have 
to be very bad. If I would really see that there is no road of return, and 
I am totally finished. Then I think that I would say: you know what, 
just end it all. Because I am only going to suffer more and more now. 
While in the end I will die anyway. So just finish it then. 
Personally in my case, I can’t speak for anybody else, I would 
continue until such time as if mentally it had become an anguish or a 
problem. 
 
 
(Leaders) 
One Dutch leader was unusual within this sample because of her experience 
with EPAS. She had been present during the dying of many friends. She would not 
want EPAS for herself because of the bureaucracy of the process. 
… what disturbed me the most is the procedure you have to go 
through. It is good that there is a procedure, but you have to keep 
making it clear to various people that for you it is unbearable 
suffering and why. I thought [if it] does it have to be like this in the 
last phase, just leave it. (…) It [EPAS] is an attempt to guarantee a 
careful approach with respect to our fellow human beings. But at the 
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same time it has been so bureaucratised that when you open up a 
question like that – such a request – that then you are taking a taken 
up into a new system. That new system then determines the quality of 
your daily … and last day of your life. Personally I have difficulty 
with that. Don’t ask me how to do it differently but my experience is 
that road is not the easiest one. 
5.4.3 Dutch courage 
Dutch informants at times referred to acts of suicide as courageous where 
Australians did not. A Dutchman provided some clarification of his apparently 
contradictory stance of suicide as brave while he also saw it as egotistical. It was 
brave because he would not dare suicide himself and he had seen the emotional 
impact of suicide on others. 
I know some that have done it. They hanged themselves or ate too 
many pills. That is a real shock. They are all young people. I knew 
them very well. That guy just did not see any purpose anymore and he 
did it. Quite brave. Right after [rehabilitation]. And a friend of mine 
did it. 
Q: So you think of him as brave? 
How they did that. I would not be brave enough myself. They would 
have been quite depressed, I understand that. But then, to just do it. I 
think Goddammit, they did do it. In itself I think it is very egotistical. 
Look at all the grief you give your family and all those people that 
love you. If you think of that then you won’t do it. When you see how 
much sadness those people had then. … I think it so egotistical like, 
then I’ll just pull the plug. You should not do that. 
5.4.4 Impacts on others 
Suicide by oneself was seen as too upsetting for others that are inevitably 
involved and this was offered as providing a justification for a formalised availability 
of euthanasia and PAS, which was seen as less upsetting. 
… a lot of it is not very pleasant. … Gassing, or you know cutting 
your wrists or whatever they tend to do. It’s not nice for people to find 
them like that so if they were able to just have the needle… 
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These people commit suicide in the most terrible way. A train driver 
gets a trauma from that. Better to give the euthanasia syringe. It is 
neater, you lie more comfortably in your coffin and nobody else 
suffers from it. 
Not committing suicide for the sake of others could create a feeling of being 
“obliged to live” for those few informants who were gravely dissatisfied with their 
lives with disability. 
 I’ve discussed it with people in the family, not saying I was going to 
do it or anything like that but just sounding out how they would react 
to it. … it probably won’t be in their [parents] time. I don’t know. It 
depends on how long they live obviously. 
The few informants who said that they were interested in EPAS for 
themselves, for reason of their unsatisfactory life with disability, also all decided 
against suicide because of an impact on others. A Dutch informant who had pre-
arranged EPAS for himself for when he has “had enough”, went through a struggle 
some years ago about whether to kill himself. 
I thought about throwing myself off a bridge or rolling in front of a 
truck but I could not physically manage that in the first years. I could 
not even get a pill out of a box. I also thought that I would burden 
others if I threw myself in front of a train, a bus or truck. 
And an Australian said: 
But I realised and I thought a lot about it that you can’t do it without it 
affecting somebody, and that’s the only reason that perhaps I haven’t 
got rid of myself. (…) I can’t make somebody else responsible.  
 
(Leaders) 
Dutch leaders but not Australians, referred to the courage of suicide or of 
having EPAS, some in a positive sense, some not. This confirmed that attributing 
courage to the ending of one’s life was a distinctively Dutch feeling. There was some 
reference to this being a wider Dutch social phenomenon, related to unrealistic media 
stereotypes of disability and death. 
And I think [that with a positive disability image campaign] those 
images will change. Look at an American program for instance. (…) 
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then you do see someone in a wheelchair pass by every now and then. 
Perhaps they don’t have much of a part but is someone who works 
there. Get it? You don’t see such images in the Netherlands. Yes, you 
do in a soapy for instance … that you see someone walk again who 
has just suffered a spinal injury. That sort of nonsense. Or indeed 
people who are heroes because they have a disability and straight 
away ask for euthanasia. 
5.4.5 A low awareness of palliative care 
The theme of “A low awareness of palliative care” showed that in both 
countries there was a low level of awareness about the nature of palliative care and 
its availability. This was most noticeable in the Dutch sample. Of those who had 
heard of palliative care many had difficulty describing what it was. Of those who did 
know what palliative care was some believed EPAS was, or should be, part of 
palliative care, thus offering choice. Others saw EPAS and palliative care are 
separate approaches to issues in dying. Dutch informants believed palliative care 
practice in their country was not good compared to practice elsewhere but was now 
improving. Australian leaders believed that palliative care in their country was good 
and improving. Leaders in both countries had a better overall knowledge of palliative 
care than that of grassroots informants. Dutch leaders echoed the grassroots’ theme 
of EPAS as an integral part of palliative care whereas the Australians did not. 
Half the Dutch sample had not heard of palliative care (palliatieve zorg) and 
did not know what it was. 
I would not know what that means. What is it? 
Australians, apart from one informant, had heard of palliative care but many 
could not correctly describe what it was. 
I don’t know a lot about it. I believe it’s when someone becomes so 
sort of out of it, they really cannot feed themselves. They get fed with 
tubes or fluid … and they are kept alive that way until their last days. 
I don’t know whether that’s right or not. 
Those in Australia and in the Netherlands who did say that they knew about 
palliative care gave a fair description of it. They described it in general terms as 
reducing the pain and suffering at the end of life, that is at a stage of terminal illness.  
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[I]t’s mainly used in terminally ill patients and they sustain you and 
they care for you. And they take care of your physical needs, 
whatever you need. They just make you as comfortable as possible 
until your death. 
I think that’s basically providing a pain-free quality environment in 
the last days, weeks of somebody’s life. 
These informants saw palliative care practice as a mix of medical and 
counselling support or as one offering comprehensive support to the patient. 
Making life as comfortable as possible for the people that are 
probably going to die. So all you’re doing is trying to improve the 
quality of life for that person. 
For me palliative care is better pain control, those kinds of things. 
Pain control, and for me that’s not only pills or painkillers, but also in 
other areas, to be with somebody, those kinds of things. I think that 
that would help well too. That does not mean that you solve 
everything though. That goes too far. 
The Dutch often associated palliative care with voluntary workers, home help 
or community nursing.  
Yes, there are volunteers, called ‘mantelzorg’ [informal care by 
family or friends] or something like that. That’s a volunteer group. 
They are in the neighbourhood quickly, home help or the doctor. (…) 
Somebody will come and visit and talk with you. Until you are dead 
they come. (…) The palliative care is more, people with a listening 
ear, you can say. (…). People in a terminal phase want to talk. And 
not be alone. You have someone to hold your hand. And pain control, 
that is the medical side. 
Some saw EPAS as actually (in the Netherlands) or potentially (in Australia) 
being an integral part of palliative care. This way palliative care and euthanasia were 
seen as options that one could choose.  
It is part of it [EPAS]. Also, somebody who has euthanasia done can 
do this with support. Look, somebody with a terminal illness then has 
somebody with them who can talk things through. 
Well, that’s one choice someone’s got but like I said, it’s a choice. I 
think euthanasia should be another choice. Everybody’s situation is 
different … . Two people might have the same diagnosis but like for 
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example my pain tolerance is a lot higher than other people’s, so I can 
handle a fair amount of pain but I know there are other people that 
just can’t handle that sort of pain, they’re just – they’re made that way 
so that their pain tolerance is low, so they’re different. I might opt for 
just palliative care, heaps of drugs and whatever pain, the rest of the 
pain I can tolerate and when it naturally goes, it goes. Whereas 
someone else might be screaming in agony to the point where they 
need to be padded or tied down or whatever because they just can’t 
handle the same sort of pain. 
Some others saw ‘euthanasia’ and palliative care as separate practices. 
So it is more help in the terminal phase, like I understand it. Where 
everything is being done to lighten suffering and take it away or 
whatever. But not to take steps towards euthanasia. (…) People who 
really are in pain, who just get morphine till they drop. People don’t 
have to suffer pain in such circumstances. Then I think that’s what 
you should always do. Always try to minimise suffering. If not 
necessary it should not be done [euthanasia]. 
Some of those few Dutch informants who knew something about palliative 
care did not think that the standard of palliative care was as good as it could be in 
their country.  
I think it is not being done well, that it is being done badly. And we 
are soon exhausted in our options, because act as if we have so many 
painkillers – people do not have to suffer. Well, I see with my bladder 
and the pain I have from that, that there is no painkiller for that. Well 
or you are completely drugged and then you no longer live. That is no 
choice. Then I think, it is not like that. Because how many people do 
suffer pain. Yes, we do act as if we don’t have to suffer pain but in 
practice that is just not true. And … one cannot fix all that. Can that 
situation be improved? I certainly think so. 
But perhaps more is possible in palliative care. And accompanying 
people towards lightening of pain and the creation of options so that 
people can, for example, die at home. That you don’t arrive at 
euthanasia that quickly… 
(Leaders) 
Dutch leaders were aware of palliative care, as treatment for pain and 
suffering at the end of life, which they described as being delivered in hospices or at 
home by volunteers. They mostly saw euthanasia as part of a continuum at the end of 
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a process where all palliative care options were exhausted. The state of palliative 
care in the Netherlands was seen as inadequate but also as now improving. 
The euthanasia possibilities and the resultant discussion have had a 
very positive effect on thinking about palliative care. That has really 
been a stimulus. And there’s a lot to be still be achieved. But that has 
really been opened up through the euthanasia discussion. I think that 
the medical profession was a bit slack on this point. It [palliative care] 
was behind whichever way you look at it. And now I think that gap is 
fast being covered. 
Australian leaders described palliative care as care for terminally ill people 
and the relief of their pain and suffering, including grief counselling. Most thought 
that there was a good availability of palliative care in Australia and that it was 
improving. Some did not know. 
The palliative care technology and supports … is [sic] improving all 
the time and I think, from my experience, where that can be delivered 
in an environment that the person wants it to be delivered in, in their 
own home or wherever they have that comfort. 
5.5 Suffering and EPAS 
The theme “Suffering and EPAS”, and its sub-themes present the various 
kinds of suffering that informants thought of as playing a role in requests for EPAS. 
These motivations were mainly concerned with how they thought about EPAS for 
others. Most informants, as presented, did not wish EPAS for themselves and most 
particularly not for reason of their disability. For some others, unbearable suffering 
arising from their disability experience could be acceptable as a valid reason to have 
EPAS themselves. Unbearable suffering of various kinds, particularly pain and loss 
of dignity, were strong sub-themes. By contrast, depression was generally not 
considered a valid reason to have EPAS as it was thought treatable. Suffering was 
seen as a subjective individual experience. Whereas everything possible should be 
done to address such suffering it was, in the final analysis seen as the decision of 
suffering person whether they had had enough and request EPAS. The suffering of 
those close to the primary suffering person was seen by some as legitimate suffering 
to be weighed in making EPAS decisions for that primary person. Some leaders 
added that a person’s suffering is better understood and ameliorated by people that 
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know each other well. For them, suffering was seen as part of the human condition 
yet as something to be minimised or avoided, if necessary by EPAS. Leaders also 
added to grassroot informants’ themes of suffering by emphasising fears of death, 
dying, disability, illness and of suffering itself which they saw as features of life that 
needed to be accepted as part of the nature of the world. 
5.5.1 Unbearable suffering 
Unbearable suffering of various kinds were important factors in the 
informants’ support for EPAS, whether for themselves or for others.  
If suffering is so unbearable, inhuman, then everyone should have the 
right [to have EPAS]. 
To physically suffer pain, really suffer pain, then certainly these days 
that can be suppressed in very many ways. But if at a certain moment 
a situation is hopeless, for yourself, that it is really a declining 
situation, then I think it [EPAS] is a consideration. 
Terminal illness was considered as a legitimate reason in itself to allow EPAS 
but was not necessarily the only reason. Informants often wanted to include an 
individual’s unbearable suffering of various kinds as sufficient reasons to have 
EPAS.  
I think probably dying, you know, like terminal illness or whatever, is 
probably high on the agenda. If you don’t have a terminal illness then 
you may not be considered but I think there are certain circumstances 
where you don’t want to be around. 
Q:. To get this clear – are you saying that euthanasia is more 
appropriate at the end of life? A: Oh no, If you have something that 
cannot be cured. [Or] something that you cannot live with. Q: So that 
could involve people that you might know, people with quadriplegia 
who do not want to live … Should euthanasia be possible for someone 
like that? A: if they wanted that, yes. If they don’t allow it they will 
jump in front of the train. They will just roll their wheelchair in front 
of the train. 
 136
5.5.2 Subjective experience of suffering 
Most informants held that, in the final analysis, the individual’s subjective 
experience of their suffering, from physical or psychological pain, or other 
conditions considered to be unbearable, should determine whether anyone chose to 
end their lives through EPAS. 
There’s all different types of pain, not just physical pain, 
psychologically you know, coping with things and … it’s just you 
know any amount of reason … to have it [EPAS], so people have got 
the choice. 
Everyone determines for themselves what is unbearable suffering. 
Someone will likely find something not reason enough [for EPAS], 
like disability, incontinence, dependency, sex and dignity of life, to 
desire this. But someone else does not see why he should not be 
allowed to turn off the light [for such reasons]. 
Mostly informants advocated that while everything possible should be done 
to alleviate suffering, at some point it was the individual’s legitimate call should they 
still want EPAS.  
But if, at a certain moment, a situation is hopeless, for yourself, that it 
is really a deteriorating situation, then I think it is a consideration.  
I think everything else has to be dealt with first and then euthanasia. it 
should not be a first step. (…) if at a certain moment a situation is 
hopeless for yourself, which is really a declining situation, then I think 
it is a consideration [EPAS]. 
What constituted unbearable suffering was held to be subjective and it could 
be reason enough for EPAS when a person has “had enough”. They held to this 
legitimacy of subjectivity of suffering while knowing that, unlike themselves, others 
often saw life with quadriplegia as unbearable, perhaps even as worse than some 
other conditions. 
Who am I to determine what suffering people should be able to take? 
What they do or don't want. 
I know a guy who lived to 29. He died of cancer, really terrible. A 
terrible disease, really. And who did say to me: it seems more difficult 
to me to have quadriplegia, while I just see it the other way around. 
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That shows you of course, when you are in a certain situation, it is 
difficult to estimate how another person experiences it. 
And for some the subjective experience of suffering could lead to EPAS for 
reason of any suffering arising from life with a disability as well. 
For some people their daily experiences of disability can be suffering. 
For that woman who was never able to come to terms with her spinal 
injury from day one [and who received EPAS], that was really 
psychological suffering. If it is no longer worthwhile for yourself, 
that’s suffering, yes. 
Some made distinctions about what would be legitimate suffering in order to 
constitute a reason to receive EPAS, such as in extreme circumstances only. There 
was a hesitancy to let any subjectively unbearable, individual reason, including 
quadriplegia, be enough to approve a euthanasia request. This hesitancy was related 
to their own disability experience of having overcome effects of disability on many 
occasions. 
I have thought about it in a perhaps more concrete fashion (than 
others) because it is of course a situation of which another person 
would say: for me this is too much. Or you would have said this about 
yourself sometimes. 
Those few informants whose experience of life with quadriplegia had led 
them to desire EPAS for themselves were among those who were most absolute 
about “a right” to define for themselves what constituted unbearable suffering for 
them in order to undergo EPAS. 
I think that people have the right to decide for themselves when they 
think, whatever anybody else may think about that, that life is no 
longer meaningful for them, to make an end to their life. Someone 
who is healthy or disabled. 
 I just don’t see the point in enduring it all, for me. I only speak for me 
obviously. That’s the whole point. Euthanasia should be about the 
person…. Now what I care about and what the person next door is to 
do is irrelevant. It’s what I want to do with my life. It should boil 
down to the individual. 
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5.5.3 Whose suffering? 
The relativity of subjective suffering from pain was also illustrated by near-
death and altered-consciousness experiences related by a small number of informants 
and one leader. While from an observer’s point of view they were in a state of acute 
suffering, they experienced it differently. They related their readiness and desire to 
leave their bodies or told of observing their choking, gasping body in an unconcerned 
disembodied state. The example below concerns the experience of an informant who 
was severely burned and had an arm and fingers from the other hand amputated after 
his accident that led to spinal cord injury. The regular cleaning and bandageing of 
burns in intensive care was extremely painful and distressing to him. He asked to be 
left alone for four hours during which an experience happened which transformed the 
way he was dealing with his pain. 
I mean I’ve never been in lots of pain apart from my accident … and a 
month later or two months later when I made a decision to say well I 
really want to get on with my life. I mean there was – I call it the 
spirit you know it was in the background – it said how’s it going John. 
I said I’m pretty pissed off actually, I’m in a lot of pain, I can’t walk, 
my arm’s burnt, my hand’s burnt, I’m bloody paralysed – what’s the 
point of life you know. And the spirit sort of said do you want to keep 
going or do you want to stop, and I said well I’ve really got a lot of 
things I want to do – I still want to get married, I still want to have 
some kids, I still want to get my business up and running, … there’s 
still lots of things I would like to do even though I’m paralysed. And 
then the next day I woke up and I just changed my train of thought. 
(…) but that time when I made that decision after seeing the spirit or 
whoever or whatever, from the following day or day morning when I 
woke up I said, OK I know it’s going to be a hard battle and a hard 
ride but I want to give it a go you know. 
Suffering, relevant to end of life decisions, did not need to be that of the 
primary person only. Suffering of those involved with that person was also seen as 
relevant and important in making EPAS decisions. 
I would not like to see my mother suffer for five or six years from 
cancer. If she says beforehand, no, I’d rather have euthanasia because 
I cannot manage this, then I say, OK, you can go it’s your choice. Of 
course I would be very sorry about her death. But I think I would 
rather have that. I think that if I had to experience those painful six 
years, that I would hate that much more. You would suffer from that 
yourself. 
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A Dutch informant described in a hypothetical example how observing and 
feeling another’s pain can contribute to an EPAS decision for that person. 
It is exactly the same if it happened in your family and you see your 
father sitting on the couch, suffering great pain. And then something 
breaks inside yourself. Then you think next time it could be your 
father-in-law. Then I think, well, I saw it in my father, let’s spare him 
the suffering. 
An Australian (who was not satisfied with his life) thought that it hurt his 
mother more now to see him suffering from his quadriplegia than if he had been able 
to have EPAS when he had his accident. Another described the pain of watching 
children with cerebral palsy on television 
It really hurts me sometimes when they show on the TV some of those 
children. There’s 20-year-olds in 12-year-old’s bodies. [EPAS could 
be a legitimate response] for the person who is suffering and the 
relatives, wives, children, whatever are suffering because they're 
seeing the person they love suffer as well. So it's a relief for both of 
them. 
Several more informants also believed that, for reason of a burden of care on 
the parents of people with intellectual disability, the parents could decide for their 
child to have EPAS. 
5.5.4 Physical and mental suffering 
Physical or mental suffering was a major theme as a reason for people 
requesting EPAS. It was seen as important to see to the relief of pain and its causes 
before EPAS was considered. If that were not possible, then EPAS was seen as 
preferable to possibly having a person commit suicide. 
You have to solve the problem first of course. It’s just the same as if 
you, with your spinal injury, said: I want to be dead, but in one way or 
another can be cured with an operation. 
You should always try to minimise people’s suffering from pain. If it 
is not necessary [EPAS] it should not happen. 
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Pain and cancer were often mentioned in this context, grouped together with 
various other conditions. These were seen as constituting legitimate reasons to 
request and receive EPAS. 
 I think probably severe pain would be the biggest factor. I cannot 
think of any other. Why should one have to suffer to the bitter end if 
one doesn’t want to? 
… if you’ve got a medical condition and the pain associated with the 
condition, as well as maybe being permanently in bed, having to be 
bathed in bed, not getting out of bed so you’ve got no quality of life at 
all. You might still have a little bit of brain functioning and I then 
think, yeah, ask, do you want to carry on? 
Some informants related their experiences of seeing others with cancer and 
the pain associated with that, but mostly had not had a very close involvement in 
dying. Generally their beliefs about pain were not explicitly generated from their 
own experience. 
Well, I have had family members die of cancer, an aunty, … she died 
of bowel cancer. A very nasty death. She should have been given the 
option of euthanasia if she wanted it. I know she refused painkillers 
and all that sort of thing… it’s just from what I heard being said by 
my parents and that I know she died a very painful and a long death. 
Mental suffering was often described as depression. The dominant sub-theme 
about depression was that it was seen as a treatable condition, which could not justify 
EPAS. 
Depression is also an illness of course. And some people cannot live 
with that. I know somebody who is very depressed but who has not 
yet let it be done [EPAS]. And she wants to die very much. … . And 
when you see her she always says: I want to die, I want to die. But she 
does not do it. She is old and does not want to be [old]. You can of 
course treat depression. … you always have to solve the problem first. 
That’s where a qualified doctor needs to decide that person is just 
going through a bad case of depression and I don’t think that’s reason 
for euthanasia …because depression can be treated with drugs 
admittedly. 
Several informants expressed that to know that one could have EPAS if pain 
and suffering becomes unbearable was a relief from suffering in itself. 
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[T]hat the moment that the person knows that it is possible, there is a 
feeling of relief. But if you know three months ahead, well, if I then 
really cannot go on I will get a pill. (…) Because it is a burden that 
people carry, that fear. Look, everyone fears dying but the fear of 
dying in that terrible pain, that makes it for many: I don’t want to 
know. I do not want to have that, period. 
5.5.5 Terminal illness and loss of meaning 
 Suffering during a terminal illness was mostly considered futile and little 
meaning was ascribed to this time. Such life was considered better to be cut short 
with EPAS: “whether it’s two hours before they die, what’s the difference?” Such 
meaningless was also perceived in conditions which involved a loss of cognition and 
which then becomes a reason to have EPAS. 
[B]ut if I would at some stage just lie there and not hear or see 
anything, then I think why? But then I think that people at that 
moment – look as long as I know that when things are like that, that I 
can call on my doctor.  
A Dutch informant told of the meaninglessness of his father’s suffering when 
close to death. A Catholic doctor ignored his father’s covert (his father also being a 
Catholic) pleas for EPAS where this informant believed that EPAS would have been 
preferable. 
When he could no longer get up from his bed there was no meaning 
left in his life, and for no-one else either. He was just waiting engulfed 
by pain, waiting for death for a long time. How good it would have 
been if, when the pain took the meaning from his life, if the doctor 
had given him something to allow us … to say goodbye in a calm 
way, after which he could just have gone to sleep.  
On the other hand a few others wanted to leave the door open to include the 
possibility that life was still worth living while terminally ill: 
That could be a big factor too, terminal illness. But again, it has to be 
weighed up. Can medical advances improve it and miracles happen 
every day. I mean, is it totally terminal and what is the person’s 
quality of life? 
Those few informants who had expressed an interest in EPAS for themselves 
referred to the presence of meaninglessness in their own lives with disability, which 
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they thought should entitle them to EPAS. One such an informant related explicitly 
to his loneliness and the way others treated him as constituting his motivations to 
want EPAS for himself. 
One day the moment will be there that after a certain number of years 
in a wheelchair, maybe twenty-five years, that I will be so tired and 
can no longer deal with the sorrow and adverse events or insults from 
people. (…). Death is final rest. No more pain and going to another 
world where there is no more guilt. Without being lonely, without 
being unhappy. 
5.5.6 Medical treatment, care, relations and dignity  
A sense of loss of dignity was woven throughout descriptions of the impacts 
of pain, medical treatment, including over-treatment and some approaches to care. A 
loss of personal dignity could arise directly from conditions one suffers from and 
could be reason enough to have EPAS. 
When life is no longer experienced as a dignified existence... That is 
different for anyone but you can call that a common denominator to 
be so psychologically ill that life is only a black hole. Then that can be 
enough I think. 
The treatment of severe pain itself was sometimes seen as undignified. Some 
informants thought that such treatment necessarily involved the administration of 
high doses of drugs which could cause an undignified state of mental incapability or 
unconsciousness. Such unconsciousness could be a result of treatment or the person’s 
condition. EPAS was then seen as an answer to such indignities. About the 
euthanasia practice in the Netherlands it was said that: “if the person wants to go they 
go in a dignified manner and painless”.  
I think it’s more to do when the quality of life slips below the point 
that you don’t want to be here, but you don’t even have the ability to 
commit suicide if you want to. Your choice is taken away because … 
when medical expertise cannot do anything more for you. Well, they 
can relieve the pain but you are so far out of it that you don’t know 
what day it is or … you are just in a non-compos mess. To relieve that 
pain you have to be drugged to the eyeballs that you might as well not 
be here anymore. 
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EPAS was seen as an option in the face of the indignity of medical 
approaches that keep people alive when they were not able to live a quality life, they 
might be unconscious, or “a cabbage”, or “vegetable”, incontinent, a burden to others 
and not receive the necessary care. Some saw a bad quality of care for many of those 
who are close to death.  
[The carers in hospital only] pump more painkillers into them, [and 
don’t] clean them up after they shit themselves. Don’t worry about 
dignity and all those sorts of things that we treasure. 
So what if they don’t want to be here, so what if they shit themselves. 
They haven’t got a clue half the time. Our job is to keep them alive. 
… the relatives are worn out, stretched to the limit. Had enough kind 
of thing and so has the person. They’ve got nothing to live for other 
than pain and no dignity and what have you. 
Fear of future conditions of severe pain or prospects of entering a nursing 
home could also be reason enough to assure people that they could have EPAS 
should the situation become unbearable. Such assurance could make suffering more 
bearable. A few informants would consider EPAS for themselves if they would ever 
have to enter a nursing home. 
[T]hat the moment that the person knows that it is possible, there is a 
feeling of relief. But if you know three months ahead, well, if I then 
really cannot go on I will get a pill. (…). Because it is a burden that 
people carry, that fear. Look, everyone fears dying but the fear of 
dying in that terrible pain, that makes it for many: I don’t want to 
know. I do not want to have that, period. 
If something would happen to my wife and I would enter a nursing 
home, then I would observe it for a while and if I did not like it I 
would consider it [euthanasia]. 
An Australian informant, who did spend some time in an institution and 
would consider death if a return to it were necessary, described her fears as a lack of 
genuine interaction with others and boredom in such a setting. She had a very high 
level of quadriplegia, being able to move her head only, and had been subject to 
significant health problems. She found her will to live in the enjoyment of her family 
relations and with others. 
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Q: And if you were by yourself and not have your family and friends 
around, are you saying that you would then think differently about 
euthanasia?  
A: Yes, yes. Particularly after my experiences in X [the institution]. 
You need to be able to bounce off people Erik, everybody does. You 
need to feel some worth, everybody does. And its only the people 
around you that bounce off that feedback to you, that assist you, but 
not in a condescending fashion, but are just as normal with you as 
they can be. In a hospital and in an institution no-one is normal with 
you like that. (…). Anybody that’s not fast and furious and cut-throat, 
there’s no time for them. And the people that drop into that category 
are the elderly, they are people alone, including people with 
disabilities, depending on their disability, and obviously people who 
are terminally ill. They have the right [to EPAS]. 
Where disability experience had influenced informants it was to support 
euthanasia because they saw that there were sometimes conditions that constituted a 
level of suffering with which one might not want to live. Experience of disability 
seemed to have been a minimal influence in how informants thought about EPAS, 
with many saying that their disability experience had not changed their views.  
The [disability] experience is a separate issue to [my views on EPAS]. 
To start off with I was bothered by it [disability] and that’s just how it 
is. During the day I just had no time to think about it. Look, you just 
keep on living and breathing and we’ll see what happens. 
I think I was always for it [EPAS]. It’s [life with disability] probably 
given me a different look at it … . I’ve got to experience what we 
always feared. 
Some others said that they could understand better why someone might want 
EPAS because of their own experiences with suffering and hardship.  
Before my accident I thought: I can do what I want, my own choices 
in life…. Now I know how life can take a funny turn over which you 
have no control. I never knew that. I thought, nothing will ever 
happen to me. … then you’ll look at it differently. You understand 
others’ suffering better. 
One thought that his disability experience had given him insights that had 
helped him form his opinions on EPAS, which included a greater caution in 
supporting it. 
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(Leaders) 
Leaders confirmed the grassroots theme of suffering as being unavoidable. 
They expressed the need for disability and suffering to be seen as part of the human 
condition, and as something to be lived with. They thought that in their societies 
there were many efforts to avoid this human condition, including through 
technical/medical approaches, genetics and professional specialisation. The common 
belief was that much suffering could be solved or avoided. 
What I was going to say about suffering I suppose is that we’re so 
used to popping pills for a headache … if you’ve got some problem 
you go and get antibiotics to solve the problem. We no longer think 
it’s acceptable to suffer, so we think that there should be an easy 
solution to remove that suffering. 
[H]ealth care in Holland has gone very far, and you see now, with 
them being busy with the revealing of DNA, the gene technology, that 
people get an increased notion of ‘Ah’ they have found a solution for 
something else, so we can prevent it. Or we no longer have to get it [a 
health condition or disability], or whatever. So you get a picture of 
some things can be avoided, and you have to always prevent them 
(from happening), because there is really a very large group of people 
who thinks that being disabled also always means suffering, and is to 
the detriment of a quality of life. (…) If you cannot give a place to 
disability, illness and suffering anymore in your community and put it 
away, sometimes literally, … in what you have got these days, houses 
where you can die [hospice] … then I think what have we done, that 
we need special houses to die, we cannot do that within the family 
anymore, at home, but we have to go to a special house.  
They thought that fears of dying, disability and illness affected how most 
people think about suffering. 
I think it plays a role, that unconsciously the average person thinks of 
disability and illness as something terrible. [The fear of] dying first 
that is also something you’d rather not talk about and after that comes 
[the fear of] disability and illness. And we keep those from the door as 
long as possible. 
Personally I think that the entire euthanasia debate is fear of illness 
and disability, just with broad sections of the population, fear of 
suffering. And they think that euthanasia is the best solution. It has 
also replaced what churches had to say in the old days. Then suffering 
was part of life. It was a process towards death. Nowadays we no 
longer have time for that or something. (…) … [B]ut people have 
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been dying miserable, bloody horrible deaths since Adam and Eve, 
there’s nothing unusual about that. What is unusual now is a change in 
our social values where there’s a significant number of people say, 
well we should terminate life when it gets past a certain point. 
Like the grassroots sample they thought of the experience of suffering as 
subjective but also as complex. Knowing the suffering person increased one’s 
knowledge of the kind of suffering that that person experienced. 
It is of course a terribly difficult dilemma: when is somebody really 
incurable, or in the terminal stage. And when does somebody have a 
mood change or a depressive episode or has very great physical 
suffering in which it is really not possible to fix it medically? There 
are all sorts of grades in that. Pain barriers are lower with one than 
with the other. And for myself I always have pain in my body but at a 
certain moment you move your boundaries again. But you can't 
determine for someone else what their pain barriers are. And not only 
physical pain but also existential pain. At best you can, because you 
had a very long-term relationship with someone and have been 
walking with him, see how much somebody is suffering. 
A leader who had tried to commit suicide described his dual experience of 
simultaneously feeling in the choking body that he observed from the ceiling in his 
disembodied, unconcerned state, confirming the subjectivity of suffering at a 
metaphysical level. 
I had surgery in 1985 and nearly died – I had an out of body death 
experience (…) But I know very clearly regardless of what scientists 
may be able to explain away in terms of lack of oxygen to my brain 
and a range of other things, that I was going somewhere that I really 
wanted to go (…). And I had a very, I guess, typical out of body 
experience in actually having two separate parts of the one but being 
able to experience someone who was suffocating and on a bed and 
someone who was up near the ceiling and who wasn’t suffocating and 
you actually knew what it was like to be pain free. And I hadn’t 
experienced that for as long as I could remember so I actually felt 
myself going somewhere else … . 
5.6 Rights, choice and compassion 
There was a strong theme of the belief that people have a right to choose and 
determine for themselves to have EPAS. This belief was more often expressed as a 
right for others rather than for oneself and could be triggered by various kinds of 
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suffering, including loss of meaning in one’s life, incurable conditions, prolongued 
unwanted medical treatment, cancer or pain. The emphasis was on the person’s 
choice of exercising one’s right to self-determination as a means towards ending 
one’s suffering. The kind of suffering to be addressed was of lesser importance.  
If that’s their choice, … it should be made available to them. It’s their 
choice. Rights and choice are the euthanasia problem in a nutshell. 
… [P]eople with cancer, things like that, naturally any terminal 
disease. If they’re of sound mind the person should be given the right 
to decide whether they want to end their life or have it dragged out by 
a hospital. 
It was often not considered necessary or appropriate for another person to 
make a judgement about what kind and degree of suffering warranted EPAS, if the 
suffering person determined that it was too much for them. 
All types of pain. Coping with things, and you know, other people, 
it’s just you know any amount of reason to have it so people have got 
the choice. 
It is each person's choice. You never know what people live through. I 
had pain in my abdomen for six months once. Then also thought: well 
I can't keep this up anymore. I didn't want to be dead, but I thought: I 
can't live this way. If I can't find a solution, if this has to be part of my 
spinal injury, chronic pain, then I can't live. I had spastic intestines, 
that can be very painful. So well, then I can't laugh everyday anymore, 
and I don't like that at all. Other people have other things. Maybe their 
face is disfigured. Some people don't want to go on then. Well just let 
them I think. 
Quite often informants insisted that everything possible should be offered and 
done to alleviate suffering. But, in the end it was for most seen as a choice to accept 
suffering and its treatment or choose to get away from it by using EPAS. A Dutch 
informant had described what she thought was EPAS on a woman with quadriplegia 
who was still in rehabilitation. She felt uncomfortable about this but insisted on a 
right to choose. 
You can talk with these people. You can do therapy. You can show 
them how others try to make something of their lives. If for you it’s 
no longer worthwhile then that is suffering. So it becomes a choice. 
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At one end of the spectrum of responses were those of the small number of 
informants who would rather be dead than live with their disability. At the other end 
were those who enjoyed a very good, or even better life, than before the onset of 
quadriplegia. Both sub-groups thought that everything should be done first to 
alleviate suffering and both deferred to an individual’s right to choice in alleviating 
suffering. For the first group the emphasis was on the exercise of a right to choose 
EPAS with the least importance attached to the kind of suffering being experienced. 
In this group an informant described how an elderly relative had been in a nursing 
home for some years as “a vegetable”. He did not visit because this was “too much” 
for him to bear to see. Even though she was not in a position to choose, he believed 
that it would be “compassionate” to “put her down”. 
Even if you are perfectly healthy, if you decide, … why shouldn’t 
you. They understand what’s going on but they’re just not particularly 
happy with life and don’t really see the sense in going on. (…) I get 
people riled up [in expressing his death wish] because they say I am 
OK but they don’t have to live it. I don’t judge others. My choice 
alone. The wheelchair is irrelevant. (…). Once you’re of consenting 
age and if you don’t want to be around then (fades). Unless there’s a 
reason that they can come up with then I can’t see the problem. And 
that’s really simplifying it and people would really laugh at you and I 
know that would never happen. But certainly when it gets to the stage 
of anything being wrong, a person should have the right but they 
haven’t. 
For the second group the emphasis was on EPAS for reason of “extreme 
suffering” that could not be otherwise alleviated. In the first group this was least 
important. 
Compassion is to care and allowing EPAS in extreme circumstances 
only. 
Always ease the suffering. Ease what’s causing it. Keep occupied. 
(…) I cannot say that people should have EPAS when they want it but 
it would not be for me to judge that kind of thing. 
Despite many informants’ insistence that “everything be done first” to 
alleviate the suffering and “people should not be killed too quickly”, there seemed to 
be little faith in the possibility of actually achieving this through care. 
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We should talk with them and treat them. But after all is said and done 
and someone decides that they’ve had enough that should be possible. 
It’s individual choice to fight till the very end but there are others 
who’d like that choice [to have EPAS]. 
In both countries a number of informants drew on knowledge gained from the 
media, especially television. On several occasions informants mentioned a television 
program that had recently been aired in giving examples of suffering that might be 
enough to warrant EPAS. In the Netherlands it was a program that had just shown a 
case of a woman who wanted to die for reason of her severe facial disfigurement. In 
Australia it was a program showing children with cerebral palsy who were thought to 
have a “bad quality of life”. 
There are things that are worse for some people: a woman whose face 
was very disfigured [was shown on television]. You never know what 
people experience. Some then just don’t want to go on. Who am I to 
determine what people should suffer? If they don’t want it? 
It really hurts me sometimes when they show on the TV some of those 
children. They’re 20 years old in a 12-year old’s body. (…). … a 
person like that, someone else, either their parent or someone thinks 
that the quality of life that they have – and even they cannot handle it 
either, seeing their child like that, say, well look this isn’t fair. … at 
least let him die with a bit of dignity. (…) [Euthanasia could be a 
legitimate request] for the person who is suffering and the relatives, 
wives, children, whatever are suffering because they’re seeing the 
person they love, suffering as well. So, it’s a relief [EPAS] for both of 
them. 
A certain personal distance between the suffering person and others who 
might be involved in end-of-life decision-making, such as EPAS, was often implied. 
There was not much talk of supporting the person in their suffering beyond ‘doing 
everything possible’ in a medical sense. Informants did not want to interfere in 
another’s end of life decision. For instance, not long after the injury that caused his 
quadriplegia a Dutch informant became suicidal and had received help from his 
friends for which he was grateful. But he still believed that personal autonomy is the 
overriding factor in end-of-life decision-making. He could “walk a little way 
alongside” the suffering person but was otherwise “a blank slate”. He was the only 
grassroots informant who mentioned the word autonomy in the interviews. He was 
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Dutch and was employed in a counselling position with a residential facility for 
younger people with intellectual disability. He told of bad quality of care and 
services for people with disabilities. He thought that an EPAS request for such 
reasons should be taken seriously in order to respect the person’s autonomy, although 
he would have difficulty accepting the reasons for it. 
I should not say that euthanasia is not allowed for non-terminally-ill, 
badly cared-for people because I think that it is important that people 
keep their autonomy. That we should not assume that I can decide 
about you, how you should live, or what you can, or cannot deal with 
in life. That is not up to me. It is for me to walk alongside you for a 
little way. (…) I would have trouble with that but I would understand 
it. I just think the reason is impossible. Politically that is not on, … in 
this way we really don’t meet their needs. Q: Euthanasia is not 
allowable under such circumstances you mean? A: No, I say, on the 
one hand you look at who says this, who wants euthanasia because 
they cannot go on any more. I say you have to take them seriously, 
and you have to seriously address the question. So I don’t say that’s 
not allowed because I cannot say that. Because you want that. How 
can I say then, you’re not allowed? But at the same time I cannot 
accept the situation that has led to it ….  
Few informants said much about any role for compassion in relation to EPAS 
even when prompted on this aspect. An Australian informant who reported a very 
good experience of life did “not see how compassion comes into it” and another, also 
with a high fulfilment in his life said that: “compassion is to care” while allowing 
EPAS in extreme circumstances only. Compassion was linked directly with 
individual rights to choice. 
The compassion is really about having the compassion for that person 
to have that right to go in dignity, to go peacefully. 
Compassion and suffering are very important. If people choose for the 
normal way of waiting for death and are ready to take the suffering 
with it, then this must be seen as a good choice for them and they 
should be supported in that. 
In both countries informants implied a kind of interpersonal distance in 
decision-making about EPAS. For most informants EPAS was not something they 
had considered for themselves or would. 
I would never give anyone an injection myself. 
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[EPAS] is not for me. What others want to do is their business. … 
they die because [their] life is over and they only have pain and 
sadness. 
Some felt empathy for another’s request to die if one was constantly 
experiencing health problems associated with quadriplegia such as bladder 
infections, headaches and pressure sores. However, most informants did not think 
about EPAS for themselves even though these health problems were part of their 
own experience.  
I live and I have quadriplegia. It is not the case that I have 
quadriplegia and I try to live. That is the difference. From my 
situation, quadriplegia is no reason to want to be dead. 
Never thought like, let it all be finished, but I did of course think 
about it. Like, would that be better than to have to live like this? For 
me that has never been an option. 
A Dutchman with 20 big hospital operations behind him underscored the dual 
approach towards a right of others to have EPAS and their own choice in this matter. 
He says about euthanasia: “ I would never do that [EPAS], without doubt. It is 
something in which I have changed since my disability”. But he also believed that, 
regarding EPAS, “others can do as they please”. A few others wanted to leave the 
option to EPAS left open for themselves. 
The option should be there. I’ve always felt that because … I have 
spinal cord injury. I’m not sick and I’m not at this stage ready to stop 
what I’m doing in my world. But even before the accident, it’s just an 
option that should be allowed to be there. Particularly when it’s a 
person that can make an informed choice. 
5.6.1 Impacts on others 
“Impacts on others” is a theme that describes the informants’ 
acknowledgement that choices involving EPAS are not, and would not, be made in 
isolation from others involved in that process, chiefly family and doctors. Those who 
would rather have EPAS than continue to live with their disability shared this 
perception. To enter into any deliberate act of ending one’s life seemed to require a 
distancing in relationship with those who would be directly involved in this act. It 
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was suggested that such distancing would minimise any emotional impact of the act 
of EPAS on such parties, especially in the case of Dutch doctors. Nevertheless 
doctors were seen as the natural professional to carry out EPAS because of their 
powers of assessment and diagnosis and their medical/technical ability to kill safely. 
Thus the professionalism that informants often referred to may imply that a certain 
legitimacy is lent to the killing process by the medical imprimatur. Notwithstanding 
this, doctors were not necessarily accepted as the natural assessor and executioner of 
the EPAS procedure. Some Australians thought that family members should be able 
to decide on and act in EPAS. Doctors should have a choice whether to engage in 
EPAS or not. They were thought to have inner wrangles in carrying out EPAS within 
its context of complex ethical decision-making. Possible legal consequences in either 
country were thought to be of influence on doctors’ consent to participate in EPAS, 
despite the legal toleration of EPAS in the Netherlands. Some Dutch informants 
thought that complex documentation was required of doctors who reported EPAS. 
They saw this as another consideration for doctors not to participate in EPAS. There 
were suggestions that some doctors may incorrectly report EPAS as a natural death 
as a result of family’s wishes for the death to be reported like this. Some concern was 
expressed about compromising the doctor’s role of healer. There was also a contrary 
theme where some participants said that EPAS is part of a doctor’s natural role. 
However others suggested that a specialist EPAS doctor who had less emotional 
involvement with the person having their lives terminated is preferable. This 
presumably made it easier for the doctor to carry out the killing procedure as well as 
for the recipient to receive it. 
Despite the strong theme of rights to individual choice with regard to EPAS 
generally there was a strong sense that choices are not made in isolation and that 
others are involved and feel the impact of an end of life decision. Involved parties 
included family, friends and doctors. 
I mean obviously, you take that individual choice. The choice is made 
up of different reasons affected by, you know, your partner or your 
family or friends but that’s all taken into consideration. 
You must of course make clear arrangements with your loved ones 
and those who stay behind so that their conscience is at peace and can 
digest it psychologically. 
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There are very few things in life that are a matter of individual choice 
– there’s always someone out there who would … . You’ve got to 
think of the rules of society, the regulations of society and the needs 
of other people and that as well. So in this case you’re talking about 
the family and how this is going to affect the family and how it’s 
going to affect the doctor, the sort of effect is on them. 
Those few who did say that they would want euthanasia at a future time for 
reason of their disability or at some possible time in future, due to unforeseen 
deterioration, also said that one’s decision to have EPAS involved others. They 
underscored this by saying that it was not dying that concerned them, it was the 
impacts on those left behind. Those who would rather be dead than live with their 
disability also felt this. 
The only thing that ever worries me a little bit is the effect it would 
have on people you leave behind. And you know, I don’t know 
whether it’s selfish sometimes, because I’ve seen how they act, you 
know after a serious accident, and how it affects them, and you wish it 
hadn’t sometimes. It does affect their life, of course it does…. Now 
I’m not saying she [mother] would have forgotten [him by now if he 
had died in the accident] but I still think it would hurt less than what it 
does now, having to come up once a week and see you go through it, 
because she knows what I. [fade out]. I can’t hide it from her. And 
your sisters know as well, they know what you …[fade out].  
I don’t worry about that [death]. But the worst thing about dying I 
think is the sorrow that others have from it. Because there are people, 
I am sure of that, who will miss me. And you leave an empty spot 
behind. And I won’t notice that then but they will. That I think is the 
worst aspect of dying. 
The responses from the small sub-set who said that they would rather be dead 
than continue to live with quadriplegia, revealed a sense of impact on others of their 
possible EPAS. For that reason it seemed that they were distanced from such others. 
The one Dutchman who had pre-arranged his euthanasia at a future time of his 
choosing, had pre-arranged his future EPAS with a doctor he had met once only and 
did not know well. He “want[ed] to keep it that way” and had thus distanced himself 
from an emotional content in this doctor-patient relationship.  
I do not know this doctor well. It is a superficial contact that I want to 
keep that way. But he understands me and I find that important. 
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The impact on others of any future decision by him to die was experienced as 
so strong that he complained that he felt under an “obligation to live” as a result: 
“Over the years you are obliged to live. This is how I’ve always felt”. 
Two Australian informants, who would like euthanasia if available, argued 
that if family understood a person’s wishes to die they would agree to EPAS and find 
that an easier course than to watch their persistent suffering. 
Well, obviously the person with the illness would be the one [to feel 
the impact of any EPAS decision]. I mean, they’re the one suffering 
so I don’t think it is really anybody else’s concern. But OK, it 
probably would impact [on others]. There’d be sorrow as there would 
be at any type of death but I think that if people understood that that is 
what the person wanted that it would be easier for them rather than to 
watch them over a period of … years or months, of a nasty illness. 
I don’t think they’d [family] be concerned. I think everyone knows 
me well enough to know that they’d be helping me. … [I]f it was legal 
I don’t know in the end whether they’d be able to go through with it 
or not, that’s their choice. But if I wanted to they certainly wouldn’t 
hold me back. 
There was some recognition that EPAS was an emotionally difficult thing for 
families and could involve conflict between those who agree with medical killing 
and those who do not: 
… [T]here will perhaps be members of family who say we do not 
want that. Others will say they can do that … and they wife says no 
and the husband says yes. 
5.6.2 Involvement of doctors in EPAS 
Doctors were seen as necessarily involved because they were needed for their 
medical knowledge in an act of EPAS. Their ‘professionalism’ was often referred to 
as if to add legitimacy to the EPAS process. 
I think it is probably a desirable thing to involve the medical 
profession. … I think that they can probably make it easier for people. 
Well, it makes it easier in that they can use drugs that make it a bit 
less traumatic I guess. … yeah, I think they know what they’re doing. 
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Some Australian informants thought that the family should be able to decide 
on EPAS. The decision should not necessarily lie with a doctor, who needed to be 
“detached”. Some also thought family members themselves should be able to 
perform EPAS. 
It should be a doctor obviously … you should have to go through a 
very rigid screening process with health professionals. I mean, OK, it 
doesn’t have to be a doctor that actually is with the person, it can be a 
family member but it needs to be a doctor … or a family member can 
… give somebody medication that’s going to kill them. 
There was also some doubt about the doctor’s role in EPAS. They had the 
needed expertise to kill but the decision should not be all theirs, nor should they 
necessarily be the only ones to assess capacity to make a decision for EPAS. 
Well, I guess you would assume [it would need to be a doctor] since 
they spend their lives keeping people alive, they should know the best 
way to let someone go…. I just figure that they are the ones that 
would know how to do it. For no other reason. … I don’t believe that 
their opinions necessarily should be – you know other than whether 
you are capable of – even then it’s a pretty touchy one, whether you 
are capable of making a decision. I mean who decides whether you’re 
you know sane or insane if you like.  
Of course a doctor should take part in it. If they’re actually involved 
they’re the ones that are going to be carrying out the euthanasia. So 
they are professional but certainly their professionalism is not – I 
mean it shouldn’t only be their decision. … I think it shouldn’t 
obviously be only a doctor. (…). Who’s the experts in these sorts of 
situations, that’s a difficult thing. I mean even people that judge 
quality of life – how could you – I mean a doctor is not necessarily an 
expert on quality of life. 
Doctors were seen as needed for their professional skill in the assessment 
process and conducting of EPAS but there was also some caution about their 
expertise in this role. Several informants suggested that the doctor that engaged in 
euthanasia should be trained in assessment and communication. 
I certainly think that… the doctors especially need to be well trained 
as far as how to deal with people and how to deal with the sensitive 
issue of it. (…). So, therefore I would say, any doctor, because he is a 
doctor, doesn’t mean he’s qualified to decide whether that’s 
something that’s an option for that person. 
 156
Both in the Netherlands and in Australia a theme of doctors who would 
specialise in EPAS and who were detached from the healing part of the medical 
profession emerged. This was prompted by a desire to keep the healing and killing 
roles separate and, again, to keep the emotional impact on others at arms length. 
I think we should have different doctors for that who will move 
throughout the country. They are people who do it from a sense of 
professionalism. (…) If it would be my ‘huisarts’ [general 
practitioner] and my mother would commit euthanasia then I think it 
absurd to have that same doctor attend to me who killed my mother 
with an injection. I just think, let it please be done by people who 
have no other role to play. In a kind of anonymity. 
I think it should be somebody separate from the medical profession. 
So it’s done with dignity and peaceful you know. (…) I think you 
should have it separate … I don’t know what you’d call them. Dr. 
Death is not a very good one but something along those lines… (…) I 
don’t think that doctors – there would be certain doctors I think where 
they would see the pain and the anguish more than anybody….  
On the other hand there were also many informants who saw no problem in 
having doctors perform EPAS as part of the doctor’s natural role. Overall, the doctor 
was very much perceived as in a purely instrumental role in performing EPAS and 
doing assessments for eligibility for EPAS. There was no mention of the doctor in 
any supportive caring role towards the person who requested EPAS. The first quote 
is by a Dutch informant who said that she did not have good relationships with the 
three consecutive ‘huisartsen’ (g.p. ’s) whom she has had and who did not know her 
well. Contradicting the main theme of detachment, she assumed that engaging a 
physician for EPAS purposes would lead to a closer doctor–patient relationship. The 
second quote was by an Australian who had a long-standing relationship with his 
local doctor. 
Q: Does the role of doctor change then or does it [EPAS] belong with 
medical practice? A: No, I think it is part of medical practice. Because 
he is the one that can bring it about. Yes, I think so. I do think you get 
a different relationship with your doctor, if you talk about that [EPAS] 
and actually do it, that you get a very different relationship. Q: And 
how would that relationship change do you think? A: It would be 
much more intimate. Something that is so close to you. But yes, I do 
think it’s a task for doctors. 
 157
So is it a part of normal medical practice would you say? Well, it isn’t 
now [in Australia] but it should be. A medical person brings people 
into the world. They treat them for whatever their problems are. They 
deal with them throughout their lives. … [A]nd then the person at the 
end of their time, whether it’s through old age or whatever, if they 
decide, then why should the medical person not have that ability to 
deal with it.  
There was acknowledgment that some doctors might not wish to perform 
EPAS because of their own moral objections or, in Australia, because of its illegality. 
Consistent with the informants’ dominant pro-choice stance towards EPAS in the 
sample, the doctors were thought to need a right to choose whether to engage in 
EPAS or not. Australian informants saw legalisation of EPAS as for the benefit of 
doctors, offering them legal protection. Some also thought that such legalisation 
would offer doctors some protection against their possible emotional distress from 
acting in EPAS as he would be acting legally on someone’s choice. In the 
Netherlands, where EPAS has been tolerated for a long time, more emphasis was 
given to recognition of the doctor’s inner dilemmas. The dilemmas were said to 
occur as end of life decisions often have to be made in “grey areas” and within a field 
of tension between a healing and a killing role. 
Yeah the doctor’s got to have a choice … . I mean the doctor has got 
to have the right to turn around and say, well, no. I’m against it, no. 
(…) I mean, obviously he’s got to believe in euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide otherwise he’s going to have, well, it’s a moral 
question for the doctor really. …[I]f they participate directly and it’s 
still illegal, well, there’s legal ramifications and this has happened in 
America with Jack Kevorkian. … [I]f they just give somebody the 
means to do it … the mental ramifications might not be there because 
it’s not up to the doctor. He’s not actually committing an act himself. 
He’s just – it’s like putting a … gun in front of someone and it’s their 
choice whether they want to pull the trigger. 
He has taken an oath to save life so he harms that in principle. I think 
that can be rather difficult for him. I would say you can have EPAS if 
it really is that bad but I think that often it’s a grey area. Of which 
they [doctors] think, well maybe we’re in too much of a hurry. Maybe 
there is yet another option. Because it’s not always crystal clear. I 
think it will then be difficult. Even if you have requested it 
beforehand, in specific circumstances, than the situation is still not 
clear … (…) So he will have a difficult time when he is in a grey area 
like that. 
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Highlighting informants’ regard for the impact of EPAS on others, one Dutch 
woman thought that she would not ever have EPAS because of the impact on the 
performing doctor. She saw suicide as preferable. 
Even for a doctor it is very difficult. I don’t know whether I can do 
this to the doctor. So in that sense I would rather make an end to it 
myself if I had the courage. 
(Leaders) 
As in the grassroots sample, leaders saw choice and self-determination as 
important concepts with regard to EPAS. In contrast to the grassroots Australian 
sample, some Australian leaders were more reluctant to support EPAS on the basis of 
self-determination than Dutch leaders were or rejected EPAS as a public policy: “I 
am not clear myself on the use of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide where 
there is a high level of suffering and pain”. They worried about an adverse impact 
upon people with disabilities. 
You’re arguing for rights and you’re arguing for people’s self-
determination in many ways as an advocate. But when it comes to the 
ultimate self-determination, I just have real concerns about those 
things that may happen, and decisions being made prematurely 
because legislation or policy enables it to happen. 
Another Australian leader did support EPAS on the basis of an entitlement to 
choose this for oneself. 
I can understand that when your life’s not easy and you make the 
decision – and I believe people should be able to make that decision 
Most Dutch leaders supported EPAS as public policy on the basis of self-
determination, although one stated he had a different personal opinion on this than he 
had as ‘leader’.  
Euthanasia is acceptable, as long as it is the free choice of the 
individual. 
Leaders mostly agreed that EPAS decisions involved others and had an 
impact on the family and doctors and that this makes EPAS complex. A few of them 
thought it better if EPAS were considered in terms of an inter-relational process. 
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I really think euthanasia is context bound. You cannot arrange that 
separate from people, circumstances or situation. (…) I think the 
emphasis is too much on the legalistic and medical aspects. It would 
be better [discussed] at a social level, on living together. [In] a social 
or an existential dimension. (…) With self determination I do not go 
so far as to say it has to be to the cost of others’ lives.  It has to be 
balanced by connectedness, with lives of others, that is where the 
boundary lies. 
Some Dutch leaders who personally knew some doctors as friends confirmed 
that there were impacts on doctors by participating in EPAS. Like the grassroots 
sample, leaders thought doctors needed to have the choice whether or not they 
engage in it. 
I have friends who are doctors and they are totally destroyed. Even 
though they agree with that. Even though they do it. Emotionally they 
go to pieces. And then I think your own rights and choices and 
freedom have limits. And that limit lies with others. (…) I think he 
needs the freedom to say no because he does so much with those 
people. For days or weeks he’ll be thinking about that. It stays with 
them. 
Interestingly, the only non-disabled Dutch leader said that he saw no change 
in a doctor’s role if they practiced EPAS. He also thought that the impact on others 
of EPAS decisions is of secondary importance only. The decision by the primary, 
suffering person is paramount: “They may think that is terrible but that is just a pity. 
That is then their own problem”. 
Australian leaders believed that in their country EPAS was widely practised 
illegally. An Australian leader who was most in support of EPAS suggested, along 
with other leaders, that legislation would protect doctors. 
I know a number of doctors who assist people to die and recently 
when I was working with [an AIDS organisation] they came out and 
said, I’ve done this and I will continue to do this …so I think there’s a 
double standard in relation to that…(…) I think some doctors [in 
Australia] would not want to, and don’t, practice euthanasia or doctor-
assisted suicide and I don’t think anyone should be forced to do that.. 
(…) I don’t think that we, as a society should get to a point where it’s 
taken for granted that that’s what doctors will do but I think it should 
be open to them to practice that openly without being penalised in a 
number of ways. 
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In both countries leaders, like the grassroots sample, raised concerns about 
the dual healing and killing roles of doctors who are involved in EPAS, involving 
their ability to assess life ending and the focus of their training towards cure. 
I really have concerns about someone from a medical background 
administering and involved [sic] in someone’s life. …[T]here’s no 
indication to me that doctors are the best qualified individuals to be 
able to make those decisions and take and whether they have a good 
value base and have a good understanding of individuals wanting to 
struggle to stay alive etc. I really struggle with that question. 
Every doctor’s dream is of course to keep everybody as healthy and 
vital as possible. All of rehabilitation is aimed at that. Only when it is 
certain that you cannot walk anymore, then they will think about what 
you will still be able to do. But then their real work is really finished. 
Yes, then they have not achieved anything – really it’s a kind of 
failing. So if they would look at death in the same way then you come 
to some interesting conclusions. 
Some leaders confirmed the grassroots theme that the involvement of the 
medical profession in killing people gave it an air of professional legitimacy. 
[I]f you start to get other people [doctors] involved in it that 
legitimises it more.  
Only doctors can determine whether there is unbearable suffering, 
according to the law-makers and politicians in the Netherlands. You 
might think nurses that cared for you for years would also know. But 
the judgement is always a medical judgement. And that judgement is 
given exclusively to the professionals. 
Like in the grassroots sample, some leaders also expressed support for 
specialist EPAS practitioners to remove some of the discomfort about the dual role. 
I think there’s a lot to be said for having a specialist in EPAS. I’d feel 
uncomfortable going to my regular doctor if I’d known that he had 
taken steps to end my mother’s life. And I think it would be hard to 
see them in the same light. 
Dutch leaders, some of whom had doctor friends and colleagues, confirmed 
that they believed doctors still did not report all EPAS cases in the Netherlands due 
to a large amount of paperwork involved in processing EPAS reports. One Dutch 
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leader reported an instance in his own family where family and doctor tacitly agreed 
to have the death by euthanasia reported as a natural death as preferred by the family. 
5.6.3 Non-autonomy: complexity and confusion  
In an overview, the theme “Non-autonomy: complexity and confusion” 
explores the complexity and some confusion involved in considering medical killing 
in relation to people who have a diminished capacity to make autonomous decisions. 
Such people include those with intellectual disability, people with mental illness and 
also others such as permanently unconscious people and children. This theme adds 
depth to the earlier presented theme where informants held with some certainty to the 
moral correctness of individual rights to choose EPAS under circumstances of 
individually determined unbearable suffering. When it came to people with 
diminished capacity to make their own decisions, such as people with intellectual 
disability, some informants supported a right to decide on EPAS for themselves. 
When pressed to answer how they saw this for people who were not able to make 
such decisions, parents and doctors together were proposed to make such decisions 
for them, as a private affair. Grassroots informants often described people with 
intellectual disability as “children” and some informants compared EPAS decisions 
for such “children” with the right to choose abortion. No reservations about doctors’ 
roles were expressed in this context whereas they were for people with capacity to 
make decisions about EPAS. However, some more general concerns in comparison 
with killing of people with intellectual disability in Nazi Germany were also 
expressed. Leaders did express concerns about doctor involvement in EPAS for 
people who lack capacity to make their own decisions for reason of power 
differences between doctor and patient. Grassroots and leaders expressed confusion 
about this “grey area” of EPAS and diminished capacity. 
When it came to people with diminished capacity to make decisions about 
themselves, such as in intellectual disability or mental illness, the right to EPAS was 
experienced as increasingly problematic. Yet the data also revealed a theme where 
informants thought that sometimes such people had the capacity to decide this for 
themselves or it was a matter of justice to allow them a right to choose. 
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I think everyone has that right. You cannot estimate how they 
experience things but if they [people with intellectual disability] ask 
for it then there will be a reason for it. 
Very difficult, very difficult. This is where the abuse could come in. 
I’m aware of that. (…) But then it’s the same as people saying that 
two people with intellectual disability shouldn’t get married and if 
they do they should get sterilised and shouldn’t be allowed to 
reproduce. It’s supposed to be a free world out there … 
Questions of choice and self-determination to decide EPAS for people with 
diminished capacity were a source of confusion for many informants. They were 
often glad that they were not in a position to have to make such decisions. 
[I]t remains a very difficult question. I’m glad when I am not involved 
in it. 
With people with psychiatric disability I think that is really difficult 
because you do not know when you give people a good treatment … 
whether the situation might not change in such a way that in the final 
analysis people do want to carry on again. (…) [For] people who have 
been in the psychiatric treadmill for many years, you can be 
sympathetic to their request. But who decides? 
Yes well, that’s the hard one isn’t it because they really don’t – 
mmmmm. 
Where informants thought that people with such diminished capacity may not 
be able to make end-of-life decisions, there was a strong theme that EPAS for people 
with intellectual disabilities was a matter for their parents to decide. This could be 
done in concert with doctors, with a suggestion that it be an act done in privacy. 
Parents, or sometimes a doctor, could best assess how genuine the wishes to die of 
someone with intellectual disability were. Many times informants, in describing the 
ability of people with intellectual disability to have EPAS, referred to children, not 
adults. 
I think if the parents or the family who have been in charge of that 
child for all their lives regarding their welfare and that they should 
have the choice at the end but to coincide with the medical 
practitioner or whoever. To be a thing between them both. 
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I think if it’s their wish and I am sure these people have very good 
doctors … I am sure that between a doctor and themselves and a local 
area co-ordinator or someone … would keep an eye on them. I think if 
that’s their wish, that’s their wish. 
In line with seeing people with intellectual disability as children, a few 
informants drew comparisons with abortion in arguing for a right of parents to decide 
on their childrens’ EPAS.  
It’s the parents’ prerogative just like in abortion. 
I would almost say that if a parent made the choice to let such a child 
come into the world then we say, OK, the child was born. We have to 
respect that. Then I think it is up to the parents to decide what 
happens. 
Doctor involvement in EPAS for people with diminished capacity then drew 
none of those reservations, such as some lack of trust in doctors’ decision-making or 
their expertise, which informants had expressed in relation to competent people who 
wished to die by medical killing. But some informants obviously did feel some 
unease in proposing EPAS could be used with people with intellectual disability. 
They raised the Nazi extermination of people with disabilities in this context and a 
few informants did object to any EPAS for people with intellectual disability. 
But of course people with severe, particularly intellectual disability, 
young people, it would be very difficult and that’s when it could also 
be construed that we’re going back to the Hitler regime whereby we 
kill all the Jews and kill all the people with intellectual disabilities and 
kill everybody that’s not an upstanding citizen of the world. It would 
be a very difficult one to address. There would have to be a lot of 
thought in that because obviously the parent or the partner of that 
person, it would have to be their decision, not the individual person’s, 
and that would be a difficult one.  
[Y]ou certainly cannot do it for people with ID or mental illness, 
there’s no way you can do it for them … . If they’re given access to 
services and a good life, they can have as good as or better than 
anyone else’s can. (…). If it goes in the wrong direction it can have 
the effect of – I mean say it goes to the other, to extremes, that people 
with disabilities or mental illness or psychiatric disabilities and 
intellectual disabilities and other categories for people to consider 
severe disabilities. If they’re euthanased, I mean what a huge impact 
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that would have on society. It’s like very much this whole debate 
about gene technology. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders agreed that EPAS for people with diminished capacity was 
problematic. At the time of the interviews in the Netherlands some of the leaders’ 
responses were influenced by a prominent public discussion about the value (of life) 
of people with intellectual disabilities. This occurred as a result of comments made 
by a Dutch philosopher in the mainstream media. A prominent Dutch leader in the 
disability movement publicly lodged a legal action against this philosopher and his 
organisation publicly condemned the comments. There was also a public debate 
about EPAS for people with psychiatric illness. It is of note that no grassroots 
informant mentioned these public discussions.  
The big discussion is now about euthanasia with those who are 
mentally incapable, what do you do with them? People who are in a 
coma, people who do not have the capacity to decide, or new-born 
babies for instance. We are not done with that in Holland – that is a 
very complex discussion. 
Self-determination is problematic for people with intellectual 
disability. It is an extra difficult process. It is made even more 
difficult because of a mental dependency rather than just a physical 
dependency [on others]. (…) [For people with intellectual disability] 
autonomy is sooner a theory than practice. 
[W]e do of course have experience with neighbouring countries, how 
quickly something can be blurred. ‘Child euthanasia’ for instance, 
that’s how it was called in Nazi Germany. That was also intended to 
address suffering and so on.  
In addition unequal power relationships between doctors and people with 
intellectual disabilities were raised by leaders in both countries as an obstacle to good 
EPAS decisions for people with intellectual disability. One Australian leader raised 
the concept of choice itself as problematic in end of life scenarios, for individuals 
and in its impact on the nature of our society. Other Australian leaders reflected these 
concerns and pointed to the inherent difficulties people have with dealing with death 
and disability. 
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And I think when you start to give choice, it makes it even that much 
harder because if you don't have the choice then it's not so much of an 
issue, when you do have the choice then you start to question well 
what do you make that choice on. (…) Most people do not ever 
consider euthanasia, but when the choice is there and condoned by 
society, then that says it is OK not only to think about it, but also 
society values you if you do it. Systemically driven choice in this 
instance is more about control – to get rid of people who are seen as a 
burden, a threat or an economic drain to the society. In this way it can 
undermine the total good of society and the notions of what a civil 
society should be. 
Yeah, it’s a grey area and it’s a struggle that I’m sure a lot of people 
have … [in] arguing for rights and you’re arguing for people’s self 
determination in many ways as an advocate but when it comes to the 
ultimate self determination, I just have real concerns about those 
things that may happen and decisions being made prematurely 
because legislation or policy enables it to happen. 
This is a terribly difficult thing to discuss … because it raises so many 
emotions … people’s inability to cope with some of those things and 
also the whole issue of: there but for the grace of God go I. And it’s 
how do people deal with the difficulties of things like death and dying 
and disability, because I think the issue of disability is also one of 
those issues that people have great difficulty in coming to terms with. 
Some leaders also expressed personal confusion about the question of EPAS 
for people with diminished capacity. An Australian describes her support for “the 
woman’s right to have an abortion” on the basis of disability of the unborn baby, and 
for EPAS if it is the person’s choice. She also states concerns about the lack of 
available support to people who have disabilities and about cloning: 
… because it buys into what I think is at the bottom of the psyche of a 
lot of us which is about our human fragility and how precious that is. 
And often the difficulties people face changes self-image etcetera 
after a traumatic accident. So, … there’s a lot of things happening and 
I think being part of a minority group who [sic] is marginalised and 
oppressed and at a systemic level sometimes that’s not obvious. But I 
actually don’t think I’ve got consistent things about many things. (…) 
I mean I hold life as very valuable at the same time as well as being 
pro-abortion. So that’s why I say I’m confused. 
Another Australian leader reflected on the dangers of implementing EPAS 
based on a very complex subject matter: 
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Look I think it’s a very complex debate and discussion and I think to 
say yes to it at a policy level I think is really quite dangerous. I think 
it’s really dangerous because I think everyone’s level of acceptance 
about what extent and when is it OK is very blurred, about when is it 
OK to happen. 
5.7 Summary 
Most informants had a low conceptual awareness of euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide with withdrawal and withholding of treatment often 
included as part of EPAS. The Dutch also included advance directives to have EPAS 
in their definitional approaches of these terms. Yet no informants had made such an 
advance directive for themselves. Most had little experience of people dying and 
knew little about palliative care. Leaders showed a somewhat greater awareness of 
palliative care and had somewhat more experience with dying, compared to the 
grassroots. Most informants supported EPAS as an individual choice, though did 
mostly not see EPAS as applicable to themselves, least for reason of their disability. 
Australian leaders were less supportive of EPAS on the basis of individual choice 
than their Dutch counterparts were. Support for EPAS was associated with a need for 
strict safeguards, mostly in the form of legal rules. Doctors were also part of such 
safeguards but also needed to be safeguarded against. Everything possible should be 
done to reduce one’s suffering. However, they also thought that legitimate 
motivations for having EPAS included an impact on others of committing suicide in 
lieu of legal EPAS; or any other individually defined suffering, apart from 
depression. Sometimes the suffering of others than the person wishing an assisted 
death could also be included in weighing up a decision to have EPAS. There was 
acknowledgement of an emotional impact on doctors who performed EPAS and there 
were divided understanding about whether EPAS was a natural part of a doctor’s 
medical role. However, on the whole doctors were seen in a naturally instrumental 
role in EPAS where a certain professional detachment was important to minimise 
emotional impacts of EPAS on the various involved parties. Many informants were 
confused about EPAS under conditions of a person’s incapacity to make their own 
decisions. Those who thought that incapable people could also have EPAS for reason 
of their suffering did not raise the same concerns to participating physicians in EPAS 
in such cases as they had raised for others. 
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Research question 2.: What are the life experiences and views of Dutch and 
Australian people with quadriplegia, and leaders in Dutch and Australian 
disability movements, with regard to issues of vulnerability, autonomy, 
dependency, independence and interdependence?  
5.8 Vulnerability: physical, psychological, and social factors – threats to 
wellbeing.  
The major theme “Vulnerability: physical, psychological, and social factors – 
threats to wellbeing” presents the dominant, perceived threats to informants’ 
physical, psychological and social wellbeing. These threats came from the 
informants’ own health problems, associated with quadriplegia; from ways in which 
the type and quality of care affected them; from public attitudes towards them as 
people with disabilities; as well as from declining social trends. In the face of such 
vulnerability, informants felt a sense of invulnerability while they also knew 
themselves to be vulnerable to the above factors. 
 5.8.1 Vulnerability and physical health  
Daily discomfort, due to their disability, was part of the lives of informants. 
Severe health conditions were, or had been, experienced by most informants from 
time to time. Most informants did not rate these conditions as a problem but clearly 
they had significant impacts on their physical integrity with significant consequences 
such as long-term hospitalisation. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, a Dutch informant, 
aged 34, died from his multiple health problems during the course of this research. 
For the few informants who experienced their lives as unsatisfactory and who would 
rather not be alive, their health conditions were deeply felt. Those few informants 
who experienced no health problems at all counted themselves lucky. 
Health issues were an important feature of life with disability for most 
informants, who experienced significant health problems. They experienced periods 
of wellness and periods of sometimes-serious illness, arising from their disability but 
most did not indicate that these were distressing them.  
Their health conditions included skin breakdown resulting in pressure sores 
(decubitus) and persistent underlying fistulas; urinary tract infections; kidney 
problems; blood poisoning; pneumonia; broken limbs; blood clots; and multi-
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resistant bacterial infections. Some of these conditions at times caused lengthy 
hospitalisations, from three months to one year. One informant had had twenty hip 
operations to remove excess bone growth, following pressure sore problems, and 
needed more. He experienced constant pain from this hip condition but said that he 
overcame this by “keeping busy”. About this health problem he said: “Yes I have 
experienced a lot. Things have not been boring”. He looked forward to meeting new 
people on his next admission.  
Problems were often recurrent. They were minimised with great personal 
vigilance over skin care and other matters. When something went wrong, problems 
could easily escalate. An example was a man who had previously spent 12 months in 
hospital for treatment of pressure sores, and who lived by himself. 
I had a period of time in bed here. Then I had to go into hospital and 
have a skin flap done. But then that healed and I came home 
Christmas this year and I stayed in bed over Christmas just to soothe 
things over and then I started getting up two hours, four hours and so 
on. But my cushion had a ridge going along it and it went right across 
the middle of the flap and so we got another pressure sore. But they 
treated it here, I didn’t have to go into hospital so I spent from end 
February, beginning of March, in bed. 
A few informants only, those who would rather have EPAS than live with 
their disability, told of the presence of constant pain, tiredness, the discomfort of 
“constantly holding yourself up”, and of strong abdominal spasm in their daily lives. 
However, in contrast with many other informants, they experienced no severe health 
problems.  
I’ve got no feeling from there down and yet my stomach’s always 
killing me, so I’m not sure if it’s bladder, bowel, it’s just always sore. 
So yeah, and shoulders and [fades]. Not having the balance is really 
difficult. Even though you’ve got no feeling it’s – I don’t know, it’s 
hard for people to understand I suppose that you’re uncomfortable 
without actually feeling pain in all parts of your body. But then the bit 
you can feel – my neck’s always sore, I’ve always got a headache and 
(fades). Just trying to hold yourself up, it’s not comfortable. So yeah, I 
don’t have any days when I’m comfortable. There’s not a day that 
goes without that, so again that’s one of the reasons that I would have 
euthanasia.   
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The few informants who had no health problems to speak of counted 
themselves fortunate as they were aware indeed of the health risks associated with 
quadriplegia: “I do not have any health problems and I am fortunate in that”. 
5.8.2 Vulnerability arising from treatment and care 
Long stays in hospital could result in iatrogenic conditions, some severe. I 
found contrasting themes of, on the one hand, enjoying stays in hospital during initial 
acute care and in rehabilitation centres, and bad experiences in these settings on the 
other. Those who did not ‘progress’ well in rehabilitation felt abandoned and felt that 
their emotional problems were ignored. Negative attitudes from some staff and 
professionals devalued and disempowered some informants. 
Entering hospital for any conditions could bring its own risks of iatrogenic 
complications. Frequent hospitalisation for long periods was a common experience. 
Several informants related such experiences as development of pressure sores in 
hospital (which required long stays in bed). Another acquired unnecessary 
deformation of his hip after non-diagnosis of multiple fractures at the time of 
accident. Yet another had been operated on without anaesthetic under a false 
assumption that the patient had no sensation in his buttocks. Another informant spent 
considerable extra time in hospital being treated with highly potent intravenously 
delivered antibiotics, which carries further risks to health. He did not realise this until 
later when he discovered by chance that he had been treated for a highly multi-
resistant pathogenic bacterial infection and its associated risks. 
I accidentally read in Times Magazine that the bacterium was in the 
top five of most resistant bugs. … I had a lot of poison in my body [to 
fight the infection]. If you read the side effects – you could go deaf. 
There are contrasting themes of having been well treated during acute care in 
hospitals and in rehabilitation on a physical level while not having one’s emotional 
needs met. Rehabilitation typically took between eight months and two years and 
was described as a hard but rewarding time for most informants. The Dutch sample 
in particular showed a theme of finding times in hospital and rehabilitation as very 
good: “[my] time in intensive care was one of the best times in my life”. Staff were 
“very empathetic and friendly”. And rehabilitation could be fun:  
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I had a lot of fun there, yes. That is strange isn’t it. … we do have a 
reunion from time to time and we still all come to the conclusion – 
what fun we had. And certainly with the staff, I can tell you that. 
However, negative staff attitudes had also been experienced, described by an 
informant as “flippant” and “derogatory” towards him and other patients. 
You’ve got a definite power structure there where the patients are 
very much at the bottom of the ladder. … that’s a very bad way to 
start off. … at the time you are going through a huge amount of 
trauma and shock and thinking this is the worst thing that ever 
happened to me and then you have staff that are saying virtually the 
same thing, that … you are no longer a powerful person, … or that 
you are somehow lower than me … 
When people were struggling to cope or their own high level of injury 
incapacitated them to a relatively greater degree compared to others going through 
rehabilitation, they felt ignored and abandoned. 
… then you saw that in the rehabilitation centre I could not progress 
further [and] I had the feeling they dumped me. … Like I say, you sit 
in a wheelchair and no shred of aftercare. 
In hindsight I think they should have supported me better. And I think 
that [is] because of my own behaviour, that I think quickly, that I can 
nut things out, and I give that impression. But that was not the case at 
all. 
For some the actions of (rehabilitation) hospital staff and professionals 
confirmed their loss of control over life by virtue of their physical disability. One 
female informant found out later that the hospital social worker had advised her 
husband to abandon her.  
[T]he marriage would not survive and he wouldn’t survive and his 
best bet was to put me in the X [nursing home] and go home and carry 
on with his life with the two little children. 
 (Leaders) 
Leaders in both countries told of rehabilitation periods getting shorter due to 
changes in health care policy and contended that personal issues were often 
inadequately addressed. They confirmed the neglect of personal issues within these 
institutional settings. 
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You have to go home within the shortest possible period of time. In 
one sense that is positive of course. But you see that issues such as 
sexuality and relationships are totally forgotten. 
5.8.3 Public attitudes 
Informants experienced good as well as bad attitudes from doctors and talked 
about their experiences of mostly negative public attitudes.  
They noticed different attitudes being displayed towards them since they 
acquired a disability. Some experienced a detached attitude from doctors, lacking 
attention to the emotional side of their nature and a lack of “follow-up”. 
I try very hard not to go to the doctor at X [a rehabilitation centre] 
because I do feel as the years have gone on that once they … see 
you’re stable, and organised and on your bike, there’s this air of 
nonchalance. If you go there … there’s this off-handish ‘take a pill, 
you’ll be fine or its just in your imagination’. … they do not pass all 
the information on to your own general doctor outside. … so I give up 
because all my own doctor can do is listen to what I have to tell 
him…. In that area I am disappointed. 
An informant who experienced his life as unsatisfactory life reported that his 
rehabilitation doctor, whom he saw for yearly check-ups, did not listen to his 
problems. He felt that he was not being treated as a human being but as a number: 
“every now and then you think that they think, there’s number such and such”. 
Doctors could be ignorant of the needs of someone with quadriplegia. 
My regular doctor knows nothing about spinal injury. If you don’t 
make very clear to him what you feel and why, and how that’s related 
to your spinal injury, then he does not know what’s wrong with you. 
Doctors were not always seen as good communicators, which was 
experienced as frustrating. 
Quite often you don’t get the chance to ask the questions that you 
want… you have to more or less just about grab him by the scruff of 
the neck and hold him in place to ask him anything. 
By contrast, some others experienced good attitudes and friendships from 
doctors. Some Dutch informants in particular saw their rehabilitation doctor in a 
positive light. 
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I know him personally rather well, and his wife too. Very nice guy. I 
have been sailing with him once.  
There were certain public attitudes that annoyed many informants, 
particularly those where they were avoided, stared at as an oddity, as “you are not 
like us” or seen as mentally deficient. Public assumptions that any companion of 
theirs was a carer were experienced as patronising. Often the informants would take 
action themselves when such situations occurred. 
… I know what it’s like to be stared at because someone’s blowing 
my nose or whatever. I know what it’s like when people look the 
other way quick in case you go up to them and dribble … and they 
don’t want to be caught standing next to you.  
… I attended the reception of a wedding and that the waiter came past 
and asked my sister who sat next to me. And he asked her ‘did I want 
coffee?’. My sister said ‘ask him!’. They are things that hurt. Then 
you think, have I really become such an alien appearance? 
5.8.4 Bureaucracy 
Informants experienced some obstacles to the flexible care arrangements, 
accessible housing and aids and appliances that they needed to function well in their 
daily lives. Dutch leaders in particular described bureaucratic rules as standing in the 
way of flexible care. Long waiting lists for access to personal care funds existed. 
More money was now being applied to reduce waiting lists but this did not address 
the problem of a dearth of people willing to work in care roles. People with 
disabilities were, in both countries, still seen as ‘care objects’ and there was some 
way to go yet towards their inclusion in community. 
In order to reduce their vulnerability and maximise their wellbeing it is very 
important that dependent people with disabilities have reliable and flexible support.  
In both countries most participants received funds to employ their own carers 
on personal care budgets, where they need them. They most often employed a 
number of carers for different tasks and times. Most were directly involved in 
recruiting and managing these employees. Others used community care organisations 
and one, in the Netherlands, used “FOKUS”, a service model that provides a package 
of a home in the community with attached personal care. Many and varied tasks were 
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carried out by such personal assistants for those with the greatest dependence on 
others. 
[They] Dress me, take me to appointments … basically anything that I 
need doing. Showering me, bowel treatment, sometimes cooking, 
driving me.  
On the whole most were very satisfied with these arrangements where they 
had them.  
I am very grateful for the arrangement… But I do feel if it was all 
gone, I wouldn’t be very happy and I know if I had to stay in X [an 
institution] or somewhere like that, I think I would just give up.  
It’s a bit more of a personal approach. I think that works really well 
and it has worked really well and there’s no reason why it won’t keep 
working well. 
This satisfaction showed for instance in the long tenure of many assistants 
who had employed by Australian informants under this scheme. The same carers had 
been employed for periods of five to eight years and one for eleven years. The same 
could not be demonstrated for Dutch informants, as the personal care budget had 
been a part of Australian policy for several decades, much longer than the only 
recently introduced Dutch policy, which at the time of the interviews in 2000 had 
been in place for some two years. Australians showed this long-term stability in 
retaining their carers. On the whole most informants were satisfied with their 
particular personal care arrangements, with individual care budgets giving them the 
greatest flexibility as compared to assistance from service organisations. 
Some informants were not satisfied with their organised care and support.  
Their complaints mostly related to arrangements where care came from an agency, 
without a say in carer selection and less influence on times when carers come in. 
Some such agencies for example did not allow their personnel to accompany clients 
on holidays as assistants and would not always be allowed to attend to home help 
tasks other than personal care. 
A few Australians had received personal accident compensation payments, 
enabling them to purchase their care directly. This worked well for one but not for 
another. The latter, with a high level of quadriplegia, felt trapped in a complicated 
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life, dominated by organising his many assistants at set times and managing a high 
carer turn-over on his highly taxed funds which did not allow him the 24-hour care 
he felt he needed. He also found it difficult to find carers and “understood” that few 
people were willing to care for people like him. He was constantly engaged in 
finding carers to fill vacated timeslots because of a carer’s absence for any reason or 
finding new employees for those who left. 
With carers and organising things, I find it a very complicated life 
whereas before my most difficult decision was what sort of day it was. 
I’ve got someone that comes in between one and two for an hour… I 
can only afford these part-timers. … they’re hard to find. …I also 
understand that there are going to be very few people out there that 
want to look after you. Unless you’ve got loads of money and can pay 
people it’s more difficult. 
Dutch informants experienced frustration due to bureaucratic approaches 
from those authorities involved in modifying access to their homes, and in processing 
applications for accessible cars, aids and equipment. The transfer from rehabilitation 
to an accessible home or being on a waiting list for a personal budget could take up 
to two years.  
But there’s a lot of procedure to go through. Because you need a long 
breath to get it all done. But once you know the routes to take … You 
say, I want a bed, or I want a hoist or a wheelchair. Or I want to adapt 
my home. And that they then take care of that. No, they’re all 
different doors to knock on. 
(Leaders) 
Dutch leaders confirmed the impacts of bureaucracy on people’s lives. They 
spoke of government-provided permanent loan cars with tabs kept on the number of 
kilometres driven, a bureaucratic organisation of personal care budgets and 
accessible transport schemes, and multiple service points for different needs. 
Australian leaders did not raise bureaucracy as a pervasive obstacle. 
Dutch leaders welcomed the move towards individual care budgets, or 
“Persoons Gebonden Budgets” (PGB’s). However, they pointed to obstacles to this 
concept working well such as excessive bureaucratic rules about what paid carers 
could or could not do and a declining availability of people wanting to work as 
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carers. At the same time mantelzorgers, that is family and friends, were increasingly 
less willing to take on long-term care roles.  
… home care, that is tied to all sorts of rules so your canary is not 
allowed to be fed by them and the cat cannot be let out. With a PGB 
(individual assistance budget) you can determine that and I think that 
is important. 
You can buy your own support. But it does have to exist [to be 
bought]. And when giving that profession a bad image is undermining 
care then perhaps young people do no longer wish to work in health 
care. 
Dutch and Australian government policy towards people with disabilities was 
“care-focussed”, turning people into “care-objects: “at a policy level care is still very 
central. That is of course connected to the fact that the Netherlands knows very big 
service organisations”. Dutch Government is cutting back on social benefits and this 
is having an impact on people with disabilities. 
A few years ago you could still get help like cooking, taking the dog 
for a walk, looking after children during illness. That is now all past. 
You have to arrange all that yourself now as a citizen and pay for it if 
you do need it. 
Waiting lists for home help sometimes last more than one year while 
waiting lists for an operation or treatment in hospitals are extremely 
long. 
People with disabilities are still mainly seen as ‘care objects’. Most 
people think that someone with a disability receives a social benefit. I 
think that marks our position.  
 They also saw an image of people with disabilities as being framed within in 
a “welfare context” and government programs being designed within a welfare 
model. 
The general community, whoever that is, often puts people with 
disabilities in a welfare model. I think they’ve [government programs] 
been designed to keep people with disabilities in a welfare model. 
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5.8.5 Vulnerability within a context of social decline  
Informants held apparently contrasting views of social developments. On the 
one hand they held a negative view of current society and a view of its further 
decline. They described society as one where people were increasingly estranged 
from each other and were increasingly individualistic and materialistic. On the other 
hand they also saw an upward trend in their societies’ support towards people with 
disabilities. This was thought to be so, even as, in the Netherlands, informants 
reported a lack of acceptance of people with disabilities in their neighbourhoods. 
Some Dutch leaders also perceived a reduced tolerance of parents choosing to have 
child with a disability, because of the financial cost to society. Euthanasia was 
thought to be more easily available in the future in a context of a greater public 
tolerance of the idea of EPAS, a declining health care sector, changing values, 
greater profit motives; greater costs of care; and population pressures. They did not 
think that their projected direction of society would change. Informants did not 
connect the wider societal issues with the desirability or otherwise of EPAS. Leaders 
echoed these themes but were more cautious about the effects of EPAS on people 
(with disabilities) within the negative society that they described. 
5.8.5.1 Decline in trust  
In both countries’ samples, there is a negative view of current society and a 
view of its further decline. Dutch informants in particular remember times where 
people were closer than they are now, particularly where they used to live in the 
country and now live in a city. 
Everyone just walked into each other’s homes. With us at home too. 
The door was always open. Here I don’t know some of my 
neighbours. And I have already lived here for five years. 
Current society was experienced as one in which relationships between 
people were more distant.  
In this street I do not have a closeness with anyone. I know who lives 
here, but that's where it stops. If I really had a need, I could ask the 
neighbours. But like it used to be in streets with neighbourly contact, I 
think that is a lot less these days.  
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I see it in my work. We think it is very bad to have so many people in 
an institution. They should all go and live in the smaller 
accommodation. It sounds very wonderful of course, but then you get 
six people with intellectual disability living in one house who are 
allowed to care for themselves and can decide all sorts of things. But 
they will land in a neighbourhood that does not accept them because 
the neighbours do not come and visit. Myself – I don't know who lives 
here either. It just doesn't work and is getting worse. People are 
getting lonelier. At least you will if you're not able to make or 
maintain contacts with people yourself 
Relationships between people are less close because life is faster, thereby 
excluding people with disabilities; because life is increasingly violent and people are 
‘harder’ and more individualistic and materialistic. 
It’s very busy, people don’t have much time to relate to anybody. I 
have lived what I consider two lives. One in the busy world and one in 
the not busy world and people don’t have time for people. Returning 
to the disability side of it, a lot of people still don’t have time for a lot 
of people who are disabled in any shape or form, not necessarily 
spinal cord. 
European society, and I think in America and in most big cities in the 
world, is rock-hard. Sometimes it gets so busy. The hospital, it’s just 
like conveyor belt work, you know how it goes. 
Violence was seen as on a rise, in their own countries and globally. 
Well, when you look at recent times, it seems as if people are getting 
angrier with each other. I think it will swing the other way again one 
day. (…) If it keeps going this way, it will get worse … (…) Well, I 
think that everyone will shield themselves from one another, that you 
will no longer know your neighbour. 
5.8.5.2 Increasing self-centredness 
There was a view that people were increasingly becoming self-centred and 
were more interested in their own wellbeing than of those immediately around them. 
People are becoming more assertive and demand more. I think that if 
you look ten years ahead people’s autonomy will go further. (…). I 
think society will become more and more individualistic. I don’t have 
a very optimistic picture of that. I think people are hardening. It is 
more about each for themselves and in the end I think it will get 
worse. 
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I think they world is going to become very cynical and develop a very 
hard shell to protect themselves or people, you know except for their 
close family, and eventually we’re going to basically be living in a 
situation where – basically it’s going to be every man for himself. 
Life in the future was also seen as one which is less compassionate and where 
life is valued less. 
You do hear that often, people don’t care about each other. (…). In 
the future I think human life will be worth less. 
I don’t see society as getting more compassionate. I think with 
growing urbanisation you’re getting more problems. People probably 
get less caring in many ways because they don’t have other people 
around them so [fades]. 
5.8.5.3 Decline and technology 
Genetic screening and a social pressure to abort babies with certain 
disabilities is a concern, mostly expressed by Dutch informants. These were seen as 
potential risks to the social status of people with disabilities. 
[G]ene technology is removing birth defects and that before they 
come about, whereas in the other one you’re talking about removing 
quite often with euthanasia and removing people with disabilities, 
easing their suffering by putting them to sleep or whatever. The other 
one is getting rid of people with disabilities in the womb. And so I 
think you could be, in both cases, you could be setting up very 
extreme sort of scenarios where you [fades]. I mean I don’t know 
what you call it, getting rid of suffering, but certainly getting rid of in 
many ways diversity too in society. 
I get the feeling that sometimes, in our current society, in its rules and 
so forth, now you are still allowed to have a disability but when my 
wife is pregnant, I have the feeling it’s going towards this, then she 
has to take a test. Amniocentesis or a lumbar puncture. Spina bifida, 
… you can let it be born but the costs are for you. That’s the scenario 
I see in front of me. And everyone says now, no, that’s not true, that’s 
not right. But I think you can see it shift like, we first make it very 
compassionate, about suffering unbearably. 
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5.8.5.4 Worsening negative trends 
Not only did informants see the current world in a generally negative light but 
they saw it as getting worse in the future. 
Unfortunately I think it is going to get worse before it gets better. Just 
looking at the youth of today and the attitudes, the violence level 
towards other people and themselves. They don’t seem to have the 
same respect for other people or themselves really. They don’t see a 
future. 
People will not have time anymore to think about quality of life. It is 
all about busy, busy, busy, busy. I think that people will think little 
about life. I think that will get worse. 
Informants did not see that the societal trends that they described would 
change for the better. An Australian summed up the feelings about a negative state of 
society by referring this situation to how she used to be before her accident as 
“arrogant, selfish, bombastic, what’s in it for me”. She had earlier described her 
personal transformation to a kinder, more patient person: 
Q: How do you see society as developing? A: Developing? Well, the 
society is a mirror of what I used to be, and you don’t develop when 
you are like that. Q: So, you’re saying we cannot change the way 
society is? A: No, unfortunately. It’s not possible. It’s like everything 
else. I suppose you’d call it evolution. We are evolving into these 
kinds of people because of the surroundings that we create for us to 
live in. I feel that there are other things that we can look at and deal 
with. But I feel that also comes with maturity. As people mature they 
go through a few of life’s beatings and life’s joys they can start to see 
things differently. But I think as a younger person and as a young 
parent you’re just too busy wrapped up and locked into what society 
expects us to do … 
5.8.5.5 Improving conditions for people with disabilities 
Informants saw improving scenarios for the societal support of people with 
disabilities, despite the other negative trends, but when prompted to qualify the 
improvements they were expressed in terms of improved physical access only. This 
apparent contradiction occurred within individual informants, rather than represent 
contrasting themes from different informants. 
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I think that people with quadriplegia … will be quite well accepted. 
… It is now a standard that everything that’s built is made to be 
accessible. Look at big shopping centres. We can get in, fantastic. 
Almost everywhere you have disabled parking spots. We can park for 
free everywhere. Those sorts of things. But that is only in the last ten 
years or so. 
I think you can wait 100 years but they will never accept disability 
completely. But I do think it will get better. Better access and that sort 
of thing. 
Informants appeared to apply some wishful thinking to their improved social 
acceptance in the simultaneous knowledge of declining social trends. Below is an 
example of the two views within individual informants. This informant for example 
simultaneously projected a future where people interact less and one where people 
with disability are included in society: 
There’s not a lot of interaction with your immediate neighbours 
although I always say hi if I see them, always wave … I think in ten 
or 20 years time if it keeps on going I don’t think people will know 
who their next door neighbour is, because there seems to be less and 
less interaction. 
And: 
I think the interaction will be so much better. I think being accepted 
into the community is happening more and more and more no, 
becoming more the norm and I think it will be the norm in ten years 
time. And because kids are going to school with people with 
disabilities, all sorts of disabilities, I think that’s a great move to have 
that interaction and then the kids don’t see it as us and them. 
5.8.5.6 Tolerance and use of EPAS 
EPAS  was thought to become more easily available in the future. This 
projected trend was often described in association with increased ‘tolerance’ to other 
issues, such as drugs and abortion, including euthanasia. The first quote is from an 
Australian who saw society becoming less compassionate, the second from a 
Dutchman who sees life getting faster and more reliant on technology in fixing 
problems. 
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I think in the long run it [euthanasia] probably will be legalised but 
it’s like the women’s struggle over abortion. (…) But I think generally 
as people get more educated that they become more supportive. 
They’ll be more tolerant. I think if it was legalised it’s probably 
because people have become more tolerant as has happened in 
Holland. 
I think that it will just get easier because people are getting more easy 
going. Q: How do you mean? A: [They] tolerate more. So, for 
instance drug taking, who moans about it? Your neighbour could have 
a cannabis garden … Who cares? … So humanity is getting more easy 
going. And I think in that sense too [EPAS]. 
5.8.5.7 Declining social trends in relation to EPAS 
Only some informants thought that pressures in health care and issues of 
profits, as well as overpopulation were factors leading to EPAS becoming more 
easily available. 
Perhaps they can reduce the waiting lists in nursing homes, when they 
‘shoot up’ a few more. I don’t approve of it but that’s what’s coming. 
I feel that euthanasia could become part of an industry, a profit-
making industry that’s lost the plot in regard to health care. 
Money is very important in this [Dutch] society. Hospitals are just 
like a business, so it will be easier [obtaining EPAS], I’m convinced. 
(…) they will sooner look at cost-benefit than look at who it is. Who 
is the person, is there still a possibility – how they look at the life of a 
person.  
But most informants did not draw any conclusions from their prediction of a 
generally more available EPAS in the future and their negative view of current and 
future society. They drew on, or referred to, the use of strict guidelines to minimise 
abuse in EPAS and the Dutch also a safeguard of ongoing public debate. EPAS was 
seen as peripheral to the broader social trends and there was a disbelief in any 
eventual misuse of any legal EPAS. 
I think it’s not a mainstream issue. Really, it’s impacting on very few 
people. Very few people, I think, actually choose it. 
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I don’t think they’re connected … I mean economic rationalism is 
very much the global picture, whereas euthanasia’s a small part. 
The possibility of a slippery slope exists. I am not afraid of that as 
long as people can reasonably discuss things. As well, the practice of 
euthanasia and its rules have to be well tied down and has to be 
transparent so it’s not possible to cheat. There have to be good rules to 
legally assess euthanasia afterwards. (…). [In] a society where the 
value of people is determined by wealth and health, there would be no 
place for ‘damaged people’ – people with disabilities and older people 
– in short people that cost extra money, … the solidarity between 
people would disappear. It would really be each for himself. I don’t 
believe that that will ever be possible. It would mean the end of the 
human race. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders in both countries shared this negative view of their societies. They 
described loss of values and increases in individualism and materialism and a 
growing importance of financial costs of suffering, affecting people with disabilities 
also. 
Modern values highlight the cult of the individual with Nike’s “Just 
do it” epitomising the way society is heading, placing less value on 
sharing, co-operating and doing things together. 
For the last 50 years or so Australia has become a country that places 
an increasing value on individual rights and I’m a bit cautious about 
supporting individual rights above social rights. 
People are getting older. That means that that period where you no 
longer undertake work is longer. Then you are a liability. You see 
now too that there are a number of people who have the feeling of, 
towards their children too, that they are a burden for them. So the 
chance that those boundaries will shift is relatively great. 
Developments in genetic screening, resulting in abortion and the quest to 
clone people worried leaders also. 
I am afraid that now with the gene research they can predict quality of 
people, that it would become difficult to lead a good life with serious 
disabilities in the community. Because they are getting fixed on 
perfect bodies, functioning according to a norm and produce 
according to their norms. Not my norms. I think it will all become 
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more difficult because you have to justify yourself [with a disability] 
more. 
The belief in improving circumstances for people with disabilities was not as 
great as in the grassroots sample. Yet some leaders also had a sense of an improving 
climate for people with disabilities, expressed in better access to opportunities for 
personal choice and economic status. 
And I think that society will be a great deal more accessible, through 
which people will be able to meet each other more readily, that you 
don’t have the apartheid that there is now. That you have a society 
that everyone can use where people can make decisions about having 
their own aids and equipment, that one looks more to the needs of the 
person rather than the profit. And I hope that in 15 years time people 
with a disability will have an economic standing that they do not have 
now. Now they are not really players.  
Other leaders were more cautious about the future for people with disabilities 
and referred to developments in genetics, governments cutting back on benefits and 
making tighter rules about these. 
I think through we’re going through a high reactionary era. I think if I 
wasn’t an optimist I’d probably be a bit concerned – on one hand we 
clone sheep and think that that’s OK and say that it’s got nothing to 
do with human beings, you can relax about that – when clearly those 
issues do have a human impact. We’re living in an era where we’ve 
got governments who are wanting to put more and more systems into 
place, for what they call public accountability, where it feels a bit 
more to me like they’re wanting everybody to toe the line and they 
think that line is just one line. (…) I think we’ve got a long way to go 
in the valuing of difference because we’re setting up systems which 
assume we’re all the same and we’re going to react to situations all 
the same. 
I think part of the acceptance of disability in Western society … is … 
that we have the wealth to accommodate people who are not 
productive. But if we go back to that situation where it’s expedient to 
get rid of people who acquired some disability then I think we run the 
real risk of society reverting to having that negative stereotype … for 
all disabilities. 
Like the grassroots sample, most leaders agreed that EPAS will eventually 
become more freely available. 
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I do not think it will get easier [to obtain EPAS]. I do think that 
people will want to have it sooner. Because the boundaries of what 
people find acceptable are shifting. Where people are 50 years old, 
they’re written off now.  
I’ve got no doubt that it will continue. Whether it’ll get up, I guess I 
take some solace from the length of time Parliaments in Australia 
have tried to legislate to legalise prostitution. 
Like the grassroots sample, most leaders did not make a direct connection 
between the nature of the declining society that they described and the desirability of 
legal euthanasia. However they expressed some caution about EPAS within our 
turbulent society. 
The Netherlands has been the first with euthanasia now for quite some 
time. I do not hope that human norms and values will go backwards 
even faster. I do think that something like this [EPAS] has to be done 
very carefully. People have the right to live. People also have the right 
to die in a humane and dignified way. 
I’m not a right to lifer. I believe strongly in a woman’s right to 
abortion and at the same time I believe that all this stuff around 
cloning really worries me because it buys into what I think is at the 
bottom of the psyche of a lot of us which is about our human fragility 
and about how precious that is, and often the difficulties people face 
changes self image etcetera after a traumatic accident. So, I think 
there’s a lot of things happening and I think being part of a minority 
group that is marginalised and oppressed and at a systemic level, 
sometimes that’s not obvious. But I actually don’t think that I’ve got 
consistent views about many things. 
Only some Australian leaders made a direct negative connection between the 
state of society and impacts on people with disability from legal EPAS: 
Down the track euthanasia might not be so much an issue of 
individual rights as a social necessity. It’s the most effective way for 
society to manage the numbers of people with disability and the 
numbers of frail aged. Q: So is that the way you see society going? A: 
No, I don’t but I guess it’s a grim possibility that it may be. How is 
society going to cope with those changes [growing numbers of people 
with disabilities and aged people]? 
Once you allow the individual to make that decision [EPAS] then it 
has systemic ramifications. (…). It’s often by devolving those societal 
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things to the level of the individual that we can create in fact systemic 
things that undermine the total good of society. 
Leaders found it difficult to say whether a change from the current negative 
society that they described is possible: 
In the last four decades we’ve had really major swings in the sorts of 
things that people have believed were important. I think at the 
moment we’re moving towards talking about community membership 
but when I say ‘we’, I mean, as a society we are not good at doing that 
stuff. 
I think we’ve got a long way to go in the valuing of difference 
because we’re setting up systems which assume we’re all the same … 
People say if people need assistance then they can have it – but you 
know it’s just another system set up to separate people. 
5.8.5.8 The disability movement and EPAS. 
In both countries disability movements were hardly at all involved in the 
public debate about EPAS. Leaders believed it to be an important issue to be aware 
of and gave a number of reasons why the disability movement has not been involved. 
This theme arose exclusively from within the leaders sample. Grassroots informants 
did not discuss the profile of the disability movement in EPAS issues and were not 
asked about it. This theme is included for its direct relevance to the significance of 
this study, that is, in part, a lack of a disability voice as participant in the wider EPAS 
debate and reasons for this.  
Leaders in both countries saw little involvement by the disability movement 
in the EPAS debate, as is also the case for other bioethical issues.  
You saw this with the debate on genetics, that everyone was talking 
about it. Ethicists, medical people, politicians but not people with a 
disability. That is rather strange. Then you are never on top of events. 
And you see that with the euthanasia debate as well. 
Well, I’m disillusioned that the sector hasn’t taken it up as an issue. 
Last year I called a couple of meetings … I circulated to all the local 
disability groups … I invited about 30 people …and the first one had 
two people turn up so we called it again and the second one had five 
people turn up but four of these people were from the same agency.  
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Because of potential negative impacts of the EPAS debate and practice on 
people with disabilities, leaders thought that the disability movement ought to keep 
an eye on the issue. It is also thought important to contribute disability perspectives 
to the issue of EPAS. 
I think it’s really important that we maintain our involvement in the 
debate and the discussion. I just think there are dangers there for 
people with disabilities with this policy and we have to be very 
mindful that decisions and policies are not going to be legislated that 
will mean that people will have their lives ended prematurely because 
of a value base of the time or of some of the decision makers of that 
time. 
We are forced to think about it. Others can put the problem away as 
being not close to them etcetera and then you do look at these things 
in a different way. 
 In both countries three reasons for non-involvement by disability movements 
were expressed. Firstly, diverse views within the membership of disability groups 
made it difficult to speak with one voice. Secondly, EPAS was not seen as a practical 
disability issue or a priority and as not easy to discuss as an existential issue. Thirdly, 
there was a fear of provoking a debate around questioning the existence of people 
with disability. 
Our membership is very diverse. There are many and different 
Christian ways of thinking or from humanitarianism … there are 
people who are very much for euthanasia but also people who are 
very much against it. (…) It is difficult to represent one voice in this 
debate, informed as it is by individual experiences and beliefs. 
I think it’s a bit like the other things I was talking about – the issues of 
unemployment [are] what are concerning people. Housing, all those 
very basic to people’s survival issues are dealt with. Not the other 
issues that I would see as equally important which is about the 
relationships, which is about choice and people’s right to make those 
sorts of decisions for themselves. 
You know, people sort of think, well you know we’re more concerned 
about life rather than death. (…). Families won’t touch this sort of 
stuff with a hundred foot pole. That’s been my experience because of 
the difficulties particularly around some of the genetic stuff. 
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I don’t think this is a topic, how shall I say this, which they can talk 
about as practically as the struggle for the personal budget. Like 
vulnerability. I don’t know whether you have ever had a discussion 
about it, vulnerability and dependency. But with us [in the 
Netherlands] it is purely in political terms rather than in existential 
terms. Not about what that means for somebody because before you 
know it you’re a wimp.  
5.8.5 Felt vulnerability 
“Felt vulnerability” is a theme that describes the personal experience of 
vulnerability. Informants felt invulnerable at the same time as recognising that their 
disability, health issues in particular, made them more vulnerable. Feelings of 
vulnerability arose from dependence on equipment and on others for essential care 
and assistance with many aspects of daily life. These feelings were diminished with 
availability of good and reliable assistance. A feeling of vulnerability was further 
reduced by focussing on living in the moment rather than on the vulnerability. 
Feelings of invulnerability and resilience arose from a feeling of having overcome 
major challenges in their life with disability. They also appear connected with an 
innate sense of invulnerability of a part of themselves that is beyond their intellectual 
reasoning. Leaders echoed the issue of good care and assistance and added other 
factors which could contribute to vulnerability such as limited access to transport and 
buildings and being financially less well off. In their view, negative images of people 
with disabilities, arising from materialistic dominant values in society, further added 
to vulnerability of people with disabilities. 
There was a constant awareness of depending on a number of arrangements 
with others to be able to function in daily life, including for toiletting, dressing and 
undressing, and preparing and assisting with food and drink. This caused a feeling of 
vulnerability. For example, an informant who lived alone, and who needed assistance 
at home and at work, confirmed this feeling. 
I think you are very vulnerable. Because if all the equipment and help 
around you falls apart – and of course it doesn’t all collapse at the 
same time. But you do realise. If all that were not there. 
 Another with complex care arrangements and multiple carers felt vulnerable 
in case a carer was suddenly unavailable.  
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[I]f they trip over and break their leg, God forbid, you’re stuck, so 
you’ve got to have at least three for every area of your caring – and 
it’s not easy to find people. 
A feeling of vulnerability was for some also present in relation to potential 
embarrassment in managing continence from day to day. This could result in a 
frequent checking that continence aids and appliances were working well. For 
instance, an informant with an implanted electronic bladder stimulator, giving her 
increased bladder control, had purchased a spare control device in case she lost the 
original. Where there was good and reliable care with regard to basic needs such as 
toiletting, dependence on others to ensure against such embarrassment involved a 
lesser degree of a felt vulnerability.  
I still get embarrassed if I wet myself or if I mess myself but touch 
wood, I haven’t done that for years, because the carers do their job 
properly and unless the equipment fails that’s the only time I get wet 
or as I say I haven’t messed myself well since I left X [institution] 
anyway. 
In contrast to a felt vulnerability there was also an expressed feeling of 
invulnerability.  
Well, I don’t feel it like that [vulnerability] but it is a fact. 
[T]hat wheelchair of mine. I sit in it but really it does not exist. Your 
intellect knows you are handicapped but in a way I am not. 
 This feeling of invulnerability was related to a sense of triumph of having 
survived and having lived through the initial spinal cord injury and the treatment 
phases and having been able to live successfully with the experience of a significant 
level of disability: “I feel more invulnerable I think, because you have survived this 
thing”. 
I think that on the one hand it makes you more invulnerable. If 
something happens to you, you can put that in a certain context. But I 
can imagine that if you break your arm, that that can be a nuisance for 
someone. While if I broke mine, well that would also be a nuisance 
but I would think, so what? So on the one hand it makes you more 
resilient. 
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(Leaders) 
Leaders confirmed the inevitable over-presence of vulnerability. They spoke 
of people with disabilities being vulnerable because of a number of factors, beyond 
those that the grassroots sample recognises as contributing to their vulnerability. 
These were a lack of good care and assistance, transport, limited physical 
accessibility and financially being less well off. 
I think that no matter who you are, that if you end up in a situation 
where you're devalued, that society isn't good at dealing with that and 
unless you have people constantly needling the consciousness of 
society then things don't change. But my sense is it'll never get 
perfect. You know we've been better than in certain times in history, 
perhaps accepting people of different races or people of different 
sexual persuasions or people of with different disabilities. But I think 
there will always be a need for vigilance around people who are not 
seen to be as valued as other people in a particular society. 
People with disabilities are also second rate citizens. They get 
excluded from many things. I cannot spontaneously say, shall we go 
to Amsterdam? Cannot be done because giving the train 24 hours 
notice is impractical. Money for a taxi is unaffordable. You don’t 
have equal opportunities in education and in work. 
 Dutch leaders in particular perceived a negative public image of people with 
disabilities as dependent people. People with intellectual disability in particular are 
being excluded and teased in their neighbourhoods as “one doesn’t know how to deal 
with them”.  
[P]eople with disabilities are often teased in society. I live in a 
neighbourhood where there is a lot of integration now from big 
institutions for people with intellectual disability, for people with 
visual disabilities. And when I see how in that neighbourhood people 
are being teased, that is really terrible. 
 5.9 A good, difficult life: responses to threats to wellbeing 
The theme ‘” good, difficult life: responses to threats to wellbeing” presents 
the responses of informants to the threats to their wellbeing. These threats are 
represented within the above major theme on vulnerability. This section describes the 
informants’ experience of life with disability which, in the main, was experienced as 
good while also as a difficult life. It presents ways in which informants dealt with 
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these. Their responses fall within internal psycho-dynamic and external social 
responses which show some power to meet their own needs for inner and social 
wellbeing and also meet their physical requirements. 
There was, however, a small group of informants whose experience of life 
with disability was unhappy. They often reported perceptions that were different 
from that of the main sample. The significance of this phenomenon and how their 
experiences formed any coherent picture in contrast to the main findings is discussed 
in Chapter Six. 
5.9.1 Choosing to embrace the disability experience 
Most informants saw their lives as difficult but also as worthwhile. They 
experienced a big difference between life before and after their injury and reported 
having “two lives”. Irritations, frustrations and disadvantages were part of their daily 
life but they had a level of acceptance of their disability as a fait accompli. This 
acceptance assisted them to live a rewarding life, aided by good care and support. 
Many informants made a conscious personal choice in accepting the fact of disability 
in their lives. In contrast, some informants, who were among the few who preferred 
death to living with their disability, did not experience worthwhile lives. They 
experienced their lives as mere survival. For them the losses of independence and 
other characteristics of their first life were constantly felt.  
Many informants reported having two lives, with noticeable differences 
between each.  
 I’ve got two lives, one pre accident and then the new one really. I’ve 
just started again. 
I just did two different things. You know it’s gone. The past is 
completely different.  
The second life was a life that they mostly saw as good, albeit one full of 
difficulties, which affected them on a regular basis.  
I experience my life as difficult with many disadvantages. In spite of 
that I still find life worthwhile while … and can see the sun shine.  
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So while you lose on one you pick up on another, I guess at different 
times in your life everybody has to re-assess the positives and 
negatives and what they are and I see mine as a positive. I see myself 
as a lucky person in some respects. 
Some experienced their present lives as very good or even better than they 
were prior to having quadriplegia. 
As I said before, it’s better. It just gives you the opportunity to explore 
a whole new realm. Also, certainly extreme frustration and annoyance 
and that but it’s still very much a wonderful life. 
Oh I think it’s good. I mean I really enjoy my life … I really enjoy 
what I do, I really enjoy the life. 
There was a level of acceptance of their life, which needs to incorporate the 
fact of having disability. Informants perceived a need to make the best of things: 
I try to be accepted in this world. I am X with a disability and not X 
without a disability. 
Well, sometimes it’s the pits. It’s, um…, if you had your choice you 
wouldn’t want it this way. That covers it I think: it’s the pits. You 
know, if you could have things differently you would but it’s what 
you’ve got and you’ve got to accept it and just get on with it. 
For many informants there had been a point of acceptance of their disability 
which had been a choice they had knowingly made. They had made such choices 
prompted by their early disability experiences in a very different life.  
I had a moment where I realised how it was. I just sat in front of the 
mirror and said to myself: You’re stuffed, don’t whinge on because 
nothing further will change. So, don’t lose your time. Take that! Go 
for it! And that’s the way it is. 
I’m really bloody lucky you know. (…) I think I have a very good 
quality of life but I’ve worked for it to make it better too. 
I think [disability] forced me. There’s been a force somewhere that’s 
forced me to wake up and smell the daisies (sic). How can I explain 
how I feel this way, I just feel it. 
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But this acceptance was also fragile. The impacts of spinal cord injury were 
constantly present throughout many activities of life: “I don’t think you ever accept 
the disability but you learn to live with it”. Life was certainly more difficult since 
acquiring quadriplegia. 
Well, just the actual physical side of it, I mean you’ve got spasms 
which gives you the shits, you’ve got to shove suppositories up your 
bum, you’ve got to wear a leg bag, your balance is – you’ve got to 
drag a chair in out of the car which I’m lucky to [be able] do, I’m not 
complaining about [it]. (…). And there are certain times where you’ve 
been out, all you want to do is drop your clothes as you’re heading 
towards the bed and crash – no, get your chair out of the car, into it, 
through the door, go and do your tapping [emptying bladder] – it just 
complicates things.   
For most their difficulties were perceived as irritations and frustrations, 
overcome in large part by means of good relationships with others, and by having 
good support, themes that are more fully presented later. 
I enjoy my life with my disability because that’s my life. I don’t have 
any, well, I don’t know of any issue I have there. I think the things 
that have made my life as enjoyable as I want it is having a good 
group of carers around me to get me onto it, you know.  
I mean, there are people with a disability and people without a 
disability. There are people with blue eyes and people with brown 
eyes. The wheelchair for me is not really something like I could not 
live with it (sic). 
In contrast, three informants saw their present lives as mostly bad, with their 
lives revolving around such issues as their care management and frustrations about 
dependency, relationships, sexuality; having to ask for many things; a loss of 
spontaneity and loss of an able body. They also thought that they would be better off 
being dead, by way of access to EPAS, than to live with their disability. For them 
there was an ongoing comparison with life as it was before the accident that caused 
quadriplegia. Their views and experiences provided strong contrasts to the themes 
that arose from the more positive life experiences that most informants described as 
shown in various themes throughout this chapter. 
And so yeah, it makes it difficult for me – I’ve got two lives, one pre 
accident and than the new one really. I’ve just started again, there’s no 
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point in trying to incorporate any of that [life before disability]. It was 
pretty obvious once I was told I wasn’t going to walk that I knew 
straight away what it meant, that it was never going to be obviously, 
as you well know, you never know quite how much how bad it’s 
going to be at first but for me it doesn’t really get any better, it’s just 
the experience, I didn’t choose to do it it’s just choice, so I just tend to 
look at life for me – I find it’s too complicated for me.(…). [I]t’s 
pointless for me to pursue something that just because it’s something I 
can do doesn’t mean that it’s me, I prefer not to change.  
Well the whole experience has been the worst thing, I mean there’s 
nothing positive to say about it really. To me personally I feel like the 
person that existed before the accident is no longer. Well, it’s not me. 
I’m just a shell of the person I was. … just being in a wheelchair. I’d 
like to change that … not being in the wheelchair covers it all.  
(Leaders) 
Confirming the grassroots’ perspective, some leaders believed that attitudes 
that people with disability held towards themselves could determine their life 
experience.  
It is also to do with how people with disability see themselves. One is 
really disabled, the other is a citizen with a disability. 
5.9.2 Shifting criteria of acceptance  
“Shifting criteria of acceptance” is a theme that reveals a changing perception 
of the circumstances under which life is worth living. Before the onset of their own 
disability fears and ignorance of disability had led some participants to conclude that 
death is better than life in a wheelchair. Now most thought the opposite. They had 
ideas now about what kind of life was not worth supporting, notably when one had 
lost consciousness or cognition. At the same time they could relate to the relativity of 
such concepts by looking at times since the onset of disability when they had shifted 
those limits, or shifted their criteria of what constituted life worth living.  
Perceptions of the ability to live with quadriplegia changed from pre- to post-
accident. Some informants recalled specifically thinking about, or talking with others 
about, the undesirability of ever being in a wheelchair, prior to the onset of their 
quadriplegia. They then thought that death might be better under such circumstances.  
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I remember thinking, I don’t know if I could live like that. … I used to 
wonder how they coped and then again it used to be quite scary. … I 
used to think oh gosh, so you didn’t want to get too close in case they 
spasmed (sic) or something but now … you see it in a whole different 
light. … and I think that the deformity is a bit daunting to some but I 
find that’s not so bad these days. 
One, an avid motorcycle enthusiast, who broke his neck in a road accident 
riding his bike, recalled having made a pact with a mate with whom he rode on trail 
bikes. They agreed to always “ride fast”, so that if they had an accident they’d be 
dead, because he had a “morbid fear” of ending up in a wheelchair. This particular 
informant was one of the few who reports such unsatisfactory life with disability that 
he would rather be dead. But most informants saw their present condition as one they 
could live with.  
I know people say, oh look, I couldn’t do it. If I ended up in a chair I 
couldn’t handle it. I say well, you don’t know till you get there.  
Some informants said that if changes could be made to improve their lives 
they would like a slightly lower level of quadriplegia to make their lives easier, or to 
regain hand or arm function, but, on reflection, also recognised that if that were 
possible such improvement would never suffice. 
Well, to be a lower level of quadriplegia – a lower level of disability, 
like instead of being a quadriplegic I’d rather be a paraplegic. But 
then I suppose if I was a paraplegic I’d say why can’t I be one of these 
people that come into hospital, break their neck and walk out. 
Informants gave scenarios in which they stated the limits of what they 
consider life worth supporting, such as permanent loss of consciousness, being 
artificially respirated or being bed-bound. At the same time they also recognised 
repeatedly shifting boundaries as to what they would accept as life worth living for 
themselves. For example, a woman who had developed further disabilities as a result 
of a car accident after acquiring quadriplegia said: 
Of course, thinking of myself, where my limits are. That you are on a 
respirator. If you are in an iron lung or something. That is my limit. I 
have learned that your limits shift time and time again. As far as that 
is concerned I think; I don’t have to decide yet . When it comes to that 
time I will decide. I have just learned through life that you keep on 
going. Apparently a human being is always capable to go over another 
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limit and find some, yes some happiness. In any case to find some 
contentment. Some equilibrium that’s what it is all about. 
Many informants adopted a relative perspective towards their 
disability: “There’s always someone worse off than yourself” was an 
often-heard statement explaining how they managed to make the best 
of their lives. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders did not have much to say about this theme but captured the essence of the 
grassroots responses by saying: 
[A] disability perspective forces you to think about the essence of 
things. A disability perspective can make theoretical issues very 
practical. 
5.9.3 Intra-personal approaches to public attitudes 
Most informants employed various strategies to not be affected too much by 
negative attitudes towards them. Their own attitudes were key in this. They 
understood why people displayed attitudes of rejection and curiosity towards them 
but they did not condone this. Their understanding came from their own, similarly 
negative attitudes towards people with disabilities, pre-quadriplegia. They perceived 
that people with intellectual disability had greater public image problems than they 
had. Leaders confirmed the importance of the disabled individual’s attitude in 
shaping their life’s experience. They described underlying social trends that 
contributed to negative attitudes, as the grassroots sample described. According to 
leaders residual public paternalism in the Netherlands; in both countries a rising 
individualism; as well as a growing concern with health and wealth, all lead to a 
public questioning of the presence of people with disability in society. At the same 
time there was a perception of a growing acceptance of people with disabilities 
through implementation of a number of integrative policies. A hierarchy indicating 
level of worth of people was apparent among the public and among people with 
disabilities themselves. 
Informants displayed a mixture of external and internal strategies of dealing 
with incidences of negative public values that were directed at them. Sometimes they 
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acted directly in trying to assert themselves as human beings with full worth. At 
other times they judged between the relative importance of self-assertion and 
adjusting one’s own view of the world. 
So I have made it my business … to go up to people and just let them 
know I’m here. I’m fine. Yes, I am sitting in a wheelchair but you can 
associate with me. 
I used to get annoyed about all sorts of things – things not really 
pertinent to life – while now I can better judge things for their value 
and have learned what is important. 
They recognised that their own attitudes towards others could change a 
negative situation into a more positive one.  
I think it’s a case of breaking through that bit of having to ask people 
to do things … it’s not really a problem. It’s just an issue that I’ve got 
to get over and do something about.  
I think sometimes it’s your attitude towards them … I mean if you’re 
rude and abrupt to them well naturally they’re going to be rude and 
abrupt back but I mean, you know, getting into places or asking for 
help, there’s not very many places that you know that if you ask 
somebody they usually help you, there’s never any moans and groans. 
Some recognised negative attitudes towards people with disabilities in 
themselves before they acquired their disability and saw their own experiences as 
relatively benign by comparison with negative public attitudes people with 
intellectual disability faced. Indeed some Dutch informants elaborated on the 
situation that people with intellectual disabilities faced. In a number of these 
informants’ neighbourhoods there were large group homes and their residents faced 
teasing from the non-disabled residents. No Australians raised this as a community-
based phenomenon.  
They recognised that negative attitudes towards them often come from 
ignorance. This understanding arose from their own dual experience of life with and 
without disability and because of their experiences with people that knew them well, 
who did not display negative attitudes towards them. This understanding helped 
some informants in reducing the impact on them from negative attitudes from others. 
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I do feel categorized. Some people give the impression that if you are 
in a wheelchair you are different, you are not like us. I think that for 
people with intellectual disabilities that is worse than for us. 
So, with strangers I have some unpleasant experiences. … they really 
think you are mad if you are in a wheelchair. And that’s normal. I 
recognise it in myself. Because … when I was not disabled, it is 
strange, if you don’t know anyone in a wheelchair, it’s not part of the 
way you see the world. At that moment that you are confronted with 
it, it gives a scare. I can understand that. 
When things were very frustrating, some informants told of letting it “out of 
their system” after which problems could be seen in a relative light, as no more than 
“having a bad day”. Frequently informants repeated their use of the maxim: there is 
always somebody worse off than yourself, in getting them through.  
Oh, there are days that I abuse and carry on, mostly with myself. By 
the time I get that out of my system and get on with it. You think, oh 
well, it’s a bad morning.  
They did try to let go of their bad experiences, because “… if we remembered 
all the bad things in our life, we’d probably go and jump off the cliff anyway”. 
Again, ice-breaking through using humour and trying to be clear and direct about the 
assistance they needed, could succeed in minimising displays of negative attitudes 
towards them.  
[Y]ou can make the situation what you like by either saying nothing 
or by making a joke out of it … I have to deal with it all the time.  
In the case of those who were experiencing unsatisfactory lives and preferred 
death, the contribution of one’s own attitudes to the quality of one’s life appeared to 
play an important role also. They greatly focused on their past, non-disabled, body 
and the physical experiences they enjoyed prior to their disability. For them, nothing 
but a full reversal, or cure, of their disability would be sufficient to restore them to 
their former state of feeling like a real man, or regain their former sexual identity, 
physical powers and independence. This construction of their daily reality 
contributed to their negative experience of life and to their suffering. They had 
decided that their present lives were not worth living. Yet there was also a realisation 
that for any change to occur in their lives a change was needed in them. One 
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expressed regret at being unable to change. The following quotes were from speakers 
who acquired quadriplegia 16 and 13 years ago and who described the attitudes of 
carers towards them as very good. The first described the attitudes of two 
stepdaughters from a previous relationship as accepting of him but this did not 
change how he felt about himself.  
[T]o them it was nothing, they never saw the wheelchair. They just 
saw me as most people do. It’s how I feel [about the situation that 
makes the difference]. (…). I don’t think the wheelchair has really 
changed anything. Only my conception of me in the wheelchair, let’s 
put it that way. I’ve still got to have somebody come in and dress me, 
I’ve still got to have somebody shower me, I’ve still got to have 
somebody help me with bowel treatment… So, just the anger and 
frustration of not being able to do what I used to do. Basically all the 
time, yeah. 
I can’t stand how I’m still not comfortable with carers doing things – 
even though you pay them – doing things for me, I find it very 
difficult to be a taker. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders confirmed the existence of negative attitudes towards people with 
disabilities but related their views to a more global level. In both countries a 
predominant human service care-model towards the needs of people with disabilities 
had resulted in reduced attention to their needs for “participation, contribution and 
relationships”. They were still seen as “objects of care” and they could also be seen 
in a black and white light: “ they are losers or heroes. Nothing in between really”. 
Dutch leaders saw a kind of paternalism arising from the care model, which 
had always told people with disabilities that they could not work or study, so why 
bother. For example, a Dutch person with disability could be stopped in the street by 
a stranger and be asked what was wrong with them.  
[T]hat curiosity has to be satisfied first before they will interact with 
you. If I’d say ‘I have MS’ then it’s done. … for them all is then clear. 
Then they will approach you like that …; that is the woman with MS, 
that is the MS’er.  
A Dutch paternalistic attitude was seen as part of the culture.  
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[S]o, yes there is some paternalism, a bit of caring which is embedded 
somewhat in the Dutch character I think. 
Dutch leaders in particular emphasised their perception of a public attitude 
which questioned whether parents “would be allowed to put children with a disability 
into the world”. People with disabilities were often seen as bludgers by the public: 
“you hear more often that people say that scooters are provided from their tax 
money”. A leader with a congenital disability who had children who also had this 
condition spoke of a culture, which was against “choosing” to have a child who had a 
disability.  
I have the idea, as somebody with a disability, you have children that 
in general people around you react with: how can you do that? You 
cannot do that to a child. You hear it via the neighbours. And maybe 
the neighbours say it themselves too. 
Dutch leaders mentioned such factors as individualism, lack of physical 
access, over-emphasis on material wealth and health as tendencies that have adverse 
consequences for people with disabilities. 
 [I]n the Netherlands individualism has grown enormously in the last 
few years. And so has a kind of health ideal. Many people in the 
Netherlands think a) they can buy health and b) that you can prevent 
certain things and if anything should happen then they fix you up. 
Well, in practice it shows that all that is only relative. 
Although some saw a gradual improvement in terms of inclusion policies in 
work, accommodation and physical access, leaders confirmed the low position of 
people with intellectual disability in a public hierarchy of human worth. But people 
with disabilities, they said, also applied a hierarchy to themselves, where the use of 
an electric wheelchair for instance indicated less worth than if one used a pushchair. 
And people with physical disabilities “don’t want to identify with intellectual 
disability, and certainly not with people with psychiatric illness”. 
There is a kind of social ladder. That is the first thing I learned with X 
[a peak disability group]. If you are blind, a woman and you work, 
you are at the top. If you’re alone and blind you’re below that. But 
still reasonably on top. And who has cerebral palsy and is incontinent, 
well you can forget it. With intellectual disability or mental illness 
you go right down the bottom as well. Formally all this is denied. 
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Some leaders saw an improvement in people with disabilities’ public image 
some did not. A Dutch leader who claimed that there was essentially no negative 
view of intellectual disability in his country, listed existing public prejudices against 
people with intellectual disability.  
[T]hey are aggressive and dangerous; cannot talk with them; they are 
crazy; they always need full care; they cannot go to school and they 
cannot have a job. 
5.9.4 Losing friends and forming new relationships  
Many informants, Dutch and Australian, experienced the loss of friendships 
upon the injury that led to quadriplegia. Often relationships with wives and 
girlfriends terminated, though this was not always attributed to the disability. Many 
informants believed that their loss of friends was related to their changed bodies and 
status and because of the hospital and rehabilitation settings they were in “they [the 
friends] didn’t like the hospital and the sorts of accidents that surrounded them. 
 
Well I regard it as two lives because the friends you had before your 
accident tend to have dropped off – they see you in a certain 
perspective – like you’re walking around, you’re doing things 
normally …, then suddenly you come along and you’ve got to get 
your chair out of the car and if there’s a step you need a hand up the 
step and those sorts of things and it’s just kinda different. 
In fact quite a few people have distanced themselves in one way or 
another since the accident, not just friends but family as well. (…) 
Admittedly some went interstate and things like that which would 
have happened anyway but there were others that just excluded me 
from their life. I suppose you put it that way because, I don’t know, 
maybe it’s too hard to have a bloke in a wheelchair tagging along all 
the time if you know what I mean. 
But for most new friends were made after these losses. 
A lot of friends stayed away but most I still have. I even gained new 
friends. 
I lost my limited friends. I still have four. I used to have more but they 
stayed away. Now I still have four real friends. They don’t visit 
everyday but I can ring them should I have any problems. … Like 
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Friday, we are going to modify my car … a friend then comes who 
says: “Oh I’ll come by”. Those sorts of things. They are real friends. 
Indicating the importance of good relationships to them, when asked what 
was the best thing about their life with a disability, informants often stated that it was 
their close relationships, with family, friends and at work, which have added 
meaning and enjoyment to their lives. 
I can say, in hindsight: well it is not meaningless what happened to 
me. I have been shaped by it. I have, like I said, deeper friendships. I 
value that greatly. I would not want to do without that. So, if you ask 
me, would you do without that in exchange for the ability to walk, I 
would say no. That may sound absurd but it is true. Would you like 
that and the ability to walk? I would say yes. 
What’s important to me – OK, well I guess a lot of my life is actually 
centred around my work or what I’m involved with, and that’s 
working for the X … And other things that are important to me I 
guess is my marriage, my wife and the life we have together.  
The importance of good relationships was also expressed through regret for 
missing, or less than perfect relationships. When asked if they wanted to change 
anything in their lives if they could, some informants referred to the primary 
importance of their relationships.  
I think that I would like to have a relationship [with my partner], 
which is less complicated, with someone who is a bit easier about 
things.  
I mean sometimes I think I’ve got a good life, but then you have days 
where you think it’s the pits – but not that many, not that many. It’s 
no use, I mean there’s nothing you can do about it, you can only sit 
and sulk. … [O]h, I guess in some ways – there’s the partner leaving, 
that sort of gets on your goat a bit, that sort of gets you a bit emotional 
…, and that’s when it sort of hits home, you think life might have 
been different, but then it may not have been different, you just, you 
don’t know. 
Work was another factor that made for a good life. Four Australian and four 
Dutch informants were employed part-time or full-time. Opportunities for 
relationships at work were important to their wellbeing, with the financial rewards of 
employment seen as of lesser importance.  
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There are customers that ask where I am when I am not at work 
because they need something or other done. I like that. 
There are daily frustrations associated with a disability. But I do do 
many things. And I make something of it. I have a nice job, I have 
very nice colleagues, very nice friends. I have a lot of people around 
me through whom I can just too many, many things. 
Then I think, what’s it all about in life? To be healthy and to have 
good relationships and just be satisfied with a little less money or no 
car. I don’t get worried about small things. I think the quadriplegia 
has a lot to do with that. 
Those informants who reported a bad life and would prefer death described 
more detached relationships. They preferred not to get involved with others, saw 
human nature as essentially bad or voiced disappointment with the way others related 
to them. 
 There’s a couple [carers] like I say have been here a long time but I 
haven’t actually, I don’t think, formed – you know … Although 
they’re caring people and you get to know them, … I tend to not get 
involved, the same as I do with all, with the rest of life. … most of 
them care but I tend not to take them up on the offer most of the time, 
I just don’t….. 
Another man from that group who described his life as “heavy shit” (“zwaar 
kloten”), said that “people have become my greatest disappointment in life”. 
5.9.5 Enrichment of relationships 
Whereas many informants had lost friends upon acquiring their disability a 
greater depth of relationship was now experienced with family and friends and in 
new relationships. Rich relationships were also experienced with carers who often 
confided in informants in relation to their own personal issues. Informants described 
contributing to their carers’ and friends’ wellbeing by being approached by them to 
talk through their personal issues. 
Some described having close relationships prior to their accidents and 
reported no loss of friends at all. These informants were in the very small sub-sample 
of those at the very highest end of a continuum in rating their lives as good. 
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However, these informants also experienced a further enrichment of their existing 
relationships with family and friends. 
A good experience with quadriplegia, I think, is that because with my 
family but also with my friends we went through a very emotional 
time that you get much closer with each other. … You get closer 
connections to those around you. When you go through the suffering 
together, certainly in the first stages, you have a lot to process – and 
still now of course. When you have problems you have to work 
through them. You learn then whom you can rely upon. 
Relationships with paid and unpaid carers also took on a certain richness. 
Paid carers often found a listening ear from the person they cared for when airing 
their own personal problems. It made no difference whether the informant was male 
or female. They were happy to fulfil such roles. Informants thus made a contribution 
in a reciprocal relationship where they were not just recipients of others’ friendships. 
I am practically a counsellor. Because I look so much deeper and 
think more clearly on the human side of life, you could virtually call 
me a counsellor to my carers.  
Especially carers do [talk with him about their problems]. I think what 
they do. What they did was use me as a release. You know, they’ve 
got something eating at them – you know they’ve got it on their chest 
and it’s just a release to talk to someone and let go. 
Friends also used informants more in this sense of ‘personal counsellor’.  
Sometimes I feel like a psychologist. Maybe that sounds crazy. But 
the stuff that has been discussed at this table, you cannot imagine. I 
have friends that raise things you wouldn’t believe. But it is 
interesting. They think L. has experienced so much already, he will 
have some wise counsel. 
5.9.6 Conscious relationship building 
Enriching relationships did not appear to happen in any automatic process 
following injury and disability. There is a theme of conscious efforts to achieve 
relationships with others, and informants used various strategies to this end. These 
efforts were made for inherent benefits of informants’ wellbeing as well as for 
feelings of security but at times in contexts where they felt that they needed to 
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maximise the quality of care that they received. The Dutch were most emphatic 
about the use of direct, open communication. Leaders confirmed the importance of 
relationships.  
Informants set out consciously to build good relationships with others, 
including at times in medical settings. In the first instance this was seen to be a 
matter of necessity in ensuring good care. This was perceived to be in their own 
interest besides the inherent benefit derived from a good relationship. A practical 
Dutchman for example described the reaching out he does whenever he enters 
hospital in order to maximise his wellbeing there. 
And I see sometimes how they relate to you. In hospital you are but a 
number. At least to start off with. Then I take care that they start to 
like me, so that they go that extra mile, that they know you. And that I 
know them. I ask them: how many children do you have, where do 
you come from, you are looking nice today. That’s how you ensure 
that people get to know you and you them, so that they take that extra 
bit of care. So you know, whatever decision they make, it is in your 
interest. Is he allowed to go home? Is he not allowed to go home? 
I’ve learnt the importance of keeping everyone as a friend. You never 
know what you need it for. I’m not sucking up to people or something 
but I think it’s important to have good relationships with everyone 
with whom I am in contact – who I am working with. I know for sure 
that if you are nice to them, that you get treated better than if you 
were not. 
Another informant who had realised his vulnerability before returning home 
from rehabilitation, reached out by inviting local ‘huis artsen’ (general practitioners) 
to his home when he first returned from rehabilitation. He then explained his 
condition to them and set out what he might need from them in future, laying the 
basis for a professional and personal relationship that might safeguard his physical 
safety and wellbeing.  
Informants used a variety of ways to enhance their relationships. These 
included breaking the ice with strangers and the use of humour to cope with difficult 
situations. Some said that they used humour between them and their partners when 
the circumstances were particularly frustrating. It was also used to deflect others’ 
embarrassment about disability. 
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Luckily I have a personality where I break the ice a little, just with a 
joke, so that they feel at ease a bit quicker. I don’t mind really to give 
people who feel unsure about this [disability] to give some 
instructions how I best like things to be done, and for them of course 
that makes it a quite lot easier. 
Another informant for example broke the ice in a typically Australian way by 
organising an annual barbecue in his garden so neighbours could get to know him. 
Reaching out to help and understand others, having a diverse social network, 
being involved in wheelchair sport and doing volunteer and paid work all facilitated 
relationships. Unique to the Dutch sample was the use of direct, open communication 
to get things done.  
Be clear, be open, be honest. Those are the three things. And you can 
apply them anywhere. Because when something goes wrong another 
will then show understanding. 
You have to be super clear on what you want and what you don’t 
want. If you don’t they’ll all take advantage of you. 
Among those informants who saw death as preferable to their life with 
disability, one was very “conscious of his appearance” and dressed neatly so that 
“people notice me more than the wheelchair”. He did not describe any other social 
strategies towards his inclusion. Of the others, one has a belief that human nature is 
predominantly bad, leading him to observe people, to not trust them and to not get 
involved. Another had lost all faith in human relationships: 
The manner in which we relate to each other, that is the biggest reason 
to keep thinking about euthanasia, about how do we live together. I 
always say that humans have become my biggest disappointment. 
But for most informants the dominant theme was one of a need for 
relationships for one’s own feelings of wellbeing and development.  
What is important to me is interacting with people because when I 
interact with people I’m coming to understand myself. 
You need to be able to bounce off people. Everybody does. And it’s 
only the people around you that you bounce of that provide that 
feedback to you. Then they assist you but not in a condescending 
fashion, but [they] are just as normal with you as they can be. 
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(Leaders) 
Australian leaders made more direct reference to and put more emphasis on 
the value of relationships than Dutch leaders did. They did not only see relationships 
as important to people with disabilities but some described them as part of a full life. 
No-one ever has a perfect life and I mean relationships are often part 
of the non-perfect part, but still, it’s the fabric of life. 
Dutch leaders tended to refer to issues such as the need for people with 
disabilities to work and be educated in the mainstream, as well as to the need for 
improved physical access and transport. They also referred to new developments in 
integration in education and individual funding for personal assistance to people with 
disabilities who lived in the community. Australians directly named relationships as 
important to people with disabilities. The Dutch did so indirectly because their 
technology of integration and individual funding was aimed at the inclusion of 
people with disabilities in community, which inevitably involves relationships.  
Government policies in both countries were less cognisant of the importance 
of facilitating relationships than on welfare or care.  
But for me it’s the interaction or the relationship issues that are 
important to me in that people with disabilities – some people have 
such limited opportunities to have relationships. I guess the issues that 
I’m more interested in are those relationship issues, other human 
rights issues that aren’t as sexy to look at … . So I tend to be more 
interested in those sorts of issues than housing, employment, more I 
guess traditional type issues. 
Australian government programs were not being built around a community 
vision but are designed around a welfare model: “the general community, whoever 
that is, often puts people with disabilities in a welfare context “. This was preventing 
the facilitation of people with disabilities’ inclusion in community. 
[T]he system of how people live in Australia is what is preventing me 
[from inclusion in community]. It could include relationships with the 
local community, it could include government programs and how 
they’re designed. I think they’ve been designed on keeping people 
with disabilities in a welfare model. 
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In the Netherlands lives of people with disabilities were seen as controlled by 
the medical profession and service providers, within a care model. 
5.9.7 Sense of meaning 
A sense of personal contribution arises from engagement in positive human 
relationships. But there is also a sense of a contribution to the wider community. This 
sense of contribution, in turn led to a sense of meaning in life for most informants. 
But meaning was a fragile concept and others should not assume meaning to be 
necessarily associated with life with disability. 
A sense of personal contribution and meaning arose from informants’ 
reciprocal and deep relationships. For instance an Australian woman with a high 
level of paralysis and dependency on others described her sense of purpose and 
meaning.  
When you try and search and see what is the purpose for all this, what 
is, why, how. What is my role in the world now. And then gradually 
as the years have unfolded …, it just becomes clearer to me every 
time, and then I pass it on to them [her carers]. And it becomes clearer 
to them. And then eventually they’ve grown enough and they move 
on. Now, after what I’ve been through, after exchanging of thoughts, 
after more and more experiences with people rather than just with 
money and me, I can be here for them and listen to them. 
This sense of contribution was not confined to the immediate private sphere. 
Informants saw the ways in which they lead their lives as a contribution to the wider 
community also. There were lessons to be learned from disability experiences. A 
Dutch informant for example, returned to the rehabilitation centre after some years in 
order to update his skills and experienced a culture shock between the very basic 
needs of some people there and the more trivial issues that occupied people at his 
work. 
Then I thought, if everyone could have a look for a week in a 
rehabilitation centre [to see] what life’s all about… whether you can 
move your own wheelchair. Whether you can comb your hair. 
He believed that there is a contribution to be made to others through such 
experiences. 
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Well, I think that I had this quadriplegia, I think that that has been, for 
me, and my surroundings, very meaningful. That sounds odd of 
course, but because of that you experience things, that you know what 
it’s about in life. I can get quite upset when people get angry for 
trivial reasons.  
People at work were unsure about him at first but had later confirmed to him 
a contribution to their thinking through his presence. His co-workers said things like: 
Wow, so much is possible. I have started to look at things differently. 
And I think that that’s important that people [with disabilities] are out 
in public. And that people see what is possible. 
Yet, as a contrasting theme, meaning in life with disability was rejected when 
disability was inappropriately glorified by others assuming it to be there. Meaning 
was seen as something ephemeral and personal. It was not something anyone else 
should a priori ascribe to anyone’s life with a disability.  
 [Y]ou should not see my disability as meaningful. I will do that 
myself, because I am the only one that can do that. I get quite pissed 
off when people [do this].  
I would not like to say that everything [has meaning]. There are 
people who say sometimes: well, it will be good for something, it has 
to be like this. Those are expressions that I don’t like very much, to be 
honest. I can, when I look back, say: well, it is not meaningless what 
happened to me. That is something else. 
Meaning is personal and sometimes only a glimpse of it can be had. There 
can also be a lot of “non-sense” in life: 
At most I can say that, through these experiences in my life, I 
discovered a small piece of meaning, or experienced it. And I want to 
be very careful with that, because I’ve experienced it sometimes … 
and sometimes I don’t. It is very fragile. It is something that you are 
given. I am always very cautious in describing it. 
For informants for whom life was not experienced as “good” and who 
preferred death, meaning seemed not to play a big part in their lives. There was more 
of a focus on their life prior to their disability.  
[It] doesn’t mean I’m depressed or anything like that. It’s just you 
know, I’ve given it a go, I’ve had my good times. 
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5.9.8 Loss of dignity and regaining it 
The theme “Loss of dignity and regaining it” shows that the perception of 
dignity is very much associated with the kind of attitudes others expressed towards 
the informants. It was also connected with some blunting of a perception of lost 
dignity with the passage of time. Dignity was affected immediately after the onset of 
the informants’ quadriplegia as well as during hospitalisation. Loss of dignity in 
accepting their “new” body’s need for intimate care became much less of an issue 
later through their positive experiences with carers whom they knew and who gave 
effective assistance. The passage of time also eroded some feelings of indignity. A 
few informants maintained a high level of unease with incontinence, which affected 
their perception of their dignity. Negative attitudes from others that caused loss of 
dignity particularly occurred in care settings.  
Informants’ dignity was particularly affronted in the time immediately after 
the onset of disability when strangers had to minister to normally private tasks like 
their toileting, showering and dressing. Over time most informants no longer saw this 
type of assistance as a loss of their dignity. This was because of their familiarity with 
helpers, good quality assistance, which helped in minimising incontinence problems. 
Time had eroded much of their sense of embarrassment. 
Well, I used to get embarrassed when I had my accident and I still get 
embarrassed at certain points, especially when we’re training a new 
carer because you never know how they’re going to react. On the 
whole, with the old carers there’s no problems at all. … [B]ut I still 
get embarrassed if I wet myself or if I mess myself. I haven’t done 
that for years because the carers do their job properly. 
I have had it now for seven years, and in the beginning you have to 
get used to it, but luckily I am rather cool in such things. Yes, it has to 
be done, I can leave it too but then I will come to die from that so, that 
makes it easy, I did not want that. Generally that goes well. It does not 
frustrate me to the extent that I would not want to live because of that. 
I urinate and get help to empty my bowels well. And sometimes that 
means problems, but after it’s over, there’s a new day and the sun 
shines. And the birds sing again. I have a lot of those things from 
which I get motivation to live. I do not, at least not till now, let that 
get obscured by bowel or bladder problems. 
Even when carers were not well known, informants became less worried 
about accepting intimate care over time. This took longer for some than for others 
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but most had gained a level of acceptance of their need for intimate care by the time 
they were discharged from rehabilitation, a period between ten months and two 
years. 
Well, to start with you think, pheww. But you know what it is? 
You’ve had so many people at your body. Then you just think, well 
why not, just let them. In the beginning you have this [attitude] like 
strange girls and intimate issues, how do you say it? Privacy. … you 
constantly get someone else. You just have to not worry about that, so 
to speak. 
How could you put it? Is it loss of self-esteem or development of self-
esteem? The point where you’re naked so often in front of people, it 
doesn’t matter any more. I mean, for years I wouldn’t have X 
[community care agency] come in, but now it’s, you know, I don’t 
have a problem. If someone new fronts up, OK, that’s what you’ve 
gotta do – bam, bam, bam, bam. I could never do that before. I’d 
break a leg before I’d let someone into my bathroom. So it is, it’s 
desensitising. 
A few informants still felt their incontinence as a major problem and as 
something that was degrading. They were among those who reported bad or very 
difficult lives. For example, a Dutch informant always worried about incontinence 
problems and resented paternalistic attitudes towards her from some of her assistants. 
I feel devalued by it. I think it is inhumane. It is. I now got my 
assistants not call out any more: ‘do you need a nappy?’ Those things, 
they drove me crazy. Then I thought: well, well, well. I said: babies 
wear nappies here. I find it very annoying and feel very unhappy with 
this. I am always thinking: oh dear, it’s not going wrong or is it going 
O.K.? My catheter, is it sitting right … . Misery, misery. Then it goes 
well for a time, and it gets better. But, always watchful, always 
checking. 
 Informants had experience of lost dignity in relation to care issues in the 
early hospitalisation days. Dignity could be preserved or regained by attentive, 
respectful care.  
I think the only time I lost my dignity and felt sort of confronted by it 
was when you get pushed on to the commode chair and go to the 
communal showers and toilets. That’s a bit of a hard… when you’re 
sitting on a loo and someone says, come on hurry up … there’s a real 
dignity issue there yeah and for the first week its terribly confronting. 
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Institutional staff attitudes could also destroy a person’s dignity. A man who 
lived in a residential care facility for some time had his dignity assaulted by staff 
attitudes and service routines. 
Q: Did you feel that you were being treated as a human being in 
(institution)? A: No, no, I was a resident. Q: And that’s not the same 
as a human being? A: No, no because to treat a person as a human 
being is to treat them with dignity. They didn’t have any … I mean 
one thing I hated was bowel treatment day because if you didn’t do it 
… well they’d give you your bombs as they call them, suppositories, 
at four o’clock in the morning, whether you was [sic] ready or not. 
And if you went in the bed, so you went in the bed … well how 
undignified can you get. I haven’t done that once here because I have 
well, a different type of living. And in fact it was better for them 
because if I did it in the bed it meant that I didn’t have to go on the 
toilet. They could put me straight in the shower and shower me. 
In essence dignity arose from interactions with others, from the nature of the 
informants’ relationships. For one informant this included his relationship with God, 
with health and material comforts playing minor roles.  
For me, life has worth, in the first place, because I know that it has 
been given by God. That determines the value. The second thing that 
determines the dignity of life for me is the relationship that I have 
with other people. That determines the dignity of my life. Number 
three, then perhaps your health. That is also important. Of course I’d 
rather be fully healthy than sit in a wheelchair. I don’t want to be 
unclear about that. But that’s not last. Number four is, you could think 
about material goods.  
5.9.9 Loss of independence, gaining a sense of interdependence 
Informants initially experienced their dependency as bad. Dependency arose 
from the nature of their disability. It was affected by physical and social 
environments and by having to continually ask for many things. Over time, through 
reaching out to others, long-term relationships developed which helped in 
outgrowing their most negative experiences of dependency. Dependency could then 
sometimes be perceived as interdependence, a fact of life to be lived with. Negative 
feelings about dependency never disappeared altogether but the great majority of 
informants had learned to live with this. A feeling of independence arose from 
receiving adequate assistance in order to engage in daily activities, within a good 
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relational context. Interdependence was understood as the reality of their lives, a 
framework in which dependence and independence blur. Interdependence was also 
described as being the nature of the world for any human being, disabled or not. A 
small minority did not feel anything much positive about their dependency and had 
not experienced a reduction in their feelings about this issue over time. 
Both Dutch and Australian informants saw dependence as the most noticeable 
and worst change in their lives after the injury that caused their quadriplegia.  
The worst thing is just that dependence on people. I don’t have to 
think about that one.  
The biggest difference is the dependency. While before that time you 
were absolutely not dependent, now you are with so many things. You 
don’t want it but it is so. The biggest difference is, I think its very 
logical, things you really cannot do. To just go on holidays, 
everything is a problem.  
It was frustrating, and problematic to some, to have to rely on others for help 
with many tasks and to have to ask for many things and to have lost a degree of 
spontaneity in one’s life because of this. In the familiar, more accessible home 
environment dependence was experienced as less of a problem than in the wider 
environment. Yet many informants felt quite independent, despite significant 
physical limitations. 
At home I am quite independent. I cannot just go anywhere. I cannot 
go to the toilet just anywhere. My freedom has been reigned in 
because of the spinal injury. That bothers me a lot. 
Well to me it’s as big a circle as you want to draw. It depends on how 
wide you want to make it. If you want a little closed circle, then 
you’re independent but if you’re more adventurous and you want to 
go out and do things like go camping, … then you become a little bit 
more dependent on somebody. 
All negative feelings of dependence had not disappeared but most informants 
had learned to live with it to a point where it was mostly no more than a nuisance or 
seen as “a fact of life” and “just having to get on with it”. Help from others with 
some tasks was mostly seen as an act of enablement to a level of independence, not 
as an affront, including for those informants with the most physically restrictive 
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impairments. Help became “a social occasion”. The relationship between carer and 
themselves could thus dissolve feelings of dependency. 
It’s a fact of life. I mean, I am dependent on my carers to get me up in 
the morning so that I can become independent – put my spoon on so 
that I can feed myself, so that I can get to my water and tea and stuff – 
but I cannot prepare a meal, but they can do that and we can sit down 
together and have breakfast together like a normal family would do. 
Sure, it’s not a family situation, but it’s still a family to me. 
There is a Dutch saying: ‘when in trouble you learn who your friends 
are’. That came true. And I did not lose any friends. Those who were 
have become closer friends. Look, it’s easy and nice to have a few 
drinks in a bar with people. And then to say at 2 am: O.K. guys see 
you later. But those who go on holidays with you, put you in the 
shower all week and give you suppositories and manually remove 
your faeces when things won’t work well – those are different friends 
than those you see in a bar sometimes. For me that is very valuable. 
So there good things and frustrating ones attached to that dependency 
at the same time. Yes, that dependency gives a very deep relationship 
with people around you. At the same time it is also fantastic to be able 
to be independent. 
This state of acceptance of one’s dependency occurred within a context of an 
accepted need for assistance, which was seen as necessary to give informants a 
degree of independent functioning, that is to enable them to a degree of 
independence. This applied in many situations, such as help to get behind the wheel 
of a car, having an eating utensil put in a splint, getting up and ready in the morning 
to get to work, study or other pursuits.  
As presented above, informants often reached out to carers and others. This 
enabled the kind of long-term relationships where feelings of dependence were 
reduced because of the reciprocity in giving and taking. Knowing each other as 
persons and not being made to feel a burden reduced feelings of dependency. 
We can do a lot to make something of it. It does limit you and you 
don’t easily become a millionaire of course. But you can be nice to 
people. You cannot for instance afford to hire someone to build you a 
ramp. But if you are just nice to your neighbour, he will build you 
one. 
The carers that I have generally stay because you know, I treat them 
well. It’s a mutual arrangement and I try to get sort of people that like 
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this sort of work. And, you know, caring carers that are obviously not 
just in it for the money but also for the satisfaction of doing it. 
This reaching out required an ongoing effort. Sometimes informants could 
only “just manage to keep up a smile for half an hour” with some paid carers and 
others said how they “worked hard” at keeping their relationships good. They also 
made an effort in selecting the ‘right’ carers in the first place, where they could. 
Most of my friends and acquaintances can assist me. When you are 
dependent on other people I think that it is important that you yourself 
are an agreeable person in being helped. It is then that you notice that 
people meet you quite willingly. Then everything goes a bit easier.  
I run an ad in the local paper …, for myself because I want to put the 
ad in the way I want to word it and that way I can interview them and 
see – I don’t want to go through a filtering agent like them to decide 
who I’m going to have, because they don’t know what sort of people I 
like. 
A few informants did not accept their state of dependence at all. Again they 
were those who reported a preference to death rather than to live with quadriplegia. It 
could interfere with “feeling like a real man” and asking others continually for help 
made them feel continually dependent. 
[W]hen I sit behind my computer I am independent, at least that’s 
what it feels like as if I am not dependent. But as soon as I am no 
longer behind the computer I feel terribly dependent. I cannot get 
away from that. 
These differences in feeling about dependence and independence were not 
directly linked to the informants’ level of physical impairment. Some with the 
highest degree of paralysis were among those least bothered with dependency, felt 
independent and could see a broader pattern of interdependency for all people. Some 
of those with a lower level of spinal cord injury, and thus a higher level of physical 
functioning, were among those feeling most affected by feelings of dependency. Nor 
did length of time of having lived with quadriplegia seem a factor. Those who 
reported a ‘bad’ life and wanted to be dead had experienced quadriplegia between 13 
and 16 years at the time of interview. On the other hand those who reported very 
‘good’ lives had acquired quadriplegia less than 10 years ago. For the bad life sub-
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group their “feeling” of “anger and frustration in just not being able to do what I used 
to be able to do” appeared to dominate their thinking.  
Q: And is that anger and frustration with you all the time or only 
occasionally? A: Basically all the time, yeah. You know if I’m at 
home I can’t just automatically get up and go turn the TV over or turn 
the TV off and put a tape on. Or if I’m out somewhere I can’t just get 
up and walk over to somebody, you know especially if the terrain’s a 
bit unstable. You know, you’re always relying on somebody I suppose 
that’s what I’m trying to say. 
 For them dependency continued to be keenly felt: “I am daily worried about 
being dependent on others, always having to ask”. And they saw no way to change 
that. One informant “could not stand” still feeling uncomfortable with dependence on 
carers for intimate tasks: “I don’t enjoy having to have things done for me. I was 
always independent so I don’t like having to have someone come in …”. If they 
could change anything at all it would be the return to a fully functioning body. 
Another of those with a bad life thought that others still could relate to him as a 
person but how he saw himself changed the nature of his relationships.  
 I don’t think the wheelchair has really changed anything, only my 
conception of me in the wheelchair. (…). I know how I feel, and as I 
said, no amount of money would change that in my personal 
circumstances. 
Many informants implied an interdependence between their social 
environment and themselves. For example, interdependence could be explained as “a 
fact of life” where “one hand has to wash the other” [a common Dutch saying], 
applicable to all people with quadriplegia as well as in general. Independence, 
dependence and interdependence were interwoven concepts in the lives of most 
informants. 
It has to do with the one hand washes the other. That’s how it is in 
life. Even if you do not have a disability, you always need other 
people – sooner or later. And people who do not think so, they really 
get into trouble if it does happen at some point [become disabled]. 
Really I believe that you always need somebody. My motto is: It’s not 
who you are but who you know. 
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But it was a small subsection of some three informants who reported their 
lives as very good, or even better, than before their disability who were explicit in 
asserting interdependence as part of the human condition. 
Interdependency is one of the basic concepts of humanity. It’s the 
ability to share, grow, assist and love other people. What greater joy 
do we have? It depends upon that important ingredient independence 
… having the necessary skills, choices and attitudes in order to be 
able to work with and assist others. 
Q: So in all of that, do you feel dependent or independent or in-
between, or how do you feel? A: No, isn’t the new word intra, intra-
dependence is the new terminology, intra-dependence. Yeah I see 
myself as a very independent person because I mean I’ve got that 
ability, had that opportunity, had very much that opportunity to be 
able to contribute to society, to be able to give back just as much or 
even more than I’m actually receiving. So yeah, that’s what part of 
being independent is. 
(Leaders) 
Leaders in both countries agreed that dependency is “a fact of life” and could 
be overcome by seeing it in a universal light. A Dutch leader with disability for 
example agreed. 
In the view of many people dependency is about the worst thing that 
can happen to you. And I think that that is true. Until you can balance 
that. There has to be an exchange. I am dependent on the greengrocer, 
my wife too [who does not have a disability]. Dependency in itself is 
not so bad, as long as it is not only that. I know people without arm or 
leg function, who can only nod their heads, upon whom I am at times 
dependent [for their advice]. I think that everyone is dependent on 
everybody else. It is just that nobody thinks that this is so anymore. 
Independence was seen as about developing people’s potential, with care 
being a normal part of that, not as extraordinary. They also held that dependence is 
caused by the disability itself, by society and by one’s own attitudes. 
Interdependence was raised as “the real issue” rather than looking at dependence and 
independence as a mutually exclusive construct. Some people would never be 
independent and would be left out of community if they had to earn their way in 
through first gaining independence. As an Australian leader who did not have a 
disability said: 
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I think it’s more, how do we look at things like interdependence, that 
are the bigger issue. Because it doesn’t matter how dependent or 
independent you are if you have people around you and you are part 
of what’s happening and contributing to that then whether you can do 
it on your own isn’t the issue. We don’t talk about children as not 
being part of our community and yet they are not as independent as 
adults. It’s the same issue with people with disabilities, that it’s not an 
issue of independence. It’s although, the way that we currently deal 
with that means that it is almost on a continuum, that people have to 
earn their way back to community by becoming more independent. 
Some people will never become independent – that’s not the issue. 
And her Dutch counterparts saw it similarly. For them the attitude of the 
person with disability also played a role. People with disabilities must also take 
responsibility themselves. Asking is difficult and must be learnt. In reaching out to 
others relationships would form and dependency would be less felt. 
If people are able to not be swallowed up by their dependency, then 
usually relationships are formed between people. If at a certain point 
you have the feeling that you don’t have the control over your own 
life anymore then you can go the other way. Then you are in fact a 
kind of a zombie in the hands of the one that has to help you. And I 
think myself that people with a disability … they have to literally 
learn that they can also pour a cup of coffee. Within people with 
disabilities themselves change has to occur too. 
On one hand it has to do with society itself, how society views people 
with disabilities, because that makes the disability. … But it’s also in 
your head. 
And dependency was seen as universally applicable, not only to people with 
disabilities: 
You can become chronically ill, you can get old and frail. All sorts of 
things. But one normally thinks only in very short terms. People do 
not look at the future nor do they look at the past. Everything is 
focussed on now. 
5.10 Value change and personal growth  
Most grassroots informants told of a positive change that had occurred in how 
they relate to others, compared to before they acquired quadriplegia. Through their 
disability experience they had developed qualities such as a listening ear, greater 
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assertiveness, patience, direct and open communication, acceptance of life’s 
unpredictability, equanimity, kindness and tolerance. Their experiences and their 
inner growth towards such qualities helped others grow and mature too. They 
themselves perceived this as personal growth, which enabled them to see the world 
and themselves in a different light. Yet, in important ways, they emphasised too that 
they were the same person as before their accident. They were aware of a 
contribution they were making to themselves and others through their inner change. 
Those who were among those at either end of a scale of good life, that is very bad or 
very good, appeared to experience a less perceptible change in values or the kind of 
growth that other informants described. 
In some sense people were the same they were prior to their accidents.  
I guess in some ways, deep down it doesn’t change your nature. I 
mean if you’re a dickhead before you’re still a dickhead afterwards. 
[M]y thinking has not changed. If I could walk now, I would do 
exactly the same things like I did then. (…). My way of life has 
changed, I think because of the restrictions. 
5.10.1 Being more social 
Whereas in some sense informants felt no inner change as to who they were, 
many informants had experienced a personal change within themselves since having 
quadriplegia. Those who were previously impatient or easily angered, or were more 
materially oriented, felt they were less so now. They had undergone a personal value 
change and thought that they had inwardly grown into more sensitive and social 
persons. 
Because I used to be a rather impatient type, and that’s going a lot 
better. For instance, if you have ever sat on the toilet for two hours … 
counting tiles and discovering patterns and trying to think of a 
mathematical formula about some patterns. Then you learn. You 
exercise patience. 
I have become more agreeable (“liever”). I have changed, become 
more of a social person. I used to be rather a-social, if I look back. I 
have to laugh about it now but I mean, I needed no-one then. And 
perhaps that is a healthy way to be but when I arrived in the 
rehabilitation centre I experienced great difficulties in working with 
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people that I needed. Before, that did not play a role – you had your 
own life. And I guess that is healthy but this is healthier. 
People had commented on the change in an informant, who had had a rough 
upbringing and who went into the army at 15 in the UK. He now had heart-to-hearts 
with his carers about their issues. 
Before my accident, well people didn’t trouble me with their problems 
anyway, but even if they did I would have most likely turned around – 
I would have probably turned around and said: well look, I’ve got 
enough problems of my own. I don’t need yours on top of mine. 
And such inner ‘growth’ was not confined to the person with quadriplegia 
only. It touched those around them too. 
Quadriplegia influences those around you in any case. You don’t have 
quadriplegia all by yourself. Life for your family, but also for your 
friends is never the same again. 
Another informant who said that she used to be bombastic, critical and not 
giving much time to people she considered “weak”, claimed that she is now more 
patient and tolerant and developed into a listener for her carers. That change was not 
limited to herself but affected those around her too. And her disability experience 
was the catalyst. Most others felt similarly. 
How can I explain how I feel this way? I just feel it. (…). I think 
before I was not a person who relied on anybody. I was always the 
one going around to my parents, doing her garden, going to my 
sister’s, lecturing her, taking her children, giving her a break. So I was 
always the big-mouth-up-front person and all of a sudden, and for X 
[husband], all of a sudden the roles had reversed and he had a lot of 
learning to do within himself and yet when I look now at the man I 
have, my bombastic attitude never really allowed him to show what 
he was made of. … a quiet achieving person – there’s been a person 
under there that I never knew I had – the depth of the person. 
I have started to live more consciously. (…). I gained an awful lot of 
knowledge about how people are, after my disability. [I] can generate 
more understanding for more things. (…) you realise more about other 
peoples’ suffering. I will not easily say to someone, you are 
whingeing. 
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The longer I seem to be in the chair, the more patience I seem to have 
and more tolerance. So, for me, although I’ve lost certain ability, I’ve 
gained other ability. 
This last quote is from an informant who said that before his accident he 
would never want to talk like this before his accident  
Now I do just listen to it. I just learnt that in those two years [of 
rehabilitation]. 
5.10.2 Living in the moment: letting go of control 
The difficulties of living with quadriplegia, including frequent health 
treatment for some, were in part bridged by informants’ personal change in attitude 
towards living a day at a time or living in the moment. There was a letting go of 
control of all situations. Paradoxically life became more enjoyable because there was 
an acceptance of the fact that life was uncertain and unpredictable. This kind of 
growth may in part account for the paradox of knowing themselves to be vulnerable 
but not feeling it. The enjoyment is in the interactions with others in the moment 
without worrying about what might come next: 
Q: So it is a very different life for you? A: Yes but not less of a life. 
Certainly not. In spite of all the troubles I do have an enjoyable life. I 
do have to go to the hospital regularly. Every time again that’s like: 
you experience something. You meet some more people. I enjoy now. 
I do not enjoy tomorrow – no, I enjoy now. 
And sometimes you’ve got to let the dust roll, so to speak. You know 
you’ve set something in place and you think oh I should have done 
this or I should have done that, but you’ve just got to let it roll. Q: 
Can’t control everything? A: Well, I’ve tried to interfere with it and 
all you do is end up creating more work than you really need for 
yourself. The result turns out to be the same and if it doesn’t well 
sometimes then you just deal with the end result and apologise or stuff 
it up or if it works out fine then think you know that’s good. 
For some who worked, work was approached in a different style, reflecting 
some prioritising of life’s goods, as well as balancing physical demands with work. 
Work was integrated more into a way of life than being the means to an end. An 
Australian participant worked part-time, making sure he spent time driving past the 
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harbour and seeing the sights on his way to and from work, or to stop off for a coffee 
on a terrace. And a Dutchman did the same in his climate. 
I used to be a career man and now I don’t really care. When I need 
some money I just build some more websites, or I draw some building 
designs. I don’t care about the rest of it. When it is good weather and I 
hear the birds sing I take the car and go. And I enjoy that. I used to not 
have time for anything. I like birds, I love storm. When there is a 
storm X. is by the water, then he goes to the Afsluitdijk [a long dyke 
connecting the northernmost provinces] with his car and lets the wind 
blow through. I love that. I never did that before. I could not. I had no 
time. 
5.10.3 Greater assertiveness 
Becoming more of a social person included, for some, the experience of 
becoming more assertive, straightforward or direct in dealing with others, where 
they were not before. For instance, an Australian woman, divorced after her accident 
because she says her husband could not deal with it, became a stronger person.  
[I was not] not dominated by my ex but I just went along with 
whatever he wanted … I just fitted into his mould and I think [that] 
once I had quadriplegia I had no choice. I had to either, you know … 
[sink or swim], and it’s funny because I’ve grown 100per cent to what 
he is. He’s still the same. He hasn’t changed at all. I’m a lot stronger 
person I think. And I’m more forthright I suppose and I think I don’t 
let people walk all over me like I did before. If I’ve got something to 
say I’ll say it. I am not rude or anything don’t think but if I feel I’m in 
the right I’ll say well, hey! 
A Dutch male said he had learned to deal with situations rather than leave 
them, while being accepting of other circumstances that he could not change. 
[Y]ou start to think more simple and logical. That is a way of life. 
More often you find a simple solution. (…). I think I have changed, I 
have become harder, a bit more straightforward, don't quickly get so 
emotional…. Because emotionally you've grown stronger. (…). [M]y 
thinking did change with the spinal injury. You have to be more 
practical. And you have to accept things more easily. Before my 
accident I was like: if I don't like it I will just go away. 
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5.10.4 Value change and perception of wellbeing 
Whereas no-one reported a personal change for the worse, a small proportion 
of informants said that they had not changed, or had changed in a very minor way 
only. These included all those who expressed the very worst and all those who 
expressed the very best of satisfaction with their present lives. Informants at either 
end of this life satisfaction scale said that they had similar attitudes to life, and 
towards others, before and after having quadriplegia. The majority of informants who 
reported a difficult and good life said they had changed a lot. 
A few informants reported lives where, although at least some of their 
relationships were good, they seemed to be more in receipt of them than being 
involved in them on a reciprocal basis. They focussed on their physical body and 
wished for its return to how it once was. Not reaching out and an inability to trust 
others seemed to stop them from valuing and developing their relationships. They 
reported no personal change or growth. 
… I think a lot of people have got the potential to be quite nasty. Q: 
So you haven’t changed in that respect? A: No, no and I’ve actually 
been proven right because I had a lot of acquaintances but one close 
friend and don’t see anybody now. I’ve been in a chair for just over 12 
or 13 years and I don’t know one single person from my past now 
except for my best mate who, I actually said to him, look if you don’t 
feel like visiting don’t do it just because you haven’t seen me for a 
while – I don’t want you to come round …. We don’t have much in 
common any more and that’s unfortunate. 
At the other end of the scale were those who said that they always were 
sociable and thinking of others and who described a very satisfactory quality of life. 
Some claimed to have even better lives now than before their injury. An Australian 
male, with a pre-injury physical labouring job and who was once a rock climber, 
described the change to having a disability as very traumatic but views the world as 
positive. 
Q: …[T]hinking of other people in that way, is that something you 
used to do before your accident or not? A: Oh yeah, I guess so. I mean 
an accident doesn’t really change a person in what they are… I mean 
maybe it’s a gradual change. Time itself changes people. I guess I was 
a fairly considerate person always. I’ve always enjoyed people. I 
mean I’ve always enjoyed the company of people and communicating 
and working with them. Never done too well on my own. As I said 
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before it’s [life post injury] better. It just gives you the opportunity to 
explore a whole new realm. Also, certainly extreme frustration and 
annoyance and that but it’s still very much a wonderful life. I don’t 
think there’s anything I’d change, no definitely not. No, I can’t think 
of anything right now. 
(Leaders) 
Reflecting some of the grassroots’ experience, and drawing on their personal 
experience, some leaders voiced a belief that a certain wisdom could be acquired 
through disability which was of benefit to society.  
 I see how I have been able to help people from my own experience 
and knowledge, of which I am very often not conscious myself, but 
[know] through what people tell you afterwards.  
It is possible that people will discover that particularly people with a 
disability have gained a certain wisdom that society needs. (…) … 
that you cannot create human beings; that people have to learn to live 
with the unknown; with the fact that any moment of the day anything 
can happen, whereby life is changed completely.  
Like for grassroots informants, change and growth had also occurred in the 
personal lives of leaders with disability. It is relevant to report it here as it seemed to 
be confirmation of this theme, especially so as these leaders had different disabilities 
to the grassroots sample.  
Once you’ve found your identity as a disabled or ill woman then it 
often shows that you experience a meaningful life within your 
restrictions. Your indicators of a good life change. 
In the last few years I have gained talents that I did not suspect in 
myself and thanks to all this I’ve gained them. 
The two non-disabled leaders also believed in the possibility of an inherent 
social contribution arising from the disability experience and an ‘enrichment’ arising 
from dealing with loss.  
Through our work we make a real contribution to society. A society 
where disability would be considered something that should not be 
encouraged, that should not happen, is a society in which I would not 
want to live. Really not. I even think that I could say it is one in which 
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I would not be able to live…. Because in my own personality there 
are at least 87 characteristics that could also be eliminated 
I believe that both the people who are experiencing or preparing for a 
loss can grow enormously as can the individual who is supporting 
those individuals. Such experiences expose us to a whole range of 
emotions and feelings that individuals need to explore in terms of 
their own value systems and this can be quite an enriching process for 
all involved. The very nature of helping and accepting support at these 
times can be a very positive experience that derives from a closeness 
and intimacy of working through difficulties associated with the loss.  
5.11 Summary 
In summary, grassroots informants experienced a heightened level of 
vulnerability arising from their disability-related health problems, others’ attitudes, 
and inadequate treatment and care. They described a socially declining society in 
which it appeared their vulnerability would grow while leaders of disability 
movements described their organisations a disinterested or unable to speak out on 
controversial bio-ethical issues, including EPAS. Nevertheless, most informants felt 
invulnerable. Partly because they had already been through difficult circumstances, 
and partly because they believed in society’s commitment to improving 
circumstances for people with disabilities. They did not think that this declining 
society, or a rising availability of EPAS, would be problematic because of their faith 
in strict safeguards. Although they did not name it autonomy, they accepted, for 
them, independence as a state that often depended on the assistance of others. This 
independence lessened negative feelings of dependency on others. They had been 
able to re-frame their initially keenly felt loss of independence and dignity through 
rich relationships with others. Initially they sought such relationships to safeguard 
their vulnerable situation. After some time these relationships, despite their difficult 
circumstances, grew to be the source of their feelings of wellbeing. A small subset of 
informants had contrary experiences. They continued to suffer from loss of 
independence and dependence on others. Their relationships were not rewarding like 
those of the main sample and they experienced their lives as unsatisfactory. Whereas 
the reciprocity involved in the relationships described by most informants implied 
interdependence between people, some in a small subset of those who had the best 
experience of their life with disability, identified interdependence as a fact of life. 
 225
Most informants described strong personal value changes in comparison between 
their pre- and post disability lives from being more self-interested then to being more 
social now. The small subsets of informants who experienced their lives with 
disability as unrewarding or as very rewarding reported little such change, the first 
continuing a predominantly individualistic view of life and the second a more social 
view.  
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 CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION  
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the findings of this study are interpreted and compared in the 
light of the conceptual framework and the wider literature. The discussion is 
structured around my responses to the study’s four research questions. I argue that 
the main sample of grassroots informants predominantly used two different and 
opposing value frameworks in relation to the first two research questions. In relation 
to the first question, which enquires into their views on EPAS, they mostly used the 
socially dominant framework of individual autonomy, with its attendant rights to 
choose EPAS. Leaders in both countries applied a more relational concept of 
individual autonomy. However, in reference to the second research question, when 
grassroots informants discussed their disability experiences in relation to 
vulnerability, dependence, and independence they used an interdependence 
framework. The findings show that the latter value system was involved in most 
informants’ successful outgrowing of significant threats to their safety and wellbeing. 
These threats included losses of relationships, dignity, meaning and independence 
through multiple causes, such as from their physical impairment, inadequate health 
care, attitudes from others and wider societal trends. Informants described similar 
kinds of threats in terms of unbearable suffering, including loss of dignity, as 
sufficient reasons to allow EPAS for others. In addressing the third research question 
I discuss how these two responses may relate to each other. I then look at the fourth 
research question, which enquires about the cross-national significance of the study’s 
finding and proceed to my conclusions, including possible further research. 
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6.2 Research question 1 
What is the knowledge, including the beliefs and assumptions, of Dutch and 
Australian people with quadriplegia and leaders in Dutch and Australian 
disability movements, on issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide?  
Five main themes were found in analysing the data in response to this 
question: Conceptualising euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; the primacy of 
rules as safeguards; death and dying as a distant experience; suffering and EPAS; and 
rights, choice and compassion. There are twenty-one sub-themes within these five 
main themes. 
Conceptualising EPAS: Both Dutch and Australian informants, grassroots and 
leaders, showed some uncertainty about defining euthanasia or physician-assisted 
suicide. They used euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide interchangeably and did 
not make great distinctions between the two. Withdrawal and withholding of 
treatment (WOT) was often seen as the same thing as EPAS. They were essentially 
perceived as the same because they all had the same outcome, that is death. The 
different processes underlying these various life-ending procedures, including any 
differences between a medical doctor’s intention to actively kill the patient or to 
decide to stop futile treatment (Somerville, 1993) were not clearly understood by 
them. One significant effect of the blurred lines between these life-ending procedures 
is that in this view EPAS can be merely seen as a relatively innocuous extension of 
current medical practice, whereas the two life-ending practices are qualitatively 
different. This in turn may make it easier to adopt a positive mindset towards 
adoption of legalised EPAS practice. Dutch and American histories of public high-
profile cases involving WOT appears to illustrate this trend to a gradually more 
positive public attitude towards legalised EPAS. However, Australian support has 
grown without such history, maybe because of an influence of these prior 
developments elsewhere. Informants appeared to demonstrate a low awareness of 
clear meanings of EPAS. Many informants were unaware of the term physician-
assisted suicide; found it difficult to articulate the meaning of euthanasia; and their 
meanings of their perception of euthanasia and PAS were blurred. The support that 
most informants gave for allowing EPAS for others therefore must be viewed in this 
context of relative ignorance. In fact, several informants volunteered that they had 
little interest in the topic.  
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The basis for their information on EPAS is further qualified by the source of 
it. Several informants, including some of those who expressed little interest, gave 
examples for EPAS, for which the source was a recently watched television program, 
which used an extreme case. The literature suggests that this sort of unawareness of 
the meanings of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is not uncommon (Aranda 
and O’Connor, 1995; Emanuel, Barry, Stoeckle, Ettelson, & Emanuel, 1991; Meier, 
Emmons, Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison, & Cassell, 1998).  
Dutch informants mostly, but some Australians also, closely identified 
advance directives with their concepts of EPAS. Such advance directives are 
contractual advance expressions of one’s wishes, indicating under what 
circumstances one would wish to have EPAS. However only one (Dutch) informant 
had formulated their own and that turned out to be about the nature of medical 
treatment, not EPAS. The literature confirms this finding as part of a wider trend: 
studies have found positive public attitudes towards advance directives while few 
people complete them (Emanuel, Barry, Stoeckle, Ettelson & Emanuel, 1991; 
Kastenbaum, 2001). My informants had not made advance directives for themselves, 
firstly because they felt their lives to be worthwhile. They had not turned their minds 
to any future scenarios where they might want to influence the nature of their 
medical treatment or indicate the use of EPAS. Secondly, upon acquiring 
quadriplegia, they had personally positively re-appraised the circumstances under 
which they could live a fulfilling life and some had done so repeatedly following 
further health problems. This apparently led them to conclude that it is difficult to 
know in advance what conditions one might still want to live with, despite earlier 
beliefs to the contrary. Thirdly, they did not have sufficient trust that their directives 
would be carried out by the medical profession. Studies confirm that their distrust is 
grounded in evidence of such unreliability of the implementation of advance 
directives (Pool, 1996). So, whereas they had their reasons not to have advance 
directives themselves, they still framed EPAS for others in this context of a 
technology of advance directives. In the light of their reasons not to have an advance 
directive document for themselves, it is interesting that they offered no caution about 
the use of advance directives by others. To the contrary, one informant told of 
apparent family coercion to have a terminally ill man act on his advance directive to 
have EPAS, but this informant showed no discomfort about this. 
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The primacy of rules as safeguards: Most informants supported EPAS while 
also insisting it be well safeguarded from abuse. They primarily insisted that strict 
rules be in place and EPAS be legalised to this end. Some showed an awareness that 
safeguarding everyone from all abuse is not always possible but most showed 
considerable faith in the workability of legal safeguards. Besides protection from 
abuse of EPAS another reason for legalisation was protection of doctors from 
prosecution. This was seen as necessary. Australian informants in particular were 
convinced that illegal EPAS occurred frequently. Indeed studies do confirm the 
presence of illegal EPAS and other medical life-ending practices in Australia (Baume 
& O’Malley, 1994; Kuhse, Singer, Baume, Clark, & Rickard, 1997; Kuhse & Singer, 
1988, 1992; Magnusson, 2002; Stevens & Hassan, 1994). Dutch informants knew 
little about their country’s legally binding guidelines towards accountable practice of 
EPAS but most believed them to be operating well enough. Kennedy (2002) and 
Gomez (1991) have suggested that such unawareness of EPAS and how it operates is 
a wider trend among the Dutch. Informants who related their experiences of coerced 
EPAS; non-reporting of EPAS by doctors; or apparent EPAS of non-terminally ill 
people with quadriplegia, mostly expressed little or no discomfort about these. 
Informants still supported EPAS, in the knowledge of abuses of the strict safeguards 
they insisted upon. Abuses of Dutch rules such as reported by informants, including 
non-reporting of EPAS by doctors (Van der Maas, van Delden, & Pijnenborg, 1991; 
Van der Wal & van der Maas, 1996; van der Wal, van der Maas, Bosma, Onwuteaka-
Philipsen, Willems, Haverkate & Kostense, 1996) and a slippery slope towards use 
of EPAS for people whose suffering was psychological, or non-somatic rather than 
physical, have also been claimed in the literature. Any abuse of euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide of people with quadriplegia, for reason of the disability, 
has not. 
Doctors were seen by all informants who supported EPAS as needed in the 
operation and safeguarding of EPAS. Legal rules such as a demonstrated soundness 
of mind to make a decision about EPAS for oneself and assessment of the suffering 
underlying a request for EPAS require doctors to apply them. Informants also raised 
the need to involve family in the decision making involved in a request for EPAS. 
Although such involvement may in practice act as a safeguard, it was not often 
mentioned as a safeguard. Informants just liked to have their family involved in 
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decision making. Family involvement for purpose of care and support for the dying 
person was not raised. Dutch informants suggested that a safeguard might be to have 
open discussion about the decision to have EPAS in the context of bespreekbaarheid. 
Bespreekbaarheid is a Dutch phenomenon meaning open conversation of something 
that might be considered taboo, in this case, EPAS. One Dutch informant considered 
that opening frequent discussion of EPAS leads to normalising it towards a growing 
availability of it. Indeed, Kennedy (2002) in his study of the history of EPAS in the 
Netherlands, called ”A well-considered death” (“Een weloverwogen dood”), 
discussed this open conversation or bespreekbaarheid as a typically Dutch approach. 
A taboo subject, or proposal, is, in the spirit of open enquiry, put on the agenda. This 
action then influences its inevitable, eventual acceptance, the longer public 
discussion is conducted. Open discussion of EPAS then, in the Netherlands, appears 
to be less of a safeguard than a preparation for acceptance of (having) EPAS. 
Death and dying as a distant experience: Not many grassroots informants had 
had close experience with the dying of others with leaders having somewhat more 
experience. The literature confirms this finding as a wider social phenomenon (Aries, 
1974, 1981; Becker, 1973; Borysenko, 1994; Gorer, 1955; Kastenbaum, 2000; 
MacNamara, 2001). Most informants saw death as relatively meaningless and many 
expressed agnosticism about any continued existence after death. Perhaps informants 
reflected something of Becker’s (1973) construct of repressed death in contemporary 
Western society when they said that they perceived most people as scared of death 
and dying. They themselves were not fearful. Those who did explain their non-
fearfulness said that their experience with dying people had removed their fear or led 
them to live their life in an appreciative way. This difference between their private 
view of death and the public’s is reflected in literature, which shows a declining 
private fear of death the closer one is to the experience of it. (see Chochinov et al., 
1995; Emanuel, Fairclough & Emanuel, 2000; Koenig, Wildman-Hanlon, & 
Schmader, 1996). Whereas most of my informants had little experience with the 
dying of others, they had of course had much experience with the “dying” of life 
with a whole physical body and had gone through dealing with and overcoming 
many of the significant losses this brought. In some sense they had already 
experienced dying, and this experience may have contributed to their lack of 
expressed fear of death. This analysis appears to be supported by the finding that 
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some informants had overcome suicidal thoughts early in their transition from being 
able-bodied to being disabled and so did not see EPAS as applicable to themselves. 
Despite their own experience, they still supported EPAS for others and the Dutch 
described suicide or EPAS by others as courageous. At the same time informants 
acknowledged the emotional impact of suicide on family, friends and others. Those 
few informants who described their lives as essentially unsatisfactory, for reason of 
their experience with disability and who would prefer EPAS to end it, said that they 
had actually decided not to kill themselves for such apparently altruistic reason as an 
impact of such an act on others. I propose that these apparently contradictory 
private/public attitudes indicate a tension. On the one hand it involves a public view 
of death and dying which involves heroic projects as a mechanism to repress 
thoughts of them (Becker, 1997), thus attributing courage to killing oneself. For 
example, one informant illustrated public repression of the fear of death with his 
description of a Dutch advertising billboard, asking: “is there coffee after death?” 
trivialising a pervasive fear of death. On the other hand this tension involves a 
private experience of overcoming the dying, or losses, associated with quadriplegia 
and regaining these in the course of daily life, where this is not recognised as 
courageous, by themselves or by others. I will return to this theme in discussing the 
relationship between the informants’ views on EPAS and their daily life experience. 
A sub-theme within “Death and dying as a distant experience”, which seems 
important to discuss separately was “A low knowledge of palliative care”: This sub-
theme shows the informants as possessing little knowledge of the nature or 
availability of palliative care. This was more so for Dutch informants, but applies to 
both countries’ grassroots samples. Palliative care is an approach to medical practice 
practiced when people are close to death and curative treatment is futile. It also 
involves control of pain and engages with any of the dying person’s social, 
psychological and spiritual problems. It includes bereavement support. Palliative care 
is a holistic approach, encompassing patient, family and the community in its scope 
(World Health Organization, 1990). Half of the Dutch informants had never heard of 
palliative care (palliatieve zorg), probably as a result of the historically low 
availability of palliative care in their country (Fraencke & Willems, 2000; Janssens, 
ten Have & Zylics, 1999; Zylics, 1998). Of those few Dutch informants, grassroots 
and leaders, who did know something about palliative care some indicated a poor 
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state of palliative care in their country but also saw it as improving. This 
understanding again reflects the literature on this point (Fraencke & Willems, 2000; 
Matthews, 1998; Zylics, 1998). In either country’s sample, of those who had heard of 
palliative care, few could well describe its principles or practice. Some perceived 
EPAS as an integral part of palliative care, allowing a choice as to the course one 
wanted to take at the end of life. Palliative care practitioners mostly exclude EPAS 
from their discipline (Enklaar, 1999; MacNamara, 2001). Leaders in both countries 
were better informed about palliative care. On the whole informants are probably 
reflecting a generally low public knowledge of palliative care in the Netherlands as 
well as in Australia (Enklaar, 1999; Zylics, 1998; Webster & Kristjanson, 2002). 
This is so despite an apparently high level of availability of palliative care in 
Australia (Palliative Care Australia, 2002) compared to the Netherlands. The 
informants’ low level of knowledge of the nature and availability of palliative care is 
probably closely associated with their distance from others’ dying experiences. 
However this would be less true of leader informants. Within the context of 
informants’ broad support for EPAS this low level of knowledge appears particularly 
significant, as various studies suggest that availability of palliative care is a factor 
which could reduce requests for EPAS (Enklaar, 1999; Ganzini, Nelson, Schmidt, 
Kraemer, Delorit & Lee, 2000; Waddell, Clarnette, Smith, Oldham, & Kellehear, 
1996). 
 Suffering and EPAS: Most informants had no wish for EPAS themselves, 
least of all for reason of disability, although they could not always rule it out for the 
unforeseeable future. MacNamara (2001) also found that, in general, people are more 
likely to agree with the principle of euthanasia than to envisage themselves asking 
for assistance in ending their own lives (p. 21). Informants thought that unbearable 
suffering of various kinds are acceptable reasons for EPAS. The most often used 
phrase was “unbearable pain and suffering”. Physical pain was mentioned most 
often. Loss of dignity could also be a reason to have EPAS. Such loss included 
intrusive medical treatment, loss of quality of life or when “life [is] no longer being 
experienced as a dignified existence”, loss of cognition, bad quality of care, the 
meaninglessness of terminal illness, and fear of future pain or entering a nursing 
home. Fear of future suffering under conditions of terminal illness was also regarded 
as a valid reason to have EPAS. Terminal illness was sufficient reason in itself but 
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other conditions, which did not involve terminal illness, could also constitute enough 
reason to have EPAS. Leaders thought that public fear of dying, disability and illness 
and their equation with suffering was underlying the EPAS debate.  
Depression was mostly not seen as a valid reason for EPAS because it was 
seen as a curable medical condition. However, virtually any other conditions, if 
judged unbearable by the sufferer, were seen as a valid reason to have EPAS. 
Unipolar major depression is now a globally widespread clinical condition, projected 
to become the leading cause of disease burden by 2020 (World Health Organization, 
2003; Seligman, in Myers (1992, p. 145). Perhaps, in the minds of informants 
depression has thus been normalised as an acceptable part of the human condition, 
rather than as suffering. However depression is a major factor in requests for EPAS 
(Breitbart, Rosenfeld & Passik, 1996) and one study suggests that all terminally ill 
patients who expressed their desire for an assisted death had a major depressive 
disorder (Chochinov, Wilson, Enns, Mowchun, Lander, Levitt, and Clinch, 1995). 
The prevalence of depression and its role in requests for EPAS therefore make it very 
relevant to the discussion of EPAS. Physical pain, on the other hand, the most 
mentioned source of suffering by informants, does not often provide the sole major 
motivation for EPAS when dying (Breitbart, Rosenfeld, Pessin, Kaim, Funesti-
EschGalietta, Nelson, et al., 2000; Chin, A.E., Hedberg, K., Higginson, G.K., & 
Fleming, D.W., 1999; Bascom & Tolle, 1996; Kissane, Street, & Nitschke, 1998; 
Lavery, 2001; Meier, Emmons, Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison & Cassell, 1998; Seale 
& Addington-Hall, 1994; Zylics, 1998). With good pain control, patients’ desire for 
EPAS declines (NIPO, 1996). Perhaps informants’ high rating of pain as a factor in 
EPAS requests is related to their low level of awareness of palliative care. Good 
palliative care is able to relieve much pain (Enklaar, 1999; MacNamara, 2001). 
Informants often stated that “everything possible” ought to be done before 
EPAS is considered. But for most unbearable suffering was also an individually and 
subjectively constructed condition. This means that if a situation “is hopeless for 
yourself”, EPAS could be considered, which appears a position close to some of the 
Dutch policy on EPAS (Regionale Toetsings Commissies Euthanasie, 2002) and to 
criteria in the former Australian Rights for the Terminally Ill Act, 1995. Informants 
did not want to intrude into how others determined their own unbearable suffering. 
Despite most informants’ insistence that EPAS was not for them, especially not for 
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reason of their disability, some of the same informants who had asserted this would 
also allow EPAS for those whose experience of disability constituted unbearable 
suffering. Among those who were most absolute and adamant about the allowability 
of EPAS for anyone who had assessed for themselves that their suffering was 
unbearable were those who had assessed their own lives with disability as 
unbearable. But unbearability of suffering might be perceived differently by the 
person undergoing than how others might observe it. The example of one informants’ 
experience of extreme pain and suffering from burns and amputations in addition to 
his spinal cord injury, and a leader’s experience of absence of pain in a near-death 
experience, show the possibility of transformation of pain. In such transformation the 
pain is still there but is experienced differently as Wendell (1996, p. 179) described. 
And many informants had positively shifted their own ideas of what was unbearable 
suffering from disability such as quadriplegia.  
Some informants wanted to reserve the allowability of EPAS for 
circumstances of extreme suffering only. But extreme suffering would be difficult to 
quantify. This would be more difficult in a culture which identifies unbearable 
suffering based on the report of the patient, as reflected in the Dutch approach 
(Regionale Toetsings Commissies Euthanasie, 2002), for example in the Chabot 
case, discussed in Chapter One (Griffiths, p. 80–82; Klozko & Chabot, 1998). The 
now redundant Australian euthanasia law, Northern Territory Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act of 1995, allowed a subjective interpretation of unbearable 
suffering by the patient. Twenty three per cent of respondents to a Dutch survey (van 
der Maas, et al., 1991), cited tiredness of life as a valid reason for EPAS. Prominent 
Australian EPAS campaigner Dr. Philip Nitschke also appears to be getting public 
support in pursuing the allowability of EPAS along similar arguments (“Nitschke: 
Right-to-die civil disobedience”, 2002). Legal safeguards against abuse of EPAS are 
difficult to conceive of under these circumstances.  
Pain and suffering are to a large degree socially constructed. Callahan (1993) 
confirms that pain is connected closely with psycho-dynamic as well as social 
factors. It is a highly complex phenomenon (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000; Csordas, in 
Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 602) associated with losses of control, of dignity, and of 
meaning in life (Callahan; Paterson & Hughes, 1999). Suffering during dying is often 
connected to past unresolved issues (Enklaar, 1999). In other words the suffering that 
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my informants described, such as losses of dignity through inadequate care, 
undignified existence, meaninglessness of a terminal state, over-treatment and fears 
of future conditions, are real. A question arises whether there should be a public 
policy to medically “treat” this kind of suffering, much of which is socially 
constructed, by way of EPAS, as my informants appear to suggest. For one informant 
the answer was that this would be morally suspect but she could still not stand in the 
way of someone who wanted EPAS for such social reasons as inadequate care. 
Wendell (1996) says that a public notion that disabled lives are not worth living “lies 
at the heart of much theorising about abortion, euthanasia and health care reform, 
putting the welfare and security, and the social acceptance, of people with disabilities 
in jeopardy”. On the other hand she says that people with disabilities, with their 
extensive experiences of the limitations of medical treatment “are unlikely to support 
an ethic of life at any cost, or a reduction of individual’s rights to choose death” (p. 
151). Ann McDonald, a person with an awful experience of growing up in an 
Australian institution (Crossley & McDonald, 1984) said that only when we improve 
the quality of the lives of people will we be able to ascertain whether they want 
euthanasia because “they think life with a disability is worthless or because they 
think it is awful” (Parsons & Newell, 1996, p. 54). The case of MacAfee (Gill, 1992), 
as that of others, has shown that it is the latter. When conditions improved they 
thrived as people.  
The Dutch doctrine of force majeure, or defence of necessity, in justification 
of a doctor’s medical killing in the face of otherwise unrelievable suffering, is 
interesting to contemplate in this context. Inevitably the doctor’s perception of a 
person’s suffering from disability as arising from their impairment depends on their 
view of disability as belonging predominantly within a medical model or a social 
model. A doctor may not be able to change much about the level and nature of social 
support of a disabled patient. But if EPAS were allowed based upon individually and 
subjectively assessed unbearable suffering he or she may be able to “help” the 
“patient” in their medical capacity to have EPAS. A generally negative orientation of 
doctors towards people with disability (Gill, 2000) would suggest the medical model 
approach towards socially constructed suffering may often prevail. And of those 
issues that characterise the disability experience, that is dependency and vulnerability 
(MacIntyre, 1999), dependence on others is a major factor in requests for EPAS by 
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anyone, disabled or not (Van der Maas, van Delden, & Pijnenborg, 1991). It appears 
then, that whether or not EPAS could be quarantined to those judged capable of 
exercising their choice for having EPAS, that the complex nature of pain and 
suffering would make it difficult to judge which kind of suffering justifies access to 
EPAS. The general reliance on the medical role of doctors in assessing unbearable 
suffering therefore is questionable as much suffering presented as physical or mental 
pain is connected with social factors. This situation is further complicated by 
findings that suggest that treatment decisions at end of life were more significantly 
determined by the doctor’s individual characteristics, their medical training and 
socio-demographic background, than by the nature of the medical problem (Waddell, 
Clarnette, Smith, Oldham & Kellehear, 1996). Others have made similar findings 
(DiPasquale and Gluck, 2001; Pool, 1996). Such findings suggest that social factors 
do not only influence pain and suffering but also determine how that suffering is 
perceived by doctors who are those empowered to implement EPAS. In this social 
context, it is again difficult to see, despite the best intentions of those operating 
within the empirical-analytical paradigm in which EPAS is embedded, how 
application of rational rules and monitoring as safeguards can be effective.  
Informants also suggested that sometimes EPAS was allowable to help the 
bystanders of a suffering person out of their suffering, either caused by the pain of 
seeing another’s suffering or by the burden of care. As the earlier example of 
apparent coercion to act on earlier expressed intentions for EPAS shows such 
bystanders may often be in a role of “advising” a family member on having EPAS. 
The dual meaning of care is that it involves both loving attention and a burden of 
cares. If not consciously, it is probable that one’s own interpretations of the suffering 
of another are conflated with one’s own burden, either from the difficulty of seeing 
another suffer meaninglessly or from a burden of care in anyone’s thinking from time 
to time. The importance and degree to which this dynamic would be present in any 
EPAS decision making would be difficult to discern and it is difficult to conceive of 
legal safeguards against it.  
As pain and suffering are largely socially determined, the appropriateness of 
the multi-dimensional nature of palliative care as physical, psychological, social, and 
spiritual, in response to the pain and suffering of dying people, is clear. The same 
dimensions of suffering are at play during life as when we are close to death and 
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suffering at the time of death is influenced by how we dealt with suffering over the 
course of a whole life (Enklaar, 1999). A multi-dimensional response to suffering at 
any time seems therefore an appropriate response. Therefore palliative care should 
not be seen as the only assistance to live well towards life’s end. If we really wanted 
to ensure that “everything possible were done first”, as my informants insisted, to 
relieve any suffering before allowing a request for EPAS, a society should also invest 
in social responses to causes of suffering such as that would not allow the 
circumstances that justified Ann MacDonald’s and MacAfee’s claim to a right to be 
killed for reason of their socially constructed awful lives. As the psycho-dynamic and 
social dimensions of suffering indicate, its amelioration requires both individual and 
public responses. 
Informants often raised examples of extreme suffering based on media 
reports. When asked whether their disability experience had influenced their views 
on EPAS, most said it had not. Where it had, the main reason was that it had given 
informants insight that there were sometimes circumstances under which some 
people did not want to live. This response seems consistent with their view that they 
supported EPAS for others but did not see it as very relevant to themselves. After all 
they had overcome significant losses already. However it did not seem consistent 
with their experience of overcoming significant threats to their wellbeing, in a 
different response to suffering than is EPAS. Later this apparent inconsistency will 
be explored further. 
 Rights, choice and compassion: Informants believed that suffering persons 
had a right to choose the way they would end their lives. For some informants a right 
to end it by EPAS was an expression of compassion towards that person in “helping” 
them out of their suffering. But most informants did not talk about compassion in the 
context of EPAS at all. Their view was that everything possible to ease suffering 
should be done but it was the person’s choice to say when they had had enough. 
Within the grassroots sample the small group of those who experienced an 
unsatisfactory life and who would prefer EPAS for themselves placed a high 
emphasis on others’ rights to choose for EPAS regardless of the type of suffering. An 
example given by one informant from this sub-set was that it was a “compassionate” 
act to “put down” his suffering aunt who was not capable of choosing. In the sub-set 
of those with a very high fulfilment in life the emphasis was on care as a 
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compassionate act in relieving the suffering and to reserve EPAS for “extreme 
suffering” only. However both groups deferred to a person’s right to make their 
decision, like most of the rest of the sample. Clearly compassion for the first group 
was not thought of as suffering with, the meaning of compassion, whereas for the 
second group it was. But care necessarily involves an active engagement with the 
suffering person and compassion in relation to EPAS necessitates engagement with 
the full range of its psycho-social issues (Gill, 1992). The theme for most of the 
sample is to give the necessary care but, in the final instance, accord to the individual 
a right to choose EPAS regardless of their type of suffering or whether it can 
otherwise be ameliorated. 
In contrast with the grassroots sample’s theme of a right to individual choice 
to EPAS, both countries’ leader samples saw self-determination as limited by a 
context of relationships to others. Australian leaders showed opposition to EPAS 
policy, as for them individual autonomy was not a sufficient reason to allow it. They 
perceived that people with disabilities would be vulnerable to abuse of EPAS. 
However, grassroots informants also understood that the exercise of rights involves 
others and is not a purely individual pursuit. But a certain interpersonal distance was 
involved in allowing others to exercise their rights. This distance allowed others to 
tend to “their business”, meaning their choice of EPAS or otherwise. The informants 
recognised an emotional impact on others arising from anyone’s choice to have 
EPAS. As mentioned earlier some of those who experienced their lives as essentially 
bad had decided against their suicide in order not to upset others. EPAS was 
considered less impactful. But here doctors could face legal prosecution, a point 
raised by both Australian and Dutch informants, and they had to bear the 
administrative burden associated with reporting EPAS, a point raised exclusively by 
Dutch informants. These were given as reasons why doctors should have a choice 
whether or not to engage in EPAS. Some thought it best that, in order to minimise an 
emotional impact on doctors and on the recipient of EPAS, professionals such as 
euthanasia specialists could be employed who would be relatively detached from the 
person receiving EPAS. As far as impacts on family was concerned, EPAS was 
thought to be less emotionally impactful than suicide and the impact would be further 
reduced by the professional participation of a physician. There was some suggestion 
in the Dutch leader sample that a doctor’s non-reporting of EPAS would also lessen 
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the emotional impact on the family by keeping it a private affair. Physicians were 
needed for their professional medical skill, an instrumental role, and also to give the 
act of EPAS a certain professional legitimacy. Some contrary views existed about the 
doctor’s participation in EPAS, which can be seen as a natural part of his medical 
role or as compromising her role as healer. The latter view could lead to the view that 
a ‘distanced doctor’ should carry out EPAS: “Let it please be done by people who 
have no other role to play, in a kind of anonymity”. Indeed such independent and 
distanced physicians appear now to have been established with the Dutch initiative 
of physicians trained in giving second opinions on EPAS (“Landelijke dekking 
SCEN”, 2003). But doctors, the informants said, should not be the only decision-
makers on EPAS. Family should be involved also in the decision because doctors 
were “not necessarily an expert on quality of life”. Exercising one’s right to have 
EPAS thus appeared to be characterised by detached relationships which revolved 
around decision-making; some distrust of doctors’ capabilities of assessment; 
privacy; minimising adverse impacts on those other than the person receiving EPAS; 
and legitimisation of the act of EPAS.  
In the sub-theme “Non-autonomy: Complexity and confusion”, within the 
main theme of “Rights, choice and compassion”, Suffering was thought to be 
included in the experience of some people who have developmental disabilities and 
mental illness or who are in a vegetative state. There was some support to extend the 
right to choose EPAS to these groups although others expressed concerns and 
opposed this. Reasons for their suffering appeared to include any medical conditions 
but for some also the condition of their disability itself. Some drew comparisons with 
the Nazi euthanasia program and leaders drew attention to unequal power 
relationships between people with intellectual disability and doctors. Some leaders 
cautioned that EPAS was a highly complex matter and societal motives underlying it 
may be “suspect”. For those who supported giving at least some people in these 
categories a right to choose EPAS, doing this was a source of uncertainty and 
confusion. They did not seem to want to deny the right to choice to them. They 
might be suffering but the question of who decides for EPAS in situations of unclear 
mental capacity confused them. A proposed solution was to let ‘parents’, in concert 
with doctors, as a private act, make the decision, because they knew their “child” 
best. Some suggested that the legitimacy of such acts of EPAS might come from the 
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current legal right to abortion, true for the Netherlands and for Western Australia. 
They were “glad” not to have to make decisions in such circumstances. In addition, 
the grassroots sample raised none of the concerns about a limited physician ability to 
make assessments of suffering for this group whereas they had for others. This might 
indicate that notions of a low valuation of people with cognitive impairments and 
confirmation of the high social valuation of intelligence and rationality (Goleman, 
1996; Saul, 1992) were present in informants. In fact leaders pointed to the presence 
of a disability hierarchy where those with cognitive and mental impairments were 
ranked low. The support that most informants gave EPAS has to be qualified by a 
sense of the complexity of the issues some of which they had no answers for. Some 
of the answers that some did propose appear to be based on negative social 
stereotypes of intellectual disability. It is difficult to see how legal safeguards would 
apply other than to prohibit EPAS for those who are not capable to make such 
decisions. But medically assessing capacity for anyone is problematic, as has already 
been pointed out. 
In summary, most informants’ views of EPAS seem close to mainstream 
Western views on the issue. They are supportive of legal, safeguarded EPAS as an 
individual choice in response to unbearable suffering, defined by the suffering 
individual. However their concepts of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are 
mostly unclear and they know little about their safeguards. Most have little 
experience about the realities of dying, including palliative care. These findings 
suggest a personal distance from dying and end-of-life decision making issues, which 
is emphasised by their support for EPAS for other but mostly not for themselves. All 
these elements of their background knowledge to their views on EPAS are also true 
for the general public. Their construction of EPAS appears inherently problematic in 
its ability to control abuse of it. The lack of notable differences between Dutch and 
Australian views suggests they are influenced by factors that go beyond any regional 
preferences. Their view of EPAS as predominantly reliant on the mechanism of 
individual choice appears related to the dominant Western values of individualism. 
This suggestion is consistent with literature which argues the strong role of 
individual autonomy in EPAS (Autonomy, 2002; Batavia, 1991, 1997; Dworkin, 
1995; Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson, 1996; Enklaar, 1999; 
Griffith, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Pijnenburg, 1998; Sobsey, 1994) and that which 
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suggests that dominant Western individualist values underlie much of the interest in 
EPAS (Callahan, 1994; Callahan & Hanson, 1998; Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; 
Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Magnusson, 2002; Mann, 1998; ten Have, 1998). 
The low awareness that informants had on the nature and practice of EPAS or 
of palliative care and little direct experience with the dying of others, suggests that 
the rights to choose EPAS that they believe (ought to) exist, are not well founded. 
This finding indicates that an important criterion in the normal choosers exercise of 
individual autonomy was not met: that is to act with understanding (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001). Understanding is enhanced by being well informed but my 
informants were not. 
Most informants supported EPAS for others, if strictly safeguarded, primarily 
by legal rules but their construct of suffering and regard for an over-riding 
importance of individual choice negated their stated intention of containing abuse of 
EPAS. Their support for strict safeguards occurred against a background of their lack 
of clear concepts of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; their low level of 
close experience with the dying of others; their low level of knowledge of palliative 
care; and a construction of subjectively defined unbearable suffering and individual 
rights to choose EPAS. As Newell (Newell, 1996; Parsons & Newell, 1996) 
indicated, restricting EPAS to the competent only is problematic because, if we 
thought that EPAS was a legitimate answer to suffering, only the competent could be 
assisted in this way. Further, Newell thought that the subjectivity of suffering made 
regulation of it difficult, as my findings also illustrate. Clearly, internal 
inconsistencies, such as the tension between individual autonomy to choose EPAS 
and subjectively defined suffering, exist within my findings. Ewin (2002, pp. 146–
147) noted this sort of problem when he suggested that autonomy and compassion to 
relieve suffering work in different directions. In this view emphasis on compassion 
might lead to relieving suffering by means of EPAS, including of those who do not 
have the rational agency to decide for themselves. Emphasis on autonomy may lead 
to EPAS in absence of great suffering to be overcome. This would make it difficult 
to regulate against abuse. Therefore he insisted on the necessity of limiting EPAS to 
those who are competent. But if the limits to a right to EPAS are indeed socially 
decided (Ewin), then according to my findings there are no limits. This is because 
my informants emphasised the right to choose based on self-assessed subjective 
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suffering which over-ruled the strict safeguards they insisted on. Some believed that 
some people with intellectual disability could exercise a right to their individual 
autonomy in deciding to have EPAS if they were suffering. EPAS could also be 
performed on those not judged to be capable themselves, in order to relieve their 
subjectively determined suffering because “everyone has that right” in “a free 
world”. Such reasoning might be a misuse of the concept of individual autonomy in a 
similar way to that described by Dutch physician Pijnenburg (1998). She stated that 
the one-dimensional-focus on autonomous choice had led to growing attention being 
paid to the “entitlement” of those who are not competent and autonomous to “receive 
an end to their life because of the presence – in the view of others – of unbearable 
and hopeless suffering” (p. 246). Such misapplication also appears reflected in 
Gomez’s (1991, p. 137) feeling that in the Dutch EPAS practice something more 
than “an argument from autonomy was at work”. He perceived a sentiment that 
certain patients were better off dead and that it was humane to kill them. To further 
complicate matters, it appears that for most informants compassion played a very 
limited role in EPAS decision-making, as the EPAS process depends on detached 
relationships. The nature of compassion requires an active engagement with the 
suffering of another but the nature of EPAS emphasises individual agency to exercise 
a right to the outcome of death as a means to escape suffering and on the regulatory 
mechanisms that establish and implement such a right. As one Dutch leader said, for 
most people EPAS is a technical issue of “protocol” and “euthanasia guidelines”, but 
“not the existential subjects that it turns around”. The social phenomenon of an 
emphasis on rational, technological solutions (Goleman, 1996; Saul, 1992; Taylor, 
1992), and a de-emphasis on the “personal, social and spiritual relationships that give 
our lives a moral texture and a sense of meaning – of self-worth, belonging, identity, 
purpose and hope” (Headey & Wearing, cited in Eckersley, p. 9) is not limited to 
EPAS but is a wider social trend. In relation to EPAS, this dynamic appears to leave 
little room for true compassion and care as it is one that operates outside deeper 
relational contexts. The dynamics of EPAS in these findings involve not only the 
individualistic normal chooser on behalf of themselves but on behalf of incompetent 
others too. This increases the vulnerability of the latter (Ells, 2001; Reinders, 2000) 
to a “definitive answer” (Reinders, p. 205) to their suffering: EPAS. These appear to 
constitute exactly those reasons why Hendin (1997) argued the impossibility of 
devising workable guidelines as safeguards for EPAS because “they fail to address 
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the inter-active nature of the decision-making process that is at the heart of 
euthanasia and its abuse” (p. 1491). In Gill’s (1992) terms, my informants’ 
engagement with the full range of individual and social issues in their responses 
about EPAS appears lacking. If good reasons for autonomous agents’ moral choices 
are indeed those that do not contain internal inconsistencies and if good (moral) 
choices ought to be universalisable (Kant, cited in Kerner, 1990), then my findings 
seem to offer little support for EPAS on either criterion, on the basis of a rationalist 
analysis.  
In conclusion, my grassroots informants based their support for EPAS on 
limited, indirect knowledge of key concepts. An individual’s subjectively defined 
suffering as unbearable should be eased if possible but ultimately it depends on the 
individual’s choice whether they have EPAS in order to deliver them from suffering. 
According to them, the EPAS process must be safeguarded with regulation and 
involves personal detachment between patient and doctor. This construction of 
support for EPAS is internally inconsistent. It appears to pose vulnerability to abuse 
of EPAS through a tension between acceptance of individually assessed unbearable 
suffering and application of a misplaced concept of non-relational individual 
autonomy in choosing EPAS. This tension appears not to allow effective application 
of regulation of EPAS. Personal detachment between patient and doctor may be a 
barrier to receiving the care one needs to relieve one’s suffering. 
6.3 Research question 2 
What are the life experiences and views of Dutch and Australian 
people with quadriplegia and leaders in Dutch and Australian 
disability movements, with regard to issues of vulnerability, 
autonomy, dependency, interdependence and independence? 
Three main themes emerged in response to this research question: 
”Vulnerability: Physical, psychological and social factors, threats to wellbeing”; “A 
good, difficult life, responses to threats to wellbeing”; and “Value change and 
personal growth”. In turn these contain thirty-one sub-themes.  
All informants had experienced a significant threat to their physical integrity 
and their psychological and social wellbeing from their acquired disability, 
quadriplegia. Their immediate disability experience was also characterised by many 
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deeply felt losses. The differences between their life prior to disability and their life 
since were so stark that they often described it as one of having had “two lives”. 
Murphy (1990), an anthropologist who described his own experience of progressive 
paralysis, applied exactly this phrase to his experience of life with and without 
disability. But most informants had overcome, or outgrown, many of these threats 
and losses and transformed their experience into one of a fulfilment or wellbeing.  
Vulnerability: physical, psychological and social factors – threats to 
wellbeing: Threats to informants’ wellbeing came from informants’ health problems, 
inadequate health care and human services, negative public attitudes and wider social 
trends. These individual and social levels of threats to wellbeing appear to match 
Cocks & Duffy’s (1993) theory of heightened vulnerability of people who have 
disabilities, of a social theory of disability (Wendell, 1996) and of the joint personal 
and social nature of human suffering in general (Cassell, 1991). Many informants 
had experienced severe health problems arising from quadriplegia. At times these 
had been exacerbated by mistakes made by health carers or doctors. The effects of 
health problems such as pressure sores (decubitis) can lead to long periods in bed 
which in turn can make a person more vulnerable to further health problems, 
iatrogenic or other when in hospital, and to social isolation. Many Australian 
informants complained of a lack of attention to their psychological wellbeing when 
in rehabilitation and of inadequate or inappropriate attention paid to their 
relationships by rehabilitation professionals. On the other hand some Dutch 
informants expressed that they especially enjoyed their rehabilitation time because of 
the close relationships they had experienced. Both views thus appear to indicate the 
importance of relationships in human wellbeing. Whereas some had good 
relationships with general practitioners post-rehabilitation, many described an 
ambivalent or off-hand attitude from their doctors. They described negative public 
attitudes, which suggested that their disability projected an image of mental 
incompetence and of being an oddity in the minds of others. Also, leaders said that 
people with disabilities were often treated as care objects rather than as people 
welcomed in their communities. Of course as soon as one is seen as different to the 
social norm or as less than human, one generally becomes more vulnerable to ill-
treatment, including in health services, support services and even to having one’s life 
shortened by death-making practices (Wolfensberger, 1990, 1992, 1998). In my 
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informants’ experience, state bureaucracy and inflexible attitudes in accommodation 
support services had an adverse impact on obtaining needed aids, appliances, and 
housing and on the flexibility of care arrangements.  
Informants described an overall negative view of society presented in the sub-
theme “Vulnerability within a context of social decline”. They spoke of a social and 
environmental decline, characterised by social estrangement, and an over-emphasis 
on technology with associated threats from new bio-technologies. Some leaders 
suggested that a value-vacuum had occurred after people had turned from religion. 
Dominant social values of individualism, materialism, progressivism and a fast pace 
of change had filled this vacuum and appeared to underlie these trends. They have 
been identified as current, wider social developments (Capra, 1982, 1996; Cocks, 
1994; Eckersley, 1998; Goleman, 1996; Popenoe, 1994). These dominant social 
beliefs and trends have been identified as increasing the vulnerability of people who 
have disabilities (Cocks, 1994, 1998; Cocks, & Duffy, 1993; Wolfensberger, 1998) 
as they have been identified as underlying value systems of current social and 
environmental decline (Capra, 1982, 1996; Cocks, 1994; Eckersley, 1998; Goleman, 
1996; Popenoe, 1994; Taylor, 1992).  
Within this social decline, informants simultaneously saw an upward trend in 
societal support for people with disabilities. But this trend was mainly associated 
with better physical access, in other words with the technology of disability issues 
rather than with the substance of relationships. Some leaders confirmed that the 
disability movement was more interested in the pursuit of structural change, such as 
in access to employment, education, transport and the built environment than in 
strategies to facilitate good relationships. Again, these findings may find a parallel in 
social trends that emphasise technological approaches to problems as part of the 
Western ideology of progressivism (Eckersley, 1998; Taylor, 1992). But it may also 
be related to the discrepancy between personal wellbeing and a negative view of 
society’s future trend. That is, personal wellbeing is relatively independent of 
material circumstances but not of social relationships (Eckersley, 1998).  
Informants saw EPAS becoming more widely available as part of a growing 
social tolerance towards social phenomena such as abortion and drug use. This view 
is consistent with the informants’ stance on EPAS, which was that it was a legitimate 
choice for individuals to make, should they wish to do so: apparently a stance of 
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tolerance of individual choice. The Dutch historical development of a growing 
acceptance and adoption of EPAS has indeed been identified by the well-known 
Dutch policies of tolerance towards drugs, abortion, and sexuality (Kennedy, 2002). 
Griffith, Bood & Weyers (1998), in discussing EPAS, actually dubbed a neutrality of 
government with regard to private morals and the values that they are based on a 
principle of tolerance. Both Dutch and Australian informants referred to ‘tolerance’ 
in explaining a growing acceptance of EPAS, indicating perhaps that the mechanism 
of individual choice is part of a universal liberalism, rather than exclusively part of a 
Dutch national culture. A few informants saw the probable wider availability of 
EPAS as associated with a lack of a sense of care towards one another, described as 
easy going.  
However, most informants, apart from some Australian leaders, drew no 
negative conclusions from the two scenarios they painted. They did not see any 
dangers in a rising acceptance of EPAS and a simultaneously declining society 
although leaders also expressed some uncertainty. They referred to their faith in strict 
safeguards with EPAS. Some informants saw EPAS as an issue that was peripheral 
to broader social trends. The Dutch, in addition, relied on the safeguard of ongoing 
public discussion. In general, informants were disbelieving about the possibility of 
abuse of EPAS. Only one grassroots informant drew a connection between the spirit 
of the times and implementation of the strict safeguards that were needed in any 
implementation of EPAS policy. I suggest that Reinders’ analysis which he bases on 
Nagel (in Reinders’, 2000, pp. 179–180) and which he applied to family-carers of 
people with intellectual disability, might explain this apparent paradox. Many people 
with quadriplegia would have experienced some improvements with regard to 
physical access to public areas and have relatively better access to employment and 
education than people with cognitive impairments for instance. A notion that things 
are getting better therefore appears logical. Despite their beliefs about a decline in 
the public area, they build their belief on improvement in their personal case on 
private experience. To do otherwise is to live with too much doubt about their 
rationale for existence and hopes for a continued good but difficult life. This 
explanation fits with Reinders’ (2000) suggestion that people are unable to 
simultaneously hold an objective and a subjective view of oneself because the 
objective, detached view devalues their private experience. 
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Some informants suggested that factors such as pressures on health care and 
cost–benefit analyses of care might contribute to a wider adoption of EPAS in the 
future, and such concerns have been raised elsewhere. Given the devalued social 
status of people with disabilities one would think that these would be legitimate 
issues for disability movements to take up. However leader-informants indicated 
there was little interest within disability movements to do so. The diverse positions 
taken on EPAS within the membership of disability movements; the perceived 
impracticability of the issue, and its complexity; and a fear of opening up a 
Pandora’s box with regard to the legitimacy of life with disability, have resulted in 
inaction. The first reason might be an illustration of the Western socially normative 
situation of an absence of a “guiding story” (Hugh Mackay, in Eckersley, 1998: 11). 
The dominant social value culture is one of respect for individual choice, and, in a 
vindication of Reinders’ (2000) concept of narrow morality, the debate was stalled. 
No collective action could be undertaken. The second reason of impracticability 
seems to once again relate to the tendency of our times to value the technological, or 
the material, in this case action on structural change, over those things which give 
our lives a moral texture and meaning (Headey & Wearing, cited in Eckersley, p. 9). 
The third reason reveals the fragile social position of people with disability and the 
difficulties of advancing the interests of the devalued. 
A good, difficult life: responses to threats to wellbeing: Informants had made 
conscious efforts to reduce threats to their wellbeing. A discussion of their responses 
gives a context to their outgrowing of feelings of dependency and to reduction of 
their vulnerability. Threats to the informants’ wellbeing have been discussed above 
and included physical, psychological, and social dimensions. Most regarded their 
present life with disability as good. Some perceived their lives as even better than it 
had been pre-disability. Such findings are confirmed in many studies involving 
people with disability, including quadriplegia (Cameron, Titus, Kosti & , Kostin, 
1973; Eisenberg & Salz, 1991; Fine & Asch, 1988; Ray & West, 1984; Stensman, 
1985; Titley, 1996;Wacker, Harper, Powell & Healey, 1983; Weinberg, 1984; Yerxa 
& Baum 1968). Many informants pointed out that their good life had not arrived 
without their ongoing effort to make it so. The first thing that had happened post-
injury was a period of grief over the significant losses that they had suffered. But 
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there was a point where they chose to embrace and accept their new circumstances 
and, as they said, “get on with it”.  
A process of shifting their criteria about what kind of life was acceptable 
seemed to play a role in this choice. This acceptance was not an attitude which had 
removed all disability-related frustration from their lives but was an acceptance of 
the fact of their impairment: that it was so. Some expressed their thought, previous to 
their disability, that death might be preferable to life in a wheelchair. But the 
experience of disability, and of subsequent health problems, had moved most 
informants’ internal limits of what might be levels of suffering they could live with. 
Nevertheless further limits they now set were loss of cognition, artificial respiration 
or being restricted to bed. Those who described their life as bad did not appear to 
have shifted their limits. Again this phenomenon of choosing how to regard one’s 
own suffering has for example been described in parent-carers of children with 
developmental disability (Reinders, 2000, p. 204) as it has for others (Luke, 1987; 
Wendell, 1996, p. 179). Those who described their lives as bad and for this reason 
desired EPAS for themselves appeared resistant to making such a choice. They 
preferred not to change. 
Most informants understood the expression of negative public attitudes 
towards them because they recognised these in themselves prior to acquiring 
quadriplegia. They also recognised that people with a cognitive impairment receive 
less public acceptance than they did, and that among people with disability a 
hierarchy of human worth, relative to types of disability, appears to be present. The 
dominant social value of rationality would seem to be involved in such ranking, 
raising one’s vulnerability with one’s level of perceived lower intelligence. This 
ranking process appears to be deep-seated as it was found both among people with 
disability who had experienced a shift in their own thinking about what kind of life 
was worth living and among the general public. As I will discuss below these 
attitudes are relevant in discussing the informants’ attitudes to EPAS.  
Informants were successful in using strategies to deflect negative public 
attitudes away from them. These ranged from ignoring them to active verbal riposte. 
In between those were responses that demonstrated their shared humanity to others, 
including ice-breaking, being clear and direct about one’s needs, and the use of 
humour. Those who were not able to achieve an acceptance of the fact of their 
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impairment and, as a result, did not feel good about themselves, found it difficult to 
accept being accepted, as they were, by others. 
Informants had suffered significant losses as a result of acquiring 
quadriplegia but had overcome many of them. After losing friends and partners they 
had found new friends and sometimes, partners in a context of deeper, more 
meaningful relationships than they had had before. Relationships were key to 
informants’ wellbeing. They added self-worth and meaning to their lives as they 
were able to receive support and to contribute in such relationships. The significant 
threat that their impairment had caused to their physical and social wellbeing had 
initially prompted them to consciously reach out to others, as a means to an end of 
support and security. But the resulting relationships represented the substance of 
their wellbeing, a flourishing, which was more than support or security. Good, 
supportive relationships had enabled informants to overcome feelings of indignity 
caused by their losses of personal control over basic bodily functions and by 
dependency on others. This dependency on others was particularly undignified when 
assistance to them was given in an uncaring manner. But loss of independence and 
dependence on others were, for a time after they acquired their impairment, 
inherently experienced as the worst effects on their dignity. This is not surprising in a 
Western society which values individual independence and where the dependency of 
disability, that is needing others for very basic personal tasks, is seen as humiliating 
(Wendell, 1996). Now, the quality of their relationships had enabled them to reframe 
their independence as that personal freedom they received through the care and 
assistance from others. There was no humiliation in this kind of relationship. The 
effort required in living in dependency and in interdependence in these ways was an 
ongoing process where this effort constituted much of the rewarding relationship 
dynamic they were in. Therefore the effort was part of the essence of their wellbeing. 
However, those who experienced their lives as bad had not overcome their feelings 
of dependency on others. There was some acknowledgement by them that this was at 
least in part due to their own attitudes towards their disability and their non-
acceptance of the fact of it. 
In discussing EPAS informants did not talk about autonomy but applied an 
approach to suffering which incorporated an overly individualistic emphasis on one’s 
rights to choose EPAS. No themes emerged of choice, or (disability) rights in 
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responding to this second research question, at least not in the sense that they used 
these concepts in characterising their views on EPAS. As mentioned above, they had 
reframed their sense of independence (as a concept that is close to autonomy as self-
rule) in relational terms. The types of committed personal relationships that were 
required to enable them to do this reframing are, as MacIntyre (1999) argues, at odds 
with “widely influential conceptions of practical reasoning” (p. 113). In the more 
general conception, he says, the question of commitment to others is left open 
because there is no concept of a debt to apparently unconnected others in a non-
voluntarily undertaken relationship or transaction. On the other hand, within my 
informants’ view of interdependence, they knew that “one hand has to wash the 
other” and that “anything can happen to you”, meaning that independence and 
therefore unconnectedness and non-commitment to others are not reflective of 
reality. Arising from it are two types of relationships. One kind is “designed for and 
justified by the advantages of the parties to the relationship” which are “governed by 
the precepts of rational choice”. The other is “those relationships that are the 
outcome of sympathy, of affective engagements that are voluntarily undertaken”. 
The crucial difference between the two, he says, is that the demands of sympathy and 
those of rational choice are distinct and confusion results from combining the two. 
“The moral requirements imposed by rational choice extend only to those who are or 
may be our partners in cooperative bargaining”. Thus many people who lack the 
cognitive wherewithal to be such partners fall outside such a mutual relationship. 
Commitment to them therefore becomes optional if rational choice is the only guide. 
My informants did not apply such rationality to the relationships that sustained them. 
To the contrary, most treated their contracted carers as trusted family. But they also 
identified people with cognitive or developmental impairments as more vulnerable 
than them. And a hierarchy of a sliding scale of human worth related to types of 
disability existed among people who had disabilities themselves, suggesting a deep-
seated sentiment in the human psyche of some people being less than fully human.  
Value change and personal growth: Changes in the informants’ attitude 
towards their own impairment had resulted from their reaching out to others in 
response to significant threats to their physical and social survival and wellbeing. As 
presented in the third main theme, “Value change and personal growth”, these 
changes in attitude amounted to a change of worldview, a personal value change. 
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Informants’ perceptions of their world as more social, as involving a degree of trust 
and letting go of personal control and as involving a greater degree of candidness 
have changed the way their social world operated, and for the better. This finding of 
positive value change confirms earlier studies involving people with disability, 
including those with quadriplegia (Bach & McDaniel, 1993; Crewe, 1996; Keaney & 
Glueckauf, 1993).  
As Crewe (1996) has also found, most of my informants signalled a sense of 
personal growth as they became aware of their changed values pre- and post-
disability onset. Indeed my informants reflected the changes in values, priorities and 
self-understanding that various studies have found (Crewe, 1996; Keaney & 
Glueckauf, 1993; Stensman, 1985; Watson, Cunningham-Burley, Watson & Milburn, 
1996) found. Those informants who reported no personal value change were those 
who had chosen not to change and who reported an unsatisfactory life. Most 
informants, who also reported a sense of wellbeing, did report personal value 
changes pre- and post-disability. Some had consciously adopted a view of the social 
world as interdependent. Those who reported very good or better lives compared to 
before they had quadriplegia, reported little value change but experienced ongoing 
personal growth. This was because their values pre-disability already closely 
matched those that the main sample had acquired post-disability experience. This 
finding appears to confirm previous studies which underlined that, as well as social 
support, one’s personality pre-spinal cord injury plays an important role in 
adjustment to quadriplegia (Bracken & Shepard, 1980). Of course, human flourishing 
in interdependence is possible, whether or not one has a disability, or whether one 
experiences the significants threats to one’s physical, mental and social integrity such 
as presented by old age (Vaillant, 2002) or when dying (Byock, 1996; Thomas, 
2001). This is because it is a personal choice to live life in ways which may or may 
not lead to flourishing, as my informants experienced, a choice Reinders (2000, p. 
204) also referred to in relation to family carers of their children with intellectual 
disability. However, a significant threat to one’s integrity, such as the onset of 
quadriplegia represents, is a powerful stimulus to act sociably, and provides an 
initially unintended route to flourishing. Experience of a significant disability, 
especially when projected to last for one’s lifetime, probably merely magnifies the 
more normative perception of the human condition of life without such disability. 
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The effects of informants’ personal value change, arising from their practised 
interdependence and sociability, were two-fold. Firstly, they enabled them to 
outgrow (Cassell, 1991; Jung, in, Wilhelm, 1962) or transcend (Wendell, 1996) the 
significantly felt problems of dependency, loss of independence and indignities 
arising from this situation. Secondly, they had begun to flourish as individuals within 
community with others. Within their private life most informants came to exhibit 
what MacIntyre (1999) calls prerequisites of independent practical reasoning. They 
also exhibited a resulting flourishing, where flourishing is acting virtuously arising 
from their engagement with the commonly unacknowledged aspects of themselves: 
dependency and vulnerability. MacIntyre proposes that virtues include acts of 
compassion, justice, courage, candidness, generosity, and temperateness. 
Independent practical reasoning involves the development and application of virtues 
as well as self-knowledge arising from “participation in a set of relationships to 
certain particular others who are able to give us what we need” (p. 99). These are 
prerequisites to an ability to choose possible, realistic personal futures for oneself. 
According to MacIntyre, a human being’s life flourishes “as a whole”, when an 
individual learns through “experience about the places both of independence and of 
dependence on others in the different stages of a flourishing life” (p. 113). The 
learning of a practical reasoner is that of “find[ing] one’s place within a network of 
givers and receivers in which the achievement of one’s individual good is understood 
to be inseparable from the achievement of the common good” (p. 113). My 
informants did exhibit such virtues as courage, patience, humour, trust and empathy 
for others. They also showed the social skills necessary to initiate and maintain their 
relationships. They showed an awareness of their states of perceived independence 
resting upon the assistance received from others in states of dependency, when they 
spoke of their independence within the disability experience. They understood their 
wellbeing as being closely associated with that of others and showed it in their 
actions.  
Informants were able to outgrow their initial problems of their dignity being 
adversely affected by loss of independence and dependence on others because they 
chose to acknowledge their own states of vulnerability and dependence as a 
necessary part of a process and which also incorporated independence. Their 
integration of dependence and attendant vulnerability thus lead to living their lives 
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as, what MacIntyre calls, “life as a whole” (p. 113). Thus, a flourishing life occurs 
within a context of polarities, such as independence and dependence, necessarily 
involving tensions and change. Practical reasoners use their knowledge to make 
judgements about what parts of life are best accepted and which not. These 
judgements must involve both sides of the polarities, such as dependence and 
independence. Ignoring one side leads to a life with little personal growth, as those 
informants who experienced their lives as unacceptably bad appeared to demonstrate. 
They felt unable to choose to accept dependence as part of (their) life and continued 
to crave for their lost independence. As a result they could not flourish within their 
poor relational context. Paradox, acceptance of it, and personal growth are thus 
inseparably connected. In other words the nature of the human condition, or 
suffering, is paradoxical and involves entropy, expressed in our inevitably fragile and 
decaying bodies. A significant threat to survival or wellbeing, such as quadriplegia 
represents, can prompt one to see this and act on this reality. It is by embracing that 
reality that, in the continued presence of some of the outer phenomena of difficult 
circumstances that tend to give rise to suffering, informants outgrew the perception 
of their suffering and attained a level of personal wellbeing or fulfilment. Such 
individual growth, or “transformation experience” (Reinders, p. 176), within 
community, as experienced by my informants, was the essence of their human 
wellbeing, as also described by MacIntyre and others (Byock, 1996, 1997; Luke, 
1987). Indeed Reinders (2000, p. 166) indicated that the enrichment one receives 
from such growth lies in the experience of making the effort rather than a goal itself. 
The outer phenomena of suffering are thus still there but in acknowledging and living 
with the paradox of life, life is perceived differently.  
Much of MacIntyre’s interdependence framework seems reflected in the 
private experience of most of my informants. Where not, their negative experiences 
of life may be further evidence of the validity of MacIntyre’s theory. His theory, 
which draws on a holistic concept of our human nature, in the light of this study, 
appears as a practical, productive and sustainable response to the human condition. 
MacIntyre’s concept of flourishing is further expanded and supported by Jung’s 
theory of outgrowing insoluble and fundamental problems of life as it is by Byock’s 
(1994) and Cassell’s notions of suffering, namely as individuals’ enlargement in 
outgrowing suffering.  
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In conclusion, my informants’ private experience of human flourishing 
through their responses to great threats to their wellbeing closely reflects MacIntyre’s 
theory of the possibility of flourishing through one’s acknowledgement of both 
human dependence and independence as part of the human condition. The next 
section will compare how the informants’ responses to research questions 1 and 2 
may relate to each other. 
 6.4 Research question 3  
What relationship may exist between the experiences of, and 
views on, autonomy, independence, dependence, vulnerability and 
interdependence and the informants’ views on euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide? 
Dutch and Australian grassroots informants commonly used two 
fundamentally different value frameworks in answering research questions 1 and 2. 
They used the interdependence framework in describing their experience of 
vulnerability, dependence, independence (autonomy) and interdependence. They 
used that of individual autonomy in describing their perspectives on EPAS. In the 
interdependence framework they found personal enrichment in the experience of 
making a social effort and of developing individual phronesis, or practical wisdom. 
In the individual autonomy paradigm they pursued the goal of elimination of 
suffering through EPAS. 
The significance about these different responses to the two questions is that 
each describes the use of different values in approaching very similar questions of 
suffering. In the disability experience informants applied the values of the 
interdependence paradigm to the keenly felt losses of independence and indignities 
arising from it, including others’ attitudes towards them and inadequate care. Good 
relationships and their ongoing efforts towards these, were key to overcoming their 
losses. Their efforts required psycho-dynamic changes which resulted in a personal 
value change, culminating in outgrowing their initial problems and their gaining of 
personal meaning, wellbeing, or flourishing. In giving their perspectives on EPAS, 
informants approached suffering, such as from losses of dignity from physical and 
mental conditions, loss of meaning, inadequate care and medical treatment, by 
allowing an individual choice to be medically killed. They did also want to do 
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everything possible first to alleviate suffering but such actions related mostly to 
medical treatment which did not involve the same relational dynamics of personal 
engagement that they used in their private lives. 
One might suggest that the two questions are about two fundamentally 
different issues where one is about how one lives daily life and another about what to 
do about unbearable suffering when dying. Therefore no meaningful comparison 
could be made between the responses to the two questions. This appears an incorrect 
proposal, as most informants did not limit kinds of suffering, which legitimised 
requests for EPAS, to a terminal condition. Nor did they circumscribe unbearable 
suffering by some objective limits, as they mostly left its assessment to individual, 
subjective judgement. The kinds of suffering encountered differently in each 
situation are comparable.  
The similarities in the kinds of suffering that informants outgrew in their 
private experience of disability and also tried to address through a public, legal 
policy of EPAS, become more apparent when considered in Chochinov, Hack, 
McClement, Kristjanson & Harlos’ (2002) analysis of dignity. Their three elements 
of dignity include illness-related concerns, including symptom management and 
preservation of independence; a dignity-conserving repertoire, involving the way one 
looks at one’s own situation and personal actions that bolster one’s dignity; and a 
social dignity inventory, referring to “social concerns or relationship dynamics that 
enhance or detract from a patient’s sense of dignity” (p. 439). All three dimensions 
were present in the suffering that my informants described in their responses to each 
research question. In informants’ daily lives they had experienced effects of their 
impairment and associated health problems. They had changed the experience of 
suffering from these conditions and from others’ attitudes and care, by changing their 
perceptions of them through taking associated personal actions, including in their 
social relations. The dimensions were also present in the suffering that they described 
which might motivate requests for EPAS. Pain and mental suffering, themselves 
largely determined by psycho-dynamic and social dynamics (Aldrich & Eccleston, 
2000; Callahan, 1993; Csordas, in Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 602; Enklaar, 1999); 
loss of meaning; inadequate care and medical treatment involve these three 
dimensions. Certainly the shared social relations dimension of dignity and human 
worth in dying (Kass & Land, 1996; Pollard, 1994) and in living daily life were 
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underscored by those few informants who desired EPAS against a background of 
their own poor relationships, with one explicitly citing this fact as his reason to want 
EPAS. 
The informants’ two paradigms are qualitatively different in many respects. 
Their interdependence view values the trust and meaning found in deep relationships 
where independence may depend on assistance from others. It involves processes of 
value changes, instrumental in outgrowing of perceptions of suffering and to 
wellbeing and flourishing. There is an acceptance of disability where its experience 
is changed by changing one’s view of it. Discernment of what one should attempt to 
control or chooses to accept is part of this flourishing. Relationships began as a 
means to an end of reducing the threats to one’s integrity but their experience of 
interactive relationships became the most important and fulfilling part of their lives 
and added meaning. The interdependence view values the care and assistance that 
arises from these relationships as preserving one’s independence and dignity, as 
Chochinov, Hack, McClement, Kristjanson & Harlos’ (2002) work also shows it can. 
The interdependence framework requires engagement with one’s whole life, that is 
aspects of both independence and dependence, and vulnerability. This requires the 
development and application of private values. This paradigm is based on private and 
social experience and operates both in the private and public sphere of community. 
The informants’ individual autonomy paradigm is based on a kind of 
autonomy, which is focused on the justice of allowing one’s free expression of 
individual rights to choose and have access to death as a solution to suffering. EPAS 
is thus characterised by individual control over one’s destiny. Relationship to others 
is mainly relevant where they are involved in decision-making towards, and 
implementation of, EPAS as a means to this end. These relationships are detached; 
not necessarily based on trust; and one needs safeguarding from abuse of EPAS by 
rules, technical expertise, professionalism and monitoring. Consequently there is 
little need for the development and application of private values involved in giving 
and receiving. An engagement with the whole life is not necessary. This paradigm is 
based on little personal experience and awareness of various relevant aspects, 
including the nature and operation of E and PAS and their safeguards, dying, and 
palliative care. It operates as a public policy but is seen as a private affair.  
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The characteristics that are predominantly expressed in either of these two 
paradigms are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Characteristics that differentiate the two paradigms_______ __________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
           Individual autonomy____________________Interdependence ___________ 
Public policy     Private experience 
Technical rules, law, monitoring  Relational process 
Justice      Care, relationships 
Outcome, ends Process, transformation, 
outgrowing, means 
Independence Interdependence, equilibrium 
Progress Development, growth, phronesis 
Rights Relationships 
Choice as right Choice to accept 
Fear of suffering Trust, care, relationship 
Distrust Trust 
Meaninglessness in dying Meaning in life with disability 
Personal detachment Relationship 
Control Acceptance 
Justification, professionalism Virtues, practice 
Rational agency Independent practical reasoner 
Conditional, contractual Unconditional relationships 
Individual Individual in community 
Bureaucracy Informality 
EPAS Phronesis, growth, flourishing 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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The two paradigms then are not merely different. In effect they are opposing 
frameworks even though they contain opposing as well as complementary values. 
This is because the interdependence paradigm incorporates autonomy within its 
framework, such as deriving control or independence through acceptance of one’s 
situation as dependent. Conversely the individual autonomy framework does not, or 
is less able to, incorporate aspects of the interdependence framework, such as 
acknowledged dependence, acceptance, unconditional relationships and personal 
growth. Within an overly individualistic autonomy paradigm on the public issue of 
EPAS policy there is little room for expression of the informants’ private paradigm 
of unconditional relationships through which suffering is transformed into wellbeing. 
Informants sensed, if not knew, of the oppositional nature of the two paradigms as 
evidenced by their belief that the dominant individualistic paradigm was 
accompanied by significant problems, including social alienation. They also sensed it 
from the different qualities of the experience of their two lives, one with, one without 
disability. Yet they supported EPAS based on this same paradigm. Their individual 
autonomy framework focused on an individual right to choice as a route to EPAS. 
Circumstances warranting EPAS included subjectively defined unbearable suffering, 
not necessarily in the presence of a terminal condition. They said, in other words, 
that an individual has a right to decide when they had had enough of life and use 
EPAS at any time of their life, not necessarily only when close to death. The 
autonomy-rationale for EPAS is often accepted as valid because of a widely held 
assumption that EPAS is a dignified extension of good life, enabled by one’s 
freedom of expression of individual autonomy (Dworkin, 1993). Hence the publicly 
often-used phrase, as it was by my informants, of dying with dignity. But most 
informants knew that good life is not lived in this manner. They drew stark contrasts 
between their independent lives prior to acquiring quadriplegia and their good, 
relationally enabled, wellbeing post-disability. Yet they did apply the socially 
dominant individualistic framework to suffering when discussing EPAS. They did 
not call it individual autonomy but they applied an overly individualistic emphasis on 
one’s rights to choose EPAS. The dominant cultural paradigm influences kinds of 
suffering we encounter, such as over-treatment under medically futile conditions; 
how we perceive them; and the kinds of public responses we apply towards them. 
But apparently it did not exert such influence in the informants’ private lives. The 
two opposing paradigms appeared to exist simultaneously, within the one person, 
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though separated in private and public spheres. The informants’ position on EPAS 
therefore appears coherent with dominant social values but not with their private 
experience. The paradigms’ simultaneous co-existence within flourishing informants 
might be regarded as remarkable because they knew that the interdependence 
framework is a practical and viable way to overcome suffering and can lead to 
personal wellbeing. In stark contrast to this private view EPAS has death as an 
outcome in response to suffering.  
In MacIntyre’s terms, flourishing informants could have been expected to 
extend their private experience of interdependence into their reasoning on EPAS. 
After all, independent practical reasoners’ are distinguished by three characteristics. 
The first is an ability to detach oneself from the “immediacy of their desires” (p. 96). 
Informants indeed showed that, in many respects, they had learned to have their own 
needs met within relationships with others and in consideration of their needs. The 
second characteristic is an ability to imagine alternative futures, referring to people in 
relatively independent states being able to think of themselves in more dependent 
states. My informants were well able to think of their futures in this way, having had 
direct experience of an independent life as well as of pronounced dependence. They 
had met this fact by choosing to accept their life as it was. In an illustration of the 
validity and value of such practical reasoning, imagining oneself in a more 
independent state, was associated with unhappiness and a preference for death in 
some informants. On the other hand some informants supported EPAS because they 
learned that “life can do them a funny turn”. There is unpredictability about that fact 
which, for them, was a reason to leave the door open on EPAS. This appears to 
contradict their practical knowledge of shifting forward the boundaries of what kind 
of life was still worth living. Informants therefore seemed to exhibit the third 
characteristic of an independent practical reasoner to a lesser degree than the first 
two characteristics. This characteristic is the ability to recognise and make “true 
practical judgements on a wide variety of kinds of good” (p. 96). In other words my 
informants’ flourishing indicated their status as independent practical reasoners. As 
such they could have been expected to apply their experience of interdependence to 
the good of overcoming suffering, in relation to EPAS. But they did not. 
Flourishing informants could also have been expected to adopt a more 
coherent position with regard to their private and public values, according to 
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Habermas’ (1989) emancipatory, or critical knowledge theory. The dominant 
individualistic paradigm underlies the issue of EPAS in various ways, as discussed. 
My informants’ paradigm of individual autonomy as they apply it to the issue of 
EPAS, exhibits many of Habermas’ characteristics of analytical/empirical 
knowledge. Informants’ views on EPAS involved technical control of the natural 
phenomenon of suffering and dying, under conditions of detached objectivity, 
involving causal relationships between people, that make it “obligatory [to filter] out 
the merely emotive from cognitive contents” (p. 303). The meaning of 
analytical/empirical knowledge is its predictive technical employability, “established 
only by the rules according to which we apply theories to reality” (p. 308). And of 
course, rules to predict safe outcomes of EPAS dominated my informants’ thinking 
also. Including ethical neutrality, enabled through the mechanism of individual 
choice, these characteristics are as much part of the dominant paradigm of 
analytical/empirical knowledge as they are of the informants’ individual autonomy 
paradigm as they apply it to EPAS. In Habermas’ (1989) terms, EPAS appears to 
insufficiently acknowledge a relationship between objective knowledge and human 
interest, as in MacIntyre’s terms such knowledge has been detached from 
conceptions of the human good, that is amelioration of suffering. Habermas calls this 
an illusory state, as analytical/empirical knowledge inevitably has its origin in the 
life-world of human action. This is where the second kind of knowledge, historical–
hermeneutical knowledge, is located. In this study it is constituted by my informants’ 
history and experiences as people with disability. It is concerned with “securing 
human existence” through “reconsolidating the consciousness of the individual in 
relation to the norms of the group” (p. 313). 
Habermas’ third kind of knowledge, critical, or emancipatory knowledge, is 
derived from reflection upon any differences between dominant ideologies and how 
people experience their lives. It involves a comparison between knowledge and 
human interest, which may dispel false consciousness of certain societal realities. 
Dispelling false consciousness in this way appears closely related to MacIntyre’s 
(1999) third characteristic of an independent, practical reasoner which enables one to 
recognise and make “true practical judgements on a wide variety of kinds of good” 
(p. 96). As informants seemed to lack this ability they also appear not to have arrived 
at Habermas’ emancipatory knowledge. Informants, evidencing privately held 
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emancipatory knowledge in their daily life, could be said, in Habermas’ words, to 
have aided “mankind’s evolution towards autonomy12 and responsibility”. However, 
they did not appear to have united their … “knowledge and interest ... nor 
“reconstruct[ed] what has been suppressed” (p. 315). The dominant paradigm, 
analytical/empirical knowledge overrode their private, historical–hermeneutical 
knowledge. One illustrative example of this is their insistence that EPAS could be 
safeguarded with rules within the declining society that they described, ignoring 
obvious links between dominant social values and negative outcomes of its practices. 
Informants had opportunities to reflect on their knowledge and private experience. 
However a presence of their emancipatory knowledge or ability to make judgements 
on a wide variety of human goods, as part of an independent practical reasoner’s 
characteristics, is not apparent. Their apparent false consciousness about the realities 
of suffering and responses towards it, needs to be explained, in order to better 
understand their views on EPAS.  
6.4.1 Explaining false consciousness 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory provides an explanatory 
framework for the informants’ application of opposing frameworks towards 
suffering, one in the private and the other in the public sphere. Festinger’s theory 
would predict that informants would experience an internal discomfort, or cognitive 
dissonance, in the face of this apparent inconsistency between their experience and 
beliefs. But they did not appear to feel any great dissonance. At most they felt some 
confusion and discomfort when discussing EPAS for those who might be suffering 
but did not possess the capacity to make a rational decision for themselves. Festinger 
theorised that where dissonance exists, it might be reduced through personal or 
cultural factors. There are a number of ways in which people try to reduce their 
dissonance. They might reduce their discomfort by changing the view or behaviour 
that causes their dissonance. They might add more cognitions of the type that support 
the view or they might decrease the importance of the elements in the views that 
cause the dissonance. Social support of others might be significant in helping to 
                                                 
12 Autonomy here is used in terms of the relational autonomy that informants expressed in their 
private, daily lives, where independence relied on assistance from others and they had taken on the 
responsibility of accepting this situation. It is that kind of autonomy, which, in Habermas’ terms unites 
knowledge with human interest. 
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personally reduce the dissonance. Cultural dissonance reducers include overt 
dominant beliefs of others and exposure to information emanating from a community 
or society. When many others all experience the same dissonance this can reduce 
one’s own dissonance through being seen as normative. In relation to my findings, 
personal and cultural dissonance reducers often overlap. In the following analysis I 
will try to identify such personal and cultural dissonance reducers as explanatory 
factors for the informants opposing beliefs. Whereas many of these points appear to 
strengthen informants’ views on EPAS they might not be sufficient to indicate why 
there is little dissonance between the informants’ interdependence and individual 
autonomy views. That will be discussed after presentation of these, nevertheless 
relevant, points. 
Information, knowledge and social support: Festinger (1957) explains that 
the greater the number of people that one knows who already agree with one’s own 
opinion, the less will be the magnitude of dissonance created by someone’s 
disagreement. Informants showed a poor conceptual knowledge of EPAS and its 
practice, little knowledge of the suffering involved in dying, and of palliative care. 
Low levels of public knowledge have been identified about the nature and 
effectiveness of rules with regard to EPAS (Kennedy, 2002), about palliative care 
(Enklaar, 1999; MacNamara, 2001; Webster & Kristjanson, 2002) and awareness of 
death and dying (Aries, 1973; Becker, 1974; Gorer, 1955; Kastenbaum, 2000; 
MacNamara, 2001). Their lack of knowledge is a normal experience. So even if they 
were aware of their knowledge as lacking, little dissonance would probably arise 
through the mechanism of social support.  
The mass media appeared to be an important source for their information on 
EPAS. There is little evidence of their use of wider sources of information on the 
subject. Some of their extreme examples of suffering in relation to EPAS were taken 
from television programs. In both Australia and the Netherlands, as in other Western 
countries, there has been a growing trend towards high public approval ratings for 
the practice and legality of EPAS, based on a principle of a right to individual choice, 
over some considerable time. Within such a dominant culture of support for EPAS I 
suggest that media coverage of EPAS issues has mostly been reflective of this level 
of public approval. I have not found any studies of the content and direction of media 
coverage of EPAS but my personal observation of the media coverage in Australia 
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would confirm an atmosphere of majority support for EPAS. In the Netherlands 
information from government, the main physicians’ professional body the 
“Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst” 
(KNMG) and the largest voluntary euthanasia society in the world, the Nederlandse 
Vereniging Voor Euthanasie (NVVE) is overwhelmingly supportive of EPAS. There 
is only some low profile, minority opposition to EPAS in the Netherlands, which is 
constituted mostly by organisations with religious affiliations. Besides, in an 
overwhelmingly secular society like the Netherlands opposition to EPAS from 
religious organisations lacks credibility. During my three-month stay in the 
Netherlands in 2000, I was only aware of, and viewed, a number of television 
programs that were broadly supportive of EPAS. 
Two factors therefore strengthened the informants’ view of support for 
EPAS. Informants had poor and selective knowledge and information on EPAS and 
on directly relevant issues and lacked that knowledge which might counter this 
knowledge. The dominant culture of apparently overwhelming support for EPAS 
probably reduced the possibility of any dissonance arising from their privately held 
belief in interdependence and their use of the dominant social ideology of individual 
autonomy on EPAS. But the combination of poor knowledge of the relevant concepts 
and issues, combined with overt social acceptance of EPAS, based on a right to 
individual choice, strengthened their view on the public issue of EPAS. In this way, 
when discussing EPAS, they mostly used cognitions of the type that support EPAS 
and had the social support for that view, being dissonance reducers.  
Distance from dying and death experience: This issue is related to being 
under-informed. Most informants had little direct exposure to dying. This is a normal 
experience as death is widely a suppressed reality in contemporary Western societies 
and people often die in clinical, medical environments away from the settings of 
daily life (Aries, 1973;Becker, 1974; Gorer, 1955; Kastenbaum, 2000; MacNamara, 
2001). So, dying and death were remote from their daily personal experience and this 
remoteness is normal. They were also distant, as their own death was a future 
scenario, not of immediate impact for themselves, and they were mostly projecting 
EPAS for others. Thus their reflections on death through EPAS for others carried few 
personal implications for themselves. Dissonance between their private view of 
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interdependence in response to suffering and their view of the public issue of EPAS 
would be reduced by the remoteness of the issue in relation to them.  
Relevant to these first two points, Festinger (1962) gives the example that if 
someone were standing in the rain but could see no evidence of getting wet 
dissonance would arise because past experience indicates that this is out of the 
ordinary. If the past experience of rain had never occurred such dissonance might not 
arise. For most of my informants there was no past experience or information that 
indicated to them that EPAS had not been properly functioning in their own country 
or elsewhere. Furthermore this gap in their knowledge is related to a normal 
experience of being under-informed about dying and death, palliative care, the nature 
and practice of EPAS and the nature and effectiveness of its safeguards.  
Internalisation of the dominant worldview: Dissonance can arise from 
dominant cultural norms where that culture can define what is consonant and what is 
not (Festinger, 1957). If one’s own norms were at odds with the dominantly held 
cultural norms, dissonance would be experienced. My informants used the socially 
dominant framework of individual rights to choice in their views on EPAS, a view 
that is also associated with dominant social values of progressivism and rationalism. 
I suggest that their application of the socially dominant framework, rather than the 
interdependence framework, is related to the overwhelming expression of that 
dominant paradigm in the fabric of daily life. At many levels they would receive 
daily messages confirming the validity of that dominant view. As such internal 
values are often held unconsciously (Harman, 1998) it is not surprising that they 
applied these values in describing their views on EPAS, a concept itself shaped by 
these dominant social values. On the other hand, the interdependence worldview, 
valued in their lives, is not socially valued. Dependence and vulnerability in the 
dominant worldview are seen as obstacles towards the desired human status of being 
a rational free agent in a competitive world. The devaluation of people who have 
disabilities is in part related to this view of what it is to be human. Naturally people 
with disabilities would not like to draw attention to their vulnerable and dependent 
states in referring to it in the high-profile EPAS debate where the debate reflects an 
overwhelming support of socially dominant individualist values. Some Dutch leaders 
specifically remarked on the difficulty of calling attention to their vulnerability and 
dependence in a world that did not value these. Seeing EPAS as a public issue and 
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the interdependence view as private functions as a mechanism to reduce dissonance, 
something that I will discuss later.  
Progressivism: If a specific view is, by definition, included in a more general 
view and the two are inconsistent, dissonance arises (Festinger, 1962). But the 
informants included euthanasia with other progressive developments, such as 
legalised abortion and, in the Netherlands, a tolerant approach to drug taking. Their 
support for euthanasia was thus consonant with other issues that are generally 
accepted as progressive and seen as evidence of tolerance. Tolerance and being 
progressive generally being seen as positive, this strengthened their public view of 
EPAS. Progress has since the nineteenth century been seen as modern with its 
themes of emancipation, analysis and secularism. It has a disregard for history in 
“dismis[sing] each yesterday with something like contempt” (Barzun, 2000, p. 521) 
as expressed perhaps in my informants’ faith in technological approaches to a better 
future for people with disabilities while expressing a world of increasing social 
alienation. Progressivism played a role in the historical Dutch euthanasia policy 
process. The necessity of changing the law in line with social change was a dominant 
idea in the Netherlands (Kennedy, 2002; ten Have, 1998). To illustrate the power of 
this idea Kennedy (2002, p. 96) quotes Josephus Jitta in 1986. Mr. Jitta was a Dutch 
President of the Supreme Court, who was involved in some prominent Dutch 
euthanasia cases, and acted as a committee member of the Dutch voluntary 
euthanasia society:  
Some fifteen years ago nude recreation was completely unacceptable: 
presently it has been socially accepted. Society changes. The result is 
that laws have to be adapted. That also goes for euthanasia. 
Therefore EPAS is perceived as good, partly because of its association with 
the valued, socially dominant ideology of progressivism. This is a factor in the 
informants’ support of EPAS as, at least superficially, consonant with their 
experience of interdependence, except that in the interdependence paradigm 
tolerance of others is indeed a virtue and is not indifference as it is in the dominant 
paradigm (ten Have, 1998). Therefore this association of tolerance with EPAS 
strengthened informants’ support for EPAS and might reduce any dissonance or stop 
it from arising when informants discuss EPAS as a public issue. 
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The importance of reason: EPAS is a rational approach to a good death as 
rational agency is an important part in its discussion even though informants gave 
only token support to a need to establish one’s capacity to choose EPAS. Rationality 
has long been seen as more important than experience (Cassell, 1991) or the 
emotional (Goleman, 1996). This is connected to the dominant scientific notion, 
within the analytical–empirical knowledge paradigm, that nothing is real unless it 
can be observed and measured. The interdependence paradigm balances reason and 
emotion in a dynamic process which leads to independent practical reasoning. But 
my informants did not appear to feel much of any dissonance that could be expected 
between this experience and their support for the rational approach in EPAS. Again, I 
suggest that the socially valued paradigm of rationalism reinforced informants’ 
support for EPAS as a public issue.  
The professionalisation of care: Care necessarily has a dual nature and this is 
reflected in the word itself. On the one hand it refers to giving another:  
[S]erious attention and thought; caution to avoid damage or loss, 
protection, supervision; taking charge of; [to] see to the safety and 
wellbeing of; interest, affection or liking. 
 On the other hand it also refers to “worry, anxiety, [to] feel concern” (The 
Australian Oxford Dictionary, 1990). This same duality is expressed for instance in 
the Dutch word zorg. So personal or public health care refers to both the action of 
caring for someone and worry and anxiety as part of it. One could worry or be 
anxious about the other’s suffering. It could also involve the worry, or the cares 
thrust upon carers who become exhausted. It could refer to anxieties that the cared-
for person has, about “having to ask for everything” – their dependency on the other, 
or about feelings of being an undue burden. Any genuine and long-term care 
relationships would likely face these dual dynamics of loving attention and cares. It 
has to necessarily operate within the forcefield of these apparent polarities of care. In 
MacIntyre’s (1999) terms such tension can only be bridged by unconditional 
commitment to one another, involving inevitable trade-offs about one’s own 
immediate welfare. Such care requires the suffering person to be seen as a whole 
person, with unique social, cultural, spiritual and other dimensions (Cassell, 1991). 
Should the inevitability of worry, as a part of care, not be acknowledged we then end 
up with a detached (professional) relationship where the effects of meaningful care 
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are weakened. Commitment to others has become harder to generate, as indicated by 
the informants’ world of increasing alienation. Techno/professional approaches to 
human need have become part of the practices of the dominant value framework 
(Callahan, 1998). This appears reflected in the informants’ preference for detachment 
between a person requesting EPAS and the physician carrying it out as it is in the 
leaders’ perception of people with disabilities being treated as care objects, rather 
than as persons, in their welfare societies. Indeed, the power of the technocratic 
world has influenced our values and ethics away from the notion of a human being as 
a whole person (Kass, 1985). Western society values maximum individual 
independence (Ells, 2001; MacIntyre, 1999; Wendell, 1996). It has commodified 
much care into goods and services and prefers technocratic and managerialist 
approaches to human need (Barzun, 2000; Cocks, 1994, 1998). Conversely it exhibits 
a reduced tolerance for suffering, imperfection, dependence and fragility in a world 
in which everything is potentially makeable and controllable (Barzun, 2000). Hence 
our worry about suffering of others that we cannot solve, but only palliate or support, 
can be taken away, in the dominant paradigm, by reaching out to professional 
expertise and technology, in the form of medical killing. My informants’ support for 
EPAS in order to ameliorate the suffering of others that results from observing a 
loved one die, could be explained in this way. It is coherent with the socially 
dominant way of dealing with some problems of suffering. Dissonance between the 
informants’ two beliefs of interdependence and autonomy might have been expected, 
as they knew the value of engageing with others in both senses of care. But for them 
the application of dominant social values of professionalism and technology, when 
discussing EPAS as a public issue, reduced any dissonance, should it even have 
arisen.  
The medical imprimatur: The medical profession is a very powerful one in 
Western culture. Physicians are not only central, trusted figures within the large 
Western public and commercial health care infrastructures but also function as 
gatekeepers to many state entitlements. This is a familiar phenomenon to many 
people with disabilities. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that my informants 
echoed the main public discourse on EPAS, when they allocated a central role to 
doctors in assessing capacity to make decisions for oneself to have EPAS. While 
expressing caution in trusting doctors in this process they also needed doctors for 
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access to killing drugs, their expertise in administering them and assessments of 
capacity to choose EPAS. Doctors, by their professional “white coat” status lend 
legitimacy to the process of EPAS. They can, by virtue of that status, make killing 
part of the socially valued medical profession’s practice. By virtue of their social 
status doctors can influence our behaviour and how we morally judge our own 
actions, as Stanley Milgram (1974) has so famously shown. The legitimacy that 
doctors can lend to medical killing may have bridged any discomfort informants may 
have felt about supporting EPAS as a public issue while holding a private, 
apparently opposing paradigm. Any dissonance between the informants’ knowledge 
of the healing powers of reciprocal relationships and allowing a person to be killed 
by their own choice in order to ameliorate their suffering might therefore not arise or 
is lessened by it. Furthermore, the use of physicians in EPAS is a widely shared 
social assumption allowing the cultural dominant norms to further support the 
informants’ views on EPAS. 
Rules for trust: Because of an unequal relationship between patient and 
doctor, informants expressed a degree of distrust in physicians’ role in EPAS. They 
suggested several safeguards to this situation. They wanted family and friends 
involved in the EPAS decision-making process. Most of all they wanted strict rules, 
within a legal framework, to safeguard EPAS from being abused. This framework 
reflects the type of relationships which, in MacIntyre’s terms would be the socially 
more influential conception of practical reasoning. Dissonance could be expected to 
arise at this point as they also knew of the effects of bureaucracy in having their 
disability-related support needs limited. In their private relationships, personal 
commitment and trust in others, in meeting their sometimes-intimate needs, provided 
the bridge between negative feelings about dependence on others and their 
flourishing. Within the unequal doctor–patient power relationship, where the price of 
professionalism is reduced personal commitment to the patient, rules must provide 
the bridge. The use of rules as safeguards to abuse of EPAS is a part of technical 
solution to the (social) problem of suffering. This normative social paradigm of 
preference for technical solutions could thus reduce any dissonance about support for 
EPAS as a public issue versus their experience of the validity of the interdependence 
framework. Their ignorance about the precise nature and effectiveness of rules as 
safeguards did not matter to them, especially as this too is part of the normal social 
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experience. It was enough to know they were there, or should be there, as a means of 
adding cognitions that supported their view on EPAS. 
In conclusion I suggest that all of the above factors play a role in 
strengthening the informants’ views on EPAS, which they describe as a public issue. 
They mostly do not see EPAS as applicable to themselves, and certainly not for 
reason of their disability. Crucially these factors point to a division between the 
informants’ private world and their view on the public issue of EPAS. Combined, 
these dimensions of reinforcement of their view on EPAS and the private/public 
division explain why there is little dissonance between their opposing paradigmatic 
attitudes towards suffering in their private world and in their views about EPAS. 
They lack information and experience, which might contradict some of their views 
on EPAS. This gap in knowledge and experience contributes to a certain remoteness 
of their private world of interdependence in relation to the world of others. A number 
of socially dominant values are consonant with their views on EPAS. These values 
include respect for individual rights to choice, progressivism and rationalism, 
identifiable as belonging in Habermas’ (1989) dominant empirical–analytical 
knowledge paradigm. Associated with this knowledge are technological, detached 
approaches to care, the imprimatur of medical technical expertise and a faith in a 
technological approach to trust. These dominant values play an influential role in 
preventing any dissonance, which might arise if informants would reflect on the 
different types of knowledge within the private and public spheres. But the division 
between the private and public, which is facilitated by their gap in knowledge about 
EPAS, dying and palliative care, mililitates against such reflection. 
However there are further influences that maintain the division between their 
private and public worlds, which provide further explanation for the lack of apparent 
dissonance. Within Reinders’ (2000) subjective view of their lives, most informants 
led a fulfilling, rewarding life. They had outgrown suffering by means of 
acknowledging dependence and vulnerability within meaningful relationships. In the 
objective view from the outside they might think to themselves that they might 
choose a life without this task, if they had a choice – by means of EPAS. Indeed, as 
indicated by some leader-informants and others (Pijnenburg, 1998; ten Have, 1998), 
some might think that some people like those with disabilities ought to be entitled to 
choose EPAS for reason of disability. It is difficult to integrate the objective view 
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into the subjective view grounded in one’s own experience without having the 
detached objective view undermine the commitment, which enables the care, and 
flourishing, in one’s lived, subjective experience to occur, as “simply a waste of 
energy” (Reinders, 2000, p. 81). Such alienation from their valuable private 
experience may thus have played a role in the few informants’ view of EPAS as 
something that could deliver them from their life with disability, a life which 
appeared as relatively poor in committed relationships. Furthermore, in a world that 
does not value dependence and vulnerability, informants appeared to have found it 
difficult to insert their private experience into the discussion of the public issue on 
EPAS. Indeed informants did not mention dependence on others as a reason to have 
EPAS, even though studies have found this to be a strong motivator underlying 
requests for it (van der Maas, van Delden & Pijnenborg, 1991; Oregon’s Death With 
Dignity Act, 2000). Confirming the presence of a social background which highly 
values individual independence and views the dependency of disability as 
humiliating (Wendell, 1996), a leader spoke of being seen as “wimps” if the Dutch 
disability movement would discuss disability in such terms. These are reasons why it 
was difficult to integrate one’s private experience into the public objective view, 
something believed to be true for anyone (Reinders, 2000). It may in part explain 
why my informants kept a division between the private and the public, with an effect 
of suppressing any dissonance between their private experiences and views on the 
public issue of EPAS. 
Dividing our world into private and public spheres has further importance in 
relation to the underlying right to choice in the EPAS debate. According to Reinders 
(2000), a minimalist or narrow approach to publicly enforceable morals is derived 
from the widely divergent individual, private views in the pluralistic, liberal society. 
In that liberal view of the world public morality does not provide a single concept of 
what is good life and does not provide guidance in private lives. Inevitably social 
conflicts will arise but the dominant social values of individual freedom and equality 
will make a distinction between what level of morality is in the private or public 
spheres. Public morality confines itself to outlining the conditions by which persons 
can arrive at a moral conception for themselves and live by that. In other words, 
public morality accords people individual rights to choice and self-determination by 
which they make their own moral decisions. Public morality in liberal society does 
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not concern itself with the morality of individual choices as long as their 
consequences remain in that person’s private sphere. Public morality then can only 
operate at a level of narrow morality, at the consensus level of individual autonomy. 
Reinders (2000) points out that there are more demanding or wider moral values than 
those of choice and self-determination, such as benevolence and generosity. These 
values are found “in a civilised and flourishing society, but they are not necessary for 
the possibility of public justification”(p. 14). My informants used a wider morality in 
their daily, interdependent lives, by which they flourished. They drew values of 
empathy, patience, candour, persistence and acceptance from the practice of their 
relational lives.  
On the issue of EPAS the informants reduced their dissonance between the 
interdependence framework and their beliefs about the role of individual autonomy 
by applying the narrow, public morality to individual decision-making about life and 
death. They might not agree with the person’s choice for EPAS. In fact they 
preferred that all were done to relieve suffering first, some evidence perhaps of their 
attempt to apply the interdependence view to EPAS. But if, in spite of everything, the 
person insisted on EPAS they could justify that by according them a right to self-
determination. There was no need for them to use wider morality, such as 
represented by the virtues they had acquired. Dissonance need not arise by applying 
the tolerance of allowing others the right to choose, requiring no further worry about 
what led to the request for EPAS. They thereby avoided any need to attempt the 
difficult task of integrating their subjective and objective views, which would have 
provided tensions, which might, on reflection, have led to critical knowledge, or 
perhaps to alienation. Ten Have (1998) illustrates the different natures of the narrow 
and wide approaches to EPAS as follows:  
In a policy of toleration, one asks different questions than in a 
normative policy, where one would ask questions of happiness and 
palliative efforts to accomplish agreed-upon goals at the end of life. 
Thus supplying euthanasia can easily be a substitute, a kind of 
indifference, for what people really want. (p. 220)  
The influences of the dominant paradigm then overwhelmingly tend to 
suppress any dissonance that informants might have felt between their private 
experience and support for EPAS. Festinger (1957) believed that the more internal 
dissonance is reduced the more difficult it becomes to shift beliefs.  
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6.5 Research question 4. 
Do cross-national disability perspectives on the above issues lead 
to deeper understanding of and insight into the issues of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and their practical 
applications? 
There is no substantial difference in the responses or national contexts 
between the Dutch and Australian samples. But there was a difference between 
grassroots and leader samples. Leader informants showed a greater awareness of 
EPAS, palliative care; had more experience with issues of dying; and appealed to 
relational autonomy in relation to EPAS while noting an opposition to EPAS by 
most of the Australian leader sample. Juxtaposing the similar grassroots findings, one 
set arising from a Western country with some 30 years experience of allowing EPAS 
and another from one with less experience appears to validate the suggestion of 
significant influence of dominant social values in thinking about EPAS as a public 
issue. Australia and the Netherlands are both liberal democracies where the paradigm 
of individual choice to goods is strong, including in EPAS. There is agreement 
among EPAS proponents and opponents of two major trends that underlie the Dutch 
(Enklaar, 1999; Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; ten Have, 1998), Australian 
(Magnusson, 2002; Somerville, 2000) and other Western societies’ (Callahan & 
Hanson, 1998; Callahan, 1994;Griffiths, Bood & Weyers, 1998; Mann, 1998) 
debates about EPAS. These are the interrelated trends of the dominance of an 
individualist paradigm, which values individual autonomy and choice; and an overly 
techno-medical approach to health care. The similarity in findings also confirms the 
suggestion that this influence of the dominant paradigm helps to suppress the 
acknowledgement of private experience as one of value to questions of human 
suffering and end-of-life decision making.  
6.6 Conclusion  
The findings in response to my first research question are that both Dutch and 
Australian parts of this study’s sample support legal EPAS as a public policy. Their 
support seems close to the high levels and the substance of public support for EPAS. 
They based their views on relatively uninformed, and indirect, knowledge of relevant 
issues such as the concepts and practice of EPAS, dying and palliative care. Their 
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position in support of EPAS appears inherently problematic, primarily because the 
informants’ construct of EPAS would make safeguarding of an EPAS policy 
difficult. Any concerns about abuse were allayed by insistence on strict safeguards. 
These appeared unenforceable however within the open-ended parameters that 
informants applied to an individual’s right to choose for EPAS based on individually 
assessed subjective experience of unbearable suffering. The dominant social values 
of individual autonomy, including individualism, materialism, progressivism and 
rationalism are involved in the informants’ construct of EPAS.  
Findings in relation to the second research question are that informants 
successfully applied an interdependence paradigm, found in their private experience, 
to threats to their physical, psychological and social integrity, or intactness as a 
whole person. These threats were in essence the same as those they identified as 
valid reasons for others to have EPAS. In the interdependence paradigm, which is 
little valued in society, these threats were transformed by embracing and outgrowing 
them, resulting in a personal level of wellbeing, or flourishing. Applying the 
societally valued dominant paradigm of individual autonomy to such threats led to 
avoidance of suffering through death assisted by EPAS. The findings in relation to 
the third research question are that the stark contrasts in the natures and outcomes of 
the two paradigms did not apparently lead to any significant cognitive dissonance 
within informants. It appeared then that they might hold their view on EPAS as 
Habermas’ (1989) “false consciousness”, having failed to recognise the opposing 
natures of the two paradigms applied to the single issue of suffering. Consequently 
they did not reflect on any such tensions and did not develop critical knowledge on 
the realities associated with the nature of suffering and its amelioration. 
There appear to be four interrelated reasons for the informants’ apparent non-
development of critical knowledge. Firstly, much of their knowledge of issues that 
were relevant to the EPAS issue was not well informed. Secondly, they divided their 
experience and views into two spheres: their experience of interdependence into a 
private sphere and their views on EPAS into a public sphere. They did this based on 
some remoteness of the issue of EPAS to their own experience and to protect 
themselves from any devaluation of their private experience. Thirdly, the dominant 
social, paradigm of individual autonomy exerted overwhelming influence on their 
views on EPAS. This was so because EPAS as a public issue was consonant with the 
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dominant paradigm, which makes up much of the public sphere. Fourthly, an 
ideology of individual choice, which is embedded within this dominant paradigm, 
allowed informants to avoid using their private experience of interdependence in 
informing the issue of EPAS. The first two reasons facilitated a feeling of remoteness 
from the issue of EPAS as one concerning others. The third reinforced their views on 
EPAS as socially valid. The fourth allowed them to defer the EPAS question of wide 
morality to a mechanism of value-free individual choice, therefore not requiring 
engagement with values embedded in their private experience. These are powerful 
reasons for not feeling much dissonance between their private experience and public 
views and for not developing critical knowledge. However, these conclusions should 
be treated cautiously in view of the framework of relational autonomy that leaders 
applied to EPAS, in contrast to the grassroots sample. It can only be suggested that 
the greater awareness that leaders displayed of dying and palliative care meant that 
they had greater opportunities to develop critical knowledge. No conclusions can be 
drawn from this contrast between grassroots and leader samples in view of the small, 
unsaturated leader sample. 
The finding in response to the fourth research question is that there is little 
difference between the findings in both countries. A similar value culture appears to 
exist in both the Netherlands and Australia in relation to values applied to end-of-life 
decision-making such as EPAS. These results appear to confirm the conclusion of the 
strong influence of the dominant values of individual autonomy in responding to 
public policy such as EPAS.  
The informants’ experience and practice within the interdependence 
paradigm appears to offer much of value in relation to amelioration of suffering. The 
paradigm seems not only relevant to people with quadriplegia but there is evidence 
of its wider presence and utility, among ageing and dying persons. As such it appears 
as a practical response to the human condition. The interdependence approach 
appears as part of human nature, with the dual benefits of outgrowing of suffering 
and achievement of individual and communal wellbeing, or flourishing. Indeed, these 
and others’ findings appear to confirm MacIntyre’s (1999) argument of the 
universality of his interdependence theory. That is, his theory is applicable to all 
human beings viewed over their lifetime. However, other parts in our human nature 
such as prejudice towards devalued others, such as people with intellectual disability 
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or other cognitive impairments, also existed in some flourishing informants who had 
acknowledged vulnerability and dependence in their own lives. This finding does not 
counter the validity of MacIntyre’s concept of practical independent reasoners 
however. It probably demonstrates different levels of personal growth, or phronesis, 
among individual informants within the interdependence paradigm and within the 
complexity of multi-faceted human nature and condition. As MacIntyre, Reinders 
(2000), Luke (1987) and many other studies, besides mine, have demonstrated, the 
personal growth process involving value change, in relationship with others, is itself 
an important source of wellbeing. In such a view of respect for differential rates of 
individual growth, equal intrinsic worth is presumed to be possessed by every human 
being under an assumption that all human beings have potential for inner growth, 
which is immeasurable. In the interdependence view committed relationships 
constitute effective safeguards against suffering and in maintaining wellbeing. By 
contrast the dominant paradigm, which holds that respect for individual autonomy in 
itself enables a good and dignified life and death, appears to be less reflective of 
human nature, at least in its approach to a goal of non-suffering. Individual 
flourishing or outgrowing of suffering is not part of it. In the dominant paradigm’s 
view the lives of those who do not possess sufficient rational agency are valued 
differently from those who do and therefore become more vulnerable to abuse of 
EPAS. This paradigm must rely on regulation as safeguards against suffering within 
its context of more detached relationships. Based on my informants’ views, 
regulation has been shown to be problematic as it has in (Dutch) practice. 
The potential contribution of the privately experienced interdependence 
paradigm by means of its transfer to the public policy issue of EPAS appears 
thwarted by a range of factors, which are mostly related to an overwhelming 
influence of dominant social values associated with individualism, including its 
mechanism of individual choice. This dominant paradigm also contains seeds of the 
heightened vulnerability of many people with disabilities. Disability, if understood as 
primarily characterised by a high level of vulnerability and dependence, is part of the 
human condition, as MacIntyre argues. The contemporary context of widespread 
social and environmental turbulence and decline, within which current and future 
EPAS policy, with its inherently problematic nature, is administered, may pose 
further challenges to our social ethics. Because of widespread unacknowledged 
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vulnerability and dependency, these challenges would not just be pertinent to people 
with disabilities, but to anyone.  
Given the wide relevance of the interdependence paradigm it is more likely 
than not that many of its virtues are expressed in many citizens’ daily lives. Despite 
the overwhelming nature of the presence of the dominant value system my 
informants have suggested that the interdependence paradigm can be chosen at any 
time. However, the interdependence paradigm seems to especially emerge out of 
necessity, at times when people face grave threats to their wellbeing. My findings 
can be seen as a dual contribution from subjugated knowledge arising from disability 
experience. This contribution is firstly that the private interdependence paradigm is 
of practical value in response to suffering and may lead to human flourishing. 
Secondly, one cannot assume that the experience of interdependence and practice of 
its virtues, will necessarily be transfered to public policy as a source of wider social 
values by people who have privately adopted the interdependence paradigm. 
 My findings suggest that the interdependence paradigm is a practical and 
rewarding approach to suffering, including at end of life, and superior to the 
individual autonomy paradigm. However any consideration of adoption of the 
interdependence paradigm in public policy towards suffering, including at the end of 
life, ought to not only acknowledge the utility of the interdependence paradigm. It is 
not enough to acknowledge human dependency and vulnerability. The influences of 
the dominant social values of an individualistic concept of autonomy and complex 
human nature, which involves prejudice, must also be acknowledged if the 
interdependence framework is to emerge in public policy in the area of end-of-life 
care and decision-making. 
6.7 Further research 
In order to further test the validity of this study I suggest that it be replicated 
using samples of people with different types of disability and with non-disabled 
populations. This study suggests that grassroots people with disabilities may hold 
different views on EPAS than do leaders in disability movements. Comparitive 
studies between these two groups may contribute to a greater understanding of 
various disability perspectives in this area. Furthermore studies of the applicability of 
the interdependence paradigm to other bio-ethical issues and to public social policy 
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of various kinds may or may not demonstrate its wider utility. Studies of the extent to 
which non-disabled persons might experience a private–public divide on bio-ethical 
questions, including EPAS, may shed further light on my findings. Finally, this study 
found suggestions of EPAS performed on non-terminally ill people with disabilities 
and one case of apparent coercion to have EPAS. There appear to be few studies of 
the incidence and nature of such phenomena in this area. Such research, both in 
countries where euthanasia and physician-assisted practices are legal and illegal, may 
introduce valuable empirical data into social and ethical debates on EPAS. 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
Dear  
 
Project title:  “Attitudes towards euthanasia and assisted suicide by people with 
disabilities in the Netherlands and Australia: Cross-national 
perspectives”. 
 
Researcher: Erik Leipoldt, phone and fax (h/w)  
 
  Email: ealeipol@student.cowan.edu.au
 
I am doing this research for a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Human 
Services at Edith Cowan University. I also have a personal interest both 
through having experience of disability myself (I have quadriplegia and 
use a wheelchair) since 1978 as well as being involved in disability 
services, advocacy, advocacy development and policy advice for some 15 
years. 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify how the perspectives of people 
with quadriplegia and those of some leaders in disability movements may 
contribute to learning more about euthanasia and assisted suicide and 
why it may or may not be a good idea to practice it.  
 
This seems an important question as it is known that people with 
disabilities are seldom heard in public debates on these issues. Through 
interviews, I aim to collect the feelings, stories and thoughts about this 
directly from people with quadriplegia and disability movement leaders. I 
hope that what I find out by doing this research will help people, with or 
without disabilities, and those in positions to make decisions about 
euthanasia to more fully understand this situation, so that their views and 
circumstances can be taken into account. 
 
Interviews will last from one to two hours and it may be necessary to 
meet with you twice if you have more to say or I need to check something 
with you. In any case I will need to check with you, sometime after the 
interview, whether my descriptions of the experiences you’ve told me 
about are correct. 
 
All interviews will be done in your preferred location, provided I can get 
there with my wheelchair. Interviews will be done in private and will be 
audio taped. You will be able to stop the tape at any time, and ask that 
anything is removed from the tape. Nobody’s name will be on the tape. 
Each tape will have a code number only. What is on the tapes will be 
typed up and these papers will also have numbers only. Any others who 
may have access to the data, such as transcribers, will have signed an 
assurance of confidentiality. When the research has been finished, 
anticipated by March, 2002, the tapes will be wiped. Participants may 
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have their interview tape(s) sent to them instead if they wish. Meanwhile 
the tapes will be kept in a safe location, where only the researcher can get 
access. No names will be used in the final report and any quotations of 
what anybody said will remain anonymous. The master list matching 
names to codes on tapes and transcripts will be kept in locked storage. 
 
During the course of the study you have the right to withdraw at any time 
and request the return of your data. 
 
ELIGIBILITY 
There are some eligibility requirements for participants. Please consider them 
carefully and ask me questions if they seem unclear in any way: 
 
• Participants must have had a cervical spinal injury for no less than five years,  
• Quadriplegia is acquired as a result of trauma and not through disease,  
• Persons who are suffering from clinical depression are not eligible to participate 
given the sensitive nature of the research. 
It is thus important that you withdraw from participation should you be 
experiencing depression.  
 
I can be contacted on the above numbers and e-mail should you have 
questions at any time. Alternatively you may contact my Principal 
Supervisor Dr. Alan Tapper on 08 94005555 or via e-mail: 
a.tapper@cowan.edu.au. 
 
Whereas your confidentiality is protected you should note that this does 
not extend to issues of abuse and neglect, should the researcher come 
across any in the course of this study, as the researcher may be legally 
obliged to report these.  
 
Thank you for participation. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
Erik Leipoldt 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup 6017 
Faculty of Community Services, Education & Social Science. 
 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of this study, counselling is available, 
should you need this, during, or after your participation in this study. 
 
You may contact X on tel. … or pager …. She is aware of this study. 
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I, 
_________________________________________ 
hereby agree to participate as a volunteer in the above named project. 
 
I hereby give permission to be interviewed and for these interviews to be 
tape recorded. I understand that only the researcher, transcribers, co-
coder and myself will have access to the data obtained, and that there will 
be no identifying evidence on any disks, cassettes and transcripts. I also 
understand that the information may be published, but my name will not 
be associated with the research. 
 
I understand that I am free to not answer any questions. I also understand 
that I am free to withdraw my consent and terminate my participation at 
any time, without penalty. 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask whatever question I desire, and 
all such questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I am, to the best of my knowledge not clinically depressed and have had 
my spinal injury for more than five years. 
 
Would you please tick to clearly indicate your agreement with the 
following two statements and sign below. Thank you. 
 
Yes I agree to participate by being interviewed  __ 
I agree to the interview being tape recorded   __ 
 
Signed: 
 
Participant__________________________   
 
Date______/______/______ 
 
 
Witness_____________________________  
 
Date______/______/______ 
 
 
Researcher__________________________  
 
Date______/______/______ 
 
 
Witness_____________________________ 
 
Date______/______/______ 
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APPENDIX A(NL) 
 
 
Geachte  
 
Studie titel:  “De houdingen tegenover euthanasie door mensen met 
handicaps in Nederland en Australie: Internationale 
perspectieven.  
 
Onderzoeker: Erik Leipoldt. Tel. en fax (  
 
Kunt u mij misschien helpen? Ik heb een klein aantal mensen nodig 
die geinterviewd zouden willen worden door mij over 
bovengenoemd onderwerp. Ik zoek naar een aantal mensen met 
cervicale dwarslaesie en wat toonaangevende sleutelfiguren in de 
brede Nederlandse gehandicaptenbeweging. Tussen mei en juni 
2000 zal ik in Nederland zijn voor interviews. 
 
Ik doe mijn onderzoek voor een doctorale graad in ‘Human 
Services’ bij de Edith Cowan University, in Perth, West Australie, 
waar ik sinds 1976 woon toen ik hier uit Nederland als 22 jarige 
kwam. Ik heb zelf een handicap, een nek dwarslaesie, sinds 1978. 
Ik ben werkzaam geweest hier in belangenbehartiging voor mensen 
met handicaps en dienst- en advies verlening en doe deze studie nu 
full-time. Ik zal er in maart 2002 mee klaar moeten zijn. 
 
Het doel van mijn onderzoek is uit te vinden hoe de perspectieven 
van mensen met dwarslaesies en ook van leiders in de 
gehandicapten beweging bij zouden kunnen dragen aan een verder 
begrip over euthanasie. 
 
Dit lijkt een belangrijk vraagstuk want het schijnt dat de opinies 
van mensen met handicaps weinig of niet aan bod komen in het 
publieke euthanasie debat. Terwijl ik hoop dat mensen met 
handicaps verse perspectieven hierover kunnen bijdragen tot nut 
van mensen met en zonder een handicap. Door middel van 
interviews hoop ik de gevoelens, opinies, verhalen en gedachten 
hierover direct van mensen met handicaps te vernemen. Zulk een 
onderzoek is, zover ik weet, nog nooit uitgevoerd..  
 
Ik heb een voorkeur voor deelnemers met een dwarslaesie in 
Noord- of Zuid-Holland daar ik zelf in Purmerend of Amsterdam 
gebaseerd zal zijn. Ik zoek naar mensen die op zijn minst vijf jaar 
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een dwarslaesie hebben, veroorzaakt door een ongeluk, operatie 
e.d., en niet dus door een ziekte van de een of andere aard. Ik zoek 
tot een aantal van zo’n 15 mensen in deze categorie. 
 
U kunt ook vragen stellen aan mijn mentor, Dr. Alan Tapper op 61 
8 94005555 or via e-mail: a.tapper@cowan.edu.au. 
 
Ik hoop van u te horen. Als u denkt anderen te weten die aan deze 
studie mee zouden willen werken in een interview (mensen met 
cervicale dwarslaesie in Noord en Zuid-Holland of/en leiders in de 
Nederlandse gehandicaptenbeweging) zou ik dat graag van u 
vernemen.  
 
Met vriendelijke groeten,  
 
 
 
Erik Leipoldt 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Dear 
 
Your name has been suggested to me as one of a person who fulfils a 
leadership role in the disability movement in Australia. In that capacity I am asking 
you whether you might be interested to participate, by means of 1 or 2 telephone 
interviews, in my Ph.D. study entitled “Attitudes towards euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide held by people with disabilities in the Netherlands and Australia: 
Cross-national perspectives”. 
 
The purpose of my study is to identify how people with disabilities and leaders in the 
disability movements in both countries may contribute fresh perspectives to the 
general euthanasia debate. I have interviewed a number of persons in the Netherlands 
and am now commencing interviews in Australia. 
 
I have some personal interest as I have had quadriplegia myself (C 5/6) since 1978. I 
have also had involvement in disability services, advocacy- advocacy development 
and policy advice. 
 
My study seems important as it is known that perspectives of people with disabilities 
are seldom publicly heard on this issue. Their unique experiences and perspectives 
may well benefit the general euthanasia debate. Through interviews I aim to collect 
the stories and thoughts about my topic directly from people with disabilities and 
leaders in disability movements. 
 
I hope that my findings will assist people, with or without a disability, to gain further 
understanding on this sensitive and complex issue. 
 
Interviews, done by phone or e-mail where necessary, take between 1 and 2 hours 
and there may be a need for a follow-up interview. If you are interested in being 
interviewed by me I would appreciate hearing from you. I can then answer any 
questions you may have and send you full information on confidentiality, consent 
giving, and other matters. Depending on numbers needed and participant criteria 
being met I may not interview all interested persons. I will of course let you know 
about that as soon as possible. 
 
HOW TO MAKE CONTACT: 
You can ring me on (  On the first number you can leave a 
message for me to return your call if necessary or send a fax. You may also contact 
me by e-mail on: ealeipol@student.cowan.edu.au . Additionally you may also 
contact my Supervisors Dr. Alan Tapper or Dr. Bob Jackson, at Edith Cowan 
University on (08) 94005555 or by e-mail a.tapper@cowan.edu.au or 
r.jackson@cowan.edu.au. 
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Thank you for taking the time to read my letter. I hope you will consider 
participating and I look forward to hearing from you. I will be pleased to answer any 
questions you may have. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
Erik Leipoldt  
B.Soc.Sci. Human Services (Hons, 1st Class), Assoc.Dip. Arts (Human Service 
Administration) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Project title:  “Attitudes towards euthanasia and assisted suicide by people with 
disabilities in the Netherlands and Australia: Cross-national 
perspectives”. 
 
Researcher: Erik Leipoldt, phone and fax (  
 
  Email: ealeipol@student.cowan.edu.au
 
I am doing this research for a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Human 
Services at Edith Cowan University. I also have a personal interest both 
through having experience of disability myself (I have quadriplegia and 
use a wheelchair) since 1978 as well as being involved in disability 
services, advocacy, advocacy development and policy advice for some 15 
years. 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify how the perspectives of people 
with quadriplegia and those of some leaders in disability movements may 
contribute to learning more about euthanasia and assisted suicide and 
why it may or may not be a good idea to practice it.  
 
This seems an important question as it is known that people with 
disabilities are seldom heard in public debates on these issues. Through 
interviews, I aim to collect the feelings, stories and thoughts about this 
directly from people with quadriplegia as well as from disability 
movement leaders. I hope that what I find in this research will help 
people, with or without disabilities, and those in positions to make 
decisions about euthanasia to more fully understand this situation, so that 
their views and circumstances can be taken into account. 
 
Interviews will last from one to two hours and it may be necessary to 
meet with you twice if you have more to say or I need to check something 
with you. In any case I will need to check with you, sometime after the 
interview, whether my descriptions of the experiences you’ve told me 
about are correct. 
 
Interstate interviews will be done per telephone or by e-mail. If by phone, 
they will be taped. You will be able to stop the tape at any time, and ask 
that anything is removed from the tape. Nobody’s name will be on the 
tape. Each tape will have a code number only. What is on the tapes will 
be typed up and these papers will also have numbers only. Any others 
who may have access to the data, such as transcribers, will have signed an 
assurance of confidentiality. When the research has been finished, 
anticipated by March, 2002, the tapes will be wiped. Participants may 
have their interview tape(s) sent to them instead if they wish. Meanwhile 
the tapes will be kept in a safe location, where only the researcher can get 
access. No names will be used in the final report and any quotations of 
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what anybody said will remain anonymous. The master list matching 
names to codes on tapes and transcripts will be kept in locked storage. 
 
During the course of the study you have the right to withdraw at any time 
and request the return of your data. 
 
There may be a need to disguise your identity in the final presentation of 
data in consideration of the fact that the disability field is small and 
descriptive data could lead to your identification. This will be discussed 
with you. 
 
Whereas your confidentiality is protected you should note that this does 
not extend to issues of abuse and neglect, should the researcher come 
across any in the course of this study, as the researcher may be legally 
obliged to report these.  
 
I can be contacted on the above numbers and e-mail should you have 
questions at any time. Alternatively you may contact my Principal 
Supervisor Dr. Alan Tapper on 61 8 94005555 or via e-mail: 
a.tapper@cowan.edu.au. 
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I, 
_________________________________________ 
hereby agree to participate as a volunteer in the above named project. 
 
I hereby give permission to be interviewed and for these interviews to be 
tape recorded. I understand that only the researcher, transcribers, co-
coder and myself will have access to the data obtained, and that there will 
be no identifying evidence on any disks, cassettes and transcripts. I also 
understand that the information may be published, but my name will not 
be associated with the research. 
 
I understand that I am free to not answer any questions. I also understand 
that I am free to withdraw my consent and terminate my participation at 
any time, without penalty. 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask whatever question I desire, and 
all such questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
Yes I agree to participate by being interviewed  __ (tick) 
 
I agree to the interview being tape recorded   __ (tick) 
 
Signed: 
 
Participant__________________________ 
 Date______/______/______ 
 
Witness_____________________________ 
 Date______/______/______ 
 
Researcher__________________________ 
 Date______/______/______ 
 
Witness_____________________________ 
 Date______/______/______ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Dear  
“Attitudes of people with disabilities towards euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide in the Netherlands and Australia: Cross-national perspectives” 
 
Following our earlier conversation this month, about distribution of my letter to a 
number of people with spinal injury in connection with my Ph.D. research I write to 
you again. 
 
Please see enclosed 30 copies of my letter, on Edith Cowan University letterhead. 
The University’s Ethics Committee has approved it and a copy of their letter to me 
advising thus is also enclosed. My research proposal was approved by them in 
January 2000. Please feel free to contact Dr. Crothers (Ethics Committee Eecutive 
Officer) or one of my supervisors (Dr. Alan Tapper on 94005555 or Dr. Bob Jackson 
on 94005659).  
 
I would greatly appreciate it if you would distribute these letters, with your cover 
note if you wish, to potential participants in my research.  
 
I can also advise you that ‘X’ has agreed to be available to speak with any 
participants who, given the research topic, may have personal difficulties in the 
course of participation. Thus far, after some pilot interviews in Perth and 14 
interviews in the Netherlands, any counselling has, to my knowledge, fortunately not 
been necessary. Participants are individually informed before commencement of the 
interview that this counselling is available and are given Ms. Beer’s contact details. 
They are also asked whether they suffer from depression or have done so in the past. 
 
I would appreciate it if you would select 30 people with cervical spinal 
injury, i.e. quadriplegia. I would ask you to select no fewer than 8 female persons in 
this sample. I will of course inform all responding persons whether or not I require 
their participation. This will depend on the response rate and content of interviews. 
 
Further criteria for potential participants are: 
• Resident of Perth/Fremantle metropolitan area. 
• Having had cervical spinal injury (quadriplegia) for no less than 5 years,  
• Not being treated for clinical depression or suspected to be depressed,  
• Injury as a result of trauma, not disease,  
• A range of shorter-term to longer-term experience and different levels of 
quadriplegia is desirable in the targeted sample. 
 
Would you please advise me of the date of distribution of the letters and of the cost 
associated with this mail-out? Thank you. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further details you may require. 
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Thank you again for agreeing to offer your assistance in this matter. I greatly 
appreciate it. 
 
Sincerely,  
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APPENDIX D(NL)  
 
 
Studie titel:  “De houdingen tegenover euthanasie door mensen met 
handicaps in Nederland en Australie: Internationale 
perspectieven.  
 
Onderzoeker: Erik Leipoldt. Tel. en fax (   
 
 
 
Geachte mevrouw, heer,  
 
Kunt u mij misschien helpen? Ik heb een klein aantal mensen 
nodig, die geinterviewd zouden willen worden door mij over 
bovengenoemd onderwerp. Ik zoek naar een aantal mensen met een 
cervicale dwarslaesie en enkele toonaangevende sleutelfiguren in 
de brede Nederlandse gehandicaptenbeweging. Tussen mei en juni 
2000 zal ik in Nederland zijn voor interviews. 
 
Ik doe mijn onderzoek voor een doctorale graad in ‘Human 
Services’ bij de Edith Cowan University, in Perth, West-Australie, 
waar ik sinds 1976 woon, toen ik hier uit Nederland als 22-jarige 
kwam. Ik heb zelf sinds 1978 een handicap, een cervicale 
dwarslaesie. Ik ben hier werkzaam geweest in belangenbehartiging 
voor mensen met handicaps en in dienst- en advies –verlening. 
Deze studie doe ik nu full-time. Ik zal er in maart 2002 mee klaar 
moeten zijn. 
 
Het doel van mijn onderzoek is uit te vinden hoe de perspectieven 
van mensen met dwarslaesies en ook van leiders in de 
gehandicaptenbeweging zouden kunnen bijdragen aan een verder 
begrip over euthanasie. 
 
Dit lijkt mij een belangrijk vraagstuk want het schijnt dat de 
opinies van mensen met handicaps weinig of niet aan bod komen in 
het publieke euthanasie-debat, terwijl ik hoop dat mensen met 
handicaps nieuwe perspectieven hierover kunnen bijdragen tot nut 
van mensen met en zonder een handicap. Door middel van 
interviews hoop ik de gevoelens, opinies, verhalen en gedachten 
hierover direct van mensen met handicaps te vernemen. Zulk een 
onderzoek is, zover ik weet, nog nooit uitgevoerd.  
 
Ik zoek naar mensen die op zijn minst vijf jaar een dwarslaesie 
hebben, veroorzaakt door een ongeluk, operatie e.d., en dus niet 
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door een ziekte van de een of andere aard. Ik zoek tot een aantal 
van zo’n 15 mensen in deze categorie. 
 
U kunt ook vragen stellen aan mijn mentor, Dr. Alan Tapper op  
61 8 94005555 of via e-mail: a.tapper@cowan.edu.au. 
 
Ik hoop van u te horen. Als u denkt anderen te weten die aan deze 
studie mee zouden willen werken in een interview (mensen met een 
cervicale dwarslaesie in Noord – en Zuid-Holland of/en leiders in 
de Nederlandse gehandicaptenbeweging) zou ik dat graag van u 
vernemen.  
 
Met dank en vriendelijke groeten,  
 
 
 
Erik Leipoldt 
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 APPENDIX E 
 
Interview guide 
 
These are not literal questions, only a framework for the researcher’s 
reference. Some may be used, some not, depending on informant responses. 
There are adaptations for leaders’ interviews. 
 
Introduction, purpose of interview and study and consent giving. 
 
Describing the individual experience of disability and impact on their lives. 
 
• To start of with, you may like to tell me anything that would get me to 
understand a bit of what kind of person you are – e.g. what is most important to 
you, your interests, anything… 
 
• How long have you had the disability, what caused it? 
 
• What did you do before it and what do you do now? 
• (education, employment, recreation) 
 
• What supports do you have and how do they work for you?  
 
• (health care-doctors, community support service, financial costs, community 
access, significant relationships) 
 
• How would you describe in your own words what life with a disability is like 
for you?  
 
• Can you tell me how your disability may have made a difference to your life? 
 
• What may be some of the best and some of the worst things about it for you – 
examples? 
 
• How independent or dependent do you feel you are? 
 
• How may this situation play a role in your life? 
 
• If you would be able to change three things you see as reasonable to ask for or 
achieve what would they be? 
 
 
Describing their understanding of and opinions on euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. 
 
• In your own words, how would you describe what euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide is? 
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• What are your thoughts about these issues? 
 
• What about people with disabilities, including mental illness, intellectual, 
physical? 
 
• Have you ever experienced issues around death and dying for others or 
yourself? 
 
• Do you think euthanasia should be legal or not? 
 
• Do you think it happens now? 
 
• How safe can euthanasia practices be? For whom? 
 
• How might rights and choices of people come into this, if at all? 
 
• What roles do compassion and suffering play in this, if at all? 
 
• Can you say whether you think terminal illness is an important consideration or 
not in addressing suffering? 
 
• How do you see the roles of doctors in this, if any? 
 
• Do you see any alternative or complementary approaches to euthanasia? 
 
• What do you know about palliative care?  
 
• What possible approaches to these questions do you think our society will 
adopt within the next 5 to 15 years? 
 
• How would you describe the main characteristics of those societies? 
 
• What influence, if any, does your own disability have on your views?  
 
• Do you wish to comment on anything else? 
 
• Demographic questions, that is age, level of quadriplegia/ type of disability, 
organisational affiliation, gender, disability, income, religion, town/suburb of 
residence. 
 
• Why did you choose to contribute to this study? 
 
• Are you able to suggest any other potential interviewees?  
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